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KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY & LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
I. LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF BUDGET AND TAX MODERNIZATION
III. LEGISLATION IMPACTING BANKING INDUSTRY
a. SB27 - Repossession of Collateralized Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. A-3
b. SB100 - Filing Period for Labor Liens A-5
c. HB248 - Bankruptcy Exemptions A-6
d. HB 294 - Regulation of Debt Adjusters A-7
IV. DISCUSSION
SECTION A
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SB27
AN ACT relating to repossession of collateral by secured parties.
Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 329A.070 is amended to read as follows:
The provisions ofKRS 329A.OlO to 329A.090 do not apply to:
(1) An officer or employee ofthe United States, this state, another state, or any political
subdivision thereof, performing his or her official duties within the course and
scope ofhis or her employment;
(2) A public accountant, certified public accountant, or the bona fide employee of
either, performing duties within the scope of public accountancy;
(3) A person engaged exclusively in the business of obtaining and furnishing
information regarding the financial rating or standing and credit of persons;
(4) An attorney-at-law, or an attorney's bona fide employee, performing duties within
the scope of the practice of law or authorized agent with duties limited to document
and record retrieval or witness interviews;
(5) An insurance company, licensed insurance agent, or staff or independent adjuster if
authorized to do business in Kentucky, performing investigative duties limited to
matters strictly pertaining to an insurance transaction;
(6) A person engaged in compiling genealogical information, or otherwise tracing
lineage or ancestry, by primarily utilizing public records and historical information
or databases;
(7) A private business employee conducting investigations relating to the company
entity by which he or she is employed;
(8) An individual obtaining information or conducting investigations on his or her own
behalf;
(9) An employee of a private investigator or a private investigating firm who works
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under the direction of the private investigator or the private investigating firm for
less than two hundred forty (240) hours per year. The board shall promulgate
administrative regulations to establish a method of verification of the number of
hours worked; or
(10) A professional engineer, a professional land surveyor, or a professional engineer's
or professional land surveyor's bona fide employee, performing duties within the
scope of practice of engineering or land surveying; or
(11) A secured creditor, or person acting on behalfofa secured creditor, engaged in
the repossession ofthe creditor's collateral pursuant to KRS 355.9-609.
A- 4
SBIOO
AN ACT relating to liens.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 2. KRS 376.230 is amended to read as follows:
(1) The lien provided for in KRS 376.210 shall be dissolved unless the person who
furnishes the labor, materials1 or supplies shall, within sixty (60)[thirt)1 (30)] days
after the last day of the month in which any labor, materials1 or supplies were
furnished, file in the county clerk's office of each county in which labor, materials1
or supplies were furnished, except as hereinafter provided, a statement in writing
verified by affidavit of the claimant or his or her authorized agent or attorney,
setting forth the amount due for which the lien is claimed, the date on which labor,
materials1 or supplies were last furnished and the name of the canal, railroad,
bridge, public highwaYl or other public improvement upon which it is claimed.
(2) In all cases where a lien is claimed for labor, materials1 or supplies furnished for the
improvement of any bridge, public highwaYl or other public property owned by the
state or by any county. charter county. urban-county. consolidated local
government. or city, the statement of lien shall be filed only in the county clerk's
office of the county in which the seat of government of the owner of the property is
located.
(3) The county clerk, upon the filing of the statement, shall make an abstract and entry
thereof as now provided by law in case of mechanics' liens in the same book used
for that purpose, and shall make proper index thereof. The clerk shall be paid by the
party filing the claim, and for attesting any copy of the lien statement. If he or she
is -required to make the copy, he or she may make an additional charge as provided
by law. The clerk's fees shall be determined pursuant to KRS 64.012. All of these
charges may be recovered by the lien claimant as costs from the party and out of the
fund against which the claim is filed.
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HB248
AN ACT relating to debtor-creditor relations.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 3. KRS 427.170 is amended to read as follows:
An individual debtor domiciled in this state isf-Dett authorized to exempt from property
of said debtor's estate the property specified under 11 u.s.e sec. 522(d)[subsectioB (d)
of sectioB 522 of The Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 92 8tat. 2549 (1978), Public Law 95
m}.
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HB294
AN ACT relating to the business of debt adjusting.
Be it enacted by the GeneralAssembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 4. I<RS 380.010 is amended to read as follows:
As used in this chapter, the following terms mean:
(1)[ "Debt adjaster," a person 't\'ho aets or offers to aet for a eonsideration as an
intermediary betv/een a debtor and his ereditors for the parpose of settling,
eompol:lflding, or in any'Nise altering the terms of payment of any debts of the
debtor; and to that end, reeei¥es money or other property from the debtor, or on
behalf of the debtor, for payment to, or distribation among, the ereditors of the
debtor.
(2) "Debtor," an individaal or indi¥idaals jointly and se¥erally, or jointly or seYlerally
indebted. ]
"Person" includes. but is not limited to. individuals. partnerships. associations.
corporations. limited liability companies. trusts. and other legal entities;
(2) "Debt adjusting" means doing business in debt adjusting. budget counseling.
debt management. or debt pooling service. or holding oneself out. by words of
similar import. as providing services to debtors in the management oftheir debts.
to do any ofthe following:
(a) Effect the adjustment. compromise. or discharge ofany account.
note or other indebtedness ofthe debtor;
(b) Receive from the debtor and disburse to the debtor's creditors any
money or other thing ofvalue; or
(c) Solicit business and advertise as a debt adjuster; and
(3) "Reside" means to live in a particular place on a temporary or permanent basis.
A-7
SECTION 5. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 380 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Subject to subsection (3) of this section. a person. whether or not located in this
state. engaged in debt adjusting shall do both ofthe following:
(a) Unless specifically instructed otherwise by a debtor. disburse to the
appropriate creditors all funds received from the debtor. less any
contributions or fees not prohibited by subsection (2) ofthis section. within
thirty (30) days ofreceipt ofthe funds from the debtor; and
(b) Maintain a separate trust account for the receipt ofany funds from
debtors and the disbursement ofthe funds to creditors on behalfofthe
debtors.
(2) If contributions or fees for engaging in debt adjusting are accepted. directly or
indirectly, a person engaged in debt adjusting shall not do any ofthe following:
(a) Accept a contribution or fee exceeding seventy-five dollars ($75)
from a debtor residing in this state for an initial set up;
(b) Accept a consultation contribution or fee exceeding fiftv dollars
($50) per calendar year from a debtor residing in this state; or
(d Accept a periodic contribution or fee from a debtor who resides in
this state that exceeds the greater ofeight and one-halfpercent (8.5%) of
the amount paid by the debtor each month for distribution to the debtor's
creditors or thirtv dollars ($30).
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) ofthis section shall not prohibit a person engaged in debt
adjusting for a debtor who resides in this state from charging the debtor a bad
check charge of twenty dollars ($20) or the amount passed on from the debt
adjuster's bank. whichever is greater. in addition to contributions or fees not
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prohibited by subsection (2) ofthis section.
(4) Fees or contributions permitted in subsections 0). (2). and (3) ofthis section may
be adjusted on an annual basis by the amount equivalent to any increase in the
consumer price index. published by the United States Department of Labor.
Bureau ofLabor Statistics.
(5) Any person that engages in debt adjusting shall file an initial registration form.
accompanied by an initial registration fee oftwo hundred fifty dollars ($250). and
the registration shall be renewed each year thereafter for a fee of two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) to cover the actual cost of filing the registration. in
accordance with administrative regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
(6) Any person that engages in debt adjusting shall arrange for and undergo an
annual audit of the person's business. including any trust funds deposited and
distributed to creditors on behalf of debtors. which shall be conducted by an
independent. third-party certified public accountant. Both of the following shall
apply to an audit performed under this subsection:
fa) The person shall file the results ofthe audit and the auditor's
opinion with the Consumer Protection Division ofthe Office ofthe
Attorney General within thirty (30) days ofthe anniversary date of filing
the initial registration; and
fb) The Attorney General shall make available a summary ofthe
results ofthe audit and the auditor's opinion upon written request ofanV
person and payment ofa fee not to exceed the cost ofcopving the summary
and opinion.
(7) A person engaged in debt adjusting shall obtain and at all times maintain
insurance coverage for errors and omissions. employee dishonestv. depositor's
forgery. and computer fraud in the amount often percent 00%) of the monthly
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average for the immediately preceding six (6) months ofthe aggregate amount of
all deposits made with the person by all debtors. The insurance coverage shall
comply with all ofthe following:
(a) The minimum limit ofthe insurance coverage shall not be less
than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), and the maximum limit of
the insurance coverage shall not be more than two hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($250,000),·
(b) The insurance coverage shall not include a deductible in excess of
ten percent (10%) ofthe face amount ofthe policy coverage;
(c) The insurance coverage shall be issued by an insurer and rated at
least A-, or it's equivalent, by a nationally recognized rating organization;
and
(d) The insurance coverage shall provide that the Consumer
Protection Division ofthe Office ofthe Attorney General shall be named as
an additional interested partv.
(8) Any person engaged in debt adjusting shall comply with the provisions of this
section.
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 380 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
The Attorney General shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with
KRS Chapter 13A to ensure the proper administration and enforcement ofthis chapter.
Section 7. KRS 380.030 is amended to read as follows:
The following persons shall not be considered debt adjusters for the purposes of this
chapter:
(1) Any attorney-at-law of this state;
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(2) Any person who is a regular, full-time employee of a debtor, and who acts as an
adjuster of his employer's debts;
(3) Any person acting pursuant to any order or judgment of court, or pursuant to
authority conferred by any law of this state or of the United States;
(4) Any person who is a creditor of the debtor, or an agent of one (1) or more creditors
of the debtor, and whose services in adjusting the debtor's debts are rendered
without cost to the debtor;
(5) Any person who, at the request of a debtor, arranges for or makes a loan to the
debtor, and who, at the authorization of the debtor, acts as an adjuster of the
debtor's debts in the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan, without
compensation for the services rendered in adjusting the debts; and
(6) Any charitable, religious or educational organization, determined to be exempt from
taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that is not in the
business ofdebt adjusting, as defined in Section 1 ofthis Act.
Section 8. KRS 380.990 is amended to read as follows:
Any person who violates the provisions ofSection 2 ofthis Act[ acts or offers to act as a
debt adjuster] in the state is guilty of a misdemeanor and:. upon conviction1 shall be
punished by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500)[$500] or imprisonment not to exceed
sixty (60) days, or both such fine and imprisonment.
Section 9. The following KRS section is repealed:
380.020 Injunction against debt adjuster -- Appointment of receiver.
A-II
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This outline is designed to provide general information on the subject matters covered. It is not intended to
provide either a complete survey of all possible developments or a comprehensive explanation or analysis of
those developments mentioned. Readers should consult the original source materials referenced. Further-
more, this outline is not intended nor should it be used as a substitute for specific legal advice or opinion.
Finally, this outline is published with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal
service.
Note: The author is currently, or in the future may be, engaged in representing clients in lawsuits and other
proceedings which directly involve some or all of the materials set forth in this outline. No statements
contained herein or any statements made by the author during his presentation should be construed as the
position of those clients for purposes of those proceedings. Nor should such statements be construed as
precluding the author from advocating any position on behalf of those or other clients.
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Case Law Update
I. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT.
A.
(4/21/04).
Household Credit Services. Inc. v. Pfennig, No. 02-857, U.S. Supreme Court
1. Credit card "overlimit fee" is not a part of the "finance charge".
2. Rejects Sixth Circuit's view that overlimit fee falls within TILA's statutory
language (15 U.S.C. §1605(a» defining finance charge as "all charges, payable directly or indirectly
by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to the extension of credit".
3. Deferring to Federal Reserve Board's express exclusion in Regulation Z (12
C.F.R. §226.4(c)(2» of overlimit fees from the definition of "finance charge". The case is an
important decision on the extent to which courts should defer to the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Z as to the proper application of the statutory provisions of the federal Truth In Lending
Act.
B. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Inc. v. Nigh, No. 03-377, U.S. Supreme Court (11/30/04).
1. Clarifying how a series of enactments in 1968, 1974, 1976 and 1995, affected
the caps under TILA (15 U.S.C. §1640(a» for statutory damages.
2. Supreme Court rejects 4th Circuit's view that 1995 amendments replaced a
$1,000 cap on statutory damages in individual lawsuits with a 2x the finance charge statutory
damage when the violation involved situations other than consumer leases or loans secured by real
property.
3. The $1,000 cap on statutory damages in individual lawsuit applies in all cases
except consumer leases or credit transactions not under an open end credit plan that is secured by
real property or a dwelling.
a. Cap in consumer lease is 25% of total amount of monthly lease
payments.
b. Cap in real estate secured transaction (other than open end credit
plan) is $2,000.
c. Right of Rescission And Unreasonable Fees.
1. Consumer attorneys invariably argue that various real estate fees should be
included in calculating the finance charge for a residential mortgage" loan under the federal Truth in
Lending Act because the fees are not "bona fide and reasonable." These TILA cases then argue
that the loan is rescindable for failure to disclose adequately the finance charge and annual
percentage rate in the Truth in Lending disclosure statement. Typically, these challenges attack
such charges as the appraisal fee, the title insurance fee and other charges that are otherwise
excludable from the finance charge under Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7), as real-estate
related fees.
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2. Recent decisions from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, however, have taken much of the plaintiffs' punch out of these types of claims. These cases
hold that, even if a particular fee is not "bona fide and reasonable," only the excess amount of the
charge must be included in the finance charge.
3. In Marquez v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 2004 WL 742205 (N.D. III. Apr. 5,
2004), the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to rescind a $68,000 loan because the title insurance
premium of $665 was not bona fide and reasonable and, therefore, should have been included in
the TILA finance charge. Plaintiff claimed that the going rate for title insurance should have been
$349.95. Faced with the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, the court ruled that only the
difference between the $665 actually charged and the "reasonable" rate of $349.95 should be
included in the finance charge, under plaintiff's theory of the case, and that because that amount of
$315.05 was within the permissible tolerance for error of one-half percent of the total loan amount
(0.5 percent of $68,000) of $340, plaintiff had failed to state a claim to rescind the loan.
4. In Scott v. IndyMac Bank, 2004 WL 422654 (N.D. III. Feb. 3, 2004),
defendants filed a motion to dismiss a class action complaint in which the plaintiff contended that the
lender and title company should have charged the lower "reissue rate" for title insurance on
refinancings. Plaintiffs also argued that the full amount of the higher "basic rate" title insurance
therefore should have been included in the TILA finance charge. In dismissing the TILA claim, the
Scott court observed that TILA's allowance for a half-percent error in calculating the finance charge
underscored the Act's intention that only the unreasonable portion of a particular fee should be
included in the finance charge calculation. "[I]nclusion of the actual amount would render tolerance
meaningless," the court stated.
5. There are only a handful of reported decisions on the issue of whether all, or
only a portion, of an unreasonable fee must be included in a finance charge under TILA. Marquez
and Scott are, perhaps, the first steps toward settling this issue in lenders' favor.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE KENTUCKY OFFICE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.
A. Consolidated Mortgage. Inc. v. Dept. Of Financial Institutions, No. 2003-CA-2122
(Ky.App. 12/10/04) (not to be published).
1. In 2003, the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions ("DFI") learned that
Consolidated Mortgage, Inc. ('CMI") had employed a closing agent who turned closing funds over to
CMI, but that these funds were never paid to the appropriate creditors. Accordingly, the OFI filed a
civil complaint pursuant to KRS 294.190(2)(b) in Franklin Circuit Court seeking injunctive relief to
enjoin CMI and its principals from further engaging in the mortgage broker business. Ten days later,
the DFI commenced a separate administrative action to revoke the brokers licenses held by CMI.
CMI was properly served with notice of the administrative hearing, but filed no response. The DFI
Commissioner subsequently entered a default order against CMI. Franklin Circuit Court upheld the
default order.
2. On appeal, GMI argued that when the DFI filed for injunctive relief in Franklin
Circuit Court, that civil action divested the DFI of jurisdiction to revoke CMI's broker licenses. The
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that KRS 294.090 granted the OFI Commissioner
exclusive authority to revoke brokers licenses and that KRS 294.190(2)(b) granted the
Commissioner authority to seek injunctive relief in Franklin Circuit Court.
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B. Consolidated Mortgage. Inc. v. Dept. Of Financial Institutions, No. 2004-CA-1094
(Ky.App. 3/4/05) (not to be published).
1. In the course of its examination of CMI, the DFI subpoenaed bank records
from Central Bank. A comparison of check copies provided by the bank compared to those
furnished by CMI indicated that they had re-dated the checks in an effort to conceal that the funds
had been used not to payoff liens as intended by the lender. Rather, the DFI concluded CMI's
officers had used the funds for either operational or personal expenses. The Commissioner revoked
CMI's mortgage broker license and imposed a $1"5,000 fine.
2. On appeal, CMI argued that the DFI's exercise of investigative subpoena
power over Central Bank's records relating to its accounts, without providing notice to CMI denied its
due process rights. The Court of Appeals, citing U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), held the
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the government. Moveover, CMI "clearly had no legitimate privacy interest in Central
Bank's bank records." Since CMI had no legitimate privacy interest in the bank records, the Court
ofAppeals reasoned that CMI had not been deprived of due process when it was not noticed on the
investigative subpoena.
III. PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS - McCreary National Bank V. Kentucky Highlands
Investment Corp.,
A. Participation Agreement stated:
"Administration.
a. Seller shall manage and administer the Loan on behalf of Seller and
Participant. Participant specifically agrees that Seller shall be entitled, in
good faith, to manage and administer the Loan and deal with Borrower as if
Seller had made the Loan without Participant's participation and in such
manner as Seller would normally act if dealing with Borrower in connection
with such Loan for its own account. Seller shall endeavor in good faith to
keep the Participant informed about the status of the Loan and the financial
condition of the Borrower and to see that Participant has the opportunity to
participate in any significant decisions which must be made respecting the
Loan. The parties shall work together in good faith to see that the interests of
both parties in the
Loan and the collateral for the Loan are protected to the greatest extent
possible.
b. Notwithstanding the foregoing, without the prior written consent of
Participant, Seller shall not (i) extend the due date of the Loan, (ii) decrease
the interest rate specified in the Loan Documents, or (iii) release all or any
part of the property given as security for the Loan, except as may be
provided in the Loan Documents.
c. Participant hereby waives any claim or cause of action that it may have
against Seller as a result of the management, administration and
enforcement of the Loan except as the result of bad faith or gross negligence
on the part of the Seller."
B. Lead bank allowed borrower to make interest only payments for six months and
substituted one personal guaranty for those of two guarantors claiming financial insolvency.
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Participating bank sought to rescind the participation or recover damages from lead bank.
C. Court of Appeals found that granting temporary moratorium on principal payments
was a permitted normal decision under clause (a). However, release of guarantors was in violation
of restrictions of clause (b)(iii). The protections granted to the lead bank in clause (c) were not
sufficient to override the specific limitations of clause (b).
IV. SET OFF - Edwards v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A. No. 2003-CA-1869 (Ky.App. 2/19/04)
(not to be published).
A. Bank properly set off funds in borrower's checking account to pay her delinquent car
loan.
B. Bank, however, acted improperly after it had depleted the checking account. To
cover checks that borrower had written on the account that was overdrawn, Bank cash advances
upon borrower's VISA/Money card and placed the funds in the checking account. Bank could not
produce any account agreement authorizing such steps, and court rejected bank's argument that it
had historically acted in this manner as a courtesy to its customers.
C. Borrower was not entitled, however, to punitive damages against the Bank for its
mishandling of the credit card.
V. LENDER LIABILITY - Pressman v. Franklin National Bank, No. 03-5592 (6th Cir. 9/9/04).
A. Dispute over bank's failure to fund the acquisition costs of land for a subdivision
development.
B. Bank's commitment letter expressly conditioned closing on locating a participating
bank on terms satisfactory to both lead and participating bank. Accordingly, bank did not act
improperly when it could not locate participating bank. Bank satisfied its implied obligations to try to
find a participating bank when it contacted two banks given short time until closing.
C. Offers from the founder of the bank and president of bank's holding company to
providing funding assistance with his own money called into question bank's conduct and good faith.
However, Court ruled there was insufficient evidence of misconduct.
VI. MORTGAGE BROKER AGREEMENT - Tri-County Mortgage Co. v. Union Planters Bank,
N.A., No. 2003-CA-787 (Ky.App. 11/24/04) (not to be published).
A. Mortgage broker could not recover claimed mortgage broker fee where there was not
any written mortgage broker contract.
B. Kentucky statute of frauds, KRS 371.010(6), requires a written agreement in order to
recover a fee unless there is some type of conduct which takes the case out of the statute of frauds.
VII. FORECLOSURES.
A. Bullock v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 2003-CA-2439 (Ky.App. 12/23/04) (not to be
published).
1. Commissioner's sale was properly set aside where house which was
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appraised for $24,000 sold for only $1,000.
2. Setting aside sale was not abuse of discretion where the high bid of less than
5% of appraised value was &&so grossly inadequate as to 'shock the conscience' or raise the
presumption of fraud."
B. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Hurstbourne Healthcare. LLC, No. 2002-CA-
1757 (Ky.App. 12/3/04) (not to be published).
1. Trial court erred in failing to set aside a default judgment on a crossclaim in a
foreclosure action where the cross-plaintiff failed to properly serve process of its crossclaim.
2. KRS 426.006 requires that a crossclaim in a foreclosure action be serve in
the manner of an initiating pleading under Civil Rule 4.
3. Since faulty service of process can make a judgment void,. Hertz You
Drive It Yourself System. Inc. v. Castle, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 177,177-178 (1958), then as a matter
of law the default judgment was a nullity. Consequently, as a "void judgment [it] is not entitled to
any deference or respect and a court has no discretion about whether or not to set it aside. As a
matter of law it must hold that the judgment is a nullity."
VIII. LIENS.
A.
12/17/04).
Gil Ruehl Mechanical. Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 2003-CA-1250 (Ky.Ap..
1. The twelve-month limitation period set out in KRS 376.090 extinguishes not
only the right to enforce the mechanics lien but extinguishes the lien itself. KRS 376.090 represents
a substantive restriction upon an essential element of a valid mechanics lien.
B. Flag Drilling Co. v. Erco. Inc., 2003-CA-2244 &2521 (Ky.App. 1/28/05)
1. Purchasers of unpaid property tax bills are entitled to recover attorney's fees
pursuant to KRS 134.420(1). That statute provides that a lien imposed by the state, county, city or
taxing district shall include "reasonable attorney fees." KRS 134.490(2) permits the private
purchasers to legally enforce liens imposed under KRS 134.420(1). Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals held purchasers "necessarily" have right to collect attorney's fees.
c. Wolterv. U.S Bancorp., No. 2003-CA-2788 (Ky.App. 12/23/04) (not to be published).
1. Bank miscalculated payment amount in loan modification agreement so
borrower's payments did not fully amortize modified loan. Bank demanded additional payments at
end of loan term and initially refused to release mortgage.
2. Bank acted wrongfully in demanding payments. Bank's failure to immediately
release mortgage at end of loan term did not give rise to statutory liability under KRS 382.365 since
Bank's had "good cause" not to immediately release when there was a bona fide dispute over
whether the borrowers had to make up the shortfall in payments.
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IX. CHECK PAYMENT PROBLEMS.
A. Republic Capital Corp. v. Lincoln General Corp., No. 2003-CA-1444 (Ky.App.
12/17/04) (not to be published).
1. Court of Appeals refused to treat as an accord and satisfaction a check that
had "Insurance - Paid In Full" written on it when the amount due was not disputed.
2. "No question is more thoroughly settled than that, where one owes a fixed
and definite sum, the payment or tender of a sum less than the amount of the debt, even though
accompanied with a statement that it is in full, though accepted by the creditor, does not operate to
defeat him from collecting the balance of his debt, for the reason that there is no consideration for
the surrender of the unpaid portion."
3. No citation to KRS 355.3-311.
B. Jones v. PBK Bank, No. 2003-CA-1512 (Ky.App. 11/24/04) (not to be published).
1. Borrowers attempting to refinance their debts have three loans at bank - one
secured by a first mortgage; one secured by a second mortgage, and one secured by a truck. There
is confusion over which loans are supposed to be paid off when the borrowers refinance their
mortgage loans. The bank applies one of the loan payment checks to the truck loan leaving a
mortgage loan remaining.
2. Genuine issues of fact exist as to who is at fault for the misapplication and
whether the bank knew or had reason to know where the payments were to be applied.
X. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS.
A. Stone v. Citifinancial Services. Inc., No. 2004-CA-453 (Ky.App. 2/25/05) (not to
be published).
1. Court of Appeals affirms Circuit Court's order enforcing settlement in real
property purchase dispute.
2. Stone offer $101K for property, which was rejected. Stone then offered
$131 K, subject to financing, which was accepted. Termites were discovered, and Stone claims to
have asked for reduction in the purchase price. At closing, the documents all reflected a $101K
purchase price, and Citifinancial's representative closed assuming this was the negotiated price. As
soon as other Citifinancial personnel discovered the lower price, Citifiancial attempted to undo the
sale. When Stone sued, the Circuit Court ruled no valid contract existed and order the transaction
rescinded. The parties then entered into settlement negotiations. Stone's's attorney faxed a
statement saying he had authority to transfer $30K to Citifinancial and release the remaining $101 K
in exchange for the property. Citifinancial claimed it accepted. Later, Stone's's attorney claimed
there was not settlement and demanded $60,000 for improvements made to the property in the
interim. Citifinancial cited the faxed agreement and appellant reneged.
3. Trial Court found there had been a settlement evidenced by the fax and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
B. Ford v. Beasley, No. 2003-CA-432 & 508 (Ky.App. 10/15/04).
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1. Doctors in arbitration over division of practice. Day before arbitration furious
settlement negotiations. Lawyers reach a settlement agreement, but one doctor refuses to sign final
settlement agreement saying he did not agree to the terms.
2. Trial court enforces settlement and Court of Appeals affirms. Trial court's
factual finding that attorney had express authority to settle was supported by evidence. Even if
attorney did not have authority, doctor's remedy was suit against his attorney when other side had
acted in good faith and would be prejudiced by failing to honor settlement.
XI. ARBITRATION.
A. Louisville Peterbilt. Inc. v. Cox, Ky., 132 S.W.2d 850 (2004). Kentucky Supreme
Court overruled the Court of Appeals' decision in Marks v. Bean, Ky. App., 57 S.W.3d 303 (2001),
that a general fraudulent inducement claim is sufficient to avoid an arbitration clause which includes
fraud within the scope of arbitration. Rather, Kentucky will follow the federal and majority state rule
that requires an allegation of fraud going to the making of the arbitration clause itself rather than the
underlying contract in general.
B. Arbitration In The Secondary Mortgage Market.
1. Effective October 31, 2004, Fannie Mae will no longer invest or accept
delivery of residential mortgage loan products that contain mandatory arbitration clauses. In Fannie
Mae Announcement 04-06, Fannie Mae issued, among other things, new instructions to lenders
outlining the policies for purchasing and accepting residential mortgage loans. Specifically, the
instructions included a prohibition against purchasing or accepting delivery of residential mortgage
loans containing mandatory arbitration clauses.
2. A limited exception exists, permitting the use of mandatory arbitration
provisions in mortgages that contain a waiver provision. The waiver provision shall provide that
if the loan is sold or an interest in the mortgage loan is transferred to Fannie Mae, the mandatory
arbitration clause becomes null and void.
c. JAMS Backs Down on Class-Action Arbitration, American Banker (03/11/05).
1. A major arbitration company, JAMS, will honor class-action waivers in
mandatory arbitration clauses in states where the courts have accepted their validity, which is a
reversal of its policy. In order to keep court costs down, subprime mortgage and credit card
lenders often add the language--which prevents borrowers from forming class actions in
arbitration--to the mandatory arbitration clause that customers must sign for certain loans.
Lenders had feared that borrowers would avoid the other major arbitration companies and take
their cases to JAMS because of its previous decision to refuse to accept class-action waivers.
2. State courts and federal courts are divided over the issue, and JAMS plans
to let the individual arbitrator determine whether to hear a case as a class action or not.
XII. CHECK FRAUD - Bradley v. National City Bank of Kentucky, No. 2003-CA-2711 (Ky.App.
12/30104) (not to be published).
A. Decedent's daughter, as successor executrix, deposited tax refund checks totaling
$58,716 into her personal account at bank in October 1998. She was removed and replaced by the
Public Administrator in August 2001. In January 2003, he brought an action against the bank,
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seeking a return of the $58,176. The bank defended on the three-year statute of limitations under
KRS 355.3-118(7)(a) and won summary judgment.
B. The Court ofAppeals upheld the trial court, declining to adopt a discovery rule absent
fraudulent concealment. (KRS 386.120, regarding a bank's duty for fiduciary accounts, was not
before the court.).
1. KRS 355.3-420 provides that an instrument is converted when "a bank makes
or obtains payment with respect to the instrument for a person not entitled to enforce the instrument
or receive payment." The statute of limitations provision at KRS 355.3-118(7)(a) states that "[f]or
conversion of an instrument, for money had and received," an action "must be commenced within
three (3) years after the claim for relief accrues." Plaintiff argued that if the three-year limitation was
applied, it should be subject to the discovery rule.
C. As an aside, a practical issue was the public administrator's argument that he could
not have discovered the cause of action until he was appointed. Nevertheless, the Court ruled the
clock had started ticking. The practical less is to think twice before becoming a successor fiduciary
or waiving the obligation of an accounting from one fiduciary to a successor. And, think twice before
automatically waiving surety on the bond because the prior fiduciary may not be able to make the
beneficiaries whole.
XIII. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.
A. Biber v. Duplicator Sales & Service, Inc., No. 2003-CA-1994 (Ky.App. 12/3/04).
1. Allegedly def~matory intra-corporate communications are not protected by
absolute privilege or the theory that there is no "publication" of the statements.
2. However, there is a qualified privilege in order that the employees of a
corporation may freely discuss internal matters without fear of a civil lawsuit for libel or slander.
3. Moreover, in this case, allegedly defamatory statements were not
actionable because they were expressions of opinion based on truthful facts about plaintiffs
misconduct.
B. Jenkins v. Atlas Siding And Window Co., No. 2003-CA-2416 (Ky.App. 12/3/04)
(not to be published).
1. Employee of building contract assaulted homeowner where working.
2. Employer was not liable because it was not foreseeable to employees that
the employee would return to customer's house to burglarize it and assault customer. Moreover,
even assuming employer knew of all of employee's past violent acts, those acts were too remote
in time and completely unrelated to his employment to be foreseeable. The employee's prior
crimes were of a different type from those committed against the customer.
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS.
A. American Trim, LLC v. Oracle Corp., No. 02-4186 (6th Cir. 9/1/04) (affirming $3MM
compensatory and $1 OMM punitive damage jury verdict against software developer that lied about
software package development status and capabilities).
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B. Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., No. 2001-SC-0262 (Ky. 10/21/04).
1. The Wal-Mart Candy Case.
2. The Supreme Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates and
remands in part, the Court of Appeals' (CA) holding in this relatively well-known case involving Wal-
Mart workers in Monticello, Kentucky, who were fired for eating candy belonging to the store. The
case became famous after a jury awarded each of the four plaintiffs $1 million for injury to
reputation, $1 million for embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish and $3 million in punitive
damages. Plaintiffs alleged a "conspiracy" by their supervisor to prevent his own demotion by
fabricating a pretense for terminating them in order to reduce payroll expenses and demonstrate a
"get tough on inventory shrinkage" stance.
3. Supreme Court (a) ordered dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy claims and (b) remanded for damages proceedings on defamation
claim.
4. Moral of Story - treat employees fairly, don't make mountains out of molehills,
and have a good reputation in the community.
xv. MAJOR TRENDS AND ISSUES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.·
A. American Bankers Association's "Status Of Important Banking Cases" (12/1/04)
XVI. THEFT OF CUSTOMER INFORMATION.
A. "Credit Card Leaks Continue At Furious Pace", MSNBC (11/24/04)
B. "FTC Testifies On Security Of Consumers' Financial Data", www.ftc.gov (4/13/05)
C. How much of your security budget are you spending on protecting your data?
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NEW THIS MONTH:
• U.S. Supreme Court Victory in Koons v. Nigh (~ 5)
• Amici briefs filed in Sola v. Washington Mutual case (~ 6)
• Miller v. Bank ofAmerica hearing on tentative decision delayed (~12)
• Diversity Jurisdiction at issue in Wachovia v. Schmidt (~ 34)
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New cases and cases in which there have been significant developments since the last monthly
report are marked *.
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ANTITRUST
1. Visa, U.S.A. v. United States (S. Ct. No. 03-1521); MasterCard International v.
United States (S. Ct. No. 03-1532). On October 7, 1998, Justice Department filed antitrust suit
against Visa and MasterCard challenging the "rules" of both networks prohibiting their respective
member banks from offering credit cards that compete with those two. The rules allegedly have the
effect of eliminating real competition between Visa and MasterCard and hampering competition or
potential competition from other networks. On October 9, 2001, court held that "duality" rules, by
which thousands ofbanks can and do issue both Visa and Master Card, are not anticompetitive, but
the prohibition against Visa and/or Master Card member banks also issuing American Express
and/or Discover cards is an antitrust violation (163 F. Supp. 2d 322). In a final order issued in late
November, 2001, the court made some modest changes without affecting the bottom line. The
district court issued a stay of its order pending appeal. On September 17, 2003, the Second Circuit
affinned largely for the reasons set forth in the District Court opinion, which the appeals court held
to be not unreasonable and supported by the evidence (344 F. 3d 229). A petition for rehearing en
bane was denied on January 9, 2004. The stay of the final district court order remains in effect.
Petitions for Writ of Certiorari were filed in the Supreme Court on May 10, 2004. U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2004.
2. Brennan v. Concord EFS, Inc. (N.D. Cal. No. 3:04 CV 02676 VRW). Filed July 2
in U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, this case challenges on antitrust
grounds the assessment of interchange fees and surcharges for customers using a number of ATM
networks including the Star network acquired by defendant Concord in 2001. In addition to the
network, several large financial institutions and VISA and MasterCard are named in the complaint.
The plaintiffs are class action representatives alleging that the totality of the fees ATM customers
pay far exceed the costs associated with the transactions and that the interchange and surcharges are
assessed because there are limited or no market alternatives and customers have no choice but to
pay the fees. An almost identical action, Sanchez v. Concord EFS, Inc., (SD NY No. 04 CV
06660), was :filed on August 16th in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District ofNew York.
ARBITRATION
3. Mandel v. Household Bank (Nevada) (Cal. App. 4th, No. 0029531) (also listed as
Shea v. Household Bank). On January 7, 2003, in a case in which ABA appeared as amicus curiae,
court upheld the enforceability of an arbitration clause added by statement stufIer·to a credit card
agreement against a variety of challenges. The one provision of the contract the· court did not
approve was a prohibition of class action arbitrations. That, according to the court, was
unconscionable. One week later, in Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
(Boehr, Real Party in Interest) (Cal. App. 2d, No. BI61305), a different appellate division of the
state court of appeals specifically and by name disagreed with the Mandel decision and enforced the
arbitration clause as written, including its prohibition against class. action arbitrations. The
California Supreme Court has granted review in both state cases. Proceedings in Mandel are stayed
pending the outcome of Boehr; Plaintiffs opening brief in Boehr was filed May 9, 2003. On
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August 13, ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici brief in Boehr contending that the Federal
Arbitration Act requires that arbitration clauses be enforced as written, preempting any state law or
court decision to the contrary. Boehr still pending and Mandel still stayed.
4. Strand v. u.s. Bank N.A. North Dakota (S. Ct. N. Dak. No. 20040068). In class
action litigation over alleged late posting of payments to credit card accounts, U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California certified. two questions to the North Dakota Supreme Court:
(1) Whether an arbitration clause that prohibited classwide dispute resolution was unconscionable
under North Dakota law and (2) If so, whether the remainder of the arbitration clause in a credit
card agreement was enforceable. The consumers' opening brief was filed April 26, 2004. The
bank's brief and a supporting amici brief by ABA and the North Dakota Bankers Association were
filed June 25. Reply brief filed on July 23, 2004. Oral argument held September 8.
CONS~RPROTECTION
* 5. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC v. Nigh (S. Ct. No. 03-377). In February, 2000, a used
vehicle transaction went horribly awry, resulting in litigation by the buyer/borrower against the
vehicle dealer/lender for violation of the Truth in Lending Act and numerous other claims. A jury
awarded the plaintiff over $24,000 in damages under the Truth in Lending Act. On appeal, the
lender argued that there is a statutory cap on damages--twice the finance charge, but not to exceed
$1,000 (15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A». Nevertheless, on February 4, 2003, the Fourth Circuit
affinned, holding that since the 1995 amendments to the statute, that $1,000 cap applied only to
certain consumer lease arrangements. Prior circuit precedent had held the cap applicable to
transactions of the sort at issue here as well, and there is no evidence of an actual Congressional
intent that the cap would no longer apply. Notwithstanding that, Congress did what it did in 1995,
and the court gave effect to the new "plain language of the statute" (4th Cir. No. 01-2201). Petition
for writ ofcertiorari :filed September 4, 2003. On October 14, ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici
brief in support of the petition. The Court granted certiorari on January 20, 2004. On April 19,
ABA and its cosponsors filed amici brief on the merits. Oral argument before the u.S. Supreme
Court was held on October 5 and its opinion was issued on November 30, by an 8 to 1 vote with
several concurring opinions in favor of the industry's position that the $1,000 cap applied to more
than consumer lease arrangements.
* 6. Sola v. Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (9th Cir. No. 04-55885). On April 26, 2004,
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (CV 03-2566) dismissed a complaint
filed on October 20, 2003, by a consumer class alleging a variety of Truth in Lending, Home
Owners Loan Act, and Washington State law claims based on WAMU's promotional materials
dealing with its overdraft protection options. Notwithstanding the promotional statements, "Don't
worry, we'll cover you" and "Automatic Protection," the deposit account agreement and the
monthly customer account statements preserved the ability of WAMU to exercise discretion in its
payment of overdrafts. The district court granted WAMU's motion to dismiss after ruling that the
overdraft charges were not "interest" under the HOLA and not "finance charges" under TILA.
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit on May 17, and a coalition of consumer
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groups filed as amici on September 23, 2004. Defendant's brief due November 17. OTS filed an
amicus brief on November 19; ABA and California Bankers Association filed an amicus brief on
November 29.
7. McIntosh v. Irwin Union Bank & Trust Co. (1st Cir. No. 02-8022). On May 13,
2003, U.S. District Court for Massachusetts held, among other things, that borrowers seeking
rescission of a loan for alleged Truth in Lending Act violations could proceed with their case as a
class action (215 F.R.D. 26), and lender appealed. On September 23, Massachusetts Bankers
Association, ABA and two other co-sponsors filed a motion for leave to participate in the appeal as
amici curiae because of the immense practical consequences of allowing class-wide rescission. On
October 9, however, the First Circuit refused to entertain an interlocutory appeal of the class
certification order.
8. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris (9th Cir. Nos. 03-16194, 16197, 16461).
California law prohibits charging interest on residential first mortgages more than one day prior to
the recording of a mortgage deed, even though the borrowed funds may have long since been
disbursed. On January 27, 2003, national bank sued to enjoin investigation and enforcement of the
statute by the state's Department of Corporations. The complaint alleged that only the Comptroller
of the Currency may exercise visitorial powers over national banks and their separately
incorporated nonbank subsidiaries, and that the prohibition in the law was preempted by the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, from which California had
not "opted out." On May 9, 2003, court granted summary judgment to Wells Fargo, holding that
the Comptroller has exclusive "visitorial" powers over national banks and their nonbank operating.
subsidiaries, and that the per diem statute was indeed preempted by DIDMCA (252 F. Supp. 2d
1065)(See also National City Bank ofIndiana v. Boutris (B. D. Cal. No. 8-03-0655 GEB JFM [May
7, 2003] and 2003 WL 21536818 [July 2, 2003]). Department of Corporations appealed to the
Ninth Circuit (Case No. 03-16194) and final briefs were filed January 16, 2004. Motion for partial
summary judgment filed January 23, 2004; motion considered February 23, 2004. Record on
appeal transmitted to the Ninth Circuit on September 23, 2004.
Two "clones" of this case were filed in district courts elsewhere; one has been decided and
oral argument was recently held in the other:
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke (D. Conn. No. 3:03 CV 0738 [JCH]) challenged
Connecticut's requirement that a state-chartered nonbank mortgage subsidiary of a national bank to
be licensed under rules applicable to other mortgage lenders. Wachovia filed a motion for
summary judgment. ABA and other co-sponsors filed an amici brief supporting Wachovia on
September 25, 2003. On May 25, court granted the motion, deferring to the Comptroller's
interpretation of the "visitorial powers" provision of the National Bank Act as exclusive and
preemptive. The Connecticut Attorney General filed a notice ofappeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 30. ABA and others filed an amici brief in support of
Wachovia on November 8th.
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Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Watters, (W.D. Mich. Civil Action No. 5:03CV0105) was filed
against the Commissioner of the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Services during the
summer of 2003. A motion for summary judgment was filed in this case as well, and supporting
amici briefs were filed by Consumer Mortgage Coalition, ABA and others on January 30, 2004. On
August 30th, the Michigan Court granted the motion and ruled that the OCC's visitorial powers and
the recently promulgated visitorial regulations were valid, thereby preempting the attempt by the
Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial Services to exert supervisory authority over
Wachovia's mortgage subsidiary. The court stated, "Although the state of Michigan maintains an
interest in protecting its citizens, those compelling policy reasons do not undennine the
reasonableness of the OCC's regulation." Wachovia's motion for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 was denied. Appeal to the Sixth Circuit filed in early October.
9. Bankwest v. Baker. (11th Cir. No. 04-12420 CC). Georgia legislature enacted
statute, scheduled to go into effect May 1, 2004, that generally makes payday lending unlawful as it
is now practiced in the state. The law recognizes that the state cannot apply its usury laws to out~of­
state lenders exporting their home state interest rates to Georgians, but it takes pains to apply the
new law to nonbank "agents" of out of state lenders where the "agents" have the "predominant
economic interest" in an individual transaction. Four state chartered banks from South Dakota and
Delaware filed suit alleging that the state law was preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
that protects the right of state-chartered banks to export interest rates. The court granted a two-
week temporary restraining order against enforcement of the act, but on May 13, 2004, denied a
motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the banks had no likelihood of success on the
merits of their claims (N.D. Ga. No. 1:04-CV-988-MHS). The banks were granted an expedited
appeal to the 11th Circuit and filed briefs June 16, 2004. Oral argument was held on July 21.
10. Bank One v. Wilens (C.D. Cal. No. SACV 03-01258 NS (ANx)). California law
requires that certain disclosures be made in connection with a bank's offering of "convenience
checks" to customers. Wilens filed suit against the bank in state court to enforce this obligation
even though she had and alleged no personal harm arising from the charged noncompliance.
California law permits such a suit as a "private attorney general" acting on behalf of the general
public. Bank One, in turn, filed suit in federal court to enjoin any such state court litigation on the
grounds that it would constitute in essence an enforcement action, and that is a matter left by federal
law exclusively to the Comptroller of the Currency under the "visitorial powers" provision of the
National Bank Act. In October, 2003, the court issued a tentative order denying the defendant's
motion to dismiss the bank's complaint as barred by the Anti-fujunction Act and granting the bank's
motion for summary judgment. (See also, Bank One v. Wilens, 2003 WL 21703629 (C.D. Cal.,
July 8, 2003).)
11. Karis House, et al. v. Bank ofAmerica (C.D. Cal. No. CV 04 2898). A new twist in
the check cashing fee cases, Bank ofAmerica has been sued, not over the charging of a fee to cash
checks for noncustomers, but rather because it filed to disclose to employers that a fee would be
charged and that the employers using Bank of America to issue payroll checks would be in
violation of a California labor law provision that prohibits charging a worker for access to his or her
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wages. Bank ofAmerica filed to remove the case to federal court on diversity and federal question
jurisdiction. The federal judge, after scheduling and canceling a hearing on the federal jurisdiction
question, rejected Bank of America's arguments and returned the case to state court. The case is
awaiting assignment.
12. Riley v. Fleet National Bank (D. Mass. No. 03-10123 NG]). On January 23, 2003, a
class action suit was filed by Social Security recipients claiming that it was a violation of the anti-
alienation provisions of the Social Security Act for a bank, exercising its general contractual right
of setoff: to take funds from the bank accounts of the plaintiffs in satisfaction of overdue loan
payments when the source of the funds in the accounts were only monthly Social Security benefits.
Matter has been dismissed with prejudice.
* In a similar case, Miller v. Bank of America, (Cal. Super., San Francisco County. No.
301917) a state judge, specifically disregarding the controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, Lopez v.
WaMu, 302 F. 3d 900, instructed a jury that Social Security benefits could not be taken by setoff to
cover overdrafts and associated fees. On February 25, 2004, the jury found the bank in violation of
the state's unfair business practices act for doing so and awarded $75 million in damages plus
$1,000 for each of an estimated 1.1 million class members. On April 1, the plaintiff filed a motion
for an injunction against any continuation of Bank of America's practices in this respect. ABA and
several co-sponsors filed amici brief on May 7 opposing that motion and the U.S. Justice
Department :filed a "Statement of Interest" on behalf of the United State~, likewise opposing the
motion. Oral argument was held on May 19. The court issued a Tentative Statement of Decision
on October 13, 2004, finding against Bank of American on all counts and awarding restitution in
the amount of $284,385, 741 representing NSF fees paid to a class of Bank of America customers
in California who received directly deposited social security benefits (and other government
benefits) anytime after August 14, 1994. In addition, each class member would receive $1,000
under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Parties contesting the ruling would be
required to file their objections by November 4 and the hearing set for November 30 has been
moved to December 8.
13. Smith v. Chrysler Financial Co., L.L.C. (D. N.J. Civil Action No. 00-6003). Auto
dealers originate and technically make loans to customers, then immediately assign such loans to
captive finance company. Finance company sets a ''buy rate," the lowest interest rate at which it
will take a dealer-originated loan. The dealer is free to originate loans at a higher rate than that,
with the dealer and finance company then splitting the difference. African-American borrowers
alleged disparate treatment by a dealer in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in that
African-Americans ended up paying disproportionately greater discretionary finance charges and
higher rates than otherwise identically situated white borrowers. Finance company, .though it did
not originate or make the loans, was also named as a defendant. ABA and three co-sponsors filed an
amici brief on April 17, 2001, arguing, among other things, that assignees of dealer paper are
specifically excluded from the definition of "creditor" in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in the
absence ofknowledge of discrimination. See also Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 2002 WL 88431
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(S.D.N.Y., January 22, 2002) (allegation that Ford "authorized subjective markups" having a
disparate impact was sufficient to state a claim under ECOA).
14. Schwartz v. Visa International (Alameda Co. [Cal.] Super. Ct. No. 822404-4). On
April 7, 2003, a state court ordered Visa and MasterCard to amend their respective rules and
regulations to assure "full and effective disclosure" of currency conversion fees charged to
customers who incur debts denominated in something other than U.S. dollars, and to make
restitution to customers charged such a fee since February, 1996. Similar cases have been filed in
state courts in eight other states. Visa and MasterCard currency conversion fees are also challenged
on antitrust grounds in a case before the Southern District of New York (In re: Currency
Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1409) where the court, in July, 2003, denied a
motion to' dismiss the complaint. American Express is defendant in a series of similar cases in the
Southern District ofFlorida.
15. Department of Legal Affairs v. Lehman Commercial Paper (Broward Co. [FL] Cir.
Ct. No. 0310116). In June, 2003, state Attorney General filed suit alleging that First Alliance.
Mortgage Co. engaged in predatory lending practices through unfair and deceptive trade practices
and through fraud in violation of state law. According to the complaint, First Alliance could not
have done so but for financing provided by Lehman Commercial which actually knew or should
have known. of First Alliance's practices. The complaint seeks an injunction against Lehman
Commercial's engaging in financing activities for any mortgage or consumer lender in Florida, and
for actual damages to consumers, punitive damages, civil penalties, costs and attorney's fees.
16. People of the State of New York v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. (S.Ct. ofN.Y.
[Albany County] Index No. 272-04). On January 20, 2004, Attorney General of New York filed
Complaint against an operating subsidiary of a national bank for alleged violations of state's
General Business Law. The Complaint alleges that mortgage borrowers carried out the tenns of
their 25-year mortgage, but that the defendant (who had acquired the loan from the original lender)
refused to release the lien and required additional payments. It seems the original lender had
miscalculated the monthly P&I payment by about $16 in favor of the borrower, and the acquiring
lender wished to recover the 25 years accumulated shortfall. The lender's efforts are said to violate
the GBL, which makes it unlawful for a creditor to assert a claim that it knows does not exist, and
makes it unlawful to commit deceptive acts and practices. Answer filed February 20, 2004.
A week before the complaint was released, the Comptroller of the Currency published a
final rule in the Federal Register in which he claimed that the National Bank Act granted him
exclusive visitorial powers over national banks and their nonbank ope~ating subsidiaries, so as to
preclude state authorities from enforcing state laws against them (69 Fed. Reg. 1895 [January 13,
2004]). The state Attorney General's action here is admittedly a test case designed to challenge the
validity of the Comptroller's rule in a concrete setting (and in a state court rather than a federal
court). The lender and the borrower have resolved the dispute between them extra-judicially.
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CREDIT UNIONS
17. American Bankers Association v. National Credit Union Administration (D. Utah,
No. 2:03cv00621 JTG). On July 15, 2003, ABA, Utah Bankers Association and four member
banks sued the regulator of federal credit unions for its approval of a six-county area of northern
Utah, containing 1.4 million people and two distinct Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as a
"local well defined community" and authorizing three federal credit unions to serve that
"community." The bankers contend that it is an abuse of discretion, in light of the actual facts, to
find that the area in question is a single community in which the residents interact and share
common interests. The three credit unions in question and three credit union trade groups moved to
intervene as parties in the case and the defendant agency has filed an answer to the complaint. On
February 11, court refused to allow plaintiffs to conduct even limited discovery, concluding that
review was limited to the administrative record--which had not yet been filed. ABA brief on the
merits of the case filed May 7. NCUA reply filed July 13, 2004. ABA reply brief filed August 6;
oral argument was held October 7.
18. Postal Community Credit Union v. Commissioner of Banks (2004 WL 1657584).
A state appeals court has upheld a lower court ruling banning Postal Community CD from
converting to a mutual savings bank. In its ruling, the court stated the state Division of Banking
ruled properly when it said state law prohibits credit union conversions to mutual savings bank.
The $120 million credit union had sought the charter switch because of a declining field of
membership.
POSTAL
19. Rate and Service Changes to Implement Functionally Equivalent Negotiated
Service Agreement with Bank One Corporation (postal Rate Commission Docket No. MC2004-
3); Rate and Service Changes to Implement Functionally Equivalent Negotiated Service
Agreement with Discover Financial Services, Inc. (Postal Rate Commission Docket No.
MC2004-4). In June, 2004, the Postal Service filed requests with the Postal Rate Commission
for Negotiated Service Agreements "NSAs" with Discover and Bank One which are "functionally
equivalent" with the NSA previously approved with Capital One. This NSA gave Capitol One
increased postage worksharing discounts in exchange for increased efforts to reduce the Postal
Service's costs associated with undeliverable-as-addressed mail and increased volumes ofFirst-
Class Mail. ABA intervened in these cases in support of the banks and expedited consideration
of these requests. The Discover and Bank One NSAs are the first functionally equivalent NSAs
and their approval is expected to pave the way for other mailers seeking to take advantage of this
type ofproceeding to reduce their own postage costs. In September, ABA filed a brief in each
case urging the PRC to approve the requested NSAs. On September 30, the Postal Rate
Commission issued an Opinion and Recommended Decision approving the Discover Financial
Services NSA. The Commission's decision will go to the Board of Govemors of the Postal
Service for final action. In the Bank One NSA, ABA joined the negotiated, proposed settlement
that will be considered by the Commission in the near tenn.
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20. Mainstream Marketing Services Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (S. Ct. No. 03-
1552). Association representing telemarketers filed suit on January 29, 2003, challenging FTC's
creation of a national "do not call" list, contending that it violates First and Fifth Amendment rights,
is in excess of statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious. A companion case was filed the
same day by the Direct Marketing Association in federal district court in Oklahoma City~
Security v. FTC, W.D. Okla. No. 03-122-W). On September 23, 2003, the Oklahoma federal court
held that the FTC lacked the statutory authority to adopt, implement and enforce the do not call
rule. That outcome was changed by legislation that was introduced, passed by both houses of
Congress and signed by the President in six days. On September 25, however, the Colorado federal
court held the do not call rule unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment in that the rule
exempted charities, politicians and some others while binding commercial callers. (D. Colo. No.
03-N-184).
The Federal Communications Commission adopted a rule complementary to the FTC's so
as to cover certain industries (such as our own) not subject to FTC jurisdiction. On July 28, 2003, a
Petition for Review of that rule was filed. American Teleservices Association v. FCC (10th Cir.
No. 03-9571). On September 26, the court denied a request for a stay of that rule, holding that the
telemarketers had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to warrant a
stay. On September 29, the Circuit Justice (Breyer) declined, on behalf of the Supreme Court, to
disturb that holding. Thus the FCC rule went into effect as scheduled on October 1, 2003, though
the FTC rule on which it was premised in the first place did not. The Colorado federal court said,
also on September 29, that the FTC would be in contempt if it shared its do not call list with the
FCC. The FTC appealed that to the Tenth Circuit on September 30. On October 7, the Tenth Circuit
issued a stay of the district court's pennanent injunction, holding that the balance of harms tipped
ever so slightly in favor of the FTC and that the FTC had shown a sufficient likelihood of success
on the merits to warrant the stay (345 F. 3d 850). The FTC announced that it would begin
enforcement immediately. On February 17, 2004, the court issued an opinion in four consolidated
cases upholding the constitutionality and statutory authority for the list as a narrowly tailored
method of pursuing the important governmental interests of protecting its citizens' privacy in their
own homes and at their own instigation. The fact that the list did not bar charitable or political calls
does not change the result. "Underinclusiveness" is a First Amendment problem only if it results in
an effort that is so insignificant as to be hardly worth the effort--clearly not the case here (358 F. 3d
1228). Petition for writ of certiorari filed May 14, 2004. On October 4, 2004, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
21. American Bankers Association v. Lockyer. (9th Cir. No. 04-16334). California
statute, colloquially known as SB 1, scheduled to go into full effect on July 1, 2004, regulates the
sharing of customer infonnation among affiliates in ways that are inconsistent with federal
requirements. Subsequent to passage of SB 1, federal Congress enacted the FACT Act
amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, making pennanent the earlier temporary preemption
of state laws governing the subject matter. Nevertheless, the state law remained on the books. On
10
April 19, 2004, ABA and other parties filed suit for a declaratory judgment and an injunction
against enforcement of the state law on the grounds ofpreemption by FCRA. On June 30, the court
granted summary judgment to the defendants. The FCRA is limited to the regulation of "consumer
reports," allowing states to enact "privacy" statutes governing other things, as 8B 1 does here.
Despite the plain language of the statute, FCRA does not preempt the state affiliate sharing law
(E.D. Cal. No. Civ. 8-04-778 MCE). A notice of appeal was filed July 2, and a motion for
expedited consideration of the appeal filed with the state's support. The Court of Appeals for the
9th Circuit granted the motion for expedition. Plaintiffs filed their brief on August 2; amici filings
in support ofplaintifIs were filed on August 9. Among the amici filing in support of the plaintiffs
were the federal banking regulators, the NCUA, and the FTC. California filed its briefAugust 31,
and the reply brief of plaintiffs was filed on September 15. Oral argument is scheduled for
December 6.
22. New York State Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission (O.D.C. No.
1:02cv00810). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires "financial institutions" to disclose privacy
policies to their clients and establishes civil sanctions of up to $10,000 per violation for failure to
do so. By FTC's definition, "financial institution" is one that provides services to clients that are
"financial activities." Arguably, that would include attorneys engaged in tax planning, estate
planning, real estate closings and bankruptcy, although there is little doubt that Congress had no
such thing in mind when it enacted the law. Bar association sought an exemption from FTC's
privacy rules for such attorneys or at least an interpretation of the law or regulations to the effect
that it did not apply to attorneys. FTC refused to provide any guidance on the subject one way or
the other. On April 29, 2002, the association filed suit claiming that the agency's unwillingness to
grant an exemption was arbitrary and capricious. The American Bar Association filed essentially
the same lawsuit in the same court in September, 2002. The two cases were consolidated. The
court denied a motion to dismiss the complaints on August 11, 2003, finding that "it does not
appear that Congress intended for the privacy provisions of the GLBA to apply to attorneys." On
April 30, 2004, the court granted summary judgment to the bar associations, essentially
incorporating by reference the earlier opinion. Having now had the benefit of viewing the
administrative record that was not before the court at the time of the earlier ruling, the court found
no reason to change its original inclination. A comparable case in North Carolina <North Carolina
Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission [E.D. N.C. No. 5:02cv941]) remains pending.
23. American Council ofLife Insurers v. Vennont Department ofBanking (Washington
County [VT] Superior Ct. No. 56-1-02 Wncv). In November, 2001, state regulator of banking,
insurance, securities and healthcare administration promulgated regulations, effective February 15,
2002, that purports to govern the disclosure of nonpublic personal financial and health infonnation
about individuals by Vermont "licensees subject to the Commissioner's jurisdiction to non affiliated
third parties. On January 30, 2002, five insurance trade associations filed suit contending that there
is no state law that grants power to the Commissioner to issue regulations governing this subject
matter, at least as to the insurance business, and that therefore the regulations are in excess of her
statutory authority. On February 12, 2004, trial court denied the trade associations' motion for
summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The generality and
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expansive nature of the rulemaking authority granted the Commissioner by statute was sufficient to
justify this particular rule even though no specific mention of authority to adopt rules in this area is
made in the statute.
PRODUCTS & SERVICES
24. Massachusetts Bankers Association v. Bowler (D. Mass. No. 03 CV 11522 JLT). In
February, 2003, the First Circuit dismissed a Petition for Review filed by the Massachusetts
Insurance Commissioner challenging a determination by the Comptroller of the Currency that
various provisions of the Commonwealth's insurance statutes were preempted with respect to
national banks by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The court held that there was no justiciable
controversy presented by that Petition since the Comptroller's detennination did not have and was
not intended to have the force and effect of law. The decision left unresolved the question of
whether the provisions of the statute at issue applied to the banks or not. On August 13, 2003,
Massachusetts Bankers Association and eight individual institutions filed suit against the insurance
commissioner for a declaratory judgment to the effect that those same provisions of the statute were
indeed preempted by the federal law. ABA and four cosponsors filed an amici brief on March 19
supporting the MBA's motion for summaryjudgment. Oral argument held April 27.
25. Fidelity National Infonnation Solutions v. Sinclair (3d Cir. No. 04-2237).
Pennsylvania law, 63 P.S. §§ 457.1, et seq., requires appraisals in non-federally related transactions,
and requires that such appraisals be performed by Pennsylvania board-certified appraisers. Fidelity
National provides, and sells to lenders, a comparatively inexpensive, largely automated
"evaluation" of the value of properties that are to serve as security for mortgages. On August 26,
Fidelity filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the Pennsylvania law, alleging that federal law and
regulation specifically allows the use of something less than a full-blown appraisal under certain
circumstances (e.g. mortgage loans of less than $250,000), and that that federal law preempts
contrary state law. In September, 2002, the Pennsylvania Bankers Association, on behalf of its
members who would be deprived of a valuable product by virtue of the Board's enforcement
actions, joined the case as a named plaintiff: On February 19, 2003, ABA joined suit as a plaintiff
. on behalf of its non-Pennsylvania members to allege that Pennsylvania law constituted an undue
burden on interstate commerce as well. On March 31, 2004, court issued a split decision,. holding
that FIRREA preempted state law with respect to "federally-related" transactions, but not with
respect to non-federally related real estate loans (B.D. Pa. No. 02-6928). Notice ofAppeal filed by
plaintiffs on April 30. On September 16, 2004, the parties filed an uncontested motion to refer the
case to mediation and suspend the briefing schedule. On November 24, a Stipulation ofVoluntary
Dismissal ofCross-Appeals was filed.
26. American Land Title Association v. Radian Group (Cal. Super., Orange County,
Case No. ). Under California state law, it is illegal to sell title insurance in the state
without being licensed, and any insurer which transacts any class of insurance other than title
insurance anywhere in the United States is ineligible for a title insurance license. Radian Group is a
private mortgage insurer that sells, among other things, a "lien protection program" to residential
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mortgage lenders. The lien protection program is said to accomplish essentially the same goals as
traditional title insurance, but is sufficiently different in its structure so as to fall outside the
definition of "title insurance." Being unimpressed by the fine points, the trade association for title
insurers filed suit in late November, 2001, contending that Radian was engaged in the unlicensed
and illegal sale of title insurance in California. On June 20, 2002, the California Department of
Insurance, in a separate proceeding, concluded that the lien protection program was, indeed, title
insurance, and issued a cease and desist order to Radian. Several other state insurance
commissioners have reached the same conclusion. On April 15, 2003, however, the California
Insurance Commissioner rejected his Department's conclusions and, while leaving the ban
temporarily in place, called for the taking of additional evidence and legal argument. On July 22,
the Commissioner released his decision after the consideration of the additional materials, and
elected to affinn the original Department decision.
27. Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (2nd Cir. No. 03-7665). Decided by
the Second Circuit on September 10
th
, the court ruled against Wells Fargo and the case was
returned to the district court for further action based on a finding ofdeference for HOD's policy
statement interpreting Section 8 ofRESPA. In particular, the class action plaintiffs alleged that
Wells violated Section 8 because it charged excessive and unreasonable fees for settlement
services provided directly by Wells, and "marked up" settlement services fees when provided by
a third party. On the first issue, the court found in favor ofWells. On the second issue, the
"mark up" of third party services, the Court afforded HOD's policy statement on Section 8
Chevron deference and held that RESPA applied to mark ups. The Second Circuit returned the
case to the district court for further proceedings on whether Wells provided any additional
services supporting the mark up ofthird party fees. A motion for rehearing has been filed and
ABA joined with other financial trade association in filing October 1 a brief in support ofWells
Fargo Home Mortgage.
TRUST
28. Tittle v. Enron (S.D. Tex. No. H-01-3913). Among the myriad of issues to be
litigated in this massive consolidated Enron case is the question of any responsibility for the fiasco
that directed trustees might have. These are the financial institutions that held the Enron employees'
savings plans while the value of those plans, largely invested in Enron stock, plummeted, and
during a "lockout period," during which employees were not permitted any transactions within their
respective plans. The trustees have moved to dismiss complaints as to them on the grounds that
their status, duties, responsibilities and liabilities as directed trustees were specifically recognized
and governed by ERISA, and that they lacked the legal and contractual capacity to conduct
themselves in any fashion other than the way they did in this case. On August 30, 2002, the
Secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief opposing the motions to dismiss, seeking to impose upon
directed trustees a higher duty than has previously been recognized for them. In October, ABA filed
amicus brief addressing only the Secretary's arguments, pointing out that they were unsupported by
statutory language and contradicted by legislative history. On September 30, 2003, the court
refused to dismiss out the trustees, adopting the Secretary ofLabor's view ofthe case.
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MISCELLANEOUS
29. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Ernst & Young. (7th Cir. No. 03-2619).
When Superior Bank, FSB, an insured institution, failed, FDIC was appointed receiver. It
proceeded to file a complaint in its corporate capacity against the bank's auditor for gross
negligence, fraud and accounting malpractice for having blessed a variety of accounting methods
that had enabled Superior to exaggerate its financial condition. On April 15, the court dismissed the
suit holding that FDIC lacked standing to sue in its corporate capacity. Had the agency filed the suit
in its capacity as receiver, it would have been bound by a mandatory arbitration clause and waiver
of punitive damages in the contract between E&Y and Superior Bank (in whose shoes FDIC as
receiver would stand) (N.D. TIL No. 02 C 7914). On July 8, 2004, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago upheld a lower-court ruling that the FDIC
could not bring its suit against Emst & Young in its corporate capacity. Controversy is now in
arbitration.
30. King v. First Capital Financial Services. (S. Ct. DI. Nos. 97263 & 97761). This is a
consolidation of about 38 separate lawsuits in which plaintiffs seek to recover document
preparation fees assessed by mortgage lenders. The claim is that preparing mortgage documents is
the practice of law, but the persons actually preparing the documents are not laWyers and therefore
cannot lawfully charge "legal fees." Lower courts have dismissed all the cases on various grounds
but the state Supreme Court has agreed to review those decisions. On July 2, 2004, ABA, Dlinois
Bankers Association, Consumer Mortgage Coalition and five other cosponsors filed amici curiae
brief contending that parties to any transaction are free to use non-laWyers to prepare paperwork
that is for their own use and benefit. Oral argument held September 28, 2004.
31. Kitson v. Bank of Edwardsville (Ill. App. 5th Dist. No. 5-04-0199). In a series of
commercial promissory notes, bank specified a particular interest rate and disclosed that the interest
would be calculated on a 365/360 basis. Borrower .filed suit claiming that the 365/360 method
resulted in an actual interest rate that was .138% above the stated rate and the discrepancy was a
violation of the lliinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Trial court certified
the case as a class action and denied the bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On
application by the bank, the court certified questions to the Appellate Court for an interlocutory
appeal. On March 25, ABA and TIlinois Bankers Association filed a brief urging the Appellate
Court to exercise its discretion in favor of granting the interlocutory appeal based upon the
importance of the case to the industry at large. Most commercial loans calculate interest on the
365/360 basis and hundreds of thousands of such loans disclose that method of calculation in
language identical to that used in the notes at issue here. The court granted leave for the appeal on
April 16; opening briefs, including an amici brief on the merits by ABA and rnA filed May 21.
Oral argument was not requested and the case will be submitted for advisement on October 18,
2004.
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32. Pioneer Commercial Funding v. American Financial Mortgage Corp. (8. Ct. Pa. No.
279 EAL 2002). American Financial was indebted to CoreStates by reason ofa series ofoverdrafts.
When a wire transfer of funds arrived in the American Financial deposit account at CoreStates, the
bank applied it to offset the debt Pioneer, which had a series ofdealings with American Financial,
claimed that the wire-transferred funds actually belonged to it, instead, and that the funds had been
wired to the American Financial account in error. They should have been wired to Pioneer's
account in another bank. CoreStates declined to reverse the offset and Pioneer sued. A jury
awarded actual, consequential and punitive damages against the bank and the bank appealed.
Pennsylvania Superior Court affinned on most issues, but vacated the punitive damages award and
remanded for a new trial on that issue (797 A. 2d 269). The bank sought allowance from
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to appeal. On January 26, 2004, ABA and Pa. Bankers Association
filed amici briefurging reversal based upon the bank's correct adherence throughout the transaction
to UCC Article 4A. Oral argument held April 13. On August 19th, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court's ruling and found in favor of CoreStates and dismissed
the need for any further proceedings.
33. National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. (4th Cir.
No. 03-2276). On August 12th, the ABA and the Maryland Bankers Association filed an amici brief
in the case concerning liability for check fraud and the duty owed by a bank to investigate when
opening a new account. The insurance company sued to recover monies deposited in the bank (and
quickly withdrawn) that were the result ofembezzlement through the issuance and payment of
fraudulent purchase orders for which legitimate checks were issued. The checks were used to open
the accounts. The defendant bank argued that at the time the accounts were opened, the bank
properly followed the requirements ofthe DCC. The lower court agreed. On appeal, the insurance
company asserted that a higher duty to investigate entities opening new accounts was required
under the UCC asserting, notwithstanding the fact that the checks were validly issued and not
forged or altered, that the forged or altered duty standard should apply. The amici brief filed
highlighted the standard ofcare in place at the time ofthe transactions and urged the court not to
apply the more recent Patriot Act standards. Oral argument tentatively scheduled for February
2005.
* 34. Wachovia v. Schmidt (4th Cir. No. 03-2061). On November 1, the 4th Circuit
detennined that Wachovia, a national bank, was located for purposes ofdiversity jurisdiction in any
state in which it has branches and remanded the underlying case to state court for consideration.
The plaintiffraised the issue ofdiversity jurisdiction for the first time on appeal from a district court
denial ofWachovia's petition to compel arbitration ofclaims. The decision is in marked contrast
to decisions in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Petition for rehearing filed November 15;
OCC filed an amicus brief in support ofthe motion for rehearing on November 29.
CALENDAR
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Overdraft Protection Programs
I. Overdraft Protection Programs - Generally
A. Lines of Credit or Linked Accounts
B. Discretionary, Ad-hoc Evaluation
1. NSF fees not finance charges.
2. Fees the same whether honored or returned.
3. Subject to disparate treatment.
c. Automated Evaluation - Undisclosed
1. Efficient.
2. Fair.
D. Disclosed Discretionary "Bounce" Protection
1. Fee income.
2. Packaged programs (technology, legal analysis, marketing, customer
communication).
E. Disclosed Protection
1. Communicated to customers as a discretionary deposit service with an
aggregate limit - Typically $100 to $700.
2. Communications concerning overdraft protection programs.
a. Conservative communication - account disclosure agreement.
b. Moderate communication - explanatory announcement letter.
c. Aggressive communication - mass media advertising.
3. Coverage is essentially automatic if certain criteria are met such as time
account has been opened and regularity of deposits.
4. Service covers checks, debit cards, pre-authorized automatic debits, ATM
withdrawals, telephone and internet transactions, etc.
5. Flat fee whether or not overdraft item paid (daily fee?).
6. Closed end loans to customers who fail to bring account positive within a
certain time - often 60 days.
II. Concerns/Consumer Group Criticism
A. It takes unfair advantage of unwary customers and encourages irresponsible
banking habits.
B. Predatory Lending - Overdraft protection amounts to a form of short-term,
high cost credit.
C. Deceptive marketing practices - Overdraft protection programs are
intentionally deceptive and predatory.
D. Consumers with frequent overdrafts.
III. Customer Reactions to Overdraft Protection Programs
A. Customer Reactions
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1. Little or no embarrassment.
2. No merchant fee in addition to bank fees.
3. No adverse credit report.
B. Wide Acceptance.
Over 2000 Institutions offer some variety of an overdraft protection program, mostly
smaller community or independent banks.
IV. Fundamental Tensions.
A. Deposit Service or Extension of Credit.
B. Inadvertence or Credit Decision.
c. Fee or InterestIFinance Charge.
D. Service Relationship or Irresponsibility (cold checks).
E. Meaningful Explanations or Fine Print.
v. Brief Legal Analysis. (For a more detailed Legal Risks Analysis see Exhibit 4.)
A. Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z
1. Require certain disclosures such as APR in certain consumer credit
transactions.
2. For Regulation Z to apply to a transaction the credit must (a) be subject to a
finance charge or (b) be payable by written agreement in more than four
installments.
3. NSF fees are not ''finance charges" if the same fee is charged for both
honored and dishonored overdraft items.
B. Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B
1. Prohibit discriminationin credit transactions.
2. Require adverse action notices.
3. NSF fees in programs not covered by Regulation Z would generally qualify
as "incidental" credit under Regulation B and not require an adverse action
notice.
4. Age discrimination when protection limits differ for accounts marketed to
senior citizens under 62.
c. Truth in Savings Act and Regulation DD
1. Deposit account disclosures must include fee amounts and conditions.
2. Require advance notice of adverse account changes.
3. Prohibit misleading statements.
D. Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E
1. Require monthly statements if EFr transaction has occurred such as ATM
withdrawal or point-of-sale debit card transaction.
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2. Statements must be accurate and understandable.
E. Federal Trade Commission Act and Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices -
Enforceable by Federal Agencies
Advertisements or other account disclosure representations must not be inaccurate or
misrepresent the service being offered.
F. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Avoid adverse action notice by not relying on information from a consumer reporting
agency in honor/dishonor decisions.
G. The Green Book
1. Guide for processing Federal ACH payments and collections.
2. 30 day account closing notice.
H. State Laws concerning cold checks, usury and automatically deposited
government checks.
I. Regulation 0 includes overdrafts as an extention of credit - those covered may
not participate.
J. Regulation CC prohibits NSF fees if bank has increased time before funds
available without notice to customer.
VI. Significant Overdraft Protection Litigation. (An analysis of the following two cases is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3.)
A. Paul Miller individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Bank of
America.
B. In Re Washington Mutual Overdraft Protection Litigation.
VII. Interagency Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs. (A reproduction of the Joint
Guidance on Overdraft Protection is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.)
A. The Interagency Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs was issued on
February 18, 2005 by The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; and The National Credit Union Administration.
B. Safety and Soundness Considerations.
1. Written policies and procedures to address credit, operational and other risks.
2. Reports detailing volume, profitability and credit performance.
3. Overdraft balances charged off in 60 days unextended by repayment plan.
4. Balances reported as loans and charge offs against ALLL.
5. Rigorous loss estimation procedures.
6. Available amounts reported as "unused commitments."
7. Risk based capital treatment with weighting according to obligor.
8. Due diligence of third party vendors.
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c. Legal Risks
1. Review by counsel prior to implementation.
2. Regulation Z definition of "finance charge" subject to review.
3. Institutions must avoid engaging in deceptive, inaccurate, misrepresentative
or unfair practices, and closely review all aspects of their overdraft proteciton
programs, expecially any material that infonn consumers about the programs.
4. When overdraft proteciton services are added to an exisiting account,
advance notice to the account holder may be required, for example, if the fee
for the service exceeds the fee for accounts that do not have the service.
D. Best Practices.
1. Marketing and Communications with Customers.
a. do not encourage routine or intentional overdrafts.
b. fairly present alternatives such as overline credit arrangements and
train staff to explain such alternatives to customers..
c. explain discretionary nature of program.
d. do not promote "free" checking and overdraft protection programs at
the same time.
e. clearly explain check clearing policies (processing order).
f. disclose type of transactions covered.
g. clearly disclose the dollar amount of the fee for each overdraft.
2. Program Features and Options.
a. election or opt out of program.
b. alert customer to overdraft on non check transactions or if not
possible post notices on proprietary ATMs.
c. distinguish actual balances from overdraft availability.
d. notify customers of each overdraft event; program features with first
use; and when terminated.
e. consider ~aily limits - number or $ amount.
f. monitor excessive customer usage- infonn of options.
g. fairly report to consumer reporting agencies and avoid negative info
if overdrafts paid within program guidelines.
E. Differences Between the Proposed and Final Guidance on Overdraft Protection
(A side by side comparison of the Proposed and Final Guidance on Overdraft
Protection is attaced hereto as Exhibit 5.)
1. The Proposed Guidance suggested that overdraft balances be charged off
within 30 days from the date first overdrawn but the Final Guidance extended
that time period to 60 days.
2. The Proposed Guidance asks that the financial institution describe the
circumstances in which the institution would refuse to pay an overdraft but
this suggestion is not in the Final Guidance.
3. The Proposed Guidance states that a financial institution should clearly
disclose to consumers the order in which the institution pays checks or
processes other transactions but this suggestion was removed from the Final
Guidance.
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VIII. Office of Thrift Supervision - Guidance on Overdraft Protection. (A reproduction of
the OTS Guidance on Overdraft Protection is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.)
A. The OTS Guidance on Overdraft Protection was issued on February 14, 2005 by
The Office of Thrift Supervision.
B. Separate Final Guidance on Overdraft Protection.
1. The OTS did not join in the Interagency Guidance on Overdraft Protection
despite being a part of the Proposed Guidance that was published for
comment.
2. The OTS choose to issue its own Guidance on overdraft protection on
Febuary 14, 2005 prior to the the Interagency's Guidance which was issued
on February 18, 2005.
c. Significant Differences Between the Interagency Guidance and the OTS
Guidance. (A side by side comparison of the Interagency Guidance and the
OTS Guidance is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.)
1. The Interagency Guidance overtly states that "When overdrafts are paid,
credit is extended." The OTS Guidance does not have a parallel statement to
that effect.
2. The OTS Guidance does not contain a "Legal Risks" section. The OTS has
not explained why it did not include a Legal Risks section.
3. A new provision was added to the "Best Practices" section which requests
that savings associations not manipulate transaction clearing rules.
4. The OTS Guidance states that if canceling a transaction which would trigger
an overdraft is not feasible for a particular type of transaction, then savings
associations should allow consumers the option of limiting access to the
overdraft protection program unavailable by transacion type, even if it results
in limiting access to the overdraft protection amount only to check
transactions.
IX. Proposed Regulation DD Amendments. (A reproduction of the Proposed Regulation
DD Amendements are attached hereto as Exhibit 7.)
A. Concern about uniformity and adequacy of overdraft fee disclosures and
promoted automated "bounced-check proteciton services."
B. Monthly and year to date aggregate fee on statements.
C. Account opening disclosures to specify eligible transactions, whether check,
debit card, ATM withdrawal, etc.
D. Advertisements to include:
1. fees
2. covered transaction types
3. time to repay or cover
4. circumstances for non-payment of overdraft
5. exemption for billboards, broadcast media and telephone responses
E. No Misleading advertisements, announcements or solicitations, which for
example represent or describe program:
C-5
1. as a "line of credit"
2. as honoring all overdrafts
3. as allowing indefinite negative balance
4. as applying solely to checks
5. as part of a "free" deposit account
x. . Guidelines as a Safe Harbor.
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Joint Release
For Immediate Release
FDIC-PR-11-2005
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
National Credit Union Administration
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
February 18, 2005
Agencies Issue Final Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs
The federal bank and credit union regulatory agencies today announced final joint guidance to assist
insured depository institutions in the disclosure and administration of overdraft protection programs.
Depository institutions may offer overdraft protection programs to transaction account customers as an
alternative to traditional ways of covering overdrafts. In response to concerns about the marketing,
disclosure, and implementation of these programs, the agencies pUblished for comment proposed
interagency guidance on overdraft protection programs in June 2004. The final joint guidance responds
to comments received by consumer and community groups, individual consumers, depository
institutions, trade associations, vendors offering overdraft protection products, other industry
representatives, and state agencies.
The final joint guidance contains three primary sections: Safety and Soundness Considerations; Legal
Risks; and Best Practices. The safety and soundness discussion seeks to ensure that financial
institutions offering overdraft protection programs adopt adequate policies and procedures to address
credit, operational, and other associated risks.
The legal risks discussion alerts institutions of the need to comply with all applicable federal and state
laws, and advises institutions to have their overdraft protection programs reviewed by legal counsel to
ensure overall compliance prior to implementation. Several federal consumer compliance laws are
outlined in the guidance.
The best practices section addresses the marketing and communications that accompany the offering of
overdraft protection programs as well as the disclosure and operation of these programs. Some of these
best practices include: avoiding the promotion of poor account management; providing a clear
explanation of the discretionary nature of the overdraft protection program; clearly disclosing fees;
explaining the impact of transaction clearing policies on the overdraft fees consumers may incur; and
monitoring program usage. The agencies also advise insured depository institutions to distinguish
overdraft protection services from "free" account features, to prominently distinguish balances from
overdraft protection funds availability, and to alert consumers before a transaction triggers any fees.
The guidance is being issued by the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC). It will be pUblished shortly in the Federal Register.
The Federal Register notice is attached.
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Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs
AGENCIES: Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (GCC); Board of
Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC); and National Credit Union Administration (NeUA).
ACTION: Final Guidance.
SUMMARY: The acc, Board, FDIC, and NeUA (the Agencies), are issuing final Joint
Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs (guidance). This guidance is intended to
assist insured depository institutions in the responsible disclosure and administration of
overdraft protection services.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
occ: Michael Bylsma, Director, Margaret Hesse, Special Counsel, or Deana Lee,
Attorney, Community and Consumer Law Division, (202) 874-5750; or Kim Scherer,
National Bank: Examiner/Credit Risk Specialist, Credit Risk Policy, (202) 874-5170.
Board: Minh-Due T. Le, Senior Attorney, Daniel Lonergan, Counsel, or Elizabeth
Eurgubian, Attorney, Division ofConsumer and Community Affairs, (202) 452-3667; or
William H. Tiemay, Supervisory Financial Analyst, Division ofBank Supervision and
Regulation, (202) 452-2412. For users ofTelecommunications Device for the Deaf
("TDD") only, contact (202) 263-4869.
FDIC: Mark Mellon, Counsel, (202) 898-3884, Legal Division; James Leitner,
Examination Specialist, (202) 898-6790; Patricia Cashman, Senior Policy Analyst, (202)
898-6534; or April Breslaw, Chief: Compliance Section, (202) 898-6609, Division of
Supervision and Consumer Protection.
NellA: Elizabeth A. Habring, Program Officer, Office ofExamination and Insurance,
(703) 518-6392; or Ross P. Kendall, StaffAttorney, Office of the General Counsel, (703)
518-6562.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Agencies have developed this fmal joint guidance to address a service offered
by insured depository institutions commonly referred to as "bounced-check protection" or
"overdraft protection." This service is sometimes offered to transaction account
customers as an alternative to traditional ways ofcovering overdrafts (e.g., overdraft lines
ofcredit or linked accounts).
While both the availability and customer acceptance ofthese overdraft protection
services have increased, aspects ofthe marketing, disclosure, and implementation of
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some ofthese programs have raised concerns with the Agencies. In a 2001 letter, the
ace identified some ofthese particular concerns.! In November 2002, the Board sought
comment about the operation ofoverdraft protection programs.2
In response to concerns raised about overdraft protection products, the Agencies
published for comment proposed Interafency Guidance on Overdraft Protection
Programs, 69 FR 31858 (June 7, 2004). The proposed guidance identified the historical
and traditional approaches to providing consumers with protection against account
overdrafts, and contrasted these approaches with the more recent overdraft protection
programs that are marketed to consumers. The Agencies also identified some ofthe
existing and potential concerns surrounding the offering and administration of such
overdraft protection programs that have been identified by federal and state bank
regulatory agencies, consumer groups, financial institutions, and their trade
representatives.
In response to these concerns, the Agencies provided guidance in three primary
sections: Safety and Soundness Considerations, Legal Risks, and Best Practices. In the
section on Safety and Soundness Considerations, the Agencies sought to ensure that
financial institutions offering overdraft protection services adopt adequate policies and
procedures to address the credit, operational, and other risks associated with these
services. The Legal Risks section ofthe proposed guidance outlined several federal
consumer compliance laws, generally alerted institutions offering overdraft protection
services ofthe need to comply with all applicable federal and state laws, and advised
institutions to have their overdraft protection programs reviewed by legal counsel to
ensure overall compliance prior to implementation. Finally, the proposed guidance set
forth best practices that serve as positive examples ofpractices that are currently
observed in, or recommended by, the industry. Broadly, these best practices address the
marketing and communications that accompany the offering ofoverdraft protection
services, as well as the disclosure, and operation, ofprogram features.
The Agencies together received over 320 comment letters in response to the
proposed guidance. Comment letters were received from depository institutions, trade
associations, vendors offering overdraft protection products, and other industry
representatives, as well as government officials, consumer and community groups, and
individual consumers.
II. Overview of Public Comments
The Agencies received comments that addressed broad aspects ofthe guidance, as
well as its specific provisions. Many industry commenters, for instance, were concerned
about the'overall scope ofthe guidance and whether it would apply to financial
institutions that do not market overdraft protection programs to consumers but do cover
1 acc Interpretive Letter 914, September 2001.
2 67 FR 72618, December 6, 2002. The Board received approximately 350 comments; most were from
industry representatives describing how the programs work.
3 The Office ofThrift Supervision joined the Agencies proposing the interagency guidance.
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the occasional overdraft on a case-by-case basis. Commenters also addressed the three
specific sections ofthe proposed guidance.
In regard to the Safety and Soundness section, for example, many industry
commenters suggested extending the proposed charge-offperiod from 30 days to a longer
period such as 45 or 60 days, in part because they believed a longer charge-offperiod
would provide consumers with more time to repay overdrafts and avoid being reported to
credit bureaus as delinquent on their accounts. Comments were also received addressing
technical reporting and accounting issues.
The Agencies received numerous comments regarding the Legal Risks section -
particularly the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
discussions. For instance, many consumer and consumer group comments stated that
overdraft protection should be considered credit covered by TILA's disclosures and other
required protections. Some ofthese comments likened the product to payday lending,
which is covered by TILA. Many industry commenters argued against the coverage of
overdraft programs by TILA and Regulation Z, and argued that the payment ofoverdrafts
does not mvolve credit and finance charges requiring TILA disclosures and protections.
Lastly, many commenters also offered specific criticism or recommended edits
with respect to particular best practices identified in the proposal. Several industry
commenters sought general clarification on whether examiners would treat the best
practices as law or rules when examining institutions offering overdraft protection
services.
m. Final Joint Guidance
The final joint guidance incorporates changes made by the Agencies to provide
clarity and address many commenter concerns. In particular, language has been added to
clarify the scope ofthe guidance. The Safety and Soundness section expressly states that
it applies to all methods ofcovering overdrafts. The introduction to the Best Practices
section clarifies that while the Agencies are concerned about promoted overdraft
protection programs, the best practices may also be useful for other methods ofcovering
overdrafts.
In response to the comments regarding the Safety and Soundness section, the
Agencies have extended the charge-offrequirement to 60 days.4 Other technical edits
have been made to further clarify reporting and accounting aspects ofthis section ofthe
guidance.
The discussion regarding the applicability ofTILA has been shortened to more
closely focus on the relevant, existing regulatory provisions. In the proposed guidance,
the discussion ofTILA and Regulation Z, like the individual discussions ofother laws
4 Federal credit unions are required by regulation to establish a time limit, not to exceed 45 calendar days,
for a member to either deposit funds or obtain an approved loan from the credit union to cover each
overdraft. 12 CPR § 701.21(c)(3).
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and regulations (e.g., the Federal Trade Commission Act), was not intended to represent a
full explication of the scope, terms, and exceptions to those provisions. Rather, it was
intended to highlight that, commonly, fees charged in connection with overdraft
protection programs and traditional methods ofpaying overdrafts fall within an existing
regulatory exception to the "finance charge" definition. Disparate commenters urged the
Board to take positions on various aspects ofTILA and Regulation Z that are unnecessary
in light of the exception addressed and the appropriate scope ofthe guidance. The
revisions to this section, and the addition of language to the Safety and Soundness section
to address the credit nature ofoverdrafts, is not intended as a commentary on the statute,
nor the adoption ofany particular commenter point ofview. As indicated in the proposal,
the existing regulatory exceptions were created for the occasional payment of overdrafts,
and as such could be reevaluated by the Board in the future, if necessary. Were the
Board to address these issues more specifically, it would do so separately under its clear
authority.
Lastly, in the final joint guidance, the Agencies reaffirm that the best practices are
practices that have been recommended or implemented by financial institutions and
others, as well as practices that may otherwise be required by applicable law. The best
practices, or principles within them, are enforceable to the extent they are required by
law. In addition, as mentioned above, the final guidance explicitly states that while the
Agencies are particularly concerned about promoted overdraft protection programs, these
practices may be useful in connection with other methods of covering overdrafts. The
Agencies have also revised numerous best practices for clarity, in response to particular
commenter suggestions.
The text ofthe final Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs follows:
Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs
The Office ofthe Comptroller ofthe Currency (GCC), Board ofGovemors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and National
Credit Union Administration (NeUA), collectively ''the Agencies," are issuing this joint
guidance concerning a service offered by insured depository institutions that is
commonly referred to as "bounced-check protection" or "overdraft protection." This
credit service is sometimes offered on both consumer and small business transaction
accounts as an alternative to traditional ways ofcovering overdrafts. This joint guidance
is intended to assist insured depository institutions in the responsible disclosure and
administration ofoverdraft protection services, particularly those that are marketed to
consumers.5
S Federal credit unions are already subject to certain regulatory requirements governing the establishment
and maintenance ofoverdraft programs. 12 CFR § 701.21(c)(3). This regulation requires a federal credit
union offering an overdraft program to adopt a written policy specifying the dollar amount ofoverdrafts
that the credit union wilJ honor (per member and overall); the time limits for a member to either deposit
funds or obtain a loan to cover an overdraft; and the amount ofthe fee and interest rate, if any, that the
credit union will charge for honoring overdrafts. This joint guidance supplements but does not change
these regulatory requirements for federal credit unions.
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Introduction
To protect against account overdrafts, some consumers obtain an overdraft line ofcredit,
which is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). If a
consumer does not have an overdraft line of credit, the institution may accommodate the
consumer and pay overdrafts on a discretionary, ad-hoc basis. Regardless ofwhether the
overdraft is paid, institutions typically have imposed a fee when an overdraft occurs,
often referred to as a nonsufficient funds or "NSF" fee. Over the years, this
accommodation has become automated by many institutions. Historically, institutions
have not promoted this accommodation. This approach has not raised significant
concerns.
More recently, some depository institutions have offered "overdraft protection" programs
that, unlike the discretionary accommodation traditionally provided to those lacking a
line of credit or other type of overdraft service (e.g., linked accounts), are marketed to
consumers essentially as short-term credit facilities. These marketed programs typically
provide consumers with an express overdraft "limit" that applies to their accounts.
While the specific details of overdraft protection programs vary from institution to
institution, and also vary over time, those currently offered by institutions incorporate
some or all ofthe following characteristics:
• Institutions inform consumers that overdraft protection is a feature of their accounts
and promote the use of the service. Institutions also may inform consumers of their
aggregate dollar limit under the overdraft protection program.
• Coverage is automatic for consumers who meet the institution's criteria (e.g., account
has been open a certain number of days; deposits are made regularly). Typically, the
institution performs no credit underwriting.
• Overdrafts generally are paid up to the aggregate limit set by the institution for the
specific class ofaccounts, typically $100 to $500.
• Many program disclosures state that payment ofan overdraft is discretionary on the
part ofthe institution, and may disclaim any legal obligation of the institution to pay
any overdraft.
• The service may extend to check transactions as well as other transactions, such as
withdrawals at automated teller machines (ATMs), transactions using debit cards,
pre-authorized automatic debits from a consumer's account, telephone-initiated funds
transfers, and on-line banking transactions.6
6 Transaction accounts at credit unions are called share draft accounts. For purposes ofthis joint guidance,
the use of the term "check" includes share drafts.
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• A flat fee is charged each time the service is triggered and an overdraft item is paid.
Commonly, a fee in the same amount would be charged even if the overdraft item
was not paid. A daily fee also may apply for each day the account remains
overdrawn.
• Some institutions offer closed-end loans to consumers who do not bring their
accounts to a positive balance within a specified time period. These repayment plans
allow consumers to repay their overdrafts and fees in installments.
Concerns
Aspects of the marketing, disclosure, and implementation of some overdraft protection
programs, intended essentially as short-term credit facilities, are of concern to the
Agencies. For example, some institutions have promoted this credit service in a manner
that leads consumers to believe that it is a line ofcredit by informing consumers that their
account includes an overdraft protection limit ofa specified dollar amount without clearly
disclosing the terms and conditions ofthe service, including how fees reduce overdraft
protection dollar limits, and how the service differs from a line of credit..
In addition, some institutions have adopted marketing practices that appear to encourage
consumers to overdraw their accounts, such as by informing consumers that the service
may be used to take an advance on their next paycheck, thereby potentially increasing the
institutions' credit exposure with little or no analysis of the consumer's creditworthiness.
These overdraft protection programs may be promoted in a manner that leads consumers
to believe that overdrafts will always be paid when, in reality, the institution reserves the
right not to pay some overdrafts. Some institutions may advertise accounts with
overdraft protection coverage as "free" accounts, and thereby lead consumers to believe
that there are no fees associated with the account or the overdraft protection program.
Furthermore, institutions may not clearly disclose that the program may cover instances
when consumers overdraw their accounts by means other than check, such as at ATMs
and point-of-sale (POS) terminals. Some institutions may include overdraft protection
amounts in the sum that they disclose as the consumer's account "balance" (for example,
at an ATM) without clearly distinguishing the funds that are available for withdrawal
without overdrawing the account. Where the institution knows that the transaction will
trigger an overdraft fee, such as at a proprietary ATM, institutions also may not alert the
consumer prior to the completion of the transaction to allow the consumer to cancel the
transaction before the fee is triggered.
Institutions should weigh carefully the risks presented by the programs including the
credit, legal, reputation, safety and soundness, and other risks. Further, institutions
should carefully review their programs to ensure that marketing and other
communications concerning the programs do not mislead consumers to believe that the
program is a traditional line of credit or that payment ofoverdrafts is guaranteed, do not
mislead consumers about their account balance or the costs and scope of the overdraft
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protection offered, and do not encourage irresponsible consumer financial behavior that
potentially may increase risk to the institution.
Safety & Soundness Considerations
When overdrafts are paid, credit is extended. Overdraft protection programs may expose
an institution to more credit risk (e.g., higher delinquencies and losses) than overdraft
lines of credit and other traditional overdraft protection options to the extent these
programs lack individual account underwriting. All overdrafts, whether or not subject to
an overdraft protection program, are subject to the safety and soundness considerations
contained in this section.
Institutions providing overdraft protection programs should adopt written policies and
procedures adequate to address the credit, operational, and other risks associated with
these types ofprograms. Prudent risk management practices include the establishment of
express account eligibility standards and well-defined and properly documented dollar
limit decision criteria. Institutions also should monitor these accounts on an ongoing
basis and be able to identify consumers who may represent an undue credit risk to the
institution. Overdraft protection programs should be administered and adjusted, as
needed, to ensure that credit risk remains in line with expectations. This may include,
where appropriate, disqualification ofa consumer from future overdraft protection.
Reports sufficient to enable management to identify, measure, and manage overdraft
volume, profitability, and credit performance should be provided to management on a
regular basis.
Institutions also are expected to incorporate prudent risk management practices related to
account repayment and suspension of overdraft protection services. These include the
establishment of specific timeframes for when consumers must pay off their overdraft
balances. For example, there should be established procedures for the suspension of
overdraft services when the account holder no longer meets the eligibility criteria (such
as when the account holder has declared bankruptcy or defaulted on another loan at the
bank) as well as for when there is a lack ofrepayment ofan overdraft. In addition,
overdraft balances should generally be charged offwhen considered uncollectible, but no
later than 60 days from the date first overdrawn.7 In some cases, an institution may allow
a consumer to cover an overdraft through an extended repayment plan when the
consumer is unable to bring the account to a positive balance within the required time
frames. The existence of the repayment plan, however, would not extend the charge-off
determination period beyond 60 days (or shorter period if applicable) as measured from
the date of the overdraft. Any payments received after the account is charged off (up to
the amount charged offagainst allowance) should be reported as a recovery.
Some overdrafts are rewritten as loan obligations in accordance with an institution's loan
policy and supported by a documented assessment ofthat consumer's ability to repay. In
those instances, the charge-offtimeframes described in the Federal Financial Institutions
7 Federal credit unions are required by regulation to establish a time limit, not to exceed 45 calendar days,
for a member to either deposit funds or obtain an approved loan from the credit union to cover each
overdraft. 12 CPR § 701.21(c)(3).
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Examination Council (FFIEC) Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account
Management Policy would apply.8
With respect to the reporting of income and loss recognition on overdraft protection
programs, institutions should follow generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
and the instructions for the Reports ofCondition and Income (Call Report), and NCUA
5300 Call Report. Overdraft balances should be reported on regulatory reports as loans.
Accordingly, overdraft losses should be charged offagainst the allowance for loan and
lease losses. The Agencies expect all institutions to adopt rigorous loss estimation
processes to ensure that overdraft fee income is accurately measured. Such methods may
include providing loss allowances for uncollectible fees Of, alternatively, only
recognizing that portion of earned fees estimated to be collectible.9 The procedures for
estimating an adequate allowance should be documented in accordance with the Policy
Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses Methodologies and
Documentation for Banks and Savings Institutions.1o
If an institution advises account holders ofthe available amount of overdraft protection,
for example, when accounts are opened or on depositors' account statements or ATM
receipts, the institution should report the available amount of overdraft protection with
legally binding commitments for Call Report, and NeVA 5300 Call Report purposes.
These available amounts, therefore, should be reported as "unused commitments" in
regulatory reports.
The Agencies also expect proper risk-based capital treatment ofoutstanding overdrawn
balances and unused commitments. I I Overdraft balances should be risk-weighted
according to the obligor. Under the federal banking agencies' risk-based capital
guidelines, the capital charge on the unused portion ofcommitments generally is based
on an off-balance sheet credit conversion factor and the risk weight appropriate to the
obligor. In general, these guidelines provide that the unused portion of a commitment is
subject to a zero percent credit conversion factor ifthe commitment has an original
maturity ofone year or less, or a 50 percent credit conversion factor if the commitment
has an original maturity over one year. Under these guidelines, a zero percent conversion
factor also applies to the unused portion ofa "retail credit card line" or "related plan" ifit
is unconditionally cancelable by the institution in accordance with applicable law.I2 The
phrase "related plans" in these guidelines includes overdraft checking plans. The
8 For federally insured credit unions, charge-off policy for booked loans is described in NeUA Letter to
Credit Unions No. 03-CU-D!, "Loan Charge-off Guidance," dated January 2003.
9 Institutions may charge offuncollected overdraft fees against the allowance for loan and lease losses if
such fees are recorded with overdraft balances as loans and estimated credit losses on the fees are provided
for in the allowance for loan and lease losses.
10 Issued by the Board, FDIC, acc, and Office ofThrift Supervision. The NCVA provided similar
guidance to credit unions in Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 02-3, "Allowance for Loan and Lease
Losses Methodologies and Documentation for Federally Insured Credit Unions," 67 FR 37445, May 29,
2002.
11 Federally insured credit unions should calculate risk-based net worth in accordance with the rules
contained in 12 CFR Part 702.
12 See 12 CFR Part 3, Appendix A, Section 3 (b)(5) (OCC); 12 CFR Part 208, Appendix A, Section III.D.5
(Board); and 12 CFR Part 325, Appendix A, Section II.D.S (FDIC).
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Agencies believe that the overdraft protection programs discussed in this joint guidance
fall within the meaning of "related plans" as a type of "overdraft checking plan" for the
purposes ofthe federal banking agencies' risk-based capital guidelines. Consequently,
overdraft protection programs that are unconditionally cancelable by the institution in
accordance with applicable law would qualify for a zero percent credit conversion factor.
Institutions entering into overdraft protection contracts with third-party vendors must
conduct thorough due diligence reviews prior to signing a contract. The interagency
guidance contained in the November 2000 Risk Management ofOutsourced Technology
Services outlines the Agencies' expectations for prudent practices in this area.
Legal Risks
Overdraft protection programs must comply with all applicable federal laws and
regulations, some ofwhich are outlined below. State laws also may be applicable,
including usury and criminal laws, and laws on unfair or deceptive acts or practices. It is
important that institutions have their overdraft protection programs reviewed by counsel
for compliance with all applicable laws prior to implementation. Further, although the
guidance below outlines federal laws and regulations as of the date this joint guidance is
published, applicable laws and regulations are subject to amendment. ·Accordingly,
institutions should monitor applicable laws and regulations for revisions and to ensure
that their overdraft protection programs are fully compliant.
Federal Trade Commission Act / Advertising Rules
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits unfair or deceptive
acts or practices. 13 The banking agencies enforce this section pursuant to their authority
in section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818.14 An act or practice
is unfair if it causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition. An act or practice is deceptive i~ in general, it is
a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead a consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances, and the representation, omission, or practice is
material.
In addition, the NeVA has promulgated similar rules that prohibit federally insured credit
unions from using advertisements or other representations that are inaccurate or
misrepresent the services or contracts offered. IS These regulations are broad enough to
prohibit federally insured credit unions from making any false representations to the
public regarding their deposit accounts.
Overdraft protection programs may raise issues under either the FTC Act or, in
connection with federally insured credit unions, the NCUA's advertising rules, depending
13 15 U.S.C. § 45.
14 See ace Advisory Letter 2002-3 (March 2002); and joint Board and FDIC Guidance on Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices by State-Chartered Banks (March 11, 2004).
15 12 CFR § 740.2.
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upon how the programs are marketed and implemented. To avoid engaging in deceptive,
inaccurate, misrepresentative, or unfair practices, institutions should closely review all
aspects oftheir overdraft protection programs, especially any materials that inform
consumers about the programs.
Truth in Lending Act
TILA and Regulation Z require creditors to give cost disclosures for extensions of
consumer credit.16 TILA and the regulation apply to creditors that regularly extend
consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written agreement in
more than four installments. I7
Under Regulation Z, fees for paying overdraft items currently are not considered finance
charges if the institution has not agreed in writing to pay overdrafts. 18 Even where the
institution agrees in writing to pay overdrafts as part of the deposit account agreement,
fees assessed against a transaction account for overdraft protection services are finance
charges only to the extent the fees exceed the charges imposed for paying or returning
overdrafts on a similar transaction account that does not have overdraft protection.
Some financial institutions also offer overdraft repayment loans to consumers who are
unable to repay their overdrafts and bring their accounts to a positive balance within a
specified time period. 19 These closed-end loans will trigger Regulation Z disclosures, for
example, if the loan is payable by written agreement in more than four installments.
Regulation Z will also be triggered where such closed-end loans are subject to a finance
charge.2o
Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B, creditors are
prohibited from discriminating against an applicant on a prohibited basis in any aspect of
a credit transaction?l This prohibition applies to overdraft protection programs. Thus,
steering or targeting certain consumers on a prohibited basis for overdraft protection
programs while offering other consumers overdraft lines of credit or other more favorable
credit products or overdraft services, will raise concerns under the ECOA.
In addition to the general prohibition against discrimination, the ECOA and Regulation B
contain specific rules concerning procedures and notices for credit denials and other
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. TILA is implemented by Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) and 12 CFR 226.2(a)(17). Institutions should be aware that whether a written
agreement exists is a matter of state law. See, e.g., 12 CFR § 226.5.
18 See 12 CFR 226.4(c)(3). Traditional lines of credit, which generally are subject to a written agreement,
do not fall under this exception.
19 For federal credit unions, this time period may not exceed 45 calendar days. 12 CPR § 701.21(c)(3).
20 See 12 CFR 226.4.
21 lSu.s.c. §§ 1691 et seq. The ECOA is implemented by Regulation B, 12 CFR Part 202. The 'ECOA
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age
(provided the applicant has the capacity to contract), the fact that all or part of the applicant's income
derives from a public assistance program, and the fact that the applicant has in good faith exercised any
right under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
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adverse action. Regulation B defines the term "adverse action," and generally requires a
creditor who takes adverse action to send a notice to the consumer providing, among
other things, the reasons for the adverse action.22 Some actions taken by creditors under
overdraft protection programs might constitute adverse action but would not require
notice to the consumer if the credit is deemed to be "incidental credit" as defined in
Regulation B. "Incidental credit" includes consumer credit that is not subject to a finance
charge, is not payable by agreement in more than four installments, and is not made
pursuant to the terms of a credit card account.23 Overdraft protection programs that are
not covered by TILA would generally qualify as incidental credit under Regulation B.
Truth in Savings Act
Under the Truth in Savings Act (TISA), deposit account disclosures must include the
amount of any fee that may be imposed in connection with the account and the conditions
under which the fee may be imposed.24 In addition, institutions must give advance
notice to affected consumers ofany change in a term that was required to be disclosed if
the change may reduce the annual percentage yield or adversely affect the consumer.
When overdraft protection services are added to an existing deposit account, advance
notice to the account holder may be required, for example, if the fee for the service
exceeds the fee for accounts that do not have the service?5 In addition, TISA prohibits
institutions from making any advertisement, announcement, or solicitation relating to a
deposit account that is inaccurate or misleading or that misrepresents their deposit
contracts.
Since these automated and marketed overdraft protection programs did not exist when
most ofthe implementing regulations were issued, the regulations may be reevaluated.
Electronic Fund Transfer Act
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation E require an institution to
provide consumers with account-opening disclosures and to send a periodic statement for
each monthly cycle in which an electronic fund transfer (EFT) has occurred and at least
quarterly ifno transfer has occurred?6 It: under an overdraft protection program, a
consumer could overdraw an account by means of an ATM withdrawal or POS debit card
transaction, both are EFTs subject to EFTA and Regulation E. As such, periodic
statements must be readily understandable and accurate regarding debits made, current
balances, and fees charged. Terminal receipts also must be readily understandable and
accurate regarding the amount of the transfer. Moreover, readily understandable and
accurate statements and receipts will help reduce the number ofalleged errors that the
22 See 12 CFR §§ 202.2(c) and 9.
23 See 12 CFR § 202.3(c).
24 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. TISA is implemented by Regulation DD at 12 CFR Part 230 for banks and
savings associations, and by NeUA's TISA regulation at 12 CFR Part 707 for federally insured credit
unions.
25 An advance change in terms notice would not be required if the consumer's account disclosures stated
that their overdraft check mayor may not be paid and the same fee would apply.
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693 et seq. The EFTA is implemented by Regulation E, 12 CFR Part 205.
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institution must investigate under Regulation E, which can be time-consuming and costly
to institutions.
Best Practices
Clear disclosures and explanations to consumers of the operation, costs, and limitations
ofan overdraft protection program and appropriate management oversight ofthe program
are fundamental to enabling responsible use ofoverdraft protection. Such disclosures
and oversight can also minimize potential consumer confusion and complaints, foster
good customer relations, and reduce credit, legal, and other potential risks to the
institution. Institutions t~at establish overdraft protection programs should, as applicable,
take into consideration the following best practices, many ofwhich have been
recommended or implemented by financial institutions and others, as well as practices
that may otherwise be required by applicable law. While the Agencies are concerned
about promoted overdraft protection programs, the best practices may also be useful for
other methods of covering overdrafts. These best practices currently observed in or
recommended by the industry include:
Marketing and Communications with Consumers
• Avoid promoting poor account management. Institutions should not market the
program in a manner that encourages routine or intentional overdrafts. Institutions
should instead present the program as a customer service that may cover inadvertent
consumer overdrafts.
• Fairly represent overdraft protection programs and alternatives. When
informing consumers about an overdraft protection program, infonn consumers
generally of other overdraft services and credit products, if any, that are available at
the institution and how the terms, including fees, for these services and products
differ. Identify for consumers the consequences ofextensively using the overdraft
protection program.
• Train staff to explain program features and other choices. Train customer service
or consumer complaint processing staff to explain their overdraft protection
program's features, costs, and terms, including how to opt out of the service. Staff
also should be able to explain other available overdraft products offered by the
institution and how consumers may qualify for them.
• Clearly explain discretionary nature of program. If payment of an overdraft is
discretionary, make this clear. Institutions should not represent that the payment of
overdrafts is guaranteed or assured if the institution retains discretion not to pay an
overdraft.
• Distinguish overdraft protection services from "free" account features.
Institutions should not promote "free" accounts and overdraft protection programs in
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the same advertisement in a manner that suggests the overdraft protection program is
free of charges.
• Clearly disclose program fees. In communications about overdraft protection
programs, clearly disclose the dollar amount of the fee for each overdraft and any
interest rate or other fees that may apply. For example, rather than merely stating that
the institution's standard NSF fee will apply, institutions should restate the dollar
amount ofany applicable fee or interest charge.
• Clarify that fees count against the disclosed overdraft protection dollar limit.
Consumers should be alerted that the fees charged for covering overdrafts, as well as
the amount of the overdraft item, will be subtracted from any overdraft protection
limit disclosed.
• Demonstrate when multiple fees will be charged. If promoting an overdraft
protection program, clearly disclose, where applicable, that more than one overdraft
fee may be charged against the account per day, depending on the number ofchecks
presented on, and other withdrawals made from, the consumer's account.
• Explain impact of transaction clearing policies. Clearly explain to consumers that
transactions may not be processed in the order in which they occurred, and that the
order in which transactions are received by the institution and processed can affect
the total amount of overdraft fees incurred by the consumer.
• Illustrate the type of transactions covered. Clearly disclose that overdraft fees may
be imposed on transactions such as ATM withdrawals, debit card transactions,
preauthorized automatic debits, telephone-initiated transfers or other electronic
transfers, if applicable, to avoid implying that check transactions are the only
transactions covered.
Program Features and Operation
• Provide election or opt-out of service. Obtain affirmative consent of consumers to
receive overdraft protection. Alternatively, where overdraft protection is
automatically provided, permit consumers to "opt out" of the overdraft program and
provide a clear consumer disclosure ofthis option.
• Alert consumers before a transaction triggers any fees. When consumers attempt
to withdraw or transfer funds made available through an overdraft protection
program, provide a specific consumer notice, where feasible, that completing the
withdrawal may trigger the overdraft fees (for example, it presently may be feasible at
a branch teller window). This notice should be presented in a manner that permits
consumers to cancel the attempted withdrawal or transfer after receiving the notice.
If this is not feasible, then post notices (e.g., on proprietary ATMs) explaining that
transactions may be approved that overdraw the account and fees may be incurred.
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Institutions should consider making access to the overdraft protection program
unavailable through means other than check transactions, if feasible.
• Prominently distinguish balances from overdraft protection funds availability.
When disclosing a single balance for an account by any means, institutions should not
include overdraft protection funds in that account balance. The disclosure should
instead represent the consumer's own funds available without the overdraft protection
funds included. If more than one balance is provided, separately (and prominently)
identify the balance without the inclusion ofoverdraft protection.
• Promptly notify consumers of overdraft protection program usage each time
used. Promptly notify consumers when overdraft protection has been accessed, for
example, by sending a notice to consumers the day the overdraft protection program
has been accessed. The notification should identify the date of the transaction, the
type of transaction, the overdraft amount, the fee associated with the overdraft, the
amount necessary to return the account to a positive balance, the amount of time
consumers have to return their accounts to a positive balance, and the consequences
ofnot returning the account to a positive balance within the given timeframe. Notify
consumers if the institution terminates or suspends the consumer's access to the
service, for example, if the consumer is no longer in good standing.
• Consider daily limits on the consumer's costs. Consider imposing a cap on
consumers' potential daily costs from the overdraft program. For example, consider
limiting daily costs from the program by providing a numerical limit on the total
overdraft transactions that will be subject to a fee per day or by providing a dollar
limit on the total fees that will be imposed per day.
• Monitor overdraft protection program usage. Monitor excessive consumer usage,
which may indicate a need for alternative credit arrangements or other services, and
inform consumers ofthese available options.
• Fairly report program usage. Institutions should not report negative information to
consumer reporting agencies when the overdrafts are paid under the terms of
overdraft protection programs that have been promoted by the institutions.
This concludes the text of the final Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs.
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C - 28
[THIS SIGNATURE PAGE PERTAINS TO THE FINAL "JOINT GUIDANCE ON
OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAMS"]
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Robert deY. Frierson (signed)
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary ofthe Board.
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Dated at Washington, D.C., the 16th day ofFebruary, 2005.
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Robert E. Feldman (signed)
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
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C - 31
C - 32
EXHIBIT 2
FINAL OTS GUIDANCE ON OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAMS
C - 33
C - 34
OTS ANNOUNCES ISSUANCE OF FINAL GUIDANCE ON THRIFT OVERDRAFT ... Page 1 of2
Office of Thrift Supervision
FOR RELEASE at 4:45 P.M. EST
Monday, February 14, 2005
OTS 05-03
For further information
Contact: Kevin Petrasic
202/906-6677
OTS ANNOUNCES ISSUANCE OF FINAL GUIDANCE ON THRIFT
OVERDRAFT PROTECTION PROGRAMS
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) announced today that it is issuing final
guidance on overdraft protection programs for savings associations. The gUidance is intended to
assist institutions in ensuring adequate disclosures in connection with, and the responsible
administration of, overdraft protection programs made available to their customers.
OTS is issuing this guidance in response to numerous concerns raised about a relatively new type
of overdraft protection service commonly referred to as "bounced-check protection" or "overdraft
protection" being offered to depository institution customers. This issue was highlighted in
guidance first proposed by the federal banking agencies last June. Today, OTS is finaliZing for
saVings associations best practices-similar to those previously proposed by the federal banking
agencies-that address marketing and communications that accompany the offering of overdraft
protection services, as well as the disclosure, and operation, of an institution's program features.
The final OTS gUidance prOVides significant fleXibility to thrifts in designing and implementing
overdraft protection programs, but also requires institutions to implement programs in a manner
that fairly and equitably respects the interests of their customers. In particular, institutions may
not manipulate transaction-clearing procedures to inflate fees charged to their customers.
A key aspect of the final guidance reqUires thrift institutions to alert their customers before a
transaction triggers a fee. Thrift customers attempting to Withdraw, transfer, or otherwise access
funds-other than by check-made available through an overdraft protection program should be
prOVided a specific consumer notice that completing the transaction will trigger an overdraft
protection fee. The notice should be presented in a manner that permits a customer to cancel any
attempted transaction after receiving the notice. For types of transactions for which this is not
feasible, an institution should prOVide its customers an opportunity to "opt out" of overdraft
protection programs for such types of transactions, even if the overall effect of the "opt out" limits
overdraft protection only to check transactions.
Pursuant to the final gUidance, thrifts are expected to implement best practices in order to apprise
their customers regarding overdraft protection programs, including:
• Fairly representing overdraft protection programs and available alternatives;
• Training thrift institution staff to explain program features and other available overdraft
protection programs offered by the institution;
• Clearly explaining the discretionary nature of overdraft protection programs offered by the
institution;
• Clearly disclosing overdraft protection program fees;
• Explaining the impact of the institution's transaction-clearing policies; and
• Monitoring overdraft protection program usage by the institution's customers.
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Final Guidance b
###
The Office of Thrift Supervision, an office of the Department of the Treasury, regulates and supervises the nation's thrift
industry. OTSts mission is to ensure the safety and soundness of, and compliance with consumer protection laws by, thrift
institutions, and to support their role as home mortgage lenders and providers of other community credit and financial
services. OTS also oversees the activities and operations of thrift holding companies that own or control thrift institutions.
Copies of OTS news releases and other documents are available at the OTS web page at www.ots.treas.gov.
Created: MondaYf 2/14/2005
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Dated: February 14, 2005.
Martha Curry I
ActingDirector, Taxpayer AdvocacyPanel.
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BILLING CODE 483G-01-P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
[No. 2005-05]
Guidance on Overdraft Protection
Programs
AGENCY: Office of Thrift Supervision,
Treasury (OTS).
ACTION: Final guidance.
SUMMARY: OTS is issuing this final
Guidance on Overdraft Protection
Programs (Guidance). This Guidance is
intended to assist savings associations
in the responsible disclosure and
administration of overdraft protection
services.
DATES: This Guidance is effective
February 18, 2005.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Maurice McClung, Program Manager,
Market Conduct, Thrift Policy, (202)
906-61B2; Richard Bennett, Counsel,
Regulations and Legislation Division,
(202) 906-7409, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20552.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
OTS has developed this final
Guidance after careful consideration of
comments received on the proposed
Interagency Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs, 69 FR 31858 (June
7, 2004). (proposed guidance) issued by
the Federal Financial Institution
Examination Council (FFIEC) agencies,
Le., the Office oftha Comptroller of the
Gmrency (OCC), Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Board),
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), and National Credit Union
Administration (NCVA). It addresses a
service offered by insured depository
institutions commonly referred to as
"bounced-check protection" or
"overdraft protection." This service is
sometimes offered to transaction
account customers as an alternative to
traditional ways of covering overdrafts
(e.g., overdraft lines of credit or linked
accounts). While both the availability
and customer acceptance of these
overdraft protection services have
increased, aspects of the marketing,
disclosure, and implementation of some
of these programs have raised concerns
forOTS.
The proposed guidance identified the
historical and traditional approaches to
providing consumers with protection
against account overdrafts and
contrasted these approaches with the
more recent overdraft protection
programs that are marketed to
consumers. The Agencies also identified
some of the existing and potential
concerns surrounding the offering and
administration of such overdraft
protection programs that bave been
identified by Federal and State bank
regulatory agencies, consumer groups,
financial institutions, and their trade
representatives.
In response to these concerns, the
Agencies provided proposed guidance
in three primary sections: Safety and
Soundness Considerations, Legal Risks,
and Best Practices. In the section on
Safety and Soundness Considerations,
the Agencies wanted to ensure that
financial institutions offering overdraft
protection services adopt adequate
policies and procedures to address the
risks associated with these services. The
Legal Risks section of the proposed
guidance outlined several federal
consumer compliance laws, generally
alerted institutions offering overdraft
protection services of the need to
comply with all applicable Federal and
State laws, and advised institutions to
have their overdraft protection programs
reviewed by legal counsel to ensure
overall compliance prior to
implementation. Finally, the proposed
guidance set forth Best Practices that
serve as positive examples of practices
that are currently observed in, or
recommended by, the industry. Broadly,
these Best Practices address the
marketing and communications that
accompany the offering of overdraft
protection services, as well as the
disclosure and operation, of program
features.
The Agencies received a total of over
320 comment letters in response to the
proposed guidance. Comment letters
were received from depository
institutions, trade associations, vendors
offering overdraft protection products,
and other industry representatives, as
well as government officials, consumer
and community groups, and individual
consumers.
D. Overview ofPublic Comments
The Agencies received comments that
addressed broad aspects of the proposed
guidance, as well as its specific
provisions. Many industry cornmenters,
for instance, were concerned about the
overall scope of the proposed guidance
and whether it would apply to financial
institutions that do not offer bounce
protection programs but do cover the
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occasional overdraft on a case-by-case
basis. Commenters also addressed the
three specific sections of the proposed
guidance.
In regard to the Safety and Soundness
section, for example, many industry
cammenters suggested extending the
charge-off period from 30 days to either
45 or 60 days because they believed a
longer charge-off period would provide
consumers with more time to repay
overdrafts and avoid being reported to
credit bureaus as delinquent on their
accounts. Comments were also received
addressing technical reporting and
accounting issues.
The Agencies received numerous
comments regarding the Legal Risks
section, particularly the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) and Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) discussions.
For instance, many consumers and
consumer group comments stated that
overdraft protection should be
considered credit covered by TILA's
disclosures and other required
protections. They likened the product to
payday lending, which is covered by
TlLA. Many industry commenters
argued against the coverage of overdraft
programs by TlLA and the Board's
Regulation Z, and urged that the
payment of overdrafts does not involve
credit and finance charges requiring the
disclosures and protections afforded by
this body of law.
Lastly, many commenters offered
specific criticisms or recommended
edits with respect to particular Best
Practices identified in the proposal.
Several industry commenters sought
general clarification of whether
examiners would treat the Best Practices
as law or rules when examining
institutions offering overdraft protection
services.
ill. Final Guidance
This final Guidance incorporates
changes made by OTS to provide clarity
and address many commenter concerns.
Language has been added to clarify the
scope of the Guidance. The Safety and
Soundness section expressly states that
it applies to all methods of covering
overdrafts. The introduction to the Best
Practices section clarifies that while
OTS is concerned about promoted
overdraft protection programs, the Best
Practices may also be useful far other
methods of covering overdrafts.
In response to the comments
regarding the Safety and Soundness
section, OTS now indicates that
overdraft balances, including
uncollected fees, should generally be
written off when considered
uncollectible, but no later than 60 days
from the date first overdrawn. This OTS
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Guidance does not address whether
overdrafts are credit because OTS
believes that some "bounce protection"
programs are provided to customers as
a fee for service rather than an extension
of credit. Other overdraft plans,
particularly those where the savings
association performs a credit check on
the borrower, provide a period of time
to repay the overdraft, and charge
interest based on the amount and time
the overdraft is outstanding, are loans.
It is not within the scope of this
Guidance to make a determination of
whether any particular overdraft
program is credit. Other technical edits
have been made to further clarify
reporting and accounting aspects of this
section of the Guidance.
This OTS Guidance has eliminated
the discussion of Legal Risks. This
section engendered substantial
comment and controversy, particularly
over whether overdrafts are credit for
purposes of TILA and Regulation Z.
OTS reminds savings associations,
however, that overdraft protection
programs must comply with all
applicable Federal laws and regulations.
It is important that savings associations
have their overdraft protection programs
reviewed by counsel for compliance
with all applicable laws prior to
implementation. As these laws and
regulations are subject to amendment,
savings associations are reminded to
monitor applicable laws and regulations
for revisions and to ensure that their
overdraft protection programs are fully
compliant with them.
Lastly, OTS reaffirms that the Best
Practices are practices that have been
recommended or implemented by
financial institutions and others, as well
as practices that may otherwise be
required by applicable law. The Best
Practices, or principles within them, are
enforceable to the extent they are
required by other federal statutes and
regulations. The final Guidance
explicitly states that while OTS is
particularly concerned about promoted
overdraft protection programs, the Best
Practices may also be useful for other
methods of covering overdrafts. OTS
also revised or shortened numerous Best
Practices for clarity, in response to
particular commenter suggestions.
OTS's Best Practices depart from
those in the proposed guidance issued
by the FFIEC agencies in a few respects.
OTS's Best Practices include not
manipulating transaction-clearing
(including, but not limited to, check-
clearing rules and batch debit
processing) to inflate fees and not
allowing consumers to access overdraft
amounts unless the consumer is
informed that the transaction will
trigger an overdraft fee and is given an
opportunity to cancel the transaction. If
this is not feasible for a particular type
of transaction, the savings association
should allow consumers the choice to
make access to the overdraft protection
program unavailable by transaction
type.
For savings associations interested in
further reading on the subject of best
practices, OTS recommends an
American Bankers Association
publication entitled, "Overdraft
Protection: A Guide for Bankers. "
The text of the OTS Guidance on
Overdraft Protection Programs follows:
OTS Guidance on Overdraft Protection
Programs
The Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) is issuing this guidance
concerning a service offered by savings
associations that is commonly referred
to as "bounced-check protection" or
"overdraft protection." This service is
sometimes offered on both consumer
and small business transaction accounts
as an alternative to traditional ways of
covering overdrafts. This guidance is
intended to assist savings associations
in the responsible disclosure and
administration of overdraft protection
services, particularly those that are
marketed to consumers.
Introduction
To protect against account overdrafts,
some consumers obtain an overdraft line
of credit, which is subject to the
disclosure requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA). If a consumer does
not have an overdraft line of credit, the
institution typically returns the check as
unpaid and charges the consumer a
nonsufficient funds or "NSF" fee. Some
institutions may accommodate the
consumer and pay overdrafts on a
discretionary, ad-hoc basis. Regardless
of whether the overdraft is paid,
institutions typically charge the NSF fee
when an overdraft occurs. Over the
years, this accommodation has become
automated by many institutions.
Historically, institutions have not
promoted this accommodation. This
approach has not raised significant
supervisory concerns.
More recently, some depository
institutions have offered "overdraft
protection" programs that, unlike the
discretionary accommodation
traditionally provided to those lacking a
line of credit or other type of overdraft
service (e.g., linked accounts), are
marketed to consumers essentially as a
convenience or fee for service program.
While the specific details of overdraft
protection programs vary from
institution to institution and also vary
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over time, those currently offered by
institutions incorporate some or all of
the following characteristics:
• Institutions inform consumers that
overdraft protection is a feature of their
accounts and advertise the use of the
service.
• Coverage is automatic for
consumers who meet the institution's
criteria (e.g., account has been open a
certain number of days, deposits are
made regularly). Typically, the
institution performs no credit
underwriting.
• Overdrafts generally are paid up to
the aggregate limit set by the institution
for the specific class of accounts,
typically $100 to $500.
• Institutions with an express
aggregate "dollar limit" inform
consumers of their limit under the
program.
• Many program disclosures state that
payment of an overdraft is discretionary
on the part of the institution and may
disclaim any legal obligation of the
institution to pay any overdraft.
• The service may extend to check
transactions as well as other
transactions, such as withdrawals at
automated teller machines (ATMs),
transactions using debit cards, pre-
authorized automatic debits from a
consumer's account, telephone-initiated
funds transfers, and on-line banking
transactions.
• A flat fee is charged each time the
service is triggered and an overdraft
item is paid. Commonly, a fee in the
same amount would be charged even if
the overdraft item were not paid. A
daily fee also may apply for each day
the account remains overdrawn.
• Some institutions offer closed-end
loans to consumers who do not bring
their accounts to a positive balance
within a specified time period. These
repayment plans allow consumers to
repay their overdrafts and fees in
installments.
Concerns
Aspects of the marketing, disclosure,
and implementation of some overdraft
protection programs are of concern to
OTS. For example, some institutions
have promoted this service in a manner
that leads consumers to believe that it
is a line of credit by informing them that
their account includes an overdraft
protection limit of a specified dollar
amount without clearly disclosing the
terms and conditions of the service,
including how fees reduce overdraft
protection dollar limits and how the
service differs from a line of credit.
In addition, some institutions have
adopted marketing practices that appear
to encourage consumers to overdraw
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their accounts, such as by informing
consumers that the service may be used
to routinely overdraw their accounts,
with little or no analysis of the
consumer's creditworthiness. These
overdraft protection programs may be
promoted in a manner that leads
consumers to believe that overdrafts
will always be paid when, in reality, the
institution reserves the right not to pay
some overdrafts. Some institutions may
advertise accounts with overdraft
protection coverage as "free" accounts
and thereby lead consumers to believe
that there are no fees associated with the
account or the overdraft protection
program.
Furthermore, institutions may not
clearly disclose that the program may
cover instances when consumers
overdraw their accounts by means other
than check, such as at ATMs and point-
of-sale (POS) terminals. Some
institutions may include overdraft
protection amounts in the figure that
they disclose as the consumer's account
"balance" (for example at an ATM)
without clearly distinguishing the funds
that are available for withdrawal
without overdrawing the account.
Where the institution knows that the
transaction will trigger an overdraft fee,
such as at a proprietary ATM,
institutions also may not alert the
consumer prior to the completion of the
transaction to allow the consumer to
cancel the transaction before the fee is
triggered.
Savings associations should carefully
weigh the risks presented by the
programs. Further, savings associations
should carefully review their programs
to ensure that marketing and other
communications concerning the
programs do not mislead consumers to
believe that the program is a traditional
line of credit or that payment of
overdrafts is guaranteed, do not mislead
consumers about their account balance
or the costs and scope of the overdraft
protection offered, and do not encourage
irresponsible consumer financial
behavior or other behavior that
potentially may unacceptably increase
risk to the savings association.
Safety & Soundness Considerations
Overdraft protection programs may
expose an institution to a higher level of
nonpayment than traditional line of
credit programs where the institution
has performed appropriate credit,
underwriting. All overdrafts, whether or
not subject to an overdraft protection
program, are subject to the safety and
soundness considerations contained in
this section.
Savings associations providing
overdraft protection programs should
adopt written policies and procedures
adequate to address the operational, and
other risks associated with these types
of programs. Prudent risk management
practices include the establishment of
express account eligibility standards
and well-defined and properly
documented dollar limit decisions and
other criteria. Savings associations also
should monitor these accounts on an
ongoing basis and be able to identify
consumers who do not manage their
accounts in a satisfactory manner.
Overdraft protection programs should
be administered and adjusted, as
needed. to ensure that the performance
of such programs is satisfactory and in
line with expectations. This may
include, where appropriate,
disqualification of a consumer from
future overdraft protection. Reports
sufficient to enable management to
identify, measure, and manage overdraft
volume, profitability, and performance
should be provided to management on
a regular basis.
Savings associations also are expected
to incorporate prudent risk management
practices related to account repayment
and suspension of overdraft protection
services. These include the
establishment of specific timeframes for
when consumers must payoff their
overdraft balances. For example, savings
associations should have established
procedures for the suspension of
overdraft services when the account
holder no longer meets the eligibility
criteria (such as when the account
holder has declared bankruptcy or
defaulted on a loan at the savings
association) as well as for when there is
a lack of timely repayment of an
overdraft. In addition, overdraft
balances, including uncollected fees.
should generally be written off when
considered uncollectible, but no later
than 60 days from the date first
overdrawn.
Some overdrafts are rewritten as loan
obligations in accordance with an
institution's loan policy and supported
by a documented assessment of that
consumer's ability to repay. In those
instances, the overdraft is considered a
loan and the delinquency and charge-off
timeframes described in the FFIEC
Uniform Retail Credit Classification and
Account Management Policy apply. See
also OTS CEO Memorandum #128 (July
27,2000) ("Revised Uniform Retail
Credit and Account Management
Policy't), available at http://
WlVW.ots.treas.gov/docS/2/25128·rdf.
With respect to the reporting 0
income and loss recognition on
overdraft protection programs, savings
associations should follow generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
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OTS expects all savings associations to
adopt rigorous loss estimation processes
to ensure that overdraft fee income is
accurately measured. Such methods
may include providing loss allowances
for uncollectible amounts or fees or,
alternatively, only recognizing that
portion of earned fees estimated to be
collectible.
Savings associations entering into
overdraft protection contracts with
third-party vendors must conduct
thorough due diligence reviews prior to
signing a contract. The interagency
guidance contained in the Outsourcing
Technology Services Booklet part of the
FFIEC's IT Examination Handbook,
outlines OTS's expectations for prudent
practices in this area. See also OTS CEO
Memorandum #201 (July 15, 2004),
available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/
docs/2/25201.pdf.
Best Practices
Clear disclosures and explanations to
consumers of the operationt costs. and
limitations of an overdraft protection
program and appropriate management
oversight of the program are
fundamental to enabling responsible use
of overdraft protection. Such disclosures
and oversight can also minimize
potential consumer confusion and
complaints, foster good customer
relations, and reduce credit, legal, and
other potential risks to the savings
association. Savings associations that
establish overdraft protection programs
should, as applicable, take into
consideration the following Best
Practices, many of which have been
recommended or implemented by
financial institutions and others, as well
as practices that may otherwise be
required by applicable law. While OTS
is concerned about promoted overdraft
protection programs, the Best Practices
may also be useful for other methods of
covering overdrafts. These Best
Practices current!y observed in or
recommended by the industry include:
Marketing and Communications With
Consumers
• Avoid promoting poor account
management. Savings associations
should not market the program in a
manner that encourages routine or
intentional overdrafts; rather present the
program as a customer service that may
cover inadvertent consumer overdrafts.
• Fairly represent overdraft
protection programs and alternatives.
When informing consumers about an
overdraft protection program, inform
consumers generally of other overdraft
services or credit products. if any, that
are available at the savings association
and how the terms, including fees, for
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these services or products differ.
Identify for consumers the
consequences of extensively using the
overdraft protection program.
• Train staff to explain program
features· and other choices. Train
customer service or consumer complaint
processing staff to explain their
overdraft protection program's features,
costs, and terms, including how to opt
out of the service. Staff also should be
able to explain other available overdraft
products offered by the savings
association and how consumers may
qualify for them.
• Clearly explain the discretionary
nature ofprogram. If payment of an
overdraft is discretionary, make this
clear. Savings associations should not
represent that the payment of overdrafts
is guaranteed or assured if the savings
association retains discretion not to pay
an overdraft.
• Distinguish overdraft protection
services from "free" account features.
Savings associations should not
promote "free" accounts and overdraft
protection services in the same
advertisement in a manner that suggests
the overdraft protection service is free of
charges. .
• Clearly disclose program fees. In
communications about overdraft
protection programs, clearly disclose the
dollar amount of the fee for each
overdraft and any interest rate or other
fees that may apply. For example, rather
than merely stating that the savings
association's standard NSF fee will
apply, savings associations should
restate the dollar amount of any
applicable fees or interest charges.
• Clarify that fees count against the
disclosed overdraft protection dollar
limit. Consumers should be alerted that
the fees charged for covering overdrafts,
as well as the amount of the overdraft
item, will be subtracted from any
overdraft protection limit disclosed.
• Demonstrate when multiple fees
will be charged. If promoting an
overdraft protection program, clearly
disclose that more than one overdraft
fee may be charged against the account
per day, depending on the nwnber of
checks presented and other withdrawals
made from the consumer's account.
• Do not manipulate transaction-
clearing rules. Transaction-clearing
rules (including check-elearing and
batch debit processing) should not be
administered unfairly or manipulated to
inflate fees.
• Explain the impact of transaction-
clearing policies. Clearly explain to
consumers that transactions may not be
processed in the order in which they
occurred and that the order in which
they are received by the savings
association and processed can affect the
total amount of overdraft fees incurred
by the consumer. Savings associations
should also clearly disclose rules for
processing and clearing transactions.
• Illustrate the type of transactions
covered. Clearly disclose that overdraft
protection fees may be imposed on
transactions such as ATM withdrawals,
debit card transactions, preauthorized
automatic debits, telephone-initiated
transfers, or other electronic transfers, if
applicable) to avoid implying that check
transactions are the only transactions
covered.
Program Features and Operation
• Provide election or opt-out of
service. Obtain affirmative consent of
consumers to receive overdraft
protection. Alternatively, where
overdraft protection is automatically
provided. permit consumers to "opt
out" of the overdraft program and
provide a clear consumer disclosure of
this option.
• Alert consumers before a
transaction triggers any fees. When
consumers attempt to withdraw,
transfer, or otherwise access funds made
available through an overdraft
protection program (other than by
check), savings associations should alert
consumers that completing the
transaction will trigger an overdraft
protection fee. Savings associations
should also give consumers an
opportunity to cancel the attempted
transaction. If this is not feasible for a
particular type of transaction, then
savings associations should allow
consumers the choice to make access to
the overdraft protection program
unavailable by transaction type, even if
it results in limiting access to the
overdraft protection amount only to
check transactions.
• Prominently distinguish balances
from overdraft protection funds
availability. When disclosing a single
balance for an account by any means,
savings associations should not include
overdraft protection funds in that
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account balance. The disclosure should
instead represent the consumer's own
funds available without the overdraft
protection funds included. If more than
one balance is provided t separately (and
prominently) identify the balance
without the inclusion of overdraft
protection.
• Promptly notify consumers of
overdraft protection program usage each
time used. In addition to any alert at the
time of transaction, promptly notify
consumers when overdraft protection
has been accessed, for example, by
sending a notice to consumers the day
the overdraft protection program has
been accessed. The notification should
identify the date of the transaction, the
type of transaction, the overdraft
amount, the fee associated with the
overdraft) the amount necessary to
return the account to a positive balance t
the amount of time consumers have to
return their accounts to a positive
balance, and the consequences of not
returning the account to a positive
balance within the given timeframe.
Notify consumers if the savings
association terminates or suspends the
consumer's access to the service, for
example. if the consumer is no longer in
good standing.
• Consider daily limits on fees
imposed. Consider providing a daily cap
on overdraft fees charged against any
one account, while continuing to
provide coverage for overdrafts up to the
overdraft limit.
• Monitor overdraft protection
program usage. Monitor excessive
consumer usage, which may indicate a
need for alternative arrangements or
other services and inform consumers of
these available options.
• Fairly report program usage.
Savings associations should not report
negative information to consumer
reporting agencies when the overdrafts
are paid under the terms of overdraft
protection programs that have been
promoted by the savings association.
This concludes the text of the OTS
Guidance on Overdraft: Protection
Programs.
Dated: February 15, 2005.
By the Office of Thrift Supervision
James E. Gilleran,
Director.
[FR Doc. 05-3195 Filed 2-17-05; 8:45 am]
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EXHIBIT 3
SIGNIFICANT OVERDRAFT PROTECTION LITIGATION
Paul Miller individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Bank of America
On February 24, 2004 a San Francisco Superior Court jury reached a verdict against Bank of
'America after a six-week triaL The verdict requires Bank of America to pay $75 million to the
California class action participants, plus $1,000 in special damages to each customer who shows the
bank caused "substantial emotional or economic hann." The class action, which was filed on
August 14, 1998, involved allegations that Bank of America unlawfully utilized funds from Social
Security direct deposit accounts of customers to collect for fees, insufficient funds, overdrafts and
other bank debts.
The California Code of Civil Procedure §704.080 states that a deposit account in which
payments of Social Security benefits are directly deposited by the government or its agent is exempt
from claims of creditors, even a bank, up to $2,425.00. This exemption continues for amounts that
exceed that threshold to the extent that it consists of payments of Social Security benefits.
Attorneys representing the affected California customers argued the Bank of America's actions
violated California laws, citing a 1974 state Supreme Court case that prohibits banks from taking
Social Security benefits to recover its own debts. The opinion reasoned that "[t]he assertion of a
banker's set off...deprives the depositor of the income which the state provided him to meet
subsistence expenses, compelling the state either to give him additional money or leave him without
means of physical survival." Krugerv. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 452-453 (Cal. Sup. et.
1974). This reasoning armed with the aforementioned statue is what lead to the recent verdict,
based entirely on California state law, in the Bank of America case.
The Bank of America verdict, however, appears in direct conflict with Lopez v. Washington
Mutual Bank 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. Cal. 2002), a case handed down by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Lopez the Court stated that the California Code of Civil Procedure
§704.080 was preempted by federal law, namely 12 C.F.R. § 557.11. This federal regulation was
issued in 1997 by the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") which asserted its authority under the
Home Owners' Loan Act to promulgate regulations that preempt state law affecting federal savings
associations. It is well settled that federal law preempts state law where Congress' intent to preempt
is explicitly stated in the statute's language and that federal regulations have no less preemptive
effect than federal statutes. The regulation overtly states that the "OTS hereby occupies the entire
field of federal savings associations' deposit related regulations" thereby expressing its intention to
preempt state law governing deposit related regulations and therefore shall control over any state
statutes. In Lopez, the Court reasoned:
This state law, which exempts Social Security and 551 benefits from
any enforcement action, would impose requirements governing
"checking accounts" because it would prohibit the use of certain
deposits to the accounts to clear overdrafts and mandate the type of
disclosures a bank must make regarding account and deposit
transactions. It would also impose requirements regarding "funds
availability" by prohibiting federal savings associations from treating
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certain benefits as available to clear overdrafts and pay fees. Finally,
it would impose requirements governing "service charges and fees,"
because it would prohibit the bank from deducting overdraft fees from
directly deposited benefits. By imposing requirements governing
"checking accounts," Section 704.080 falls within the specific
categories of laws that are preempted under Section 557.12.
When the Bank of America verdict is appealed it is entirely possible that the decision will be
reversed on preemption grounds. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("GCe") has a
regulation similar to the OTS regulation at issue in Lopez. 12 C.F.R. Part 7.4002 gives a national
bank the authority to impose non-interest charges and fees, including deposit account service
charges to its customers.
The court in Lopez also dealt with the issue of whether or not the use of directly deposited
Social Security benefits to satisfy obligations owed to the depositing bank was in violation of
federal law. The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs (a) voluntarily opened an account with
the bank and executed and account holder agreement which outlined the terms and conditions of the
Washington Mutual's overdraft policies, (b) established a direct deposit for their benefits, an
agreement to which Washington Mutual was not a party, and (c) remained free at all times to close
their account or change their direct deposit instructions, each deposit to the account after an
overdraft should therefore be treated as a voluntary payment of debt incurred.
The scope of the Bank of America verdict should ultimately be limited to state chartered
banks doing business in California. We are not aware of similar public benefit direct deposit
restrictions in other states.
In Re Washington Mutual Overdraft Protection Litigation
On April 26, 2004, the United States District Court, Central District of California, dismissed
a class action lawsuit against Washington Mutual Bank ("WAMU") that alleged that WAMU
violated the Truth in Lending Act (''TILA''), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq., the Home Owners' Loan
Act ("HOLA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, et seq., and various Washington and California state laws. The
plaintiffs in the case alleged that WAMU extended credit to its customers through an overdraft
courtesy program called Overdraft Limit. They also claimed WAMU's overdraft protection
promotional materials represented that WAMU agreed as a matter of contract to be legally obligated
to pay all overdraft items up to a certain assigned limit and thus created a credit relationship. The
promotional materials included the following phrases: "Don't worry, we'll cover you," "Automatic
protection provided to all new checking accounts," and "Up to your limit, we'll pay your checks."
The plaintiffs asserted that overdraft fees are "finance charges" covered by TILA and thus
require proper annual percentage rate disclosures under TILA regulations. The Court concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the overdraft fees were "finance charges." The Court cited
Section 226.4(b)(2) of Regulation Z in coming to this conclusion. Regulation Z states that, "any
charge imposed on a checking account" is deemed a finance charge only if it "exceeds the charge
for a similar account without a credit feature." In other words, "[i]f a charge for an account with a
credit feature does not exceed the charge for an account without a credit feature, the charge is not a
finance charge under §226.4(b)(2)." 12 C.F.R. §226.4, Supp. 1,14(b)
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The plaintiffs also claimed that WAMU's overdraft fee was the same amount for ~ccounts
with or without the credit feature; therefore, the overdraft fee would not be a finance charge under
Regulation Z. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that the parties had
a written credit agreement pertaining to the payment of items that create an overdraft as an
additional reason in support of the conclusion that the overdraft fees are not finance charges. The
plaintiffs had alleged that WAMU "represented in its promotional materials that it was agreeing as a
matter of contract to be legally obligated to pay all overdraft items up to the 'limit' assigned to the
account." The Court rightly concluded that promotional materials are not agreements and therefore
to the extent that the promotional materials directly contradict a subsequent depository agreement,
they will not support a legal conclusion that the parties agreed in writing to payment of the overdraft
fees.
In addition, the plaintiffs argued that overdraft fees are "interest" and therefore are subject to
limits imposed by HOLA. The Court ruled that overdraft fees were not "interest" imposed in
connection with a credit transaction, but were instead charges arising from the terms of the
depository agreement. The Court cited Nicolas v. Deposit Ouar. Nat'l Bank, 182 F.R.D. at 231 as
providing the most persuasive argument for the Court's conclusion. In Nicolas, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Southern Division, relied on a brief filed by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"). According to the oce, the overdraft fee
was not "interest" in connection with an extension of credit since the bank charge(s) the fee without
regard to whether the Bank pays the item creating the overdraft. The Court found that instead the
fee was a deposit account service charge governed by the depository agreement. WAMU charged
an overdraft fee regardless of whether a check was honored or returned unpaid and therefore the
court concluded that the overdraft charges were not "interest" imposed in connection with an
extension of credit under HOLA, § 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g)(1).
Further, the plaintiffs asserted that ATM and Debit cards are "credit cards" when they
include an overdraft courtesy feature and therefore are subject to TILA regulations that prohibit
·unsolicited issuance of credit cards and require disclosure of the annual percentage rate in periodic
statements. The Court ruled that the plaintiff's claim failed because ATM cards and debit cards are
not subject to Regulation Z's disclosure requirements for credit cards. Under Regulation Z, 12
C.F.R. §226.5a, a credit card issuer must make certain disclosures when it solicits an application to
open a credit card account. However, section 226.Sa(a)(3) expressly excludes "overdraft lines of
credit tied to asset accounts accessed by check-guarantee cards or by debit cards; or lines of credit
accessed by check-guarantee cards or debit cards that can be used only at ATMs." In addition,
because the overdraft fees are not "finance charges," Regulation Z does not require disclosure of an
annual percentage rate. Based on the aforementioned analysis the Court determined that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim under TILA.
The aforementioned federal law violations were dismissed, as a result, the Court exercised
its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction of the pendent state law claims and therefore
dismissed the state law claims without prejudice or comment.
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EXHmIT4
LEGAL RISKS REVIEW FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The "Legal Risks Review for Financial Institutions" is reproduced with pennission from BSG,
LLC from their OverdrafHonor Implementation Manual for educational purpose only. This
material is proprietary and any further reproduction or use without the prior written consent of
BSG. LLC is prohibited.
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LEGAL RISKS REVIEW FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Regulation B (12 CFR Part 202);
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 USC § 1691).
Regulation B prohibits discrimination in credit transactions based on "race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age." 12 CPR § 202.2(z). This prohibition extends
from advertising through applications, adverse action notices, loans, collections, and charge-offs.
The OverdraftHonor® program is implemented on all accounts that meet the established
screening criteria. Thus certain consumers are not targeted for the ODH program while other
consumers are offered other more favorable credit products or overdraft services. Regulation B
defmes Itcredit" as "the right granted by a creditor to an applicant to defer payment of a debt,
incur debt and defer its payment, or purchase property or services and defer payment thereof' 12
CFR § 202.20). In addition, Regulation B defines the term "adverse action" and generally
requires a creditor who takes adverse action to send a notice to the consumer providing among
other things, the reasons for the adverse action, however, usual and customary practice has been
that when a financial institution returns a check because insufficient funds exist in the customer's
account, the institution need not provide the credit analysis of this decision required by
Regulation B. Some actions taken by financial institutions under overdraft protection programs
might constitute adverse action but would not require notice to the consumer if the credit is
deemed to be "incidental credit" as defined in Regulation B. "Incidental credit" includes
consumer credit that is not subject to a finance charge, is not payable by agreement in more than
four installments, and is not made pursuant to the terms of a credit card account. Regulation B
does not include paying an overdraft in its defmition of a finance charge. Applying this analysis
to the OverdraftHonor® leads to the conclusion that no adverse action notice is required by
Regulation B.
B. Regulation 0 (12 CFR Pa~ 215).
Regulation 0 requires reporting extensions of credit by a fmancial institution to an
"executive officer, director or principal shareholder," and related interests of same. 12 CPR §
215.1. For purposes of Regulation 0 only, and no other federal statute or Federal Reserve Board
Regulation. an overdraft is expressly considered an extension of credit. See 12 CFR § 215.3.
The OverdraftHonor® policy stating when an NSF will be paid or returned cannot be offered to
persons covered by Regulation O.
c. Regulation Z (12 CFR Part 226): Truth-In-Lending Act (15 USC § 1601)
Regulation Z requires disclosure of significant tenns of consumer credit through the use
of prescribed language and document formats. Regulation Z applies to extensions of credit,
which are defined as "the right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment."
12 CFR § 226.2(a)(14). Four conditions must be satisfied for Regulation Z to apply to a
transaction: n(i) the credit is offered or extended to consumers; (ii) the offering or extension of
credit is done regularly; (iii) the credit is subject to a finance charge or is payable by a written
agreement in more than four installments; and (iv) the credit is primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes." 12 CPR § 226.1(c)(I). Three cases have examined this third requirement
and held that flat fees charged to checking accounts for insufficient fund checks did not violate
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Regulation Z. The most recent, on April 26, 2004, the United States District Court, Central
District of California, dismissed a class action lawsuit against Washington Mutual Bank that
alleged that Washington Mutual Bank's overdraft fees were ''finance charges" covered by the
Truth in Lending Act. OverdraftHonor®TM as well as the overdraft program utilized by
Washington Mutual Bank assesses the same fee for insufficient fund items, whether the item is
paid or returned and therefore is not a fmance charge. Thus, the Regulation Z disclosures will not
be required in connection with the OverdraftHonor® program as they were not required for
Washington Mutual Bank. (See also Taylor v. Union Planters Bank ofSouthern Mississippi, 964
F.Supp. 1120 (S.D Miss 1997); Nicolas v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, 182 FRO 226 (SD.
Miss. 1998)).
In addition, the Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs issued in February
2005 clearly states "fees for paying overdraft items currently are not considered fmance charges if
the institution has not agreed in writing to pay overdrafts. Even where the institution agrees in
writing to pay overdrafts as part of the deposit account agreement, fees assessed against a
transaction account for overdraft protection services are finance charges only to the extent the
fees exceed the charges imposed for paying or returning overdrafts on a similar transaction
account that does not have overdraft protection."
D. Regulation DD (12 CFR Part 230); Truth-In-Savings Act (12 USC § 4301).
Regulation DD governs much of the content of the bank's Truth-In-Savings disclosure
brochures or forms required to be given to a new deposit account customer. See 12 CPR § 230.4.
In addition, when a change in terms occurs that may reduce the annual percentage yield or
adversely effect the consumer in terms of higher fees, the financial institution must give notice of
this change and disclose the effective date of the change to the customer at least 30 calendar days
before the effective date of the change. See 12 CFR § 230.5.
OverdraftHonor® does not affect the terms or fees associated with deposit accounts.
OverdraftHonor® simply· clarifies a process already in place at an institution for paying or
returning checks when a customer experiences an NSF. For this reaSOD, no 30-day notification is
required. However, if the financial institution changes its overdraft fee at the same time it
implements this program, Regulation DD disclosure will be required.
Regulation DD also limits how accounts may be advertised. Specifically, descriptions of
an account as "free" or "no cost" are prohibited if minimum balances must be maintained to avoid
transaction fees, there is a maximum number of transactions allowed on the account or regular
service or transaction fees are imposed on the account. 12 CPR § 230.4(b)(4). 12 CPR §
230.4(b)(4) Supp. I, lists specific fees that must be disclosed, including monthly service fees,
"fees for special services, such as stop-payment fees, fees for balance inquiries or verification of
deposits, fees associated with checks returned unpaid." The overdraft fee charged under this
policy does not expressly fall under the types of fees that must be disclosed to the customer.
However, these fees could be considered "transaction and service fees that consumers reasonably
expect to be imposed on a regular basis." 12 CFR § 230.8(a) Snpp I. Thus, OverdraftHonor® is
implemented on a number of different consumer account types and not just "free" accounts.
The NSF and overdraft fees are not fees imposed on a specific type of deposit account,
but are fees associated with customers experiencing an NSF in relation to their account.
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Therefore, these fees have not been considered. activity fees associated with a specific deposit
account.
E. Regulation CC (12 CFR Part 229).
Regulation CC requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal by
depositors on a specified schedule. Regulation CC issues are usually addressed in a financial
institution's Truth-in-Savings disclosure brochures or forms. Regulation CC addresses the
financial institution's responsibilities if an item resulting in an NSF situation is returned unpaid.
See 12 CPR §§ 229.30 - 229.33. The Regulation does not pertain to a financial institution's
decision to payor return an item, which results in an NSF situation. In addition, 12 CFR §
229.13 prohibits a financial institution from collecting overdraft fees if the it has increased the
time before funds will be made available without giving notice to the customer. The theory
behind this limitation is the overdraft would not have occurred if the funds availability had not
been delayed and the deposited check actually paid.
F. Regulation E (12 CFR Part 205).
Regulation E regulates issuance of ATM cards and limits customer liability for misuse.
See 12 CFR §§ 205.5 - 205.6. Regulation E issues are often addressed through the Truth-in-
Savings disclosure brochures or forms. As it relates to our program, Reg. E requires that financial
institutions cannot insist that the auto-transfers to repay a New Start Repayment Program come
from a specific account chosen by the financial institution, but can come from an account chosen
by the customer.
G. Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 USC § 1681) I Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction
Act of 2003 (the "FACT Act").
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (the ''FCRA'') regulates the consumer-credit reporting
industry in an effort to promote more accurate reporting of credit information. See 15 USC §
1681(b). This Act was extended, effective as of 1997, to require that adverse action notices be
provided to consumer's for not just credit, insurance, or employment situations, but ANY action
adverse to the interests of the consumer if the financial institution's action is based in whole or in
part on infonnation in a consumer report. See 15 USC § 1681(k).
For purposes of the FCRA, a consumer report is defmed as "any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living" 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(1). A consumer report from Chex Systems
used to deny a consumer the ability to open a checking account at a financial institution would
require the issuance of an adverse action notice to the consumer under the FeRA.
Financial institutions have generally not considered the decision to payor return an
overdraft as requiring adverse action reporting. It is important under the OverdraftHonor®
policy that the financial institution does not use any communication or information provided
by a consumer-reporting agency in the decision making process for paying or returning an
NSF transaction.
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The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 (the "FACT Act") was signed into
law on December 4, 2003. The purpose of this new law is to expand the provisions of the FCRA
with a goal of uniform national standards in a number of key areas. In addition, the FACT Act is
intended to provide consumers with additional tools to fight identity theft and to ensure the
accuracy of their credit reports. As part of these additional tools the FACT Act requires financial
institutions to provide negative information notices to customers before sending such information
to a consumer reporting agency. This requirement became effective December 1, 2004.
The following are excerpts from the FACT Act and the FCRA that explain who is
required to provide the negative infonnation notice:
§ 623(7)(A)(i): If any financial institution that extends credit and regularly and
in the ordinary course of business furnishes infonnation to a consumer reporting
agency described in section 603(p) of this title furnishes negative information to
such an agency regarding credit extended to a customer, the financial institution
shall provide a notice of such furnishing of negative information, in writing, to
the customer.
§ 603(p): The term "consumer reporting agency that compiles and maintains
files on consumers on a nationwide basis" means a consumer reporting agency
that regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating, and
maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties
bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity,
each of the following regarding consumers residing nationwide:
(1) Public record information.
(2) Credit account information from persons who furnish that information
regularly and in the ordinary course of business.
The definition of a consumer reporting agency is broad enough to include agencies such
as ChexSystems. As such, collection letters should proactively inform consumers of negative
information that will be provided to consumer reporting agencies. The model disclosures set
forth in the regulations only address the negative impact on a consumer's credit report, however,
we have always recommended that consumers be informed of the possibility of not being able to
obtain checking account privileges at other financial institutions.
The FACT Act requires institutions to send a negative information notice to customers
before furnishing such notice to the consumer reporting agency, but in no event later than 30 days
after the occurrence of the reporting event. Once reported, the financial institution is not required
to send further notices if additional negative information concerning the same transaction,
extension of credit, account, or customer is provided to the consumer reporting agency.
Until we receive further clarification, we recommend the following sample language be
added to collection letters and brochures. The FACT Act states that a fmancial institution shall
be deemed to be in compliance with the negative notice requirement if the financial institution
uses the model disclosure form prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board. The last two lines are
from the model disclosure form.
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We may report infonnation about your account to consumer reporting agencies,
which may affect your ability to obtain checking account privileges at other
financial institutions. We may also report infonnation about your account to
credit bureaus. Late payments, missed payments, or other defaults on your
account may be reflected in your credit report.
H. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 27 (12 USC § 1831d); National Banking Act § 85
(12 USC § 85).
Section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 USC § 1831d, sets forth the
maximum level of interest chargeable by a state chartered, federally insured bank. In interpreting
Section 27, the FDIC General Counsel has held that cases decided under Section 85 of the
National Banking Act, 12 USC § 85, are controlling as to the definition of interest for purposes of
Section 27. Section 85 of the National Banking Act regulates the interest rate a federally
chartered bank may charge customers. Under Section 85, the preliminary issue is if the charge is
considered interest under applicable state law. If the fee were considered interest under the
applicable state's law, it would be subject to the restriction on maximum interest rates imposed by
either Section 27 or Section 85. Each financial institution implementing the OverdraftHonor®
program will need to perfonn an analysis of applicable state legal issues.
I. Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45)
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits unfair or deceptive
acts or practices. The banking agencies enforce this section pursuant to their authority in section
8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818.14 An act or practice is unfair if it
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition. An act or practice is deceptive if, in general, it is a representation, omission, or
practice that is likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances, and the
representation, omission, or practice is material.
The OverdraftHonor® program disclosures clearly inform consumers of all aspects of the
overdraft service including the fee charged for each NSF item, and that the institution is not
encouraging accountholders to overdraw their accounts or become dependent on the policy to
meet short-term cash needs.
J. Green Book Guidelines (Enrolbnent - Section G Termination of Enrollment,
Termination by the Financial Institution).
http://www.fms.treas.oovlgreenbooklenroll/enroll-g.html
The 9reen Book is a comprehensive guide for financial institutions processing Federal
government ACH payments and collections.
Financial institutions may close an account to which Federal benefit payments are
currently being sent by providing a 30-day written notice to the recipient prior to closing the
account. In cases involving fraud, accounts may be closed immediately. The fmancial institution
cannot revoke the enrollment authorization by notifying the Federal agency and not the recipient.
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The 30-day written notice should remind the recipient to make other arrangements for the
handling of hislher payments. The financial institution must credit to the recipient's account any
payments received during the 30-day notice period. The financial institution must also
immediately return to the Federal government all payments received after the 30-day notice
period. A financial institution that closes the account without properly terminating the enrollment
must make the funds available to the recipient until proper notice is provided.
K. Call Reports of Unpaid Overdraft Balances.
Call Reports do provide that unpaid overdraft balances and over 30-day balances be
reported as delinquent loans. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Reports
of Condition and Income Instructions. After 30 days, the OverdraftHonor® process may have
some overdraft balances converted into New Start Repayment Programs (non-interest bearing
loans), or the process to write these balances off will be started. IT the financial institution and
customer agree to convert the overdraft balance into a loan, the institution's loan documentation
process will be followed.
L. State Regulations.
The foregoing analysis focuses on federal statutes and regulations. State statutes and
regulations may impact the ability of a fmancial institution to implement OverdraftHonor® in a
given state. Some potential state law issues are the state's definition of a "loan", the state's
method of calculating interest, the state's usury laws and the state's banking regulations. As with
other programs, the financial institution must comply with all state and federal statutes and
regulations.
BSG. LLC Disclaimer
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST YOU IN MAKING AN INFORMED
DECISION WITH RESPECT TO YOUR POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
OVERDRAFTHONOR®. WHILE WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ASSISTED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM AND OBSERVED THE SUCCESSFUL
RESOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE AND LEGAL CONCERNS OF A NUMBER OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, BSG, LLC RECOMMENDS THAT YOU PERFORM AN
INDEPENDENT LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW, AND IMPLEMENT THIS
OVERDRAFTHONOR® SERVICE ONLY AFTER REVIEW WITH YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL.
WHILE WE PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF REGULATIONS, LEGAL ISSUES AND USUAL AND
CUSTOMARY PRACTICES, WE EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE NOT
ATTORNEYS, DO NOT REPRESENT OUR EFFORTS AS A LEGAL OPINION, AND CANNOT
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEGAL DECISIONS AND CHOICES YOUR INSTITUTION
MAKES.
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LEGAL RISKS REVIEW FOR CREDIT UNIONS
Federal Credit Union Regulations.
Section 701.21 is promulgated pursuant to the NeUA's Board's exclusive authority as set
forth in Section 107(5) of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 V.S.C 1757(5)) to regulate the rates,
tenns of repayment and other conditions of Federal credit union loans and lines of credit
(including credit cards) to members.
Section 701.21(c)(3) Credit applications and overdrafts, states that a credit union may
advance money to a member to cover an account deficit without having a credit application from
the borrower on file if the credit union has a written overdraft policy. The policy must:
1. Set a cap on the total dollar amount of all overdrafts the credit union will honor consistent
with the credit union's ability to absorb losses;
2. Establish a time limit not to exceed forty-five calendar days for a member either to
deposit funds or obtain an approved loan from the credit union to cover each overdraft;
3. Limit the dollar amount of overdrafts the credit union will honor per member; and
4. Establish the fee and interest rate, if any, the credit union will charge members for
honoring overdrafts.
Under the Truth in Savings Act, deposit account disclosures must include the amount of
any fee that may be imposed in connection with the account and the conditions under which the
fee may be imposed. The Truth in Savings Act is implemented by NeUA's Truth in Savings Act
regulation at 12 CFR Part 707 for federally insured credit unions.
Federal Credit Union Advertising Rules (12 CPR § 740.2.)
Section 740.2 addresses the use of advertisements or other representations that are
inaccurate or misrepresent the services or contracts offered which would include making false
representations to the public regarding an institution's deposit accounts. The OverdraftHonor®
program disclosures clearly inform consumers of all aspects of the overdraft service including the
fee charged for each NSF item, and that the institution is not encouraging accountholders to
overdraw their accounts or become dependent on the policy to meet short-term cash needs.
State Regulations.
The foregoing analysis focuses on federal credit union regulations. State statutes and
regulations may impact the ability of a fmancial institution to implement OverdraftHonor® in a
given state. Some potential state law issues are the state's definition of a "loan", the state's method
of calculating interest, the state's usury laws and the state's banking regulations. As with other
programs, the financial institution must comply with all state and federal statutes and regulations.
BSG, LLC Disclaimer
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST YOU IN MAKING AN INFORMED
DECISION WITH RESPECT TO YOUR POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
OVERDRAFTHONOR@. WHILE WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ASSISTED IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAM AND OBSERVED THE SUCCESSFUL
RESOLUTION OF THE COMPLIANCE AND LEGAL CONCERNS OF A NUMBER OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, BSG, LLC RECOMMENDS THAT YOU PERFORM AN
C - 53
111
BSG Financial
OverdraftHonor® Implementation Manual
Confidential & Proprietary Material
INDEPENDENT LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE REVIEW, AND IMPLEMENT TmS
OVERDRAFfHONOR® SERVICE ONLY AFTER REVIEW WITH YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL.
WHILE WE PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF REGULATIONS, LEGAL ISSUES AND USUAL AND
CUSTOMARY PRACTICES, WE EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE NOT
ATTORNEYS, DO NOT REPRESENT OUR EFFORTS AS A LEGAL OPINION, AND CANNOT
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LEGAL DECISIONS AND CHOICES YOUR INSTITUTION
MAKES.
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EXHIBITS
SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON - PROPOSED AND FINAL JOINT GUIDANCE
Overdraft balances should generally be
charged off within 30 days from the date
first overdrawn. [Revised in the final
Guidelines]
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Adopt express account eligibility
standards and well defined and properly
documented dollar limit decision criteria.
Monitor accounts on an ongoing basis
and be able to identify consumers who
ma re resent an undue credit.
Reports should be provided to enable
management to identify, measure, and
manage overdraft volume, profitability,
and credit erformance on a re ular basis.
Specific Timeframes for when consumers
must payoff their overdraft balances
should be established.
There should be established procedures
for the suspension of overdraft services
when the account holder no longer meets
the eligibility criteria as well as for when
the there is a lack of repayment of an
overdraft.
Overdraft balances should generally be
charged off when considered
uncollectible but no later than 60 days
from the date first overdrawn.
Guidelines allow extended repayment
plan "in some cases," however the
existence of the repayment plan would
not extend the charge off determination
eriod be ond 6O-da s.
Any payments received after the account
is charged off (up to the amount charged
off against allowance) should be reported
as a recove .
When overdrafts are rewritten as loan
obligations in accordance with an
institution's loan policy and supported by
a document assessment of that
consumer's ability to repay the charge-off
timeframes in the FFIEC Uniform Retail
Credit Classification and Account
Mana ement Polic would a 1.
Institutions should follow GAAP and the
instruction for the Call Report and NCUA
5300 Call Re ort
Overdraft balances should be reported on
re ulato rts as loans. Accordin 1 ,
overdraft losses should be charged off
against the allowance for loan and lease
losses and uncollected overdraft fees
should be reversed against overdraft fee
income or an associated earned fee loss
allowance. [Revised in the final
Guidelines]
The Agencies expect all institutions to
adopt rigorous loss estimation processes
to ensure that any allowances related to
earned fees reflect all estimated losses
and that earned but uncollected fees are
accounted for accurately. [Revised in
the final Guidelines]
[Not mentioned in initial draft of the
Guidelines]
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overdraft losses should be charged off
against the allowance for loan and lease
losses.
The Agencies expect all institutions to
adopt rigorous loss estimation processes
to ensure that overdraft fee income is
accurately measured.
If an institution advises account holders
of the available amount of overdraft
protection the institution should report the
available amount of overdraft protection
with legally binding commitments for
Call Report, and NCUA 5300 Call Report
purposes. These available amounts,
therefore, should be reported as "unused
commitments" in re lato r orts.
The Agencies also expect proper risk-
based capital treatment of outstanding
overdrawn balances and unused
commitments. Overdraft balances should
be risk-wei hted accordin to the obli or.
Institutions entering into overdraft
protection contracts with third-party
vendors must conduct thorough due
diligence reviews prior to signing a
contract.
Institutions should have their overdraft
protection programs reviewed by counsel
for compliance with all applicable laws
rior to im lementation.
Institutions should monitor applicable
laws and regulations for revisions and to
ensure that their overdraft protection
ro ams are full com Hant.
Institutions must avoid engaging in
deceptive, inaccurate, misrepresentative,
or unfair practices, and closely review all
aspects of their overdraft protection
programs, especially any material that
inform consumers about the ro ams.
Currently fees for paying overdraft items
are not considered finance charges if the
institution has not agreed in writing to
pay overdrafts, however, Regulation Z
would be triggered if an overdraft
repayment loan (usually offered to those
who cannot re a their overdrafts is
payable by written agreement in more
than four installments. Regulation Z will
also be triggered where such loans are
sub'ect to a finance char e.
When overdraft protection services are
added to an existing deposit account,
advance notice to the account holder may
be required, for example, if the fee for the
service exceeds the fee for accounts that
do not have the service.
Institutions should not market the
program in a manner that encourage
routine or intentional overdrafts.
Institutions should instead present that
program as a customer service that may
cover inadvertent consumer overdrafts.
If, under an overdraft protection program,
a consumer could overdraw an account by
means of an ATM withdrawal or POS
debit card transaction, both are EFTs
subject to EFTA and Regulation E. As
such, periodic statements must be readily
understandable and accurate regarding
debits made, current balances, and fees
charged. Terminal receipts also must be
readily understandable and accurate
re ardin the amount of the transfer.
Under the ECOA and Regulation B,
creditors are prohibited from
discriminating against an applicant on a
prohibited basis in any aspect of a credit
transaction.
Fairly represent overdraft protection
programs and alternatives. When
informing consumers about an overdraft
protection program, inform consumers
generally of other overdraft services and
credit products, if any, that are available
at the institution and how the terms,
including fees, for these services and
roducts differ.
Train staff to explain program features
and other choices. Train customer
service or consumer complaint processing
staff to explain their overdraft protection
program's features, costs, and terms,
includin how to 0 t out of the service.
Where the added overdraft protection fees
do not exceed previously disclosed NSF
fees, a new disclosure may be required if
the previous disclosure did not adequately
disclose that the fees would be assessed
for both paid checks and returned checks.
[This sentence did not make it to the final
Guidelines.)
If the overdraft payment is discretionary, Clearly explain discretionary nature of
describe the circumstances in which the program
...••.'.::-:.,:..",,'.;:1 institution would refuse to pay an
<:'F;:,;wi;:.1 overdraft or otherwise suspend the
'C·'."".:,,:,-,.. overdraft rotection ro am.
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.0"".,:.' •..."1 Furthermore, if payment of overdrafts is
,,,.. ",!,""",.. discretionary, information provided to
!0f~t;S?"":',C:':;}:? \i:;'{'. >1 consumers should not contain any
<:,: ,Y... /C: ?K:;i";:~;·~~~:.F\1 representations that would lead a<, consumer to expect that payment of
overdrafts is guaranteed or assured.
[These two sentences did not make the
final Guidelines)
Clearly disclose to consumers the order in
which the institution pays checks or
processes other transactions (e.g.,
transactions at the ATM or point of sale
terminal). [This sentence did not make
the final Guidelines)
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Distinguish overdraft protection services
from ''Free account features. Institutions
should not promote "free" account and
overdraft protection programs in the same
advertisement in a manner that suggests
the overdraft protection program is free of
char es.
In communications about overdraft
protection programs, clearly disclose the
dollar amount of the fee for each
overdraft and any interest rate or other
fees that rna a I.
Clarify that fees count against the
disclosed overdraft protection dollar
limit.
Demonstrate when multiple fees will be
char ed.
Explain impact of transaction clearing
policies. Transactions may not be
processed in the order in which they
occurred and the order in which
transactions are received by the
institution and processed can affect the
total amount of overdraft fees incurred.
lllustrate the type of transactions covered.
Clearly disclose that overdraft fees may
be imposed on transactions such as ATM
withdrawals, debit card transactions. etc.
Provide election or opt-out of service.
Obtain affirmative consent of consumers
to receive overdraft protection.
Alternatively, where overdraft protection
is automatically provided, permit
consumers to "opt-out" of the program
and provide a clear consumer disclosure
of this 0 tion.
Alert consumers before a transaction
triggers any fees. When consumers
attempt to withdraw or transfer funds
made available through an overdraft
protection program, provide a specific
consumer notice, where feasible, that
completing the withdrawal may trigger
the overdraft fees. This notice should be
presented in a manner that permits
consumers to cancel the attempted
withdrawal or transfer after receivin the
notice. If this is not feasible, then post
notices (e.g., on proprietary ATMs)
explaining that transactions may be
approved that overdmw the account and
fees rna be incurred.
Prominently distinguish balances from
overdraft protection funds availability.
Institutions should also consider Promptly notify consumers of overdraft
reiterating the terms of the overdraft protection program usage each time used.
protection service when the consumer
accesses the service for the first time.
Where feasible, notify consumers in
advance if the institution plans to
terminate or suspend the consumer's
access to the service. [These two
sentences did not make the final
Guidelines]
Consider limiting the number of Consider imposing a cap on consumers'
overdrafts or the dollar amount of fees potential daily costs from the overdraft
that will be charged against anyone program.
account each day while continuing to
provide coverage for all overdrafts up to
the overdraft limit. [Revised in the final
Guidelines]
Monitor excessive consumer usage,
which may indicate a need for alternative
credit arrangements or other services, and
inform consumers of these available
o tions.
Institutions should not report negative
information to consumer reporting
agencies when the overdrafts are paid
under the terms of the overdraft
rotection ro ams.
C·59
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EXHIBIT 6
SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON - OTS GUIDANCE AND FINAL JOINT GUIDANCE
Adopt express account eligibility
standards and well defined and properly
documented dollar limit decision criteria.
Monitor accounts on an ongoing basis
and be able to identify consumers who
rna re resent an undue credit.
Reports should be provided to enable
management to identify, measure, and
manage overdraft volume, profitability,
and credit erformance on a re ular basis.
Specific Timeframes for when consumers
must payoff their overdraft balances
should be established.
There should be established procedures
for the suspension of overdraft services
when the account holder no longer meets
the eligibility criteria as well as for when
the there is a lack of repayment of an
overdraft.
Overdraft balances should generally be
charged off when considered
uncollectible but no later than 60 days
from the date first overdrawn.
Guidelines allow extended repayment
plan "in some cases," however the
existence of the repayment plan would
not extend the charge off determination
eriod be ond 60-da s.
Any payments received after the account
is charged off (up to the amount charged
off against allowance) should be reported
as a recover .
When overdrafts are rewritten as loan
obligations in accordance with an
institution's loan policy and supported by
a document assessment of that
consumer's ability to repay the charge-off
timeframes in the FFIEC Uniform Retail
Credit Classification and Account
Mana ement Polic would a I.
Associations should follow Institutions should follow GAAP and the
instruction for the Call Report and NCUA
5300 Call Re ort
do not have a Overdraft balances should be reported on
re ulato re rts as loans. Accordin I ,
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[The OTS Guidelines do not have a
parallel provision]
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a
parallel provision]
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section)
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section)
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section)
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section)
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section)
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overdraft losses should be charged off
against the allowance for loan and lease
losses.
The Agencies expect all institutions to
adopt rigorous loss estimation processes
to ensure that overdraft fee income is
accuratel measured.
If an institution advises account holders
of the available amount of overdraft
protection the institution should report the
available amount of overdraft protection
with legally binding commitments for
Call Report, and NCUA 5300 Call Report
purposes. These available amounts,
therefore, should be reported as "unused
commitments" in re ulator re orts.
The Agencies also expect proper risk-
based capital treatment of outstanding
overdrawn balances and unused
commitments. Overdraft balances should
be risk-wei hted accordin to the obli or.
Institutions entering into overdraft
protection contracts with third-party
vendors must conduct thorough due
diligence reviews prior to signing a
contract.
Institutions should have their overdraft
protection programs reviewed by counsel
for compliance with all applicable laws
rior to im lementation.
Institutions should monitor applicable
laws and regulations for revisions and to
ensure that their overdraft protection
ro ams are full com liant.
Institutions must avoid engaging in
deceptive, inaccurate, misrepresentative,
or unfair practices, and closely review all
aspects of their overdraft protection
programs, especially any material that
inform consumers about the ro ams.
Currently fees for paying overdraft items
are not considered finance charges if the
institution has not agreed in writing to
pay overdrafts, however, Regulation Z
would be triggered if an overdraft
repayment loan (usually offered to those
who cannot repay their overdrafts) is
payable by written agreement in more
than four installments. Regulation Z will
also be triggered where such· loans are
sub'ect to a finance char e.
Under the ECOA and Regulation B,
creditors are prohibited from
discriminatin a ainst an a licant on a
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section]
[The OTS Guidelines do not have a legal
risks section]
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prohibited basis in any aspect of a credit
transaction.
When overdraft protection services are
added to an existing deposit account,
advance notice to the account holder may
be required, for example. if the fee for the
service exceeds the fee for accounts that
do not have the service.
If. under an overdraft protection program,
a consumer could overdraw an account by
means of an ATM withdrawal or POS
debit card transaction, both are EFrs
subject to EFTA and Regulation E. As
such. periodic statements must be readily
understandable and accurate regarding
debits made, cmrent balances. and fees
charged. Terminal receipts also must be
readily understandable and accurate
re ardin the amount of the transfer.
'. ~~ "A'ii:
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Institutions should not market the
program in a manner that encourage
routine or intentional overdrafts.
Institutions should instead present that
program as a customer service that may
cover inadvertent consumer overdrafts.
Fairly represent overdraft protection
programs and alternatives. When
informing consumers about an overdraft
protection program, inform consumers
generally of other overdraft services and
credit products, if any, that are available
at the institution and how the terms,
including fees, for these services and
ducts differ.
Train staff to explain program features
and other choices. Train customer
service or consumer complaint processing
staff to explain their overdraft protection
program's features, costs, and terms,
includin how to 0 t out of the service.
Clearly explain discretionary nature of
ro am
Distinguish overdraft protection services
from "Free account features. Institutions
should not promote "free" account and
overdraft protection programs in the same
advertisement in a manner that suggests
the overdraft protection program is free of
char es.
In communications about overdraft
protection programs, clearly disclose the
dollar amount of the fee for each
overdraft and any interest rale or other
fees that ma a I.
Savings associations should also clearly
disclose rules for processing and clearing
transactions. [This suggestion in the OTS
Guidelines is also found in the Proposed
Joint Guidelines but not the Final Joint
Guidelines.] [See also Item 18 below]
If canceling the transaction is not feasible
for a particular type of transaction, then
savings associations should allow
consumers the choice to make access to
the overdraft protection program
unavailable by transaction type, even if it
results in limiting access to the overdraft
protection amount only to check
transactions. [This sentence is unique to
the OTS Guidelines.]
Clarify that fees count against the
disclosed overdraft protection dollar
limit.
Demonstrate when multiple fees will be
char ed.
Explain impact of transaction clearing
policies. Transactions may not be
processed in the order in which they
occurred and the order in which
transactions are received by the
institution and processed can affect the
total amount of overdraft fees incurred.
Dlustrate the type of transactions covered.
Clearly disclose that overdraft fees may
be imposed on transactions such as ATM
withdrawals, debit card transactions, etc.
Provide election or opt-out of service.
Obtain affirmative consent of consumers
to receive overdraft protection.
Alternatively. where overdraft protection
is automatically provided, permit
consumers to "opt-out" of the program
and provide a clear consumer disclosure
of this 0 tion.
Alert consumers before a transaction
triggers any fees. When consumers
attempt to withdraw or transfer funds
made available through an overdraft
protection program, provide a specific
consumer notice, where feasible, that
completing the withdrawal may trigger
the overdraft fees. This notice should be
presented in a manner that permits
consumers to cancel the attempted
withdrawal or transfer after receiving the
notice. If this is not feasible, then post
notices (e.g., on proprietary ATMs)
explaining that transactions may be
approved that overdraw the account and
fees rna be incurred.
Prominently distinguish balances from
overdraft protection funds availability.
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Do not manipulate transaction-clearing
rules. Transaction-clearing rules
(including check-clearing and batch debit
processing) should not be administered
unfairly or manipulated to inflate fees.
[This sentence is unique to the OTS
Guidelines.]
C·65
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PROPOSED REGULATION DD Al\fENDl\fENTS
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Proposed Rules
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices Is to give Interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 230
[Regulation DD; Docket No. R-1197]
Truth in Savings
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Board proposes to amend
Regulation DO, which implements the
Troth in Savings Act. and the staff
commentary to the regulation, to
address concerns about the uniformity
and adequacy of information provided
to consumers when they overdraw their
accounts. The proposed amendments, in
part, address a specific service offered
by depository institutions, commonly
referred to as "bounced-check
protection" or "courtesy overdraft
protection.n
Bounced-checlc protection is an
automated service that is sometimes
provided to deposit account consumers
as an alternative to a traditional line of
credit. To address concerns about the
marketing ofbounced-check protection
services, a proposed revision to the
regulation would expand the
prohibition against misleading
advertisements to cover
communications with current
consumers about existing accounts; the
staff commentary would provide
examples. Proposed revisions to
Regulation DD would require additional
fee and other disclosures about
automated overdraft services, including
in advertisements. The Board also is
proposing amendments of general
applicability that would require
institutions to provide more unifonn
disclosures about overdraft and
returned-item fees.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before August 6, 2004.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R-1197, by any
of the following methods:
• Agency Web site: http://
www.fedemlreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
http://www·federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm·
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail:
regs.comments@/edemlreserve.gov.
Include docket number in the subject
line of the message.
• FAX: 202/452-3819 or 202/452-
3102.
• Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW.• Washington,
DC 20551. All public comments are
available from the Board's web site at
http://www·federalreserve.gov/
genemlinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, except as necessary for
technical reasons. Accordingly, your
comments will not be edited to remove
any identifying or contact information.
Public comments may also be viewed
electronically or in paper in Room MP-
500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th
and C Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m. on weekdays.
FOR FURTHER INFORlIAnoN CONTACT:
Elizabeth A. Eurgubian, Attorney, or Ky
Tran-Trong or Krista P. DeLargy, Senior
Attomeys, Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, at (202)
452-3667 or 452-2412; for users of
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
("TDD") only, contact (202) 263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATK)N:
I. The Truth in Savings Act
The Truth in Savings Act (TISA), 12
U.S.C. 4301 et seq., is implemented by
the Board's Regulation DD (12 CPR part
230). The purpose of the act and
regulation is to assist consumers in
comparing deposit accounts offered by
depository institutions, principally
through the disclosure of fees, the
annual percentage yield (APY). the
interest rate. and other account terms.
An official staff commentary interprets
the requirements of Regulation DD (12
CFR part 230 (Supp. I)). Credit unions
are governed by a substantially similar
regulation issued by the National Credit
Union Administration.
Under TISA and Regulation DD,
disclosures must be given upon a
consumer's request and before an
account is opened. Institutions are not
required to provide periodic statements;
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but if they do, the act requires that fees.
yields, and other information be
provided on the statements. Notice must
be given to accountholders before an
adverse change in account tenns occurs
and prior to the renewal of certificates
of deposit (time accounts).
TISA and Regulation DD contain mIes
for advertising deposit accounts. There
is a prohibition against advertisements,
announcements, or solicitations that are
inaccurate or misleading, or that
misrepresent the deposit contract.
Institutions are also prohibited from
describing an account as free (or using
words of similar meaning) if a regular
service or transaction fee is imposed, if
a minimum balance must be
maintained, or if a fee is imposed when
a customer exceeds a specified number
of transactions. In addition, the act and
regulation impose substantive
restrictions on institutions' practices
regarding the payment of interest on
accounts and the calculation of account
balances.
D. Concerns Abont Bounced-Check
Protection Services
Historically, depository institutions
have used their discretion on an ad hoc
basis to pay overdrafts for consumers on
transaction accounts, usually imposing
a fee. Over the years, some institutions
automated the process for considering
whether to honor overdrafts to reduce
the costs of reviewing individual items,
but generally institutions did not inform
customers of their internal policies for
determining whether an item would be
paid or returned. More recently, third-
party vendors have developed and sold
automated programs to institutions.
particularly to smaller ones. What
generally distinguishes the vendor
programs from institutions' in-house
automated processes is the addition of
marketing plans that appear designed to
promote the generation of fee income by
stating a dollar amount that consumers
would be allowed to overdraw and by
encouraging consumers to overdraw
their accounts and use the service as a
line of credit.
While bounced-check protection
services vary among institutions, many
programs have the following
characteristics:
• Institutions inform consumers that
overdraft protection is a feature of their
accounts and promote the use ofthe
service. Institutions also infonn
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consumers of their aggregate dollar limit
under the overdraft protection program.
• Coverage is automatic for
consumers who meet the institution's
criteria (e.g., account has been open a
certain number of days, deposits are
made regularly). Typically, the
institution performs no credit
underwriting.
• Overdrafts generally are paid up to
the aggregate limit set by the institution
for the specific class of accounts,
typically $100 to $500.
• Many program disclosures state that
payment of an overdraft is discretionary
on the part of the institution, and may
disclaim any legal obligation of the
institution to pay any overdraft.
• The service may extend to check
transactions as well as other
transactions, such as withdrawals at
automated teller machines ("ATMs"),
transactions using debit cards, pre-
authorized automatic debits from a
consumer's account, telephone-initiated
funds transfers, and on-line banking
transactions.
• A flat fee is charged each time the
service is triggered and an overdraft
item is paid. Commonly, a fee in the
same amount would be charged even if
the overdraft item were not paid. A
daily fee also may apply for each day
the account remains overdrawn.
• Some institutions offer closed-end
loans to consumers who do not bring
their accoWlts to a positive balance
within a specified time period. These
repayment plans allow consumers to
repay their overdrafts and fees in
installments.
In November 2002, when it published
the annual proposed update to the staff
commentary to Regulation Z, the Board
solicited comment and information from
the public about how bounced-check
protection services are designed and
operated, to determine the need for
guidance to depository institutions
under Regulation Z or other laws (61 FR
12618, December 6, 2002). The Board
received approximately 350 comment
letters; most were from industry
representatives describing how the
services work.
Consumer advocates, state agency
representatives, and others believed that
bounced-eheck protection services
should be subject to TILA and
Regulation Z. They noted that in
addition to warning consumers about
the high cost of the service, Truth in
Lending disclosures would apprise
consumers about the true nature of the
service as a credit transaction. Industry
commenters opposed coverage under
TILA, stating that the current disclosure
requirements lUlder TISA are adequate,
and that coverage under TILA would be
burdensome. The Board believes that
consumers would benefit from more
uniform and complete information
about the costs and terms of overdraft
services not covered under TILA,
including in advertisements.
Improvements in the disclosures
provided to consumers could aid them
in understanding the costs associated
with overdrawing their accounts and
promote better account management.
The Board is not proposing at th}s time
to cover these services under TILA and
Regulation Z, although further
consideration of the need for such
coverage may be appropriate if concerns
about these overdraft programs persist
in the future.
Paying consumers' occasional or
inadvertent overdrafts is a long-
established customer service provided
by depository institutions. The Board
recognized this longstanding practice
when it initially adopted Regulation Z
in 1969; the regulation provided that
these transactions are generally exempt
from coverage under Regulation Z
where there is no written agreement
between the consumer and institution to
pay an overdraft and impose a fee. See
§ 226.4(c)(3). The exemption was
designed to facilitate depository
institutions' ability to accommodate
consumers on an ad-hoc basis.
The Board's study of bounced-check
protection services has identified a
number of concerns about some
programs. One major concern relates to
the adequacy of information provided to
consumers whose accounts are eligible
for bounced-check protection services.
The proposed revisions to Regulation
DD and the staff commentary are
intended to improve the infonnation
provided to consumers about these
overdraft services.
Other concerns center on institutions'
marketing practices. Although the
service is designed to protect consumers
against occasional inadvertent
overdrafts, some institutions'
promotional materials make the service
appear to be a line of credit, apparently
to promote a consumer's repeated use of
the service. Many of the marketing plans
include material that informs consumers
of the availabllity of the bounced-check
protection service, and also of the
maximum aggregate dollar amount of
overdrafts the institution will pay. Some
marketing plans encourage consumers
to use the service to meet short-term
credit needs, and not just as protection
against inadvertent overdrafts. Some
institutions have encouraged consumers
specifically to use an overdraft as an
advance on their next paycheck.
Notwithstanding the marketing
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promises, however, qualifying language
disclaims any legal obligation by the
institution to pay any overdraft. In some
cases, deposit accounts that are
promoted as being "free" also promote
bounced-check protection services that
involve substantial fees. In addition,
some institutions do not clearly inform
consumers that ATM withdrawals, debit
card transactions, or other electronic
transfers may routinely be authorized
under these overdraft services and that
fees will be imposed in such cases.
Proposed revisions to Regulation DD's
advertising rules and disclosure
requirements are intended to address
these concerns.
In addition to the Board's proposed
revisions to Regulation DD and the staff
commentary, the member agencies of
the Federal Financial Institution
Examination Council (FFIEC) have
developed proposed supervisory
guidance for institutions that offer
bounced-eheck protection services. The
proposed interagency guidance, which
is being published for comment, would
include best practices addressing the
marketing and operation ofbounced-
check protection services. For example,
institutions would be encouraged. to
obtain customers consent to receive
overdraft protection or inform
customers how they may "opt out" of
the service, avoid encouraging routine
or intentional overdrafts, and to
promptly notify consumers when they
access an overdraft protection service.
m. Concerns About Uniform Disclosure
of Overdraft Fees
The Board has concerns about the
unifonnity and adequacy of cost
disclosures provided to consumers
regarding overdraft and returned-item
fees under Regulation DD. Many
institutions already provide timely
information to consumers about
overdrafts in their accounts and the fees
imposed, including notices that are sent
at the time the overdraft occurs and on
periodic statements. These practices and
disclosures are not uniform among
institutions, however, and some
consumers may not receive adequate
infonnation on a timely basis.
Fees for paying overdrafts and for
returned items are typically flat fees
unrelated to the amoWlt of the item.
These amounts may be significant when
there are multiple overdrafts although
the items may represent relatively small
dollar amounts. Even when consumers
are aware that an account is or may
become overdrawn, they do not
necessarily know the number of
overdraft items that will result or the
total fees that will be imposed, both of
which are determined by the order in
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which items drawn on the account are
presented and the institution's policies
regarding the order in which items are
paid. Accordingly, some consumers may
not be aware of the total amount of fees
being imposed and the amount by
which the account is overdrawn until
the next periodic statement is received.
And when the periodic statement is
provided, it may intersperse fees among
other items rather than providing a total.
As a result, the overall cost of obtaining
credit through an overdraft service is
not clearly presented to consumers.
TISA was enacted, in part, for the
purpose of requiring clear and uniform
disclosures regarding deposit account
terms and fees assessable against these
accounts. Such disclosures allow
consumers to make meaningful
comparisons among different accounts
and to make informed judgments about
the use of their accounts. To further the
purposes of TISA, the Board is
proposing unifonn requirements for
notifying consumers about returned-
item fees and overdraft fees (whether
the overdraft is created by check, by
ATM withdrawal or other electronic
transfer, or by other means). These rules
will also help ensure that where an
overdraft is paid, consumers are
uniformly notified about the account's
status. Information about overdrafts and
returned items that is provided on a
regular and timely basis may enable
consumers to avoid unnecessary fees; it
may assist consumers to better consider
their approach to account management
and determine whether the account's
terms and features are suited to their
needs or whether other types of
accounts or services would be more
appropriate.
IV. Summary ofProposed Revisions
Pursuant to its authority under
Section 269(a) of TISA, the Board is
proposing the following revisions to
Regulation DD and the staff commentary
to address concerns about the
uniformity and adequacy of institutions'
disclosure of overdraft fees generally,
and to address concerns about
advertised automated overdraft services
(Ubounced-check protection services")
in particular:
Disclosures Concerning Overdroft Fees
Genemlly
Periodic statements. Institutions that
provide periodic statements would be
required to include the total amount of
fees imposed for overdrafts and the total
amount of fees for returned items for the
statement period and for the calendar
year to date.
Account-opening disclosures.
Institutions would be required to
specify in the account-opening
disclosures provided under the Truth in
Savings Act whether overdraft
protection fees may be imposed in
connection with checks, automated
teller machine (ATM) withdrawals, or
other electronic fund transfers.
Additional Protections for Accounts
With Certain Overdmft Protection
Services (Bounced-Check Protection)
Additional advertising disclosures. To
reduce consumer confusion about the
nature of the overdraft service and how
it differs from a traditional line of credit,
institutions that market automated
overdraft payment services that are not
covered by TILA would have to include
in their advertisements about the
service: the fee for the payment of each
overdraft item, the types of transactions
covered, the time period consumers
have to repay or cover any overdraft,
and the circumstances under which the
institution would not pay an overdraft.
An exemption in Regulation DD for
broadcast media, billboards, and
telephone response machines, which
applies to other types of advertising
disclosures, would also apply here.
Prohibiting misleading
advertisements. TISA prohibits
advertisements, announcements, or
solicitations that are misleading or that
misrepresent the deposit contract.
Currently, Regulation DD applies the
prohibition only to advertisements for
prospective accounts. To address
concerns about overdraft protection
services, Regulation DD would be
amended to also apply the prohibition
to communications with consumers
about the terms of their current
accounts.
Examples ofmisleading
advertisements. The staff commentary
would also be revised to provide five
examples of advertisements that would
ordinarily be deemed misleading: (1)
Representing an overdraft protection
service as a "line of credit;" (2)
representing that the institution will
honor all checks or transactions, when
the institution retains discretion at any
time not to honor any transaction; (3)
representing that consumers may
overdraw their accounts and maintain a
negative balance for an indefinite or
extended period when the tenns of the
service require consumers to promptly
retum the deposit account to a positive
balance; (4) describing a service solely
as protection against bOWlced checks
when the overdraft service may be
imposed in connection with ATM
withdrawals and other electronic fund
transfers that permit consumers to
overdraw their accolDlt; and (5)
describing an account as "free" or Uno
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cost" and also promoting a service for
which there is a fee (including a
bOWlced-eheck protection service),
unless the advertisement clearly and
conspicuously indicates there is a cost
associated with the service.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 230.2 Definitions
2(b) Advertisements
TISA prohibits institutions from
making any advertisement,
announcement, or solicitation relating
to a deposit account that is inaccurate
or misleading or that misrepresents its
deposit contract. 12 U.S.C. 4302(e).
Regulation DD defines "advertisement"
to include "a commercial message
appearing in any medium, that
promotes directly or indirectly the
availability of, or a deposit in, an
account." See § 230.2(b). Under the
existing staff commentary, institutions'
communications with consumers about
existing accounts are not considered
"advertisements" under Regulation DD.
See comment 2(b)-2.iii. The Board is
proposing to revise the definition of an
advertisement to cover communications
with existing consumers for some
purposes. The revised definition does
not affect rules for triggering additional
disclosures when an advertisement
states an APY or bonus; the existing
definition of "advertisement," which
would continue to apply for this
purpose, would be redesignated as
§ 230.2(b)(1) and would also be
modified for stylistic consistency; DO
substantive change is intended.
Proposed § 230.2(b)(2) applies TISA's
prohibition against misleading or
inaccurate advertisements or
misrepresentations of the deposit
contract to communications with
consumers about existing accounts. The
expanded definition of an advertisement
that covers existing accounts would also
apply in det~rminingwhether a
communication is an advertisement that
triggers additional disclosures about
overdraft protection services.
An advertisement includes a
commercial message that invites, offers,
or otherwise promotes a deposit or other
service in connection with an account
or class of accounts. The revision to the
definition of "advertisement" does not
affect providing required disclosures on
an account, such as at account opening,
on a periodic statement, or on an
electronic terminal receipt (as required
by TISA or the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, 15 U.S.c. 1693 et seq.), for
example. See new comment 2(b)-2.
Current comment 2(b)-2 would be
redesignated as comment 2(b)-3.
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Section 230.4 Account Disclosures
4(b) Content of Account Disclosmes
4(b)(4) Fees
Under TISA and Regulation DD,
before an account is opened. institutions
must provide a schedule describing all
fees that may be charged in connection
with the account. The schedule must
also disclose the amount of the fee and
the conditions under which the fee will
be imposed. 12 U.S.C. 4303;
§ 230.4(b)(4). When tenns required to be
disclosed in the schedule change and
adversely affect accountholders, notice
of the change must be provided 30 days
in advance. 12 U.S.C. 4305; § 2305(a).
Currently the guidance for describing
fees is quite general. providing that
"naming and describing the fee will
typically satisfy these requirements."
See comment 4(b)(4)-3. Proposed
comment 4(b)(4)-5 would require
institutions to state in their account-
opening disclosures the types of
transactions for which an overdraft
protection fee may be imposed. Solely
describing an overdraft protection fee as
a "fee for overdrafts" or "fee for
overdraft items" would not provide
sufficient notice to consumers as to
whether the fee applies to overdrafts by
check only or whether it also applies to
overdrafts by other means. The
proposed comment would clarify that
the disclosure must indicate that a fee
may be imposed in connection with
checks, ATM withdrawals, or other
electronic fund transfers that overdraw
the account, if that is the case.
Section 230.6 Periodic Statement
Disclosures
6(a) General Rule
6(a)(3) Fees Imposed
Although periodic statements are not
required by TISA, an institution that
provides such statements must disclose
any fees or charges imposed on the
account during the statement period. To
assist consumers in better
understanding the costs associated with
overdrawing their accounts, the Board is
proposing to revise the requirements for
providing cost disclosures on periodic
statements.
Under Regulation DO, fees must be
itemized on a periodic statement by
type, for example, by separately listing
the monthly service charge, ATM fees,
and returned check fees. When multiple
fees of the same type are charged in a
single period, comment 6(a)(3}-2 in the
current staff commentary to the
regulation states that institutions have
the option of showing each fee as a
separate charge or, altematively,
aggregating all fees of the same type and
disclosing a single dollar amount for
that category. For clarity, this guidance
would be moved to § 230.6(a)(3)(i) of the
regulation.
Under proposed § 230.6(a)(3)(ii),
institutions would be required to
disclose overdraft fees or returned-item
fees on periodic statements on an
aggregate basis for the statement period.
Institutions that currently disclose each
fee as a separate charge on periodic
statements could continue to do so as an
additional voluntary disclosure.
Comment 6(a)(3)-2 provides guidance
on itemizing and describing fees on
periodic statements. The comment
would be revised to reflect the proposed
revisions to the regulation concerning
overdraft fees and returned-item fees
and to clarify that these two types of
fees may not be grouped together as fees
for insufficient funds.
To highlight the overall cost to
consumers of presenting items on an
account with insufficient funds on a
routine basis, proposed § 230.6(a)(3)(ii)
would require institutions' periodic
statements to show the total amounts for
overdraft fees and returned-item fees for
the calendar year to date. The Board
believes that disclosure of year-to-date
totals would better inform consumers
about the cumulative effect of using an
overdraft service on a regular basis. An
institution's disclosures regarding the
total overdraft fees paid by a consumer
during the calendar year might also
serve as a source of infonnation for
financial institutions seeking to monitor
consumers' frequency in overdrawing
their accounts. The Board requests
comment on whether the requirement to
disclose cumulative year-to-date fee
totals should be limited to institutions
that market overdraft payment services,
and thereby encourage the routine use
of the service.
Section 230.8 Advertising
Under the proposal, § 230.8(a) of
Regulation DD would be reorganized for
clarity. The regulation and staff
commentary would be revised to
specifically address the promotion of
bounced-check protection services.
8(a) Misleading or Inaccurate
Advertisements
8(a)(1)
Some bounced-check protection
services, typically those provided under
programs developed by third-party
vendors, include marketing plans that
appear designed to increase customer
usage of overdrafts. Some marketing
plans include materials that encourage
consumers to overdraw their accounts
and use the service as a line of credit by
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stating that overdrafts up to a specific
dollar amount will be paid. Some
marketing plans also include statements
suggesting that consumers may treat the
service as a line of credit, for example,
to take an advance on their next
paycheck or to cover unexpected
expenses.
Notwithstanding the marketing
promises, the vendors' programs
include qualifying language disclaiming
any legal obligation by the institution to
pay any individual overdraft, regardless
of the amount. The institutions'
reservation of the right not to pay
overdrafts may not appear prominently
or conspicuously in the marketing
materials. Moreover, unlike traditional
lines of credit, consumers using
bounced-check protection services
generally are not permitted to carry a
credit balance forward at a
predetermined and disclosed rate of
interest. Instead, consumers using the
service are generally charged a flat fee
for each overdraft item and are expected
to repay the entire overdraft amount
within a short period. Under these
circumstances, implying that the
overdraft service is a traditional line of
credit or suggesting that the service can
be used like a line of credit may be
inconsistent with the actual terms and
limitations of the service.
As discussed above, Regulation DD
would be revised to apply TISA's
prohibition against misrepresentations
and misleading advertisements to
communications with consumers about
their existing accounts, to cover
institutions' marketing of deposit-
related services, including bounced..
check protection services. A new
comment 8(a)-10 would be added to
provide guidance on the types of
advertisements that may violate the
rule.
Five new examples would be added to
the commentary relating to the
promotion of overdraft payment
services. The staff commentary would
be revised to state that institutions may
not mislead consumers by representing
an overdraft service as a uline of credit"
unless the service is subject to the
Board's Regulation Z. An advertisement
could also mislead consumers if it
represents that the institution will
honor all checks or authorize all
transactions that overdraw an account,
with or without a specified dollar limit,
when the institution retains discretion
at any time not to honor checks or
authorize transactions.
A third example would state that an
advertisement could mislead consumers
by representing that consumers with
overdrawn accounts are allowed to
maintain a negative balance when the
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terms of the account's overdraft service
require consumers to promptly return
the deposit account to a positive
balance. The fourth example provides
that promotional materials describing a
service solely as protection against
bounced checks could mislead
consumers if the service also applies to
ATM withdrawals and other debit card
transactions and electronic fund
transfers..
A fifth new example of misleading
advertisements relates to the
advertisement of free accounts. Under
Regulation DD. an institution may not
describe an account as "free" (or use a
similar term) if any maintenance or
activity fee may be imposed on the
account. Examples of fees that trigger
the prohibition against advertising an
account as free are listed in comment
8(a)-3.
Comment 8(a)-4 lists certain account-
related fees that are not considered to be
maintenance or activity fees. for
example. check-printing fees, stop-
payment fees, or fees associated with
checks that are returned unpaid.
Likewise, fees for bounced-check
protection services would not be
considered maintenance or activity fees.
because the fees relate to the
institution's provision of credit as
opposed to fees related to the use of the
consumer's own funds in the account
Nevertheless, there has been concern
that some institutions promote bounced-
check protection services as a feature of
their free checking accounts, and that
consumers may be misled into thinking
that overdraft protection on such
accounts is without costs.
The commentary would be revised to
state that an advertisement would be
deemed misleading if the account is
described as "free" and also promotes
account-related services for which there
is a fee, unless the advertisement clearly
and conspicuously indicates there is a
cost associated with the advertised
service. Under proposed comment 8(a)-
10, the advertisement may, but need
not, state the actual cost of the service,
although such a disclosure may be
required under proposed § 230.8(f) for
certain advertisements. The proposed
comment applies to fees for account-
related services that are not considered
"maintenance or activity fees" (such as
fees for bounced-check protection or for
specially designed checks). Regulation
DO's prohibition against advertising an
account as --free" if the institution
imposes a Umaintenance or activity fee"
is unaffected by the proposal.
Comment is also solicited on other
types of advertisements of overdraft
protection services that would
potentially mislead consumers about (i)
the tenns, limitations, costs. or nature of
the service and (ii) the fact that the
service is not a traditional line of credit.
For example, where an institution's
payment of overdrafts is automated,
does advertising to consumers that the
institution will pay overdrafts up to a
specified dollar amount mislead
consumers about the nature of the
service? Furthermore, would such an
advertisement potentially mislead
consumers about whether the bank may
not pay an overdraft? Does encouraging
consumers to use the service to obtain
credit instead of using it to cover
inadvertent overdrafts mislead
consumers about the actual tenns of the
service'? Do advertisements that
encourage the regular or routine use of
the service mislead consumers about the
cost of the service?
Section 230.8(a)(1) is revised for
stylistic consistency, without
substantive change.
8(a)(2)
TISA's limitation on advertising an
accoWlt as free is implemented in
§ 230.8(a). This provision would be
redesignated as § 230.8(a)(2), without
any substantive change.
8(t) Additional Disclosures in
Connection With Automated Overdraft
Services
TISA and Regulation DD require
additional information to be provided if
an advertisement for a deposit account
refers to a specific rate of interest, yield,
or rate of earnings. 12 U.S.C. 4302:
§ 230.a(c). Advertisements for bonuses
on deposit accounts also trigger
additional information. § 230.8(d). TISA
authorizes the Board to exempt
"broadcast and electronic media and
outdoor advertising from stating some
additional information, if the Board
finds the disclosures to be unnecessarily
burdensome." 12 U.S.C. 4302(b). These
limited disclosure rules are
implemented in § 230.8(e)(1). The
exemptions for broadcast and electronic
media do not extend to advertisements
posted on the Internet or sent by a-mail.
A principal concern about
institutions' promotion of overdraft
protection services is that consumers
may be led to believe that the service
represents a traditional line of credit.
Some marketing materials focus on the
dollar amount of the overdraft limit,
which may lead consumers to believe
that a line of credit is being provided.
Some advertisements create the
impression that the service can be relied
upon to obtain short term extensions of
credit from time to time (up to a given
amount) at minimal cost. These
promotions may mislead or confuse
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consumers regarding the nature, costs,
terms, and limitations of the service.
This problem may be magnified
somewhat because marketed automated
overdraft services are relatively new.
Where consumers are targeted with
advertisements about overdraft
protection services, additional
disclosures could reduce the potential
that some consumers would be misled.
and generally educate consumers about
the nature of the service to enable them
to compare the terms offered by
different financial institutions.
Accordingly. in order to ensure that
advertisements promoting overdraft
protection services are not misleading.
the Board is proposing to revise
Regulation DD to require certain
disclosures in advertisements for
automated overdraft payment services.
To reduce consumer confusion about
the costs, terms, and limitations of the
service and how it differs from a
traditional line of credit, advertisements
would be required to disclose (1) the fee
for the payment of each overdraft item;
(2) the types of transactions covered; (3)
the amount of time the consumer ·has to
repay or cover any overdraft; and (4) the
circumstances under which the
institution would not pay an overdraft.
The proposed rule woUld provide an
exemption for certain types of
advertisements to mirror exemptions
provided for other types ofadvertising
disclosures. Under TISA and Regulation
DO, advertisements that state the annual
percentage yield for an account must
also disclose certain other information.
The regulation specifically exempts
from these disclosure requirements,
advertisements using broadcast media,
outdoor billboards, and telephone
response machines. These exemptions
were based on concerns about the
practical limitations of time and space
for these types ofmedia; these concerns
are not as significant for print
advertising or marketing on Internet
Web sites. These exemptions would also
apply to the advertising rules for
automated overdraft payment services
under proposed § 230.8(f). Proposed
comment 8(fJ-1 would clarify that for
purposes of the advertising disclosures,
institutions may describe the types of
transactions covered in the same
manner as the disclosures required
before account-opening (see proposed
comment 4(b)(4}-5).
Comment 8(f)-2 provides that in
describing the circumstances under
which an institution will not pay an
overdraft, a general description will
typically satisfy the requirement, for
example, statements such as "overdrafts
will not be paid if your account is not
in good standing, you are not making
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regular deposits, or you have too many
overdrafts."
Comment 8(f)-3 clarifies the
relationship between the general
guidance in comment 8(a)-10.v. (the
rules for advertisements that promote
free .accounts as well as an account-
related service for which a fee is
charged) and the requirements of
§ 230.8(t) when the account-related
service being advertised is an automated
overdraft service.
VI. Fonn ofComment Letters
Comment letters should refer to
Docket No. R-1197 and, when possible.
should use a standard typeface with a
font size of 10 or 12; this will enable the
Board to convert text submitted in paper
form to machine-readable form through
electronic scanning, and will facilitate
automated retrieval of comments for
review. Comments may be mailed
electronically to
regs.comments@/ederalreserve.gov.
vu. Solicitation ofComments
Regarding the Use of uPlain Language"
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 requires the Board to
use "plain languageu in all proposed
and final rules published after January
1, 2000. The Board invites comments on
whether the proposed rules are clearly
stated and effectively organized, and
how the Board might make the proposed
text easier to understand.
vm. Initial Kegulatory Flexibility
Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires federal
agencies to publish an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis to describe the
impact ofproposed rules on small
entities. A final regulatory flexibility
analysis will be prepared and will
consider comments received during the
public comment period.
1. Statement otthe objectives ofthe
proposal. The Board is proposing
revisions to Regulation DD to address
the uniformity and adequacy of
insitutions' disclosme of overdraft fees
generally. and to address concerns about
advertised automated overdraft services
("bounced-check protections services")
in particular. As stated more fully
above, the existing regulation would be
amended to provide that depository
institutions offering certain overdraft
payment services would be required to
provide more complete information
regarding those services. Account-
opening disclosures and other
marketing materials would describe
more completely how fees may be
triggered. The total dollar amount of
overdraft and returned-item fees for the
period and for the calendar year to date
would be required on periodic
statements. Certain advertising practices
would be prohibited, and additional
disclosures would be required.
TISA was enacted, in part, for the
purpose of requiring clear and unifonn
disclosures regarding deposit account
terms and fees assessable against these
accounts. Such disclosures allow
consumers to make meaningful
comparisons between different accounts
and also allow consumers to make
infonned judgments about the use of
their accounts. 12 U.S.C. 4301. TISA
authorizes the Board to prescribe
regulations to carry out the purpose and
provisions of the statute. 12 U.S.C.
4308(a)(1). The act expressly states that
the Board's regulations may contain
"such classifications, differentiations, or
other provisions, * * * as, in the
judgment of the Board, are necessary or
proper to carry out the purposes of (the
Act], to prevent circumvention or
evasion of the requirements of [the Act],
or to facilitate compliance with the
requirements of [the Act]." 12 U.S.C.
4308(a)(3). The Board believes that the
proposed revisions to Regulation DD
discussed above are within the
Congress' broad grant of authority to the
Board to adopt provisions that carry out
the purposes of the statute.
2. Small entities affected by the
proposal. The number of small entities
affected by this proposal is unknown.
Approximately 14,580 depository
institutions in the United States that
must comply with the Truth in Savings
Act have assets of $150 million or less
and thus are considered small entities
for purposes of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, based on 2003 call
report data. Approximately 5,900 are
institutions that must comply with the
Board's Regulation DD; approximately
8,860 are credit unions that must
comply with National Credit Union
Administration regulations, which must
be substantially similar to the Board's
Regulation DD. The Board believes
small depository institutions that offer
accounts where overdraft or returned-
item fees are imposed currently send
periodic statements on those accounts.
Periodic statement disclosures would
need to be revised to display aggregate
overdraft and aggregate returned-item
fees for the statement period and year to
date. Account-opening disclosures and
marketing materials would have to be
reviewed, and perhaps revised.
3. Other fedeml rules. The Board
believes no federal rules duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed
revisions to Regulation DD.
4. Significant alternatives to the
proposed revisions. As discussed above,
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the Board requests comment on whether
the requirement to disclose cumulative
year-to-date totals for overdraft and
returned-item fees should be limited to
institutions that market overdraft
payment services, and thereby
encourage the routine use of the service.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506;
5 CFR 1320 Appendix A.1), the Board
reviewed the rule under the authority
delegated to the Board by the Office of
Management and Budget. The Federal
Reserve may not conduct or sponsor,
and an organization is not required to
respond to, this information collection
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The OMB control
number is 7100-0271.
The collection of infonnation that is
revised by this mlemaking is found in
12 CFR part 230 and in Appendix B.
This collection is mandatory ("15 U.S.C.
4301 et seq.) to evidence compliance
with the requirements of Regulation DD
and the Truth in Savings Act (TISA).
Institutions are required to retain
records for twenty-four months. The
respondents/recordkeepers are for-profit
depository institutions, including small
businesses. This regulation applies to all
types of depository institutions, not just
state member banks. Under Paperwork
Reduction Act regulations, however, the
Federal Reserve accounts for the burden
of the paperwork associated with the
regulation only for state member banks.
Other agencies account for the
paperwork burden on their respective
constituencies under this regulation.
The proposed revisions provide that
depository institutions offering certain
overdraft payment services would be
required to provide more complete
information regarding those services.
Account-opening disclosures and other
marketing materials would describe
more completely how fees may be
triggered. The total dollar amount of
overdraft and returned-item fees for the
period and for the calendar year to date
would be required on periodic
statements, and year-to-date totals
would be required. Certain advertising
practices would be prohibited, and
additional disclosures would be
required. Although the proposal adds
these requirements, it is expected that
these revisions would not significantly
increase the paperwork burden of
depository institutions. With respect to
state member banks, it is estimated that
there are 976 respondent/recordkeepers.
Current annual burden is estimated to
be 146,644 hours.
Because the records are maintained at
state member banks and the notices are
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(b) Advertisement means a
commercial message, appearing in any
mediwn, that promotes directly or
indirectlI:
~(1)~The availability "'or terms.....
of, or a deposit in, a ...-ne~ accoWlt
~;and
(2) For purposes of § 230.8(a) and (f)
of this part, the tenns of, or 8 deposit in,
a new or existing accoWlt.....
* * * * *
not provided to the Federal Reserve, no
issue of confidentiality arises under the
Freedom of Information Act.
The Federal Reserve requests
comments from depository institutions,
especially state member banks, that will
help to estimate burden of the various
disclosures that would be made in the
first year this proposed regulation
would be effective. Comments are
invited on: (a) The cost of compliance;
(b) ways to enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be
disclosed; and (c) ways to minimize the
burden of disclosures on respondents,
including through the use of automated
disclosure techniques or other forms of
information technology. Comments on
the collection of infonnation should be
sent to the Office of Management and
Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project
(7100-0271), Washington, DC 20503,
with copias of such comments sent to
Cynthia Ayouch, Federal Reserve Board
Clearance Officer, Division ofResearch
and Statistics, Mail Stop 97, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Washington, DC 20551.
Text ofProposed Revisions
Certain conventions have been used
to highlight the proposed revisions.
New language is shown inside bold-
faced arrows while language that would
be deleted is set off with bold-faced
brackets.
List ofSubjects in 12 CFR Part 230
Advertising, Banks, Banking,
Consumer protection, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Troth in
savings.
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Board proposes to amend
Regulation DD, 12 CPR part 230, as set
forth below:
PART 23O-TRUTH IN SAVINGS
(REGULATION DD)
1. The authority citation for part 230
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 4301 et seq.
2. Section 230.2 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
§ 230.2 Definitions.
(1) The fee for the payment of each
overdraft;
(2) The types of transactions for
which a fee for overdrawing an account
may be imposed;
(3) The time period by which the
consumer must repay or cover any
overdraft; and
(4) The circumstances under which
the institution would not pay an
overdraft.~
5. In Supplement I to part 230:
a. Under Section 230.2 Definitions.
under (b) Advertisement, existing
paragraph 2. is redesignated as
paragraph 3.; a new paragraph 2. is
added; and newly designated paragraph
3.iii. is revised.
b. Under Section 230.4 Account
disclosures, under (b)(4) Fees, a new
paragraph 5. is added.
c. Under Section 230.6 Periodic
statement disclosures, under (a)(3) Fees
imposed, paragraph 2. is revised.
d. Under Section 230.8 Advertising,
under (a) Misleading or inaccurate
advertisements, a new paragraph 10. is
added, a new paragraph title (f)
Additional disclosures in connection
with automated overdraft services is
added, and new paragraph (I) 1. through
(f) 3. are added
Supplement I To Part 230-0mcial
Staff Interpretations
Section 230.2 Definitions
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Advertisement
*
*
*
~2. Existing accounts. For purposes
of the prohibition on misleading
advertisements in § 230.8(a) of this part
and disclosure requirements under
§ 230.8(f) of this part, an advertisement
includes a commercial message in
visual, oral, or print media that invites,
offers, or otherwise promotes a deposit
in, or other service available in
connection with, an existing consumer
account or class of accounts. An
institution is not promoting a deposit or
service solely by providing disclosures
required by Federal or other applicable
law at account opening, on a periodic
statement, or on an electronic terminal
receipt.~
~3.""'* * *
iii. ~For purposes of § 230.8(b) of
this part through § 230.8(e)'of this
part,..... information given to consumers
about existing accounts, such as cUlT8nt
rates recorded on a voice-response
machine or notices for automatically
renewable time account sent before
renewal.
(3) Fees imposed. Fees required to be
disclosed under § 230.4(b)(4) of this part
that were debited to the account during
the statement period. The fees shall be
itemized by type and dollar amounts.
~(i) General. Except as provided in
paragraph (a)(3)(ii) of this section, when
fees of the same type are imposed more
than once in a statement period, a
depository institution may itemize each
fee separately or group the fees together
and disclose a total dollar amount for all
fees of that type.
(iil Overdraft and returned-item fees.
Institutions must disclose a total dollar
amount for all overdraft fees and a total
dollar amount for all returned-item fees
for the statement period and for the
calendar year to date. The total dollar
amoWlt for overdraft fees shall include
all overdrafts on the account, whether
created by check, by ATM withdrawal
or other electronic transfer) or by other
means. Institutions may itemize each
overdraft fee or returned-item fee, in
addition to providing the disclosures
required by this paragraph.~
* * * * *
3. Section 230.6 is amended by
republishing the introductory text and
revising paragraph (a)(3) to read as
follows:
§ 230.6 Periodic statement disclosures.
(a) General rule. If a depository
institution mails or delivers a periodic
statement, the statement shall include
the following disclosures:
* * * * *
4. Section 230.8 is amended by
revising paragraph (a) and adding a new
paragraph (f) to read as follows:
5230.8 Advertising.
(a) Misleading or inaccurote
advertisements. An advertisement shall
not:
~(1)~Be misleading or inaccurate
~o~ [and shall not] misrepresent a
depository institution s deposit contract.
~(2~ [An advertisement shall not]
Refer to or describe an account as "free"
or Uno cost" (or contain a similar term)
if any maintenance or activity fee may
be imposed on the account. The word
"profit" shall not be used in referring to
interest paid on an account.
* * * * *
~f) Additional disclosures in
connection with automated overdraft
services. Except for an advertisement
subject to paragraph (e)(1) of this
section, any announcement, solicitation,
or advertisement promoting an
automated overdraft service that is not
subject to the Board's Regulation Z (12
CPR part 226) shall disclose in a clear
and conspicuous manner:
****•
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service for which a fee will be charged,
and requires that the advertisement state
that a cost is associated with the service.
If the advertised account-related service
is an overdraft service subject to the
requirements of § 230.8(f) of this part,
institutions must disclose the fee for the
payment of each overdraft, not merely
that a cost is associated with the
overdraft service, as well as other
required information.~
* * * * *
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board)
proposes to amend its regulation
implementing the Privacy Act of 1974.
The primary proposed changes concern
the waiver of copying fees charged to
current or former Board employees for
access to records under the Privacy Act,
and the special procedures for release of
medical records. In addition, the Board
is proposing to make minor editorial
and technical changes.
DATES: Comment must be received on or
before July 7, 2004.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R-1200, by any
of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://
www.fedemlreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
http://www·federalreserve.govl
genemlinfolfoiaIProposedRegs·cfm.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail:
regs.comments@federalreseIVe.gov.
Include docket number in the subject
line of the message.
• FAX: 202/452-3819 or 202/452-
3102.
• Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Ave~ue,N.W.,
Washington, DC 20551.
****
misleading, inaccurate, or misrepresent
the deposit contract are:
i. Representing an overdraft
protection service as a "line of credit,"
unless the service is subject to the
Board's Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226.
ii. Representing that the institution
will honor all checks or authorize all
transactions that overdraw an account,
with or without a specified dollar limit,
when the institution retains discretion
at any time not to honor checks or
authorize transactions.
iii. Representing that consumers with
an overdrawn account are allowed to
maintain a negative balance when the
terms oftha account's overdraft service
require consumers to promptly return
the deposit account to a positive
balance.
iv. Describing a service solely as
protection against bounced checks when
the service being promoted allows
consumers to overdraw their accounts
by other means, such as ATM
withdrawals, debit card transactions, or
other electronic fund transfers.
v. Advertising an account-related
service for which a fee will be charged
in an advertisement that also uses the
word "free" or "no cost" (or a similar
term) to describe the account, unless the
advertisement clearly and
conspicuously indicates that there is a
cost associated with the service. If the
fee is a maintenance or activity fee
under § 230.8(a)(2) of this part, however,
an advertisement may not describe the
account as "free" or Uno cost" (or
contain a similar term) even if the fee is
disclosed in the advertisement.~
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
(b)(4) Fees
*
(b) Content ofaccount disclosures
* * * * *
*
Section 230.4 Account disclosures
(a){3) Fees imposed
* * * * *
*
*
Section 230.6 Periodic statement
disclosures
(a) General rule
~5. Fees for overdmwing an account.
Under § 230.4(b)(4) of this part
institutions must disclose the
conditions under which a fee may be
imposed. In satisfying this requirement
institutions must specify the types of
transactions for which an overdraft fee
may be imposed. In describing the
conditions, an institution must state
whether the fee applies to overdrafts
created by check, or by ATM
withdrawal or other electronic transfer,
as applicable. For example, where a fee
may be imposed in such circumstances,
disclosing a fee for covering an overdraft
Ucreated by check, or by ATM
withdrawal or other electronic transfer"
would typically satisfy this requirement;
disclosing a fee "for overdraft items"
wouldnot.~
*
*
2. Itemizing fees by type. In itemizing
fees imposed more than once in the
period, institutions may group fees if
they are the same type. ~(But overdraft
and returned-item fees each must be
separately totaled for the statement
period and cumulatively for the
calendar year. See § 230.6(a)(3)(ii).)~
[Butl~When fees of the same type are *
grouped togeth~ the description must ~(f)Additional d!sclosures in
make clear that the dollar figure connection with automated overdraft
represents more than a single fee, for services.
example, "total fees for checks written 1. Types of transactions. Disclosing
this period." Examples of fees that may that a fee may be imposed for covering
not be grouped together are- overdrafts on an account "created by
i. Monthly maintenance and excess- check, or by ATM withdrawal or other
activity fees. electronic transfer" would typically
li. "Transfer" fees, ifdifferent dollar satisfy the requirements of § 230.8(f)(2)
amounts are imposed-such as $.50 for of this part where the fee may be
deJ!osits and $1.00 for withdrawals. imposed in these circumstances. See
Iii. Fees for electronic fund transfers comment 4(b)(4)-5.
and fees for other services, such as 2. Circumstances for nonpayment. In
balance-inquiry or maintenance fees. describing the circumstances under
~v. Fees for transactions that which an institution will not pay an
overdraw an account and fees for overdraft, a general description will
returning checks or other items typically satisfy the requirement, for
unpaid.~ example, statements such as "overdrafts
will not be paid if your accoWlt is not
in good standing, or you are not making
regular deposits, or you have too many
overdrafts."
3. Advertising an account as '1ree."
Comment S(a}-10.v. provides general
guidance to institutions that advertise
free accounts with an account-related
Section 230.8 Advertising
(a) Misleading or inaccurate
advertisements .
~10. Examples. Examples of
advertisements that would ordinarily be
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews selected bankruptcy decisions during the past year, with a particular
emphasis on decisions of interest to lenders in Kentucky and elsewhere in the Sixth Circuit.
Selected non-bankruptcy cases which are of interest to lenders are also included.
II. NEW BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. Chapter 13 Plan Issues
Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004)
In this case, the United States Supreme Court was asked to rule on the appropriate
method of determining the cram down interest rate in Chapter 13 -- i.e., the rate that gives the
creditor the present value of its claim under a Chapter 13 plan when the claim is paid in
installment payments to the creditor in lieu of a lump sum payment. The Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that the "formula approach," in which the prime rate was augmented to account for
risk of nonpayment by borrowers in the debtors' financial position, was the proper method.
In the underlying matter, the Debtors purchased a truck with financing at an interest rate
of 21 %. The Debtors later filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. At the time
of filing, the value of the truck was $4,000, so the creditor's secured claim was limited to that
amount. The Debtors' proposed plan also called for an interest rate of 9.5% per year based on a
"formula rate" calculation where the prime rate of 8% was increased to account for risk of
nonpayment by the debtors. Although the creditor argued that it was entitled to 21 % interest, the
amount it would have obtained if it could foreclose on the property, collect the proceeds and
reinvest them in a similar loan, the bankruptcy court approved the plan as proposed.
The district court reversed, holding that Seventh Circuit precedent required bankruptcy
courts to set cram down interest rates at the level the creditor could have obtained if it foreclosed.
The district court thus found 21 % to be the appropriate rate.
Many thanks to our associates Kathryn V. Eberle, Angela S. Fetcher, Emily L. Pagorski and Stephen
Houston for their excellent research and drafting assistance, without which we would not have these materials.
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The Seventh Circuit remanded to the bankruptcy court, agreeing with the district court
that, in cram down proceedings, the interest rate should be what the creditor in question could
obtain in making a new loan to a similarly situated debtor not in bankruptcy, but stating that the
pre-bankruptcy contract rate of 21 % did not duplicate the present value of the collateral to the
creditor because loans to bankrupt, court-supervised debtors involve risks not incurred in loans to
new debtors. The Seventh Circuit held that, to correct this, the original contract rate should serve
as a presumptive cram down rate that debtors or creditors could challenge. The court remanded
to afford the Debtors or the creditor a chance to rebut the 21 % rate. The Supreme Court
reversed.
The Supreme Court noted that, as the Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance on which
calculations to use, three considerations govern what method should be used to set an interest
rate in cram down situations. The first is that the Bankruptcy Code has numerous provisions that
require present value calculations. Thus, Congress intended judges to follow the same approach
when choosing appropriate interest rates and to use an approach that is familiar in the financial
community and that minimizes the need for expensive evidentiary proceedings. The second
consideration is that Chapter 13 authorizes a bankruptcy court to modify the rights of any
creditor whose claim is secured by anything other than the debtor's residence, and a court can
modify the number, timing, and interest rate set forth in the debtor's contract. The third
consideration is that the cram down provision mandates an objective rather than subjective
approach. In other words, the provision does not require that the terms· of the loan match the
terms of the contract agreed to prebankruptcy.
Looking at these three considerations, the Court rejected the coerced loan, presumptive
contract rate, and cost of funds approaches because they are complicated, impose significant
evidentiary costs and have the goal of making a creditor whole rather than to ensure debtor's
payments have the required present value. The Court stated that the coerced loan approach
overcompensates creditors because the market lending rate covers things not relevant in a cram
down situation, such as transaction costs and overall profits. As to the presumptive contract
approach, the Court stated that it improperly focuses on the creditor's potential use of the
proceeds in a foreclosure sale, requires a debtor to obtain information on the creditor's overhead
costs, financial circumstances and lending practices to rebut the presumptive contract rate, and
produces results where similarly situated creditors end up with vastly different cram down rates.
The Court also stated that the cost of funds approach mistakenly focuses on the creditworthiness
of the creditor rather than the debtor.
The Court stated that the formula approach was the preferred approach because it used
the national prime rate reflecting the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial
bank should charge a creditworthy customer. And because a bankrupt debtor poses a higher risk
of nonpayment, the approach requires the bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate accordingly.
The Court stated that the size of that risk adjustment depends on factors such as the
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security and the duration and feasibility of the
reorganization plan. Thus, a bankruptcy court will need to hold a hearing for the creditor and
debtors to present evidence on the appropriate risk adjustment. The Court approved this
approach in part because starting from a low estimate and adjusting it upward puts the burden on
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the creditors, who are likely to have greater access to information not in the debtors' filings. The
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and remanded to the bankruptcy court.
The Court declined to determine "the proper scale for the risk adjustment." The Court
acknowledged the lender's argument that a risk adjustment in the range of one to three percent is
inadequate to compensate a creditor for the risk that the plan would fail. The Court simply noted
that a bankruptcy court should only approve a plan if it is persuaded that the debtor will be able
to comply with it. The Court held that this means that a bankruptcy court must "select a rate
high enough to compensate the creditor for its risk but not so high as to doom the plan. If the
court determines that the likelihood of default is so high as to necessitate an 'eye-popping'
interest rate ... the plan should probably not be confirmed."
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, stated that the contract rate is a good indicator of
actual risk and provides a quick and reasonably accurate standard. Justice Scalia stated that the
contract rate approach makes two reasonable assumptions: (1) The subprime lending markets are
competitive and largely efficient, which means that the contract rate reasonably reflects actual
risk at the time of borrowing; and (2) The expected costs of default in Chapter 13 are no less than
those at the time of lending, which means that the risk persists when the Debtor files for Chapter
13.
In re Edmondson. 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 136 fE.D. Ky. 2005)
Here, an assignee of a creditor who did not object to the terms of a Chapter 13 plan was
held bound by that plan. The Debtors filed their Chapter 13 plan on April 27, 2000 and listed
Fifth Third Bank as a secured creditor on a second mortgage for a particular amount. The plan
was then confirmed without objection from the bank. The bank later assigned the mortgage to C
& W Asset Acquisition, LLC ("C & W"), which also filed a lien against the property, and a
proof of claim. The Debtors sought release of the lien after payment of the amount provided in
the plan, but C&W objected on the ground that the amount really owed was higher. The
bankruptcy court found that a Chapter 13 plan confirmation order is res judicata as to all issues
which were decided, or could have been decided, at the confirmation hearing. It further held that
a creditor who fails to object to the confirmation of a proposed plan at an appropriate time is
deemed to have accepted the plan and is bound by the confirmation order.
In re Farthing. 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 97 fE.D. Ky. 2005)
This case deals with lien stripping. On July 3, 2004 the Debtors filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 13. Their schedules indicated that their residence was encumbered by a first
mortgage in the amount of $4,000.00, a second mortgage in the amount of $54,794.70, and a
third mortgage in the amount of $15,160.00. On July 11, 2004 the Debtors filed a Plan, valuing
the secured claim of the third mortgage at zero and providing for repayment at the same rate as
other unsecured creditors. At the January 4, 2005 confirmation hearing, counsel for the Debtors
informed the court that the first mortgage had been forgiven by the first mortgagees on October
1, 2004. The third mortgagee objected, arguing that its claim now was partially secured and
could not be stripped off.
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The bankruptcy court held that the Plan did not violate §1322(b)(2) as argued by the third
mortgagee, citing authority that debtors may "strip off' mortgages that are totally unsecured.
The bankruptcy court held that this determination is to be made as of the date the petition was
filed. The court noted that "while it may be appropriate to determine the value of collateral -
and, therefore, the extent to which a creditor's claim is secured - as of confirmation or the date of
the valuation hearing ... it is appropriate to determine if the creditor holds a secured claim at all
as of the date the petition was filed." (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
confirmed the Plan because, as of the petition date, the third mortgagee did not have a secured
claim.
In Fe Wellman, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2254.(6tb eire BAP 2004)
Here, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("Panel") affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding
that creditor Salt Creek Valley Bank's· motion for relief from stay, which was filed but not heard
before confirmation of the Debtors' Chapter 13 plan, was incompatible with the confirmed plan
and therefore denied the bank's motion.
The bank held a first mortgage on a three-acre parcel of real estate owned by the Debtors.
On February 3, 2003, the Debtors filed their Chapter 13 case. On March 12, 2003, the Debtors
filed an amended Chapter 13 plan and the bank filed a motion (1) to dismiss the chapter 13 case
with prejudice because of repetitive filings; (2) to enjoin the filing of any further petitions by or
against the Debtors for a specified period; and (3) for related relief. This was also treated as a
confirmation objection. On June 18, 2003, an agreed order was entered in which the parties
provided that in the event the case was dismissed prior to February 3, 2006 then, as to the bank,
the dismissal would be "with prejudice" and the 180 day time bar would be deemed applicable to
it. Also on June 18, the bank filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. The Chapter 13
plan was confirmed on July 30 and provided for payment of the mortgage. The bankruptcy court
subsequently overruled the bank's motion for relief from stay on the ground that it was not
compatible with the confirmed plan.
The Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. It noted that an order confirming a
Chapter 13 plan is res judicata as to all "justifiable issues" which were or could have been
decided at the confirmation hearing. "Section 1327 precludes a creditor from asserting, after
confirmation, any other interest than that provided for it in the confirmed plan." Thus, it held
that if a motion for· relief from stay is filed before confirmation, unless it pertains to a post-
confirmation failure to make payments, the motion is untimely in view of the transcendence of
the confirmed plan.
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B. Plan Confirmation, Consummation and Other Chapter 11 Issues
Pratt v. Ventas, Inc., 365 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2004)
This case involves non-debtor releases and the preclusive effect of Chapter 11 plan
confirmation. Plaintiffs filed state law claims against Vencor, Inc. ("Old Vencor"). Old Vencor
then changed its name to Ventas on May 1, 1998 and spun off its nursing home operations to a
new entity named Vencor, Inc. ("New Vencor"). New Vencor, on September 13, 1999, filed for
relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. New Vencor sought to enforce the automatic
stay in each of the plaintiffs' state court actions. Some of the plaintiffs filed proofs of claim. A
Reorganization Plan for New Vencor was proposed, and notice sent to those plaintiffs who filed
proofs of claim. The Delaware bankruptcy court confirmed the Plan on March 19, 2001, and it
became effective on April 20, 2001.
Pursuant to the Plan, Ventas agreed to contribute $40 million to the funding of a
settlement with the United States and agreed to amendments of certain leases with New Vencor,
thereby reducing New Vencor's rental obligations. In exchange, Ventas was given a release of
plaintiffs' claims arising from operation of the nursing homes prior to May 1, 1998, and an
injunction was imposed proscribing suits against Ventas and New Vencor for alleged conduct
prior to the date of confirmation.
Plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
claiming that Ventas obtained the releases by fraudulent means. They argued that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over their third-party action against Ventas and, thus, the
injunction did not bar plaintiffs' suit. The district court held that plaintiffs could not collaterally
attack the confirmation order issued by the Delaware bankruptcy court, and therefore dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that the plaintiffs were free to pursue
their claim in the Delaware bankruptcy court. The plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was
pending, the plaintiffs again unsuccessfully pursued their claims in the Delaware bankruptcy
court, but did not pursue an appeal there.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the rule of Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.
300, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995), would not allow the plaintiffs to circumvent the bankruptcy court's
order by filing the action in the Kentucky district court. Although the court found that it was an
error for the district court to dismiss the action without determining if the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction to enter the Confirmation Order, it was harmless error in light of the plaintiffs'
subsequent return to the bankruptcy court for the purpose of challenging that court's authority.
The court also stated that because the Delaware bankruptcy court decided that it did have
jurisdiction to enter the Confirmation Order with the releases, it could not look at the issue
because of the res judicata effect of the bankruptcy court's determination.
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In Re Bankvest Capital Corp.! Eagle Insurance Company v. Bankvest Capital Corp.! 360 F.3d
291 (1sf eire 2004)
The issue on appeal was whether 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) permits a debtor in possession
to assume an unexpired lease without first curing any nonmonetary defaults. The First Circuit
held that it does, creating a circuit split. The Debtor Bankvest's business was originating,
securitizing, selling and servicing equipment leases. Bankvest was the lessor on two equipment
leases at issue here. In its Chapter 11 plan, the Debtor provided that all equipment leases would
be assumed by the Estate unless 1) the lease was specifically rejected or 2) any party to the lease
filed a claim for cure costs. The lessees here filed claims for cure costs under the Chapter 11
plan. They claimed that the Debtor had failed to replace loaner equipment with permanent
equipment. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the cure claims on the ground that 11 USC §
365(b)(2)(D) permits the Debtor in possession to assume executory contracts or unexpired leases
without first curing non-monetary defaults.
Section 365(b) provides that if the Debtor has defaulted on an executory contract prior to
assumption, the Debtor may not assume the contract unless it 1) cures the default, 2)
compensates the non-debtor party for any actual monetary damages resulting from the default,
and 3) provides adequate assurance of future performance under the contract. Section 365(b)
provides:
(2) paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that
is a breach of a provision relating to-
* * *
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a
default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform
nonmonetary obligations under the executory contract or unexpired
lease.
The lessees contended that the word "penalty" in paragraph 2(D) modified both "rate" and
"provision." Debtor contended that "penalty" modifies only the term "rate." The court found no
textual basis requiring that the bankruptcy court's interpretation be overturned, and found the
statute to be ambiguous. The court stated that many non-monetary defaults are historical facts
that are impossible to. cure. "Requiring a debtor to cure such incurable defaults is tantamount to
barring 'the Debtor from assuming any lease or contract in which such default has occurred-no
matter how essential that contract might be to the Debtor's reorganization in bankruptcy." Id at
299. The court determined that such a result could not be what Congress had intended because it
would undermine the successful rehabilitation of the business. The court determined that
Congress intended § 365(b)(2)(D) to excuse debtors from the obligation to cure nonmonetary
defaults as a condition of assumption. The lessees argued that paragraph (2)(D) could not apply
to all non-monetary defaults because such an interpretation would render the ipso facto default
provisions of § 365(b)(2) superfluous. The court disagreed, finding that ipso facto defaults
described in subparagraph A through C of § 365(b)(2) need not be non-monetary. Therefore, the
court held that the Debtor need not cure the non-monetary default before assuming the
equipment leases.
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In Re Heartland Steel. Inc.• Siemens Energy and Automation. Inc. v. Good. 389 F. 3d 741 (7th
eir.2004)
This case deals with the nature of a confirmed plan -- i.e., court order or private contract.
The liquidating agent filed objections to three claims made against the Debtor estate. The issue
on appeal was whether the liquidating agent's objections were timely filed. The time limit to
object to claims was set at 90 days after the effective date of the plan. The 90th day fell on a
Sunday. The objections were filed the following Monday. The liquidating agent relied on rule
9006(a), which states that the period of time for filing a document includes the last date of that
period unless that date is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, in which case the period runs on
the next business day. The claimants alleged that the plan of reorganization should be deemed a
private contract between the parties and that its deadlines should not be subject to Rule 9006(a).
The court found that a plan is neither pure contract nor pure court order and that the filing
deadlines contained within the plan are subject to the same rules of procedure as any other filing
deadlines. The court found that by entering a confirmation order, the court incorporates by
reference the entirety of the plan into its judgment. The court found that based on this reasoning,
all of the provisions of a plan are "prescribed or allowed" by the court's confirmation of the plan,
thus meeting the prerequisite of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a). The court found that since the
language regarding the deadline in the plan referred to the time for filing documents with the
court, the reasonable interpretation of that language would be to apply the procedural rules of the
court. The court did indicate that it was not suggesting that the parties could not have drafted
language that would avoid the automatic rollover provision of Rule 9006(a).
In Re Russell Cave Co.• Inc.• The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ofRussell Cave
Co.! Inc. v. General Electric Capital Corp.! 107 Fed. A[![!x.449 {6th eire 2004} {Uo[!ublished}
This case addresses procedural issues regarding attempts to recharacterize debt to equity.
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Committee") sought to recharacterize
appellee's claims as equity rather than debt and to equitably subordinate those claims. Under the
plan that governed the disposition of the remainder of the Debtor's assets and claims, the Debtor
and the Committee had the responsibility to make claim objections. The plan defined claim
objection as "the rights of the Debtor and the [Committee] to object to allowance and/or payment
of any Claim/or any reason, including, without limitation, the grounds set forth in Sections 502,
503, 506, and 507, ... but not including the right to seek subordination of any Claim under
Sections 509 and 510 . . . or otherwise." The Committee filed an adversary proceeding raising
its recharacterization claims after the claims objection deadline. The bankruptcy court dismissed
the claims as time-barred.
The Court of Appeals found that the recharacterization claims fell within the plan's
definition of claim objections because the Committee was objecting to an allowance of the claim
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and payment of the claim. It found that a claim to recharacterize debt to equity is the same as
objecting to the claims allowance.
The Court also dismissed the Committee's claim that its recharacterization claims were in
fact subordination claims. The Court found that recharacterization and equitable subordination
are different: recharacterization focuses on the existence of a debt or a claim whereas equitable
subordination focuses on the conduct of the creditor. Further, because the Committee filed its
recharacterization claims as separate counts from its equitable subordination claims it could not
then argue that its claims fell under the equitable subordination exception of the plan. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the order dismissing the Committee's recharacterization claims as untimely.
In re Horizon Natural Resources Company, 316 B.R. 268 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 2004)
In this case, the court was faced with the motions of several subsidiaries of Horizon
Natural Resources Company (collectively "Debtors") to terminate collective bargaining
agreements and to terminate or modify employee benefit plans. Debtors sought to reject the
collective bargaining agreements under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, to modify certain union retiree benefit
plans pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1114, and to modify Coal Act union retiree benefit plans, also
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1114. Each of the collective bargaining agreements contained a
"successorship clause," which provided that Debtors agreed not to sell their operations without
obtaining agreement of the purchaser to assume Debtors' obligations under the agreement.
In late 2002, the Debtors filed for Chapter 11 relief. The Debtors first attempted to
reorganize, but the decision was later made to liquidate substantially all of their assets. The
Debtors filed two Chapter 11 plans, both of which sought an order to sell the Debtors' assets free
and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances, apparently including successor liability under the
collective bargaining agreements. After negotiations between the Debtors and the unions from
August 2003 and early 2004 regarding modifications to the collective bargaining agreements and
employee benefit plans failed, the Debtors filed the instant motions.
The Debtors offered proof that, without the relief requested in the motions, the Chapter
11 plans would not be confirmable and mine reclamation would be impossible. There was also
evidence that the Debtors tried to market their operations with the collective bargaining
agreements and employee benefit plans in place, but that there were no offers with these
obligations.
The court first looked at whether retiree benefits under the Coal Act could be modified or
terminated under § 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court stated that § 1114 permits the
modification of retiree benefits, while § 9711 of the Coal Act prohibits modification of retiree
benefits in effect at the beginning of 1992 for as long as the employer remains in business. The
court also held that Coal Act benefits were "retiree benefits" under § 1114. The court stated that
§ 1114 deals with the narrow, specific subject of modification of retiree benefits when the
employer is in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, while the Coal Act covers a more general spectrum.
The court held that the two statutes were not conflicting and that, if Congress had wanted to
exclude Coal Act benefits from the reach of § 1114, it could have done so by limiting the
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definition of retiree benefits in the Bankruptcy Code or by stating in the Coal Act that the
obligations thereunder are unaffected by the Bankruptcy Code.
The court then looked to the requirements for rejecting collective bargaining agreements
and retiree benefits under §§ 1113 and 1114 and used the nine-part test from In re American
Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), in deciding to grant the motions to
reject or modify. The court stated that the facts of the case showed that the relief was necessary
to the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan of the Debtors, that the Debtor's proposals made in
2004 to modify were made in good faith, that the Union's failure to accept the proposals was
without good cause, and that the proposed modifications treated all parties fairly and equitably.
Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Service Merchandise Company, Inc., 396 F.3d 737l6th eire 2005)
Here, a shopping· center landlord appealed the decision of the bankruptcy court allowing
the assumption and assignment of the Debtor tenant's lease of a retail space. Although the
landlord sought a stay of the bankruptcy court's order approving the assumption and assignment,
it was not granted. Therefore, the court found the Debtor was entitled to dismissal of the appeal
as moot under § 363(m) (the reversal on appeal of an order permitting a sale or lease does not
affect the validity of the transaction unless stayed). The court stated that it need not decide
whether to apply the per se rule of mootness adopted by the majority of the circuits because the
relief sought by the landlord would have disturbed the validity of the § 363 sale and assignment
at issue in the appeal. The court determined that an assignment of a lease for valuable
consideration is a sale ofproperty and therefore 363(m) does apply.
In re Regal Cinemas, Inc., Capitol Industries, Inc. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 393 F.3d 647 (6th
eir.2004)
Capitol Industries was the lessee on a theater lease. It assigned its lease of the theatre to
Regal Cinemas. However, Capitol remained guarantor of any rent obligations not paid by Regal.
When Regal Cinemas filed for bankruptcy protection, it rejected the lease of the theatre. The
Landlord and the Debtor then entered into an agreement whereby the Debtor paid to the
Landlord the maximum amount permitted under § 502(b)(6) (capping lease rejection damages).
Capitol filed a claim for what apparently was the full amount remaining due on the lease, based
on the indemnification provision. The bankruptcy court denied the claim and the district court
appealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed.
Capitol's claim was subject to the limitations of § 502(e)(I), which disallows co-debtor
claims to the extent that the claim of their creditor is disallowed - Le., the co-debtor does not get
a more favorable result than the underlying creditor. Capitol argued that the lower courts erred
because its claim included more than the lease rejection damages. The court disagreed, and
found that § 502(e)(I) is broad enough to encompass any liability shared with the Debtor,
whatever its basis. Therefore, Capitol's claim was disallowed to the extent that the Landlord's
claim against the estate was disallowed. Since Debtor already paid the maximum amount that
the Landlord could collect, Capitol's claim was disallowed in its entirety.
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State o(Florida v. TeB. Orlando Ltd., 391 F.3d 1287 (11th eire 2004)
This case addresses the scope of the exemption from transfer-type taxes given Chapter II
asset sales. Here, the Chapter II Debtors reached agreement with a lender for new financing,
but the lender conditioned the credit on a non-debtor company refinancing one of its properties
through that lender also. The non-debtor company agreed solely to accommodate the Debtors.
The lender issued commitment letters for the loans, pursuant to which the Debtors filed a plan of
reorganization treating the non-debtor transaction as exempt from Florida documentary stamp
taxes, intangible taxes and other taxes pursuant to II U.S.C. § 1146(c). The Florida Department
of Revenue ("FDOR") filed an objection to the confirmation of the plan, stating that the plan did
not comply with II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(I) because the § I I46(c) exemption was not available to
non-debtor entities. The bankruptcy court agreed and confirmed the plan with a provision that
stated that the non-debtor transaction was not exempt from Florida documentary stamp taxes.
The non-debtor paid the taxes under protest and, with the Debtors, filed suit in state court for a
refund of the stamp taxes and for declaratory relief. The FDOR removed the case to federal
bankruptcy court, which found that the non-debtor loan agreement was done pursuant to the
debtor's plan, was essential to that plan and was necessary to implement the plan. The
bankruptcy court therefore held that the non-debtor loan transaction was "under a plan" within
the meaning of § 1146(c), and the non-debtor was entitled to get back the stamp taxes it had paid.
The district court reversed, holding that § 1146(c) was inapplicable because the transaction
involved two non-debtors.
On. appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the term "under" in § 1146(c), which exempts
from stamp or similar taxes any instrument of transfer "under" a confirmed chapter II plan,
referred to a transfer authorized by a confirmed Chapter II plan, which in turn authorizes any
transfer that is necessary to the consummation of the plan. Because the plan authorized the non-
debtor transaction, the court found it necessary to the consummation of the plan. The court held
that the non-debtor mortgage was exempt from Florida's stamp tax. The court stated that
nothing in the language of § 1146(c) restricted its application to transactions involving the debtor
or estate property. The court also rejected the FDOR's argument that construing § I I46(c) to
encompass transactions involving non-estate property would extend the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction past its statutory limits. The court stated that the issue in the case was whether a
non-debtor was entitled to an exemption under federal bankruptcy law, and the adjudication of
substantive bankruptcy law was within the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The court
differentiated cases relied upon by the FDOR, because in those cases, the third-party transactions
were not necessary to the confirmation of the plan, an element the court found necessary for the
transaction to be exempt under § 1146(c).
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C. Discharge and Dischargeability
Stamper v. United States (In re Gardner), 360 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2004)
In this case, the Debtor was an attorney who failed to pay his tax liabilities for 1990 and
1991. At the request of the IRS, the attorney provided him with certain financial information,
but did not list a nominee account in the name of his secretary and her husband, which the
attorney used for his personal banking needs. In 1993, he received a $500,000 distribution from
his law firm, which he used to pay taxes, but did not apply to any of the 1990 or 1991 tax
liabilities. After several more failed attempts to compromise his tax liabilities, and several other
submissions of financial information, the attorney filed a bankruptcy proceeding on October 30,
1995. The attorney did not list any cash or bank accounts and did not list a pending case at his
law firm on his bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy case closed September 23, 1998.
On March 12, 1999, the United States sought to reopen the attorney's bankruptcy
proceeding, which was granted. The government then instituted this adversary proceeding in
which it claimed that the attorney's 1990 and 1991 tax liabilities were nondischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(I)(C). The bankruptcy court conducted a trial in which the attorney admitted
that he used nominee accounts to hide his assets from the State of Kentucky, that he was aware
of his obligations to pay his 1990 and 1991 federal income taxes and that he could have used
some of the income he earned to pay those taxes. The government also submitted evidence of
the attorney's extravagant lifestyle after he incurred the tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991. Based
on this evidence the bankruptcy court held that the attorney had willfully attempted to evade his
tax liabilities within Section 523(a)(I)(C), and they were therefore not dischargeable. The
district court affirmed.
In affirming both courts, the court of appeals held that Section 523(a)(I)(C) applies to
attempts to evade either assessment of tax or payment of it (as here). It held that the government
met both the conduct requirement and the mental state requirement in proving that Mr. Gardner
willfully attempted to evade payment of the tax liability. The conduct requirement was met by
Mr. Gardner hiding money in nominee accounts, failing to disclose the identity of the accounts
and failing to apply income to the liabilities. The mental state requirement was met because Mr.
Gardner knew of his liabilities and knew that he could have used some of his income to pay the
liabilities.
In re Best (Steier v. Best), 109 Fed Appx. 1 (6th Cir. 2004) (Unpublished)
Here, the Sixth Circuit held that the debtors' effort to thwart the collection of the
judgment debt did not render it nondischargeable under §523(a)(6), because the concealment did
not cause or give rise to the judgment debt. Also, the bankruptcy court did not err in concluding
that the debtors did not invade the unsecured creditor's legal rights by selling assets and using
the proceeds to pay other creditors instead of paying him. Finally, the false financial statement
provided to the creditor did not render the debt nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(B) (i.e.,
incurring debt through a false financial statement), because the creditor did not rely on the
statement in deciding to invest.
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In 1996 Mr. Best founded Impairment Analysis Centers, Inc. ("lAC") with Mr. Finney.
On November 10, 1997, Steier executed an agreement whereby he paid Best and Finney
$300,000 and each gave him fifty shares of lAC stock. Steier was to receive 50 more shares in
May 1998, upon payment of $450,000, reduced to $300,000 if he found other investors. If Steier
failed to do so, he would return his shares and Finney and Best would repay his $300,000. In the
next few months, disagreements arose. In April 1998, Steir demanded that Best and Finney
repay his $300,000. In May 1998, Best and Finney wrote Steier stating that they were unable to
reimburse him at that time. Steir sued for breach of contract and won a judgment for $300,000
plus interest in September 1998. In October 2000, the Bests filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In
January 2001, Steier filed an adversary proceeding, seeking a declaration that the Bests'
judgment debt was non-dischargeable. Steier alleged that the Bests concealed assets to prevent
him from collecting his judgment. The bankruptcy court held the debt was dischargeable under §
523(a)(6) (debt arising from willful and malicious injury to property) and that §523(a)(2)(B) did
not apply. The district court affirmed and Steier appealed.
The Sixth Circuit found that it was immaterial whether or not the Bests disposed of or
concealed assets in a way that they knew would prevent Steier from collecting the judgment debt
because the concealment occurred after the debt arose and did not give rise to the debt. The court
further noted that a breach of contract does not constitute a willful and malicious injury under §
523(a)(6). Additionally, while the Bests' actions may have caused Steier a lost opportunity to
collect the funds, Steier, an unsecured creditor, did not have a greater right to these funds than
any of the Bests' other creditors. The court also affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the
false financial statement did not render the debt non-dischargeable under §523(a)(2)(B) because
Steier did not rely on the financial statement and balance sheets and this finding was amply
supported by Steier's own deposition testimony (i.e., that he had relied on the enthusiasm of the
principals of the business).
In re Miller (Miller v. Pa. Higher Education), 377 F. 3d 616 (6th eire 2004)
The Sixth Circuit held that any discharge, whole or partial, of student loan debt must be
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 523(a)(8), which requires a finding of "undue hardship." Thus,
the court reversed the bankruptcy court's partial discharge of student loan debt when the
bankruptcy court properly relied on 11 U.S.C. Section 105(a) to discharge a fraction of the
student loan debt, but failed to make a finding of "undue hardship" as required under Section
523(a)(8).
The debtor, Patricia Miller, received a B.A. in 1988, a Masters degree in 1992, and
pursued a Doctorate of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville until 1997,
accumulating approximately $90,000 in student loans. For several years, she requested and
received forbearance and deferments on those loans. In 2001, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition and sought to discharge all of her outstanding student loan debt (over 99% remained
unpaid at that time).
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The bankruptcy court applied the correct test when analyzing whether all of Miller's
student loan debt presented an "undue hardship." The Sixth Circuit combines the three-part test
enunciated in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education, 831 F. 2d 395 (2d. Cir. 1987), plus
other relevant factors discussed in Hornsby v. Tenn. Student Assistance, 144 F. 3d 433 (6th Cir.
1998) to determine if student loan debt presents an "undue hardship" as required by Section
523(a)(8). Upon finding that Miller failed to meet her burden of proof as to the entire loan
amount, the bankruptcy court attempted to determine if at least some of the amount was
dischargeable. The bankruptcy court turned to Section 105(a), which provides that a court may
issue any order that is necessary to "carry out the provisions of this title." The use of Section
105(a), to discharge student loan debt, in part, was approved in Hornsby. However, when
determining the amount, if any, to discharge, the bankruptcy court failed to apply the same
"undue hardship" test. Thus, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions
for the bankruptcy court to apply the proper "undue hardship" analysis with respect to the
portion of the loans that were discharged.
In Re Michael J. OYler. Oyler v. Educational Credit Management Corporation. 397 F.3d 382
(6th Cir. 2005)
Here, the bankruptcy court permitted the discharge of student loan debt under 523(a)(8)
("undue hardship" for the debtor and dependents). The creditor successfully appealed on the
grounds the debt did not pose an undue hardship because the Debtor had chosen a low paying
job. The Debtor was a pastor of a small start-up church, with an annual family income of
approximately $10,000. His only debts listed under his Chapter 13 plan were approximately
$40,000 in student loans. At the time of trial, the Debtor was current on his monthly plan of
payments. The Sixth Circuit stated that whether the student loans pose an undue hardship is a
legal question and therefore reviewed de novo. The Court, for the first time, expressly endorsed
the Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servo Corp., 831 F. 2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987) factors
for analyzing undue hardship. The factors are as follows: "(1) that the Debtor cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for herself and her
dependants if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and (3) that the Debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. Id. The Court
found that the Debtor failed prong 2 because Debtor's inability to pay the debts was a result of
his free choice. "Choosing a low-paying job cannot merit undue hardship relief'." Healy v.
Massachusetts Higher Educ. (In Re Healy), 161 B.R. 389, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1993) The lower
courts erred by not considering that Debtor's decision to accept a low-paying position was
voluntary. The court ruled that the debt was not an undue hardship and as such discharge of the
debt was unavailable.
In re Blaszak. 397 F.3d 386 (6th eire 2005)
Here, the Sixth Circuit held that the Debtor's debt for failure·to remit trust funds was not
dischargeable under §~23(a)(4).
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James Blaszak started Consumers Land Title Agency, Inc. ("Consumers"), articles of
incorporation for which were filed December 27, 1996. On or about December 12, 1996,
Consumers had entered into an agency agreement with plaintiff, Commonwealth Land Title
Company ("Commonwealth"). The agency agreement appointed and authorized Consumers to be
an issuing agent for Commonwealth. The agency agreement was signed by James Blaszak. The
bankruptcy court determined that under Ohio law Blaszak was a promoter for Consumers at the
time he signed the agency agreement and was therefore liable on the pre-incorporation contract.
The agreement remained in force until January 2, 2001, when it was terminated by
Commonwealth because Blaszak failed to report and remit moneys from settlements, closings
and premiums collected. Commonwealth claims these "defalcations" constitute breach of
contract of the agency agreement and breach of fiduciary duty, resulting in losses in excess of
$99,000. At Commonwealth's request, the bankruptcy court issued an order finding Blaszak's
debt non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed,
holding the debt non-dischargeable regardless of the capacity in which Blaszak signed the
contract.
The Sixth Circuit likewise affirmed, but on the basis of the Debtor's promoter capacity.
The Sixth Circuit defines "defalcation" to "encompass embezzlement and misappropriation by a
fiduciary, as well as the failure to properly account for such funds." To find that a debt is
nondischargeable due to defalcation, the creditor must prove the following by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) a preexisting fiduciary relationship which requires that the debtor hold funds in
trust for a third party; (2) breach of that fiduciary relationship; and (3) a resulting loss. Whether a
fiduciary relationship exists is determined by looking to federal law which requires that the
debtor hold funds in trust for a third party (i.e., it must be more than a principal-agent
relationship alone). "The mere failure to meet an obligation while acting in a fiduciary capacity
does not rise to the level of defalcation; an express or technical trust must also be present." In re
Garver, 116 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1997). The court found that the agency agreement met all of
the requirements of an express or technical trust and therefore affirmed.
D. Avoidance Actions
In Re Simms Construction Services Co., Inc., Corzin v. Decker, Vonau, Sybert and Lackev,
Co., L.P.A., 311 H.R. 479 (6th eire B.A.P. 2004)
Here, the BAP ,held that an Ohio attorney's charging lien is a lien for all purposes in
bankruptcy and can defeat a preference claim to recover fees from a lawyer. A law firm
provided prepetition legal services to the Debtor. During the 90 days prior to filing bankruptcy,
the firm received payment for those services from the proceeds of an arbitration award. The
Trustee sued to recover these payments as preferential transfers. The firm defended on the basis
that its lien on the funds made it a secured creditor and the payment not preferential. The
bankruptcy court concluded that, because the agreement to recover its fees from the arbitration
award was oral, it was not sufficient to create the lien.
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The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court found that the Ohio courts had not articulated the
level of proof required to establish the existence of an attorney's lien. The court found that the
Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that an agreement between the attorney and client is not a
prerequisite to the creation of an attorney lien. In addition, the Ohio court of Appeals had
recently held that an affidavit from the client is sufficient to establish the attorney charging lien.
Therefore, the court found that the law firm did have an enforceable attorney charging lien,
based upon the affidavits of the owner of the debtor corporation and an attorney of the law firm.
The court found that, once the attorneys charging lien is established, it is treated as a lien for all
purposes under the bankruptcy code. The court found that the payment to the law firm could not
be a preference because "payments to a creditor who is fully secured are not preferential since
the creditor would receive payment up to the full value of his collateral in Chapter 7 liquidation."
(Quoting In Re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F. 2d 1490, 1493. (6th Cir. 1990)).
In Re Thrush, Bvron Center State Bank v. Tibbie, 388 F. 3d 195 (6th Cir. 2004)
Debtor purchased a mobile home from an individual who had financed his purchase of
the mobile home through a bank. That same bank also financed the Debtor's transaction. The
bank executed a release of lien on the previous owner's certificate of title and simultaneously
entered its name on the certificate of title as the new lien holder. Just weeks later, the Debtor
filed for bankruptcy, but had not yet applied for a title in his own name. Debtor filed for a title in
his own name post-petition, and the new title listed the bank as the first and only lien holder.
The Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding to avoid the bank's security interest in the mobile
home. The bankruptcy court found that the bank had not perfected its interest in the mobile
home because it failed to file its security interest with the Department of Commerce, as required
by state law, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The district court reversed the
bankruptcy court on the ground that the prior security interest remained valid until a new title
application is delivered. However, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the bankruptcy
court.
In Re Vance, Rogan v. America's Wholesale Lender, 99 Fed. Appx. 25 (6th Cir. 2004)
(Unpublished)
Here, the Trustee successfully avoided a defective mortgage. The Trustee sought to
avoid a mortgage based on the assertion that the mortgage was invalid against a bona fide
purchaser lacking notice of the mortgage, and therefore invalid against the Trustee, because of
various defects. The defects included omissions in the notary's acknowledgement, such as the
name of the county where the acknowledgement was taken, the identity and/or names of those
who signed the mortgage and the date of the acknowledgement. The bankruptcy court
determined that this acknowledgment failed to comply with KRS §§ 423.130 and 423.160.
Kentucky law has uniformly held that defective acknowledgement of the security interest,
though recorded, does not provide protection against a good faith purchaser without notice. The
court determined that, based on the strong arm provision of bankruptcy law, the Trustee cannot
be deemed to have actual knowledge of the mortgage. As an improperly executed security
interest does not provide constructive notice under Kentucky law, the Trustee could not be
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deemed to have notice of the mortgage, permitting it to be avoided. The district court reversed
but the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court.
In re Biggs, 377 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2004)
Here, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy alld district courts,
holding a deed of trust invalid where the required acknowledgment omitted the names of the
individuals purporting to acknowledge their signatures on the deed.
On November 6, 1997, Richard and Kathy Biggs executed a deed of trust on their
Tennessee home securing a $65,000 loan and naming Seacoast Equities, Inc. as the beneficiary.
The acknowledgment on the last page of the deed of trust omitted the names of the Biggs as the
individuals purporting to acknowledge their signatures on the deed. On January 12, 1998,
Seacoast Equities recorded the deed of trust and sold its interest in the deed to Ocwen Federal
Bank. On April 9, 2001, the Biggs filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7. The Trustee then
filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court to avoid the deed of trust held by Ocwen under
§544(a)'s strong arm clause on the ground that the acknowledgment was defective and that her
status as a bona fide purchaser gave her a superior interest in the Debtors' home. The
bankruptcy court ruled for the Trustee. It held that, in order for the acknowledgment to be in
substantial compliance with Tennessee law, it must include the names of the people who
appeared before the notary. Ocwen appealed the decision to the district court, which affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It noted that Tennessee law specifically forgives defective
acknowledgments that either in "substance" or "intent" comply with the statutory requirements
for a proper acknowledgement. However, the substantial compliance test could not save the
deed of trust held by Ocwen because the savings provision addresses the unintentional omission
of words by the officer taking the acknowledgment, not the unintentional omission of the names
of the acknowledging individuals. Further, the deed of trust held by Ocwen failed the intent test
because in this case the notary named no one in the certificate of acknowledgment and the court
could not determine who, if anyone, intended to acknowledge the signatures on the deed of trust.
In Re Huffman, Kovacs v. National Lending Center, Inc., 369 F. 3d 972 (6th Cir. 2004)
This case encompassed three consolidated appeals of judgments by the district court
allowing the bankruptcy Trustee to avoid mortgages held by creditors First Union Home Equity
Bank and ContiMortgage Corporation under 11 U.S.C. § 544. The district court and court of
appeals held that an Ohio statute stating that a recorded mortgage was irrebuttably presumed to
be properly executed regardless of any actual or allegedly defect in the witnessing was
unconstitutional because it also pertained to a wide variety of additional subjects, in violation of
Article 2 § 15d of the Ohio constitution, which provides that no bill shall contain more than one
subject. The court stated that the pivotal question was whether the various topics shared a
common purpose or relationship. The court found that there was none. The court determined
that, while the mortgages could have been saved by a recent amendment to the law, the amended
statute could not be applied retroactively to impair the Trustee's vested rights.
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Johnson v. Altegra Credit Co. (In re Coleman), Case No. 01-53130, Adv. No. 02-5167, 2004
Bankr. LEXIS 967 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 21, 2004)
This is another decision involving avoidance of a mortgage. The Debtors, before filing a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, refinanced a loan with CIT Group on their mobile home and real property.
The note was assigned to Altegra Credit Co. ("Creditor"). The Trustee claimed that, because
Creditor's lien did not appear on the mobile home's certificate of title and because the mortgage
did not comply with the notarial acknowledgement requirements of KRS 423.130, her interest
was superior to the creditor's interest, and she could therefore avoid the lien as a hypothetical
lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(I).
The court stated that, because the creditor's security interest did not appear on the mobile
home's certificate of title, as required by Kentucky law, it was unperfected on the date of the
filing of the Debtors' petition. Thus, the Trustee's lien pursuant to § 544(a)(I) was prior and
superior, and the Trustee could avoid the mortgage on that basis.
The Trustee argued that she also had priority as a bona fide purchaser pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) because the mortgage did not meet the requirements in KRS 423.130 for
proper notarization. The court agreed based upon Rogan v. America's Wholesale Lender (In re
Vance), 99 Fed. Appx. 25, 2004 WL 771484, at *2 (6th Cir. 2004).
Gardner v. Century Bank ofKentuckv. Inc. (In re Dennis), Case No. 04-3037, Adv. No. 04-
3022,2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1469 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 29,2004)
Here, the Trustee sought to avoid the creditor's mortgage on the basis that the mortgage
did not recite the maturity date of the indebtedness secured as required under KRS 382.330.
The court stated that KRS 382.330 says that a mortgage may not be recorded unless it
states the date and maturity of the obligation secured. The creditor responded by arguing that the
mortgage was in fact recorded. The court said that, although an improperly recorded mortgage
may give actual notice to those searching the title, a bankruptcy trustee has the rights and
avoidance powers of a judicial lien creditor and bona fide purchaser "without regard to any
knowledge of the Trustee or of any other creditor" under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). Also, Sixth Circuit
law held that a "defectively acknowledged security interest that is recorded does not provide
protection from a subsequent party who lacks notice of the interest." Rogan v. America's
Wholesale Lender (In re Vance), 99 Fed. Appx. 25, 27 (6th Cir. 2004). Because the mortgage did
not give third parties constructive notice of the mortgage, it was improperly recorded and the
Trustee cannot have actual notice or knowledge of the mortgage. The court held that the Trustee
could avoid the mortgage.
Spradlin v. Stump (In re Charles), Case No. 04-70204, Adv. No. 04-7017, 2004 Bankr.
LEXIS 1741 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Oct. 19, 2004)
Here, the court declined to invalidate a lien based on alleged drafting errors. The Stumps
executed a "General Warranty Deed with Lien" to one of the Debtors and a third party "for and
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in consideration of the sum of $180,000, secured by a promissory note of even date hereof,
payable pursuant to said note, the last payment being due and payable on or before October 1,
2009, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt for which is hereby acknowledged." A
paragraph in the deed stated that a lien is retained on the property to secure the unpaid purchase
price. With the deed was a Certificate of Consideration which stated, "We, the undersigned,
hereby certify pursuant to KRS Chapter 382, ... that the above stated consideration in the
amount of $ 180,000 is true, correct and full consideration paid for the property conveyed," and
it is signed by the sellers and purchasers, followed by notary entries stating that the deed was
acknowledged by the Stumps and that the Certificate of Consideration was subscribed and sworn
to by the Stumps and by the Debtor and the third party.
Dated the same day was a promissory note signed by the Debtor and the third party that
stated that they promised to pay the Stumps $150,000 plus interest in monthly installments with
the last payment due on September 1, 2009. The Stumps and Phelps BP Mart, Inc., as sellers,
and the Debtor, the third party and their wives, as purchasers, entered into a "Contract of Sale
and Purchase of Business Assets" for the purchase of the personalty and real estate described in
the deed. One of the paragraphs of that contract, designated PAYMENT OF PURCHASE
PRICE, stated that the purchasers were to pay $150,000 in monthly installments with the final
payment due on September 1, 2009.
When the Debtors filed their chapter 7 petition, they listed the transaction on schedule G
as an executory contract or unexpired lease. The Stumps filed a proof of claim, alleging a
secured claim of $100,483.73 based on the note and lien in the above transaction. The Trustee
filed the instant action seeking to avoid the Stumps' lien as unperfected as against the Trustee as
a hypothetical bona fide purchaser or judicial lien creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 544. She argued
that the deed failed to properly retain a lien on the property and that the acknowledgement was
deficient.
The court, after considering Kentucky law on the requirements for signatures, attestation
and filing of deeds, held that the deed in question complied with the law and gave adequate
notice of the Stumps' lien. The court stated that the deed's title clearly reflects that a lien is
being retained to secure the unpaid purchase price. The court stated that, although the stated
amount of indebtedness is incorrect, it is less than the actual amount of the indebtedness, which
is the secured amount, and although the maturity date was incorrect, it was off by only one
payment. Thus, the court dismissed the Trustee's suit with prejudice.
Baker v. Hodge (In re Hodge), Case No. 04-20357, Adv. No. 04-2034, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS
1477 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 28,2004)
This case deals with the positions of the Trustee and junior lienholders when an otherwise
first lien has been mistakenly released pre-petition. Here, Fifth Third Bank of Northern
Kentucky, Inc. ("Fifth Third") recorded a mortgage on the Debtors' residence on June 11, 1999,
but mistakenly released the mortgage on February 7, 2001. On April 25, 2003, Legal
Recoveries, Inc. ("Legal Recoveries") recorded a judgment lien against ,each Debtor, as did
Huntington National Bank ("Huntington") on January 8, 2004. On February 19, 2004, the
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Debtors filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition and, in their schedules, valued the property at
$71,000. The Debtors also, in amended Schedule C, claimed an exemption on the property.
Fifth Third filed a proof of claim. Legal Recoveries also filed a proof of claim, asserting that the
claim was secured by a judgment lien. Huntington filed a proof of claim, but filed it as an
unsecured claim.
The Trustee filed a complaint seeking to avoid Fifth Third's mortgage under 11 U.S.C. §
544(a) and preserve it for the estate, to avoid Huntington's judgment lien as a preference, for a
determination that the judgment lien of Legal Recoveries was subordinate to the estate and to the
Debtors' exemptions, for a determination that the Debtors' interests are subordinate to the estate
and for authority to sell the property fee of clear of the mortgage, judgment liens and
exemptions. The Debtors filed a motion to avoid the judgment lien of Legal Recoveries as
impairing their exemption. The Trustee admitted subsequently that the lien of Legal Recoveries
was superior to Fifth Third's mortgage and thus, the Trustee's rights as successor to that
mortgage.
The court stated that, under Kentucky law, the release of a mortgage reinstates title in the
mortgagor or grantor, although a mortgagee who mistakenly releases a mortgage is entitled to
have the mortgage reinstated as long as later claimants did not rely to their detriment on the
release in acquiring their rights. However, the court noted that, based on Sixth Circuit authority,
the equitable right to have the mortgage reinstated does not rise to the level of a present security
interest for the purpose of federal tax lien statutes. Thus, a competing claimant will prevail over
an unrecorded, equitable mortgage so long as the claimant did not have notice that the release
was erroneous. Thus, Fifth Third retained no interest in the property following the recordation of
the release, and the Trustee has no authority under § 544(a) to avoid any interest. Even though §
544(a) gives the Trustee the right of a judicial lien creditor or bona fide purchaser without
knowledge, the court stated that these rights would be subject to the rights of other judicial lien
creditors that were perfected prior to the commencement of the case. Thus, the Trustee's rights
by virtue of § 544(a) are subordinate to the judicial lien rights of Legal Recoveries and
Huntington.
The Trustee was permitted to avoid Huntington's lien as a preference under 11 U.S.C. §
547. However, the liens of Legal Recoveries were not permitted to be avoided by the Debtors
because they did not impair the Debtors' exemption. The remaining liens and exemption totaled
only approximately $32,000, which was much less than the value of the property.
In Re Ulinski. Ulinski v. Huntington National Bank, 317 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2004)
Here, the court held invalid a vehicle lien when the final act to perfect the lien took place
post-petition. The Debtor financed the purchase of a truck through a lender from whom he had
been leasing that vehicle. The Trustee sought to avoid the bank's loan as a preferential transfer
or a post-petition transfer, and as a violation of the automatic stay. The bank claimed that,
because it had taken all steps necessary to have its lien noted on the certificate of title and
because the certificate of title still noted it as the owner of the truck and not the lienholder, its
interest was perfected prior to filing of the bankruptcy petition. However, Kentucky law
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provides that the sole means of perfecting the lien on a vehicle is by notation on its certificate of
title. Perfection of this lien did not occur until after the petition had been filed. The Court
determined that, if the lien was invalid under § 362, the Trustee would not need to avoid it. Any
act in violation of the automatic stay is considered to be invalid and has no effect. Despite the
bank's notation on the certificate of title, the truck was deemed to be property of the estate at
commencement of the case.
As the perfection of the bank's lien was in violation of the automatic stay, the Court
deemed it invalid.
In re Lewis, 398 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2005)
Here, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the avoidance of a late-filed mortgage as a preferential
transfer pursuant to § 547, notwithstanding the appointment of a receiver for the lender under
FIRREA.
On September 9, 1999, Ms. Lewis executed a note to Superior Bank and, with two family
members, executed a mortgage on her real property to secure the note. Superior did not record
the mortgage until April 17, 2000. On May 4, 2000, Ms. Lewis filed under Chapter 7. On
November 11, 2000, the Trustee filed an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid Superior's
mortgage. On July 27, 2001, Superior was placed in receivership pursuant to the provisions of
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"). On November
15, 2001, the bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and
avoided Superior's mortgage. The district court affirmed, as did the Sixth Circuit. The FDIC, as
receiver, appealed and challenged the bankruptcy co~'s subject matter jurisdiction under
FIRREA.
The question of whether FIRREA applies to an action pending at the time a receiver was
appointed was an issue of first impression in the Sixth Circuit. The Court found that Congress
did not intend for § 1821(d)(13)(D) to strip the bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction in a pre-
receivership context and that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to decide the avoidance issue
at the time the adversary complaint was filed. The Sixth Circuit further found that, if the receiver
does not request a stay, FIRREA does not prevent a court that acquired jurisdiction before the
receiver was appointed from deciding the issues before it. § 1821(d)(13(D) only precludes a
court from acquiring jurisdiction after a receiver is appointed. Therefore, the bankruptcy court
retained jurisdiction to decide the adversary action because the FDIC did not intervene and
request a stay of the pre-receivership case after it was appointed receiver of Superior.
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E. Exemptions/Property of the Estate
In re Medex Regional Laboratories. LLC. 314 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2004)
Here, the bankruptcy court found that the proceeds of a directors' and officers' liability
policy were not property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate because any indemnification to be
provided to the Debtor under the policy was hypothetical and/or speculative.
The Debtor was organized as a Tennessee limited liability company. Each of individuals
at issue here ("Officers") was a governor and/or manager of the Debtor. In 2002, the Debtor
obtained a Directors' and Officers' liability insurance policy. Each Officer was an "Insured
Person," the Debtor was an "Insured Entity," and the Officers and the Debtor were "Insureds" as
defined in the policy. On April 8, 2003, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition commencing its
Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. A committee later filed an adversary proceeding against the
Officers in their capacities as officers and/or directors alleging breach of fiduciary duty and
related claims. Each of the Officers asserted indemnification by the Debtor as an affirmative
defense. Additionally, five of the Officers filed proofs of claim in the Debtor's bankruptcy case
for an undetermined amount based upon possible indemnification claims against the Debtor
(with the adversary proceeding constituting a "Claim" as defined in the policy). The insurer
conditioned payment of the costs of defense on the court (1) finding that the policy proceeds
were not property of the Debtor's estate, or (2) granting relief from the automatic stay as to the
policy proceeds.
The bankruptcy court noted that, while there is general agreement that Directors' and
Officers' policies are property of the estate, there is disagreement regarding the status of policy
proceeds. It concluded that, because the Debtor had not provided any indemnification to the
movants and because any indemnification was hypothetical and/or speculative, the policy
proceeds were not the property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. The insurer was therefore not
precluded by the automatic stay from disbursing the costs of defense directly to the Officers. The
bankruptcy court stated the rule as follows:
"When a debtor's liability insurance policy provides direct coverage to the debtor
the proceeds are property of the estate, because the proceeds are payable to the
debtor. Further, when the liability insurance policy only provides direct coverage
to the directors and officers the proceeds are not property of the estate. However,
when there is coverage for the directors and officers and the debtor, the proceeds
will be property of the estate if depletion of the proceeds would have an adverse
effect on the estate to the extent the policy actually protects the estate's other
assets from diminution. Lastly, when the liability policy provides the debtor with
indemnification coverage but indemnification either has not occurred, is
hypothetical or speculative, the proceeds are not property of the bankruptcy
estate."
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Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004)
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the working owner of
a business may qualify as a "participant" in an ERISA pension plan.
Dr. Raymond B. Yates was the sole shareholder and president of Raymond B. Yates,
M.D., P.C., a professional corporation, which maintained a profit sharing plan ("Profit Sharing
Plan"). At least one other person besides Dr. Yates and his wife were participants in the Profit
Sharing Plan. The Profit Sharing Plan contained a spendthrift clause, which precluded the
alienation or assignment of any benefit or interest in the plan except for loans to participants. Dr.
Yates, in December 1998, borrowed $20,000 from the Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Money
Purchase Pension Plan, which was later merged into the Profit Sharing Plan. Dr. Yates originally
defaulted on the terms of the loan but finally did repay to the Profit Sharing Plan the
approximately $50,000 in principal and interest due. Three weeks after the repayment, Dr.
Yates's creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against him. The Trustee filed an
adversary complaint against the Profit Sharing Plan and Dr. Yates as its Trustee asking the
bankruptcy court to avoid the preferential transfer of the $50,000 by Dr. Yates to the Profit
Sharing Plan.
The bankruptcy court, relying on existing Sixth Circuit precedent, granted summary
judgment to the Trustee, holding that, as the self-employed owner of the professional corporation
that sponsored the Profit Sharing Plan, Dr. Yates could not participate in the plan as an employee
under ERISA and could therefore not use the anti-alienation spendthrift clause to enforce the
restriction of his interest. Therefore, the money Dr. Yates put into the Profit Sharing Plan was
not protected by ERISA. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Court reversed. It considered the text of ERISA, which contained multiple
indications that Congress intended working owners to qualify as plan participants, and an amicus
curiae brief filed by the Department of Labor in which it stated that it believed owners were
included in the definition of "participant." The Court held that a working owner may be a
participant under ERISA on equal terms with other plan participants as long as the plan covers
one or more employees other than the business owner and his or her spouse, and that the owner
qualifies for all the protections of ERISA.
United States v. Wagner, 382F. 3d 598 (6th eire 2004)
This case addresses the criminal concealment of assets in a bankruptcy context.
Appellant appeals his conviction for fraudulently concealing property from a bankruptcy Trustee
and filing a false document in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Debtor filed a pro se Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding to stay approximately 75 foreclosure actions. He refused to attend the
customary meeting with the U.S. Trustee's office, and filed a "plan" that simply criticized the
judge. He also further "encumbered" several of his properties with bogus mortgages based on
forged documents purporting to evidence a loan to the Debtor from the Small Business
Administration. The United States Trustee's office filed a motion to convert Debtor's
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bankruptcy petition to a Chapter 7 petition, which was granted. The Debtor then ordered tenants
not to pay rent to the Trustee and changed property locks to thwart the Trustee's efforts to sell
the properties. The Debtor was indicted for fraudulently presenting the SBA mortgage and note
and the plan, fraudulently ordering his tenants to pay rent to him as opposed to the Chapter 7
Trustee and for concealing assets by changing the locks on the houses that were assets of the
Estate. The Debtor was found guilty on the first and third counts, however, the jury was unable
to reach a unanimous verdict on count 2.
On appeal, the Debtor argued that he did not "conceal" property by changing the locks.
The court determined that Debtor concealed property within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 152(1),
by depriving the Trustee of access to the houses and withholding the values of the properties. As
there is no materiality requirement in § 152(1), the Court determined that such issues as the
minimal inconvenience caused by the changing of locks were irrelevant.
The Debtor also argued that his conviction for bankruptcy fraud should be reversed
because his actions had not been proven to have an affect on the bankruptcy court. The court
analyzed his conviction under the three-part test for § 157(2): (1) the existence of a scheme to
defraud or intent to later formulate a scheme to defraud; (2) the filing of a document and a
proceeding under Title 11; (3) for the purpose of executing or attempting to execute the scheme.
The court found that there was no requirement that the fraudulent filing have its intended effect.
The court affirmed based on its finding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Wagner
devised a scheme to defraud the court and filed the plan of arrangements in furtherance of that
scheme.
F. Good FaithlDismissaI
In Re Integrated Telecom Express. Inc.• NMSBPCSLDHB. LP. v. Integrated Telecom
Express. Inc.• 384 F. 3d 108 (3rd eire 2004)
Here, the Third Circuit dismissed a Chapter 11 proceeding for lack of good faith where a
non-operating debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition in order to force the reduction of a lease
termination liability, so that more value could be distributed to shareholders. The Debtor had
been a supplier of software and equipment to broadband communications industries. It leased
real property in Silicon Valley from the Landlord in early 2001. The lease was for a period of 10
years with escalating rent. The tenant then encountered various legal and financial difficulties
and formed a plan to liquidate, but needed to deal with its liability under the lease. The Debtor's
Board of Directors authorized a Chapter 11 filing in order to take advantage of the post-petition
lease termination damages cap set forth in § 502(b)(6) (the greater of one year's rent or 15% not
to exceed three years' rent) if the Landlord would not accept $8 million for the obligations under
the lease, and a letter to that effect went to the Landlord. The Debtor and the Landlord were
unable to reach an agreement, and the Debtor filed the bankruptcy proceeding. At the time of
filing, the Debtor listed over $106 million in assets. The Landlord filed proof of claim for $26
million. The Debtor also listed miscellaneous liabilities of approximately $430,000. The Debtor
moved to reject the lease and the Landlord moved to dismiss for lack of good faith. The
bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss. It noted several factors supporting the filing,
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including a desire to stem losses and return some remaining value to investors. However, it also
held that the desire to take advantage of § 502(b)(6) was enough to support the filing. The
district court affirmed.
The court of appeals noted that the burden is on the Debtor to establish that the petition
was filed in good faith. The court of appeals reviewed the bankruptcy court's decision for abuse
of discretion. The court focused on whether the petition served a valid bankruptcy purpose or
was filed merely to obtain a tactical litigation advantage. The court found that filing a
bankruptcy petition merely to obtain tactical litigation advantage is not within the legitimate
scope of the bankruptcy law. Because the Debtor was out of business, the court determined that
the main issue on appeal was whether the petition might reasonably have maximized the value of
the bankruptcy estate. The court did note that the Debtor need not be insolvent before filing for
bankruptcy protection. However, here, there was no value for the Debtor's assets that was
threatened outside of bankruptcy,. but that could be preserved or maximized in a bankruptcy
proceeding. The court found that the collapse of the Debtor's business model did not support a
finding of good faith. The Debtor was not suffering from financial distress when it filed its
petition and the lower court's findings to the contrary constituted legal error.
The court also found that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of good
faith based on the Debtor's stated purpose to provide a framework for resolving a class action
against it. The court noted that the Debtor would have remained solvent even had the class and
the Landlord been able to recover their full claims.
The court stated that it appeared that the Debtor had filed for Chapter 11 protection to
gain a litigation advantage. The court noted that prior cases rejected this as a good faith reason
for filing for bankruptcy protection. The court also found that dissolution ~d distribution were
not valid purposes for filing a bankruptcy petition. The court also determined that the sale of the
Debtor's intellectual property rights through the bankruptcy court did not justify the filing. The
court found that the only increase in value for these assets was as. a result of the Committee's
challenge to the Debtor's proposed sale and auction. The court stated that bankruptcy protection
was not necessary to alert the Debtor to the fact that it could achieve a higher price for its assets
in an open auction.
The court then addressed whether the Debtor's desire to take advantage of the cap on
Landlord claims established good faith in and of itself. The bankruptcy court determined that the
Debtor's desire to take advantage of the § 502(b)(6) cap does not establish bad faith. The court
of appeals agreed, stating that it is not bad faith to seek to avail oneself of a particular protection
of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the court found that such a desire, standing alone, cannot
establish good faith. The court found that good faith must be determined prior to the operation
of § 502(b)(6). The court stated that although the Code allows redistribution of value from one
interest to another, the redistributions are merely the means to effectuate the purpose of
preserving going concerns and maximizing the value of the estate. To be filed in good faith, a
petition must seek to create or preserve value that would be lost but for the protections of
bankruptcy. The court held that the bankruptcy court and the district court erred as a matter of
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law in concluding that the Debtor suffered financial distress. Because the Debtor was not in
financial distress, the petition was not filed in good faith.
In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2004)
Here, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling that to grant the Debtors a
Chapter 7 discharge would constitute a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy system because the
Debtors had disposable income with which to pay their creditors.
In 2001 the Debtors voluntarily filed under Chapter 7. At the time of the filing, the
Debtors owed approximately $160,000 in unsecured non-priority debt that was consumer in
nature. The Debtors' net monthly income totaled $4,923 and their net monthly expenses totaled
$4,749. The Debtors' Schedule 1 showed a voluntary monthly contribution of $460 to the
Debtor's employer-sponsored 401K program. The Trustee filed a motion to dismiss the case
under § 707(b) as a "substantial abuse" of the chapter. The bankruptcy court noted that
substantial abuse can be predicated on a lack of honesty or a lack of need and concluded the
Debtors were not needy. It granted the motion and the Sixth Circuit BAP affirmed on that
ground. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The court held that that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in including
401K contributions as disposable income for purposes of determining the Debtors' ability to pay
under § 707(b), on the ground that the 401K contributions were not reasonably necessary to the
maintenance and support of the Debtors or their dependant.
The court held that the bankruptcy court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the Debtors' ability to repay 14% over three years or 23% over five years meant they did not
satisfy the need prong of the test. The court acknowledged there is not a bright line test for
determining the extent of ability to repay that will support a substantial abuse finding.
Copper v. Copper (In re Copper), 314 B~R. 628 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004)
In this case, the Debtor, a distinguished university professor, had filed his sixth
bankruptcy petition in an attempt to avoid paying his ex-wife the amounts she was awarded
under the divorce decree. Each of the prior petitions was dismissed because of the Debtor's
failure to comply with basic bankruptcy requirements. During this sixth bankruptcy matter, the
former wife filed an adversary proceeding against the Debtor, asserting that the debts owed to
her were nondischargeable and that the Debtor's discharge should be denied. Just before trial,
the Debtor filed a motion to convert his chapter 7 ~.ankruptcy into a chapter 13 pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 706(a).
The bankruptcy court noted that there were a number of serious false statements in the
Debtor's schedules and statement of financial affairs. In fact, the Debtor's attorney stated that
his client was the most sanctioned debtor in the district and that his client had told "egregious
lies" during the trial. The judge then held that it would be futile to convert the Debtor's case into
a chapter 13, because a chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good faith, and the Debtor was not
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capable of making such a proposal. Thus, the motion to convert was denied, and this appeal
followed.
The Debtor argued that, no matter how reprehensible his conduct, he had an absolute,
one-time right to convert his chapter 7 case to a chapter 13 case. The court, although
recognizing that there is a line of cases holding differently, held that the right to convert is not
absolute and, in extreme circumstances, such as bad faith or an attempt to abuse the bankruptcy
process, it could be denied. The court thus affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the
motion to convert was motivated solely by a desire to avoid a determination that the Debtor was
not entitled to a discharge, and affirmed the denial of the motion for conversion.
G. Attorneys
Rubin v. Pringle an re Focus Media, Inc.), 387 F.3d 1077 (9th eire 2004)
Here, the attorney for a party in a bankruptcy proceeding was deemed to be the agent for
service of process on that party in a later adversary proceeding. An involuntary bankruptcy case
was filed against Focus Media, Inc. Over a year later, the Trustee brought an adversary
proceeding against the sole shareholder of the Debtor, alleging that the Debtor transferred
millions to the shareholder. The Trustee also sought to freeze the shareholder's assets by a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court issued
the TRO and scheduled a hearing on the preliminary injunction. The Trustee served the attorney
who represented the shareholder in the underlying bankruptcy action. The shareholder appeared
by counsel only and challenged service ofprocess.
The court tentatively granted the preliminary injunction motion, stating that the question
really came down to whether the attorney was impliedly designated as the agent for service of
process for the shareholder. The bankruptcy court found that the attorney, as counsel for the
shareholder in the underlying bankruptcy action, was impliedly authorized to receive service of
process on his behalf in the adversary case. The shareholder appealed, and the district court
affirmed, stating that service on the shareholder was proper under Bankruptcy Rule 7004(b) and
adopted the ruling of the bankruptcy court that implied authority to accept service of process was
proper under the bankruptcy rules.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the attorney was impliedly authorized to
accept service on the shareholder's behalf because the attorney was extensively involved in the
underlying bankruptcy on the shareholder's behalf and because the shareholder had been served
with papers in the bankruptcy proceeding in the care of the attorney with no objection. The court
held that Rule 7004(b)(8) allowed the agent for service of process to be an agent impliedly
authorized to accept service on a client's behalf.
The court also held that Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308 (1999), which held that asset-freezing injunctions are impermissible where a
creditor seeking money damages lacks any interest in the debtor's assets, was inapplicable
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because that case did not bar the issuance of preliminary injunctions freezing assets where a
party in a bankruptcy alleges fraudulent conveyance or other equitable causes of action.
H. Credit Facility and Collateral Disputes
Pressman v. Franklin National Bank and GordonE. Inman, 384 F.3d 182 (6th Cir. 2004)
The bank in this case prevailed on allegations that it improperly declined to make a loan.
A partnership was formed to purchase several tracts and develop them as a residential
subdivision. One of the parties spoke to a loan officer at Franklin National Bank ("Bank"),
concerning an acquisition loan for a certain piece of property. The officer asserted that the Bank
would need to obtain a participating bank to finance a portion of the loan. He then told the
partner that the loan had been approved but that the Bank still needed to locate a participating
bank in order to provide the loan. The Bank approached a Georgia lender who required approval
of the rezoning before agreeing to participate in the loan. There was conflicting evidence on
whether the partner was told this was the only impediment to the loan. The Bank subsequently
executed a Commitment Letter, dated July 31, 1996, stating that it intended to make a loan to the
partnership but that it was contingent on the Bank's ability to find a participating bank. The
rezoning of the property was officially approved on August 12, but the Georgia lender decided
not to participate in the loan. The partnership later obtained a loan elsewhere but on less
favorable terms then those originally proposed by Bank. Two years later the partnership filed for
bankruptcy. Another partner purchased all the partnership's claims and filed suit against the
Bank and one of its principals alleging that the Bank was liable for breach of contract, fraud and
civil conspiracy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Bank defendants on all
claims.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the partner's argument that the Bank waived the participating-
bank condition with a representation that the participating Georgia lender was ready to close
subject only to final rezoning approval. The court found that: (1) there was no evidence that the
Bank officer possessed the requisite intent to waive; (2) at the time of his alleged representation,
the Bank had no rights under the participating-bank condition that could be waived; (3) a merger
and integration clause contained in the Commitment Letter precluded the partnership from
relying upon the alleged rep~esentations made prior to the execution of the letter; and (4) the
commitment letter required that any waiver had to be in writing and executed by both parties,
which was not done. The court also affirmed the district court's finding that the Bank acted in
good faith and used commercially reasonable standards.
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the evidence did not establish that the
Bank defendants intended to defraud the partnership.
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Huntington National Bank v. Porter, Nos. 2001-CA-000505-MR, 2001-CA-000509-MR &
2003-CA-00I022-MR, 2004 WL 1909295 (Ky. App. Aug. 27, 2004) (Unpublished)
In this case, DDR Rental and Leasing, Inc., d/b/a Dollar Rent-A-Car of Kentucky
("DDR") received floorplan financing from Huntington for $8.6 million. DDR purchased cars
from local dealers, and had repurchase agreements for the dealers to buy back the cars at an
agreed amount of money. Huntington had a security interest in the cars purchased from the
dealers, and the buy back amounts were to be paid to Huntington toward the floorplan debt.
However, because the dealers repurchasing the cars required Huntington to release its lien on
them and the money from the repurchases was paid directly to DDR, Huntington was left
unsecured. To protect itself, Huntington asked the shareholders of DDR to sign an
indemnification agreement promising to reimburse Huntington for any losses it might suffer
from DDR's failure to abide by the repurchase agreements with the dealers. DDR claimed that
Huntington also promised to extend overline financing of $5 million to DDR for DDR to
purchase new cars before receiving payment for the repurchased cars, which claim the bank
disputed.
The trial court held that the agreement between the DDR shareholders and Huntington
was actually a guaranty agreement and was unenforceable under KRS 371.065 for failure to
comply with the terms of the statute. The trial court also directed a verdict in favor of
Huntington on the claim of fraud by one of the DDR shareholders. A jury determined that DDR
was liable on the floorplan note for over $3:8 million.
Huntington appealed the determination that the indemnity agreement with the DDR
shareholders was actually a guaranty agreement subject to KRS 371.065. The court of appeals
stated that, despite its label as an indemnity agreement, the agreement was a guaranty because it
was a "promise to protect the promisee (Huntington) against loss or damage through the failure
of DDR to fulfill its obligations to Huntington." Thus, it stated, KRS 371.065 applied, and the
guaranty did not comply with the statute because it did not state "the amount of the maximum
aggregate liability of the guarantor thereunder, and the date on which the guaranty terminates."
The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the guaranty agreement was unenforceable.
The court of appeals did, however, reverse the directed verdict in favor of Huntington on
th~ shareholder's fraud claim, stating that the shareholder had presented enough evidence that
Huntington, through its representative, had made material representations to him (through DDR)
regarding overline financing.
Eubanks v. CBSK Financial Group. Inc.• 385 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2004)
This case involved Debtors who prosecuted a lender liability claim after omitting it from
their schedule of assets, and discusses the concept ofjudicial estoppel.
Although this case has a somewhat complicated procedural history, reduced to the basics,
the Debtors claimed to have filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding as a result of a dispute
with a lender over the cancellation of a loan previously approved. The Debtors did not initially
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identify the lender as a creditor or identify the lender liability claim as an asset. However, they
did later make the Trustee aware of the claim and provided documents to him concerning it. The
plaintiffs at one point sought to substitute the Trustee as a plaintiff in the action, but the
bankruptcy court ultimately entered the Trustee's final report which declared the lender liability
claim "fully administered and fully abandoned." After a number of procedural steps, they
eventually attempted to amend their original petition to add the claim as an asset, which
amendment the lender sought to block. During the course of the case, the Debtors did bring the
lender liability claim. The district court eventually dismissed it on grounds of judicial estoppel,
and the plaintiffs appealed.
The court noted that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the party from asserting a
position that is contrary one the party has asserted under oath in a prior proceeding where the
prior court adopted the contrary position. The lender argued that the plaintiffs' failure to include
the potential claim as an asset in its initial bankruptcy adjudication warranted judicial estoppel.
The court declined to apply that doctrine here, noting that the plaintiffs' disclosures to the
Trustee through correspondence, motions and status conference requests supported their
argument that the claim's omission on the schedules was inadvertent and that all parties knew
they intended to pursue the claim. The court found there was no evidence of any fraudulent
intent to conceal the claim.
Lavne v. Bank One. Kentuckv. N.A., 395 F.3d 271 (6th eire 2005)
This case deals with a lender's duty to preserve collateral value where the collateral is
shares of stock. Plaintiffs Charles E. Johnson, Jr. and Geoff Layne entered into two loan
transactions with Bank One, Kentucky, N.A. ("Bank One"), borrowing a total amount of
approximately $6 million secured by their shares of stock in the company PurchasePro.com, Inc.,
of which Johnson was founder and CEO and Layne was national marketing director. The loan
agreements included a Loan-to-Value ("LTV") ratio for each debtor that had to meet specified
percentages or the debtors had five days to cure by increasing the collateral or reducing the
outstanding balance, after which the loan would be in default and Bank One could exercis~ the
right to sell the stock with ten days notice to Johnson. In February 2001, the stock price fell, and
both loans exceeded their LTV ratios. Bank One entered into discussions with Johnson and
Payne to pledge more collateral. After Layne went back and forth several times on whether he
wanted the bank to sell the shares, Bank One had final discussions with the two debtors
regarding pledging additional collateral. The proposed deal fell through, and Bank One notified
Johnson of his continued default on the loans. Bank One finally sold Johnson's shares in July,
recovering approximately $525,000, and leaving a $2.2 million unpaid balance. Layne and
Johnson separately filed suit against Bank One, and the cases were consolidated. Layne
subsequently settled. Bank One filed counterclaims seeking payment of the loan deficiencies
and then filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims. The district
court granted Bank One's motion, and Johnson appealed.
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Johnson argued that Bank One violated a duty under Kentucky law to preserve the value
of the collateral it had in its possession under the V.C.C. as adopted in Kentucky. See KRS
355.9-207. The court stated that whether a secured party's duty to preserve collateral applies to
pledged shares was an issue of first impression in Kentucky. The court held that, under
Kentucky law, a lender has no obligation to sell pledged stock held as collateral merely because
of market decline, regardless of whether the loan is over-collateralized. The court held that it is
the duty of the borrower, if he is concerned about the decline in the share value, to substitute the
pledged stock with other valuable assets or sell the pledged stock himself and payoff the loan.
The decision suggests that, had the borrower requested the sale of the stock, and the bank
refused, the result could have been different.
Johnson also argued that Bank One violated Kentucky law by failing to dispose of the
pledged stock in a commercially reasonable manner. The court recognized that KRS 355.9-
627(2) allows as commercially reasonable sales of collateral on a recognized market such as the
New York Stock Exchange. It held that the sale of the stock by Bank One on NASDAQ was
commercially reasonable.
Johnson's final argument was that Bank One breached its fiduciary duty by failing to sell
the pledged stock when the LTV ratio exceeded the required percentage. The court held that
there was no fiduciary relationship created between Bank One and Johnson pursuant to the loan
agreements, as precedent recognized that "banks do not generally have fiduciary relationships
with their debtors." The court affirmed the district court.
I. Miscellaneous
Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corp. v. Crow (In re Crow), 394 F.3d 918 (11th Cir.
2004)
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the bankruptcy
court's denial of a motion to dismiss filed by the government entities, which claimed that the
debtors' adversary proceeding was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The court affirmed the denial of the government's motion to dismiss as to the count
seeking to discharge student loans, as the Supreme Court, in Tennessee Student Assistance
Corporation v. Hood, 124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004), had already decided that the bankruptcy rule
requiring a debtor to file an adversary proceeding against a state agency to discharge student loan
debt did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment because the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is
derived from the jurisdiction over the debtor's property and does not infringe state sovereignty.
The court vacated the bankruptcy court's denial of the motion to dismiss on the second
count, which sought damages for the government agencies' attempts to collect from the Debtors
after receiving notice of the Chapter 7 filing. The court stated that count two sought affirmative
relief from the state through judicial process, and therefore jurisdiction was in personam. This
meant that Hood did not apply. The court stated that it was joining the Seventh, Ninth, Third,
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Fifth and Fourth Circuits which held that Congress's attempts under 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy proceedings were invalid in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996). Seminole Tribe held that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity by
legislation passed pursuant to its Article I powers, which the court here concluded Congress used
to adopt § 106(a). The court also held that neither § 5, nor § 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
were routes under which Congress did, or could validly, abrogate state sovereign immunity for
bankruptcy matters.
United States v. Collins, 97 Fed. Appx. 629 (6th Cir. 2004) (Unpublished)
Here, the Debtor appealed a conviction of bankruptcy fraud. The conviction came after
the Debtor filed for bankruptcy protection in 1996. Her petition did not list her one-half interest
in a house or the mortgage on the property. The Debtor also testified that she did not own any
property. After that testimony, but before the discharge, she retained counsel to sell the property
and her counsel sent letters to her brother, the other one-half owner, negotiating the terms of the
sale. The property was sold and the proceeds distributed between the Debtor and her brother.
The Debtor was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 152 for knowingly and fraudulently
concealing a property interest from the Trustee. At trial, the Debtor stated that she did not know
she was the real owner of the property, but rather thought she was holding it with her brother
until her mother returned from prison. She also claimed that she gave her brother a quitclaim
deed to give the property back to their parents, but she later discovered that her brother had never
signed or recorded it. The Debtor's brother refuted these allegations. A jury found the Debtor
guilty under an instruction of deliberate ignorance.
The Debtor argued on appeal that the introduction of letters from her attorneys to her
brother was improper because the attorneys were not subject to cross-examination and because
they were not properly authenticated. The court held that the letters were admissible non-
hearsay because they were admissions of a party opponent as a statement by a party's agent or as
a statement by a person authorized to m'ake a statement concerning the subject, and that the
letters were properly authenticated by the person who received them, the Debtor's brother.
The Debtor also argued that the jury instruction for "deliberate ignorance" violated her
right to a fair trial because, she claimed, the evidence did not support the instruction. The court
disagreed, holding that there was ample evidence for the instruction. The Debtor's conviction
was thus affirmed.
Wachovia Bank, NationalAssociation v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 2004)
Here, the Fourth Circuit held that, for federal diversity jurisdiction purposes, a national
bank is located where it·operates its branch offices.
Wachovia Bank is a national banking association with its principal place of business in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Wachovia operates branch offices in a number of states, including
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South Carolina. David Schmidt is a citizen of South Carolina, and on April 10, 2003, he and
other plaintiffs filed a complaint in South Carolina state court naming Wachovia and others as
defendants. The complaint alleged that the defendants fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to
engage in a risky tax-motivated investment scheme. Wachovia filed a petition in the United
States District Court in South Carolina seeking an order compelling arbitration and a motion to
compel arbitration of the state claims, naming Schmidt and related business entities as
defendants. The sole basis of jurisdiction for Wachovia's petition was diversity jurisdiction.
The district court denied Wachovia's petition and it appealed. For the first time, Schmidt then
argued that diversity was lacking because Wachovia is "located" in South Carolina within the
meaning of28 U.S.C. § 1348 (national banking associations are deemed citizens of the states in
which they are respectively "located").
The court looked to three traditional tools of statutory interpretation in reaching its
conclusion that Wachovia was "located" in South Carolina. First, in construing the plain
meaning of the statute the court found that the "located" referred to "physical presence in a
place" and that a national banking association becomes physically present in a state when it
"operates branch offices in that state and conducts business there." Thus, under the plain
meaning of the statute, a national banking association is "located" wherever it operates branch
offices.
Second, to give independent meaning to the terms used to refer to the presence of a
banking association in §1348, the Court found that where a national bank is "established" refers
to a bank's charter location and that a bank is "located" where it has a physical presence. In so
holding, the Fourth Circuit found controlling the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens and
Southern National Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977), which interpreted "located" in the
former venue statute to include branch offices. Bougas found that different statutory terms in the
same section should be given different meanings. Thus, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation that "established" referred to a bank's charter location while "located"
referred to a bank's principal place of business because, as a practical matter, this interpretation
failed to give independent meanings to the terms "established" and "located."
Third, the Fourth Circuit concluded that venue and jurisdiction statutes should be treated
as in pari material, so that the Supreme Court's construction ofa term in one statute must control
the meaning of the identical term in the other.
United States v. Abel Cosmo Galetti. 541 U.S. 114 (2004)
The Court held that the United States was authorized to collect a partnership's unpaid
federal employment taxes from individuals who had been general partners where the taxes had
been timely assessed against the partnership. If a tax is properly assessed within three years the
statute of limitations for collection of that tax is extended by 10 years from the date of the
assessment. The issue presented was whether the United States must assess the taxes not only
against the partnership but also against each individual partner to avail itself of the extended
statute of limitations. Generally, a partnership has a separate identity from its partners and the
partners are only secondarily liable for tax debts of the partnership. The Debtors claimed that the
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timely assessment of the partnership could only extend the statute of limitations against the
partnership. Therefore, the debtors claimed that the IRS could no longer collect the debt from
them. The government claimed that as the Debtors conceded that they were liable for the
partnership's debt, the government had a right to payment. The Court held that the tax code
contained no requirement that the government make separate assessments of a single tax against
persons or entities secondarily liable therefore. The Court stated that it is the tax, not the
taxpayer, which is assessed. The statute of limitations attaches to the debt as a whole.
White v. Kentuckiana Livestock Market, 397 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2005)
Here, the Debtors sued their former employer for relief under 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (which
prohibits private employers from discharging employees solely because they have invoked
bankruptcy protection). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the
adversary proceeding because the evidence supported the bankruptcy court's finding that the
Debtors had not been fired by their mutual employer "solely because" of their Chapter 7 filing.
On March 16, 2001, the Debtors filed for protection under Chapter 7. Their employment
was terminated three days after the filing was reported in a local newspaper. The Debtors
commenced an adversary proceeding against the employer in the bankruptcy case. Their case
was principally supported by testimony concerning the employer's statements that the
bankruptcy and failure to pay investors in a prior business deal were factors in the firing,
including a sworn statement to the Kentucky unemployment insurance authorities that the
Debtors were fired because they filed for bankruptcy protection and this reflected poorly on the
business. The employer defended by contending that there were additional reasons to terminate
the Debtors' employment. These included Mr. White's offer to help his bosses cheat on their
income taxes in exchange for a company car, and Mrs. White's sloppy bookkeeping. The
employer acknowledged that one of the additional reasons that Mrs. White was fired was that she
was married to Mr. White and he was being fired. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary
proceeding.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It rejected the Debtors' argument that a termination is
prohibited if the bankruptcy filing is a "substantial factor" in the termination (Le., that
bankruptcy discrimination should be analyzed like that based on race, sex or age). The court
held that the language "solely because" is unambiguous and acknowledged the likelihood that
this would make bankruptcy discrimination more difficult to prove than discrimination based
upon the factors referred to above.
In Re Calumet Farm, Inc., First National Bank & Trust v. Brant, 2005 U.S. ADD. LEXIS
2767 (6th Cir. 2005)
This case deals with liability for return of mistaken wire transfers. Here, the former
Calumet Farm authorized its bank to transfer $77,301 to White Birch Farm to pay interestJon the
Debtor's $1 million debt to White Birch for the purchase of a one-half interest in the Stallion
Mogambo. The bank mistakenly wired $770,301 to White Birch's account at CitiBank. White
Birch refused to return the overpayment and Calumet eventually entered Chapter 11. The Debtor
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and the bank reached a partial settlement with each other under which the Debtor assigned to the
bank any right to recovery that it had against White Birch.
After various interim appeals, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for White
Birch, after finding that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding that White Birch
had notice of the transfer error before the funds were credited to its account at CitiBank, and
White Birch thus satisfied the required element of its "discharge for value" defense to the bank's
restitution claim. The district court affirmed, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.
The court reviewed Uniform Commercial Code and Federal Reserve Regulation
provisions and noted that a bank is entitled to recover from the beneficiary of an erroneous
transfer the excess payment received to the extent allowed by law governing mistake and
restitution. The Court noted that this provision authorizes the bank to seek restitution from the
beneficiary if the bank committed an error in executing the payment order, and that this concept
incorporates the "discharge for value" defense.
"A creditor of another or one having a lien on property who has received
from a third person any benefit in discharge of the debt or lien is under no duty to
make restitution therefore, although the discharge was given by mistake of the
transferor as to his interests or duties, if the transferee made no misrepresentation
and did not have notice of the transferor's mistake."
Thus, a key issue here was the timing of the notice of the mistake in a wire transfer
context. The court noted that prior decisions had erroneously focused on when White Birch
received the funds, rather than on when it credited Calumet's account, which the court criticized
as eviscerating the concept of "discharge" from the "discharge for value" defense. The court
noted that, while there was some dispute about when White Birch received notice of the error,
there was no dispute that it had notice of the error before it credited Calumet's account. The
court noted that White Birch's behavior also established that it was aware of the error as soon as
it learned of the wire transfer because it immediately transferred the overage. into a third account
so that "everything could be sorted out." The court concluded that White Birch had prior notice
of the mistake for purposes of the discharge for value rule and could not use that defense.
III. BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION UPDATE
• The U.S. Senate passed S.B. 256, the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005" on March 10, 2005. As of this date, passage by the House of
Representatives is expected.
• A copy of the CRS Report for Congress is attached.
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The "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005," S. 256, in the 109th Congress
Summary
On February 1, 2005, Senator Grassley introduced S. 256, the "Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005" (BAPCA), in the 109th
Congress, 1st Session. The bill is similar to that passed by the House in the 10Sth
Congress. S. 256 addresses many areas ofbankruptcy practice, including consumer
filings, small business bankruptcy, tax bankruptcy, ancillary and cross-border cases,
financial contract provisions, amendments to chapter 12 governing family farmer
reorganization, and health care and employee benefits. This report surveys selected
provisions that have been of interest to past Congresses that have considered
comparable legislation.
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The "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005,"8. 256,
in the 109th Congress
Introduction. On February 1, 2005, Senator Grassley introduced S. 256, the
"Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005" (BAPCA),
in the 109th Congress, 1st Session. 1 The bill is similar to that passed by the House in
the 10gth Congress.2 Like the House-passed bill from the 10gth Congress, S. 256
omits the provision making nondischargeable liability for violation of protective
orders and violent protests against providers of "lawful services," including
reproductive health services.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., is divided into eight
chapters - chapters 1,3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, and 13. Chapters 1,3, and 5 govern general
procedures involving management and administration ofthe bankruptcy estate which
are applicable, as specified, to the operative chapters. Chapters 7 through 13, the
operative chapters, address the different forms of bankruptcy relief. Chapter 7
governs liquidation; chapter 11 governs business reorganization; chapter 12, family
farmer reorganization; and, chapter 13, consumer reorganization.
Also codified under Title 11 of the United States Code are the Rules of
Bankruptcy Court and officially authorized bankruptcy forms.
Survey ofSelected Provisions. S. 256 addresses many areas ofbankruptcy
practice, including consumer filings, small business bankruptcy, tax bankruptcy,
ancillary and cross-border cases, financial contract provisions, amendments to
chapter 12 governing family farmer reorganization, and health care and employee
benefits.
The chart below surveys selected provisions that have been of interest to past
Congresses that have considered comparable legislation.
1 151 CONGo REc. S768 (daily ed. Feb. I, 2005).
2 H.R. 975, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 2003. See H.R. Rept. 108-40, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
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CRS-2
Implementation
Definition of "current
monthly income"
Presumed abuse
Would amend 11 U.S.C. § 707 to permit creditors, the
trustee, or any party in interest to challenge a debtor's
eligibility to file under chapter 7. If indicated, the
U.S. trustee must file a statement that the debtor's
case is a presumed abuse of chapter 7. § 102.
Excludes Social Security benefits; payments to
victims ofwar crimes or crimes against humanity; and
payments to victims ofinternational terrorism. § 102.
Debtor presumed to be abusing chapter 7 if current
monthly income, excluding allowed deductions,
secured debt payments, and priority unsecured debt
payments, multiplied by 60, would permit a debtor to
pay not less than the lesser of (a) 25% of nonpriority
unsecured debt or $6,000 (or $100 a month),
whichever is greater, or (b) $10,000.
In addition to the means test, the court may find that
the debtor's filing was in bad faith or that the totality
of the circumstances demonstrates abuse. § 102.
D·39
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CRS-3
Calculation of
permissible monthly
living expenses
To rebut the
presumption ofabuse
Expenses to be calculated as specified under the
National Standards and Local Standards, and the
debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories
specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the
Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the
debtor resides. A debtor may also subtract, if
reasonably necessary, an allowance ofup to 5% ofthe
IRS food and clothing categories.
Individualized expenses may include debts incurred to
protect the debtor's family from domestic violence;
actual expenses for the care and support of
nondependent, elderly, ill or disabled household or
family members; private orpublic school tuition ofup
to $1,500 per year; administrative expenses for
chapter 13 candidates; average monthly expenses for
secured and priority debts; actual expenses for
housing and utilities, if reasonably necessary; and,
charitable contributions of up to 15% of gross
income.3
Dollar amounts will be adjusted at three-year intervals
in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. § 102.
A debtor must demonstrate and justify "special
circumstances" in order to adjust current monthly
income determination. § 102.
3 Charitable contributions are permissible under current law, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b), and would
not be altered by the bill.
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CRS-4
Safe harbor exemption
from the means test
IRS Living Standards
applicable to chapter 13
reorganization plan
Only the judge, U.S. trustee or bankruptcy
administrator may bring a substantial abuse motion if
the debtor's current monthly income is less than the
highest national or the applicable State median family
income.
No party may make a motion to convert the debtor to
chapter 13 if the debtor (and spouse combined) have
a monthly income equal to or less than the state
median household income reported by the Bureau of
the Census.
The U.S. trustee may also decline to file a motion to
convert if the debtor's monthly income is between
100% and 150% of the national or applicable State
median income, and would permit a debtor to pay the
lesser of (a) 25% of nonpriority unsecured debt or
$6,000, whichever is greater, or (b) $10,000. § 102.
A chapter 13 debtor's "disposable income" which
may be directed to the repayment plan will be
calculated in accordance with IRS Living Standards if
the debtor meets the applicable means test for state
median family income.
A chapter 13 debtor may deduct from plan payments
the costs of health insurance; domestic support
obligations; charitable contributions of up to 15% of
gross income; and expenses necessary to operate a
business.
§ 102.
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CRS-5
Attorney sanctions for
improper motion
Creditor sanctions for
an improper motion
Dismissal offilings by
persons convicted of
violent crimes or drug
trafficking
If a panel trustee brings a successful motion for
dismissal or conversion, counsel for the debtor maybe
liable to reimburse the trustee for costs, attorneys'
fees, and payment of a civil penalty if the court fmds
a violation of Bankruptcy Rule 9011.
An attorney's signature on the bankruptcy petition
certifies that the attorney has performed an
investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to
the petition; that the attorney has determined that the
petition is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law; and that the attorney has no knowledge
after an inquiry that the information in accompanying
schedules is incorrect. § 102.
The court may award the debtor costs for contesting
an unsuccessful motion to convert if the court finds
that the motion violated Rule 9011, or was intended to
coerce the debtor into waiving rights under the
Bankruptcy Code. A small business creditor whose
claim is less than $1000 is not liable for sanctions.
§ 102.
A crime victim or party in interest may request
dismissal of the voluntary bankruptcy case of the
convicted debtor. The court must grant the
dismissal unless the filing is necessary to satisfy a
domestic support obligation. § 102.
Mandatory credit
counseling
Debtor must undergo credit counseling within 180
days of filing, and may not obtain a discharge until
completion of a personal financial management
instructional course.
The jurisdictional filing requirement may be waived
for 30 to 45 days if the debtor certifies exigent
circumstances or was denied service from an
approved counseling agency.
The U.S. trustee or bankruptcy administrator for the
judicial district is directed to oversee and approve
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies.
106.
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Promotion ofalternative
dispute resolution
Reaffirmation
agreements
Preserving defenses
against predatory
lenders
A creditor's allowable claim may be reduced by 20%
ifa court finds that the creditor ''unreasonably refused
to negotiate a reasonable alternative repayment
schedule proposed by an approved credit counseling
agency that provides repayment ofat least 60% of the
debt, and the debtor can prove by "clear and
convincing" evidence that a creditor unreasonably
refused to consider the offer." § 201.
Imposes enhanced requirements for approval of a
reaffinnation agreement when the debtor is not
represented by counsel but exempts credit unions
from creditor disclosure requirements; requires U.S.
Attorney and FBI to investigate abusive reaffinnation
practices. § 203.
Amends 11 U.S.C. § 363 to add a new subsection
preserving defenses that a party to a consumer credit
transaction may have ifthe contract is sold by a debtor
in bankruptcy. § 204.
GAO reaffirmation study Requires a study of reaffinnation practices and a
report to Congress. § 205.
Domestic support owed
to individuals and
government units made
first priority
Trustee notification of
child support claim
holders
Priority assigned to
claims for liability
incurred by the debtor
DUl
Would move domestic support obligations to first
priority, which is currently allocated to administrative
expenses of the bankruptcy estate. Administrative
expenses would become second priority.
However, ifa trustee is appointed under chapter 7, 11,
12, or 13, the trustee's expenses may be paid before
domestic support. § 212.
Would direct the trustee to notify a priority child
support recipient of the existence of a state child
support enforcement agency, and,upon discharge, the
existence of nondischargeable and reaffinned debt.
§ 219.
A new § 507 tenth priority is created for unsecured
claims for liability incurred by a debtor from
operating a vessel while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. Claims of this nature are also
nondischargeable. § 223.
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CRS-7
Retirement savings
exemption broadened
Exemption for savingfor
postsecondary education
Protection ofnonpublic
personal information
and consumer privacy
ombudsman
Prohibition on
disclosure ofidentify of
minor children
Lien stripping on
security interests in
consumer goods
(cramdown)
Would clarify and expand the law to provide that
retirement accounts that are tax exempt under the
Internal Revenue Code are exempted from the
debtor's estate up to a $1,000,000 cap, which may be
increased if "the interests ofjustice so require."
§ 224.
Subject to certain IRS requirements, excludes funds
up to $5000 per specified beneficiary made within a
year of filing in an education individual retirement
account and/or any funds used to purchase a tuition
credit or certificate under a qualified state tuition
program. §225.
Prohibits the transfer by the debtor of personal
customer information unless approved by the court.
Provides for the appointment of a consumer privacy
ombudsman if a debtor wishes to sell or lease such
information. §§ 231,232.
Debtor may not be required to disclose the name of a
minor child in public records. U.S. trustee or auditor
may have access to nonpublic records maintained by the
court. § 233.
Chapter 13 debtors would not be permitted to
bifurcate security interests in an automobile purchased
within 910 days (2 Y2 years) before the filing; or in
other consumer goods purchased within 1 year of the
filing. § 306.
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Homestead exemption
Residential lease
exceptedfrom the
automatic stay
Restrictions on chapter
7 and chapter 13 filings.
Definition of "debtor's residence" includes mobile
homes or trailers. § 306.
Imposes lengthened residency requirements to qualify
for state exemption. § 307.
Reduces the value of the exemption if the value is
attributable to property that the debtor disposed of
within 10 years of bankruptcy with the intent to
hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. § 308.
Debtors' electing a state homestead exemption may
not exempt any interest acquired within 1215 days
(3.3 years) of filing which exceeds in the aggregate
$125,000, unless the value in excess of that amount
occurs from a transfer of residences within the same
state. Exempts family farmers from the limit.
Limitations may not apply to amounts reasonably
necessary to support the debtor and any dependents.
Imposes a firm $125,000 cap on an individual who is
convicted of specified felonies (including violations
of federal securities laws) or who commits criminal
acts, intentional torts, or willful or reckless
misconduct that caused serious physical injury or
death within 5 years preceding the bankruptcy filing.
§ 322.
Adds new provisions permitting a landlord/lessor to
bypass the automatic stay to continue with a
residential eviction of a tenant/lessee. § 311.
Extends time within which a debtor who has received
a chapter 7 discharge may not receive another from 6
to 8 years.
Amends chapter 13 to disallow discharge ifthe debtor
filed under chapters 7, 11, or 12 within 4 years prior
to the 13 filing, or under chapter 13, within 2 years of
the subsequent filing. § 312.
D·45
CRS-9
Definition of
"household goods"
Debtor's duty to
disclose tax filings.
Plan duration
Wages withheld by an
employerfor
contributions to
employee benefit plans
Valuation of collateral
Wages and benefits
awarded as back pay
Audits
Defines household goods to include clothing,
furniture, appliances, 1 radio, 1 television, 1 VCR,
other electronic entertainment equipment with a
market value of under $500, linens, china, crockery,
kitchenware, educational materials used by minor
dependent children, medical equipment and supplies,
furniture used exclusively by minors and disabled or
elderly dependents, personal effects, 1 personal
computer and antiques and jewelry with a value less
than $500. § 313.
Modifies debtor filing requirements under 11 U.S.C.
§ 521 to include federal tax returns. § 315.
Chapter 13 plans to have 5 year duration for families
whose monthly income is not less than the highest
state median family income. Families below the
highest state median income would have 3 year plans.
§ 318.
Withheld wages for contributions to employee benefit
plans would be excluded from the debtor (employer's)
estate. § 323.
A secured creditor's allowable claim would be the
retail cost to replace the item without deduction for
costs of sale or marketing. Personal property's
replacement value would be the price a retail
merchant would charge for like items. § 327.
Makes specified prepetition and postpetition wages
and benefits awarded as back pay in a judicial
proceeding a high-priority administrative expense.
§ 329.
The Attorney General is directed to establish a
procedure to ensure random audits of no less than 1
out ofevery 250 individual filings; the U.S. trustee is
authorized to enter into contracts with auditors, and to
take action when misstatements in the debtor's
petition and schedules are identified. § 603.
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Debts to government
units for domestic
support
Expanded definition of
student loan
Loan repayments to
debtor's retirement
savings or thrift plan
Consumer debts
presumed fraudulent
Debts incurred to pay
nondischargeable debts
are nondischargeable
Expanded definition of
nondischargeable
condominium and
homeowners association
fees
FEC penalties
nondischargeable
Defines "domestic support obligation" to include
debts owed to or recoverable by a governmental unit.
§§ 211, 215.
Adds qualified educational loans as defined under §
221 of the IRe to those educational loans that are
currently nondischargeable. § 220.
Makes nondischargeable, i.e., allows an employer to
continue to withhold, loan repayments to debtor's
savings/retirement plan from debtor's wages.
§ 224(c).
Consumer debts owed to a single creditor for more
than $550 for "luxury goods" incurred within 90 days
offiling; and cash advances for more than $750 under
an open end credit plan within 70 days of filing are
presumed to be nondischargeable. § 310.
Debts incurred to a third party to pay a tax to a state or
local government unit become nondischargeable.
§ 314.
Expands the types of post-petition condo and
homeowners association fees that are
nondischargeable by omitting requirement that in
order to be nondischargeable the debtor must reside in
the residence postpetition. § 412.
Fines and penalties under federal election law are
made nondischargeable. § 1235.
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Amendments to the
Truth in Lending Act
(TILA)
Study ofbankruptcy
impact ofcredit
extended to dependent
students
Consumer credit studies
TILA amended to require enhanced mmlmum
payment disclosures under an open end credit plan;
enhanced disclosures regarding the tax deductibilityof
credit extensions which exceed the fair market value
of a dwelling for credit transactions secured by the
consumer's dwelling; disclosures related to
introductory "teaser" rates; disclosures related to
Internet-based open end credit solicitations; and
disclosures related to late payment deadlines and
penalties. TILA would be amended to prohibit
termination ofa credit account because the consumer
has not incurred finance charges. §§ 1301-1306.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is
directed to study bankruptcy impact of credit
extensions to students in postsecondary school.
§ 1308.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is
directed to study existing protections for consumers
for unauthorized use of a dual use debit card. § 1307.
Increased employee
wage and benefit
priority
Trustee to appoint
retiree committees
Retiree insurance
benefits
Avoidable preferences
Increases the high-priority categories for employee
wages and benefits from $4925 earned within 90 days
of filing to $10,000 earned within 180 days of filing.
§ 1401.
Amends 11 U.S.C. § 1114 to provide that in the event
that a retiree committee is appointed, the appointment
ofmembers will be made by the u.s. Trustee, not the
court. § 447.
Amends 11 U.S.C. § 1114 to allow the court to
reinstate retiree benefits that are modified by a debtor
within 180 days prior to the bankruptcy filing unless
the court finds that the balance of equities supports
such modifications. § 1404.
Amends 11 U.S.C. § 547 to liberalize the rules for
defending against an avoidable transfer in the ordinary
course ofbusiness; creates a new preference exception
to aggregate transfers ofless than $5,000. § 409.
D·48
CRS-12
Fraudulent transfers
Small business
bankruptcy
Health care business
bankruptcy
Trustee to appoint
retiree committees
Amends 11 V.S.c. § 548 to increase the time period
for setting aside certain fraudulent transactions from
one year to two and expressly includes certain
transfers made pursuant to an employment contract.
§ 1402.
Subtitle B ofTitle N has provisions defIning a "small
business" for chapter 11 purposes as one with debts
under $2,000,000. The debtor's period ofexclusivity
to fIle a reorganization plan is 180 days. A plan and
disclosure statement must be fIled within 300 days of
the initial fIling.
A plan must be confIrmed within 45 days of fIling in
bankruptcy. § 438.
Provisions require establishment of uniform
accounting and reporting standards for small
businesses. Grounds for appointment ofa trustee and
the trustee's general supervisory duties are expanded,
as are grounds for dismissal or conversion ofthe case.
§§ 431-442.
DefInes a broad variety of service-providing health
care business, including skilled nursing facilities,
assisted-living facilities and homes for the aged.
Provides for the disposition and disposal of patient
records and for the costs of closing the facility,
including the transfer of patients. Permits the court
to appoint a patient care ombudsman to monitor
patient care and represent the interest of patients.
Excludes participation in medicare from the automatic
stay. §§ 1101- 1106.
Amends 11 V.S.C. § 1114 to provide that in the event
that a retiree committee is appointed, the appointment
ofmembers will be made by the V.S. Trustee, not the
court. § 447.
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Chapter 11 corporate
nondischargeability
Title X dealing with
chapter 12 family
farmers
Confinnation of a plan under chapter 11 would not
discharge a corporate debtor from debts under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) that are owed to a domestic
governmental unit for property obtained by false
pretenses or representations; or owed to an individual
under subchapter III ofchapter 37 ofTitle 31, U.S.C.;
or any debt for taxes for which the debtor willfully
attempted to evade or made a fraudulent return.
§ 708.
Makes chapter 12 pennanent. Measure to be effective
upon enactment; includes jurisdictional debt limit in
amount subject to readjustment in accordance with
CPI; subordinates certain high priority unsecured
claims owed to the government to nonpriority claims.
Measure to take effect upon enactment, but will not
apply to pending cases. §§ 1001-1003.
Raises jurisdictional debt limit of family farmers to
$3,237,000 and lowers percentage requirement of
income derived from farming and expands the time
frame for measuring fann income from one to three
years. §§ 1004, 1005.
Prohibits retroactive assessment ofdisposable income.
§ 1006
Amends chapter 12 to include "family fishennen."
§ 1007.
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CRS-14
In forma pauperis filings
Bankruptcyjudgeships
Directs the Judicial Conference to prescribe
procedures for waiving bankruptcy fees for an
individual debtor under chapter 7 whose income is
less than 150% ofthe official poverty line and who is
unable to pay the fee in installments. § 418.
Creates new temporary bankruptcy judgeships for
designated districts. § 1223.
Procedure to certify
appeals from a
bankruptcy court to a
court ofappeals
Involuntary Bankruptcy
General effective date
Establishes procedures to permit direct appeals from
a bankruptcy court to a court ofappeals ifthe decision
involves a substantial question of law for which there
, is no controlling decision; a question requiring
resolution of conflicting decisions; or, a matter of
public importance. §1233.
Makes technical corrections made to 11 U.S.C. § 303
dealing with involuntary bankruptcy. Measure
applies upon enactment, but not to pending cases. §
1234.
Subject to express provisions otherwise in specified
titles, the new law will take effect 180 days after
enactment and will not apply to cases commenced
before the effective date. § 1501.
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PART 353-SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS
Sec.
~~~,LPljJPQ$~Elnd sQQP~,
353.~ OE;lfinttiQ!J$_,
353.3 R~PQrts andr~cords.
AUTHORITY: 12 U.S.C. 1818, 1819; 31 U.S.C. 5318.
SOURCE: The provisions of Part 353 appear at 61 Fed. Reg. 6099, February 16, 1996, effective
April 1, 1996, except as otherwise noted.
§ 353.1 Purpose and scope.
The purpose of this part is to ensure that an insured state nonmember bank files a Suspicious Activity
Report when it detects a known or suspected criminal violation of federal law or a suspicious
transaction related to a money laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. This part
applies to all insured state nonmember banks as well as any insured, state-licensed branches of
foreign banks.
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 353.1J
§ 353.2 Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(a) FinCEN means the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treasury.
(b) Institution-affiliated party means any institution-affiliated party as that term is defined in sections 3
(u) and 8(b)(5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(u) and 1818(b)(5».
[Codified to 12 C.F.R. § 353.2J
§ 353.3 Reports and records.
(a) Suspicious activity reports required. A bank shall file a suspicious activity report with the
appropriate federal law enforcement agencies and the Department of the Treasury, in accordance with
the form's instructions, by sending a completed suspicious activity report to FinCEN in the following
circumstances:
(1) Insider abuse involving any amount. Whenever the bank detects any known or suspected
E - 1
federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations, committed or attempted against the bank or
involving a transaction or transactions conducted through the bank, where the bank believes it was
either an actual or potential victim of a criminal 'violation or series of criminal violations, or that the bank
was used to facilitate a criminal transaction, and the bank has a substantial basis for identifying one of
the bank's directors, officers, employees, agents, or other institution-affiliated parties as having
committed or aided in the commission of the criminal violation, regardless of the amount involved in
the violation;
(2) Transactions aggregating $5,000 or more where a 'suspect can be identified.·Whenever the
bank detects any known or suspected federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations,
committed or attempted against the bank or involving a transaction or transactions conducted through
the bank, and involving or aggregating $5,000 or more in funds or other assets, where the bank
believes it was either an actual or potential victim of a criminal violation, or series of criminal violations,
or that the bank was used to facilitate a criminal transaction, and the bank has a substantial basis for
identifying a possible suspect or group of suspects. If it is determined prior to filing this report that the
identified suspect or group of suspects has used an "alias", then information regarding the true identity
of the suspect or group of suspects, as wen as alias identifiers, such as driver's license or social
security numbers, addresses and telephone numbers, must be reported;
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(3) Transactions aggregating $25,000 or more regardless ofpotential suspects. Whenever the bank
detects any known or suspected federal criminal violation or pattern of criminal violations, committed or
attempted against the bank or involving a transaction or transactions conducted through the bank,
involving or aggregating $25,000 or more in funds or other assets, where the bank believes it was
either an actual or potential victim of a criminal violation, or series of criminal violations, or that the
bank was used to facilitate a criminal transaction, even though the bank has no substantial basis for
identifying a possible suspect or group of suspects; or
(4) Transactions aggregating $5,000 or more that involve potential money laundering or violations
of the Bank Secrecy Act. Any transaction (which for purposes of this paragraph (a)(4) means a
deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, 19an, extension of credit,
purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument or investment
security, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by
whatever means effected) conducted or attempted by, at or through the bank and involving or
aggregating $5,000 or more in funds or other assets, if the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to
suspect that:
(i) The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or is intended or conducted in order
to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activities (including, without-limitation, the
ownership, nature, source, location, or control of such funds or assets) as part of a plan to violate or
evade any federal law or regulation or to avoid any transaction reporting requirement under federal
law;
(ii) The transaction is designed to evade any regulations promulgated under the Bank Secrecy
Act; or
(iii) The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort of transaction in
which the particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no
reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, including the
background and possible purpose of the transaction.
(b) Time for reporting. (1) A bank shall file the suspicious activity report no later than 30 calendar
days after the date of initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing a suspicious activity
report. If no suspect was identified on the date of detection of the incident requiring the filing, a bank
may delay filing a suspicious activity report for an additional 30 calendar days to identify a suspect. In
no case shall reporting be delayed more than 60 calendar days after the date of initial detection of a
reportable transaction.
(2) In situations involving violations requiring immediate attention, such as when a reportable
violation is ongoing, the bank shall immediately notify, by telephone, an appropriate law enforcement
authority and the appropriate FDIC regional office (Division of Supervision) in addition to filing a timely
report.
(c) Reports to state and local authorities. A bank is encouraged to file a copy of the suspicious
activity report with state and local law enforcement agencies where appropriate.
(d) Exemptions. (1) A bank need not file a suspicious activity report for a robbery or burglary
committed or attempted, that is reported to appropriate law enforcement authorities.
(2) A bank need not file a suspicious activity report for lost, missing, counterfeit, or stolen securities
if it files a report pursuant to the reporting requirements of t7__.QEB_24Q_~J_lf~ ..1..
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(e) Retention of records. A bank shall maintain a copy of any suspicious activity report filed and the
original or business record equivalent of any supporting documentation for a period of five years from
the date of filing the suspicious activity report. Supporting documentation shall be identified and
maintained by the bank as such, and shall be deemed to have been filed with the suspicious activity
report. A bank must make all supporting documentation available to appropriate law enforcement
authorities upon request.
(f) Notification to board ofdirectors. The management of a bank shall promptly notify its board of
directors, or a committee thereof, of any report filed pursuant to this section.
{{2-29-96 p.2967}}The term "board of directors" includes the managing official of an insured state-
licensed branch of a foreign bank for purposes of this part.
(g) Confidentiality ofsuspicious activity reports. Suspicious activity reports are confidential. Any bank
SUbpoenaed or otherwise requested to disclose a suspicious activity report or the information
contained in a suspicious activity report shall decline to produce the suspicious activity report or to
provide any information that would disclose that a suspicious activity report has been prepared or filed
citing this part, applicable law (e.g., ~1JL_S~Q,_~.3..1~{g)), or both, and notify the appropriate FDIC
regional office (Division of Supervision).
(h) Safe Harbor. The safe harbor provisions of 31 U.S.C. 5318(g), which exempts any bank that
makes a disclosure of any possible violation of law or regulation from liability under any law or
regulation of the United States, or any constitution, law or regulation of any state or political
subdivision, cover all reports of suspected or known criminal violations and suspicious activities to law
enforcement and financial institution supervisory authorities, including supporting documentation,
regardless of whether such reports are filed pursuant to this part or are filed on a voluntary basis.
[Codified to 12 C.FR. § 353.3J
[The page following this is 3077.)
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Paper copies of FDIC financial institution letters may be obtained through the FDIC's Public Information
Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (1-877-275-3342 or 202-416-6940).
Financial Institution Letters
FIL-16-2005
March 15, 2005
Deposit Insurance Coverage
Video-Overview on Deposit Insurance Coverage for Bank Employees and
Customers
The FDIC has produced a video on CD-ROM for bank employees and bank customers about the FDIC's
rules and requirements for deposit insurance coverage. The 27-minute video - FDIC's Video-Overview
on DepoSit Insurance Coverage - provides an overview of how deposit insurance works, focusing on
the most common account ownership categories used by individuals and families. The video on CD-
ROM was first released on DVD (FDIC's Video on Deposit Insurance Coverage) on November 10, 2004.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has produced a digital video on CD-ROM for bank
employees and customers that explains federal deposit insurance coverage. The video was first
released on DVD on November 10, 2004 (FDIC's Video on Deposit Insurance Coverage). The new CD-
ROM version - FDIC's Video-Overview on Deposit Insurance Coverage - is also available for viewing
through the FDIC's Web site. .
The video, which is 27 minutes long, provides an overview of deposit insurance coverage rules and
requirements, with specific emphasis on the most common account ownership categories used by
individuals and families. The video was designed as an informational and training tool for bank
employees. The video can be seen in English or Spanish.
The video is, divided into four parts:
• Part I, "Introduction," presents the basics of deposit insurance coverage and is intended to
reinforce the viewer's confidence in the stability of the banking system.
• Part II, "Personal Accounts," and Part III, "Business Accounts," are designed to inform and
educate viewers on how FDIC deposit insurance coverage works in a variety of situations for the
eight different ownership account categories.
• Part IV, tfResources," explains the various ways to contact the FDIC to obtain more information
on deposit insurance coverage.
Viewing the Video from the FDIC Web Page
Financial institutions may view FDIC's Video-Overview on Deposit Insurance Coverage on the FDIC's
Web site. To view the video, go to Videos on Deposit Insurance Coverage at
http://www.fdic.gov/deposiUdeRosits/video/index.htmI.This page identifies the videos available for
viewing, as well as system requirements and system test options.
Obtaining Copies from the FDIC
The FDIC will provide insured banks and savings associations with limited copies of the video on CD-
ROM at no charge. To place an order for the video on CD-ROM or DVD, complete and submit the order
form located on the FDIC's Web site at http://www2.fdic.gov/depositinsuran.ceregister/index.asQ. Please
allow four to six weeks for delivery.
Using the order form on the FDIC's Web site will ensure the fastest delivery of your order. If .your
institution does not have access to the Internet, orders may be faxed or mailed to the FDIC:
FAX: FDIC Public Information Center
202-416-2111
Or write to: 801 17th Street, N.W., Room 100
Washington, D.C. 20434
E· 5
Orders submitted by FAX or mail should be written on your institution's letterhead and include a contact
name, a telephone number where the contact may be reached, the title of the video requested, and the
number of copies requested.
Reproduction of the Video
Financial institutions and consumers may reproduce FDIC's Video-Overview on Deposit Insurance
Coverage without permission from the FDIC, provided it is reproduced in its entirety.
For more information about the FDIC's new deposit insurance video, please contact the FDIC's Call
Center toll-free at 1-877-275-3342.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection
Last Updaled·03/14/2005 communications@fdic.gov
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Proposed Rules
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENTOFTHETREASURV
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Chap. I
(Docket No. 05-011
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Chap. II
[Docket No. OP-1220]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Chap. III
DEPARTMENTOFTHETREASURV
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Chap. V
[No. 2005-02]
Request for Burden Reduction
Recommendations; Money
Laundering, Safety and Soundness,
and Securities Rules; Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996 Review
AGENCIES: Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), Treasury; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),
Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of regulatory review;
request for comments.
SUMMARY: The OCC, Board, FDIC, and
OTS ("we" or "the Agencies") are
reviewing our regulations to identify
outdated, unnecessary, or unduly
'burdensome·regulatory requirements
pursuant to the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of
1996 (EGRPRA). Today, we request your
comments and suggestions on ways to
reduce burden in rules we have
categorized as Money Laundering,
Safety and Soundness, and Securities.
All comments are welcome. We
specifically invite comment on the
following issues: Whether statutory
changes are needed; whether the
regulations contain requirements that
are not needed to serve the purposes of
the statutes they implement; the extent
to which the regulations may adversely
affect competition; whether the cost of
compliance associated with reporting,
recordkeeping, and disclosure
requirements, particularly on small
institutions, is justified; whether any
regulatory requirements are inconsistent
or redundant; and whether any
regulations are unclear.
We will analyze the comments
received and propose burden-reducing
changes to our regulations where
appropriate. Some of your suggestions
for burden reduction might require
legislative changes. Where legislative
changes would be required, we will
consider your suggestions in
recommending appropriate changes to
Congress.
DATES: Written comments must be
received no later than May 4, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
EGRPRA Web site: http://
www.EGRPRA.gov.
• Comments submitted at the
Agencies' joint Web site will
automatically be distributed to all the
Agencies. Comments received at the
EGRPRA Web site and by other ~eans
will be posted on the Web site to the
extent possible.
Individual agency addresses: You are
also welcome to submit comments to
the Agencies at the following contact
points (due to delays in paper mail
delivery in the Washington area,
commenters may prefer to submit their
comments by alternative means):
acc: You may submit comments,
identified by [docket 05-01), by any of
the following methods:
• E-mail:
regs.comments@occ.freas.gov. Include
[docket 05-01) in the subject line of the
message.
• Fax: (202) 874-4448.
• Mail: Public Information Room,
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 250 E Street, SW., Mailstop
1-5, Washington, DC 20219; Attention:
Docket ##. .
Public Inspection: You may inspect
and photocopy comments at the Public
Information Room. You can make an
E-7
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appointment to inspect the comments
by calling (202) 874-5043.
Board: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket Number OP-1220,
by any of the following methods:
• Agency Web site: http://
www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
http://www·federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail:
regs.comments@federaJreserve.gov.
Include docket number in the subject
line of the message.
• Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-
3102.
• Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551.
All public comments are available
from the Board's Web site at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo /
foia/ProposedRegs.cfm, as submitted,
except as necessary for technical
reasons. Accordingly, your comments
will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information.
Public comments may also be viewed
electronically or in paper in Room MP-
500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th
and C Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC: You may submit comments,
identified as EGRPRA burden reduction
comments, by any of the following
methods:
• http://www·fdic.gov/regulations/
laws/federaJ/propose.html.
• E-mail: comments@fdic.gov.
Include "EGRPRA burden reduction
commenf' in the subject line of the
message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may be
hand delivered to the guard station at
the rear of the 550 17th Street Building
(located on F Street) on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
Public Inspection: You may inspect
comments at the FDIC Public
Information Center, Room 100,801 17th
Street, NW., between 9 a.m. and 4:30
p.m. on business days.
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DTS: You may submit comments,
identified by "No. 2005-02." by any of
the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-Mail:
regs.comments@ots.treas.gov. Include
"No. 2005-02" in the subject line of the
message, and provide your name and
telephone number.
• Fax: (202) 906-6518.
• Mail: RegulationComments.Chief
Counsel's Office, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20552.
• Hand Delivery: Comments may ~e
hand delivered to the Guard's Desk, East
Lobby Entrance, 1700 G Street, NW.,
from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on business days,
Attention: Regulation Comments, Chief
Counsel's Office.
Public Inspection: OTS will post
comments and the related index on the
OTS Internet site at http://
www.ots.treas.gov/
pagehtml.cfm?catNumber=67&an=1. In
addition, you may inspect comments at
the Public Reading Room, 1700 G Street,
NW., by appointment. To make an
appointment for access, call (202) 906-
5922, send an e-mail to
public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a fax
to (202) 906-7755. (Please identify the
material you would like to inspect to
assist us in serving you.) OTS schedules
appointments on business days between
10 a.m. and 4 p.m. In most cases,
appointments will be available the next
business day following the date OTS
receives a request.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DCC:
• Stuart Feldstein, Assistant Director,
Legislative and Regulatory Activities
Division, (202) 874-5090.
• Heidi Thomas, Special Counsel,
Legislative and Regulatory Activities
Division, (202) 874-5090.
• Lee Walzer, Counsel, Legislative
and Regulatory Activities Division,
(202) 874-5090.
Board:
• Patricia A. Robinson, Managing
Senior Counsel, Legal Division, (202)
452-3005.
• Michael J. O'Rourke, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 452-3288.
• John C. Wood, Counsel, Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs, (202)
452-2412.
• Kevin H. Wilson, Supervisory
Financial Analyst, Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, (202) 452-
2362.
• For users of Telecommunications
Device for the Deaf (TDD) only, contact
(202) 263-4869.
FDIC:
• Claude A. Rollin, Special Assistant
to the Vice Chairman, (202) 898-8741.
• Steven D. Fritts, Associate Director,
Division of Supervision and Consumer
Protection, (202) 898-3723.
• Ruth R. Amberg, Senior Counsel,
Legal Division, (202) 898-3736.
• Thomas Nixon, Counsel, Legal
Division, (202) 898-8766.
OTS:
• Glenn Gimble, Senior Project
Manager, Thrift Policy, Supervision
Policy, (202) 906-7158.
• Josephine Battle, Program Analyst,
Thrift Policy, Supervision Policy, (202)
906-6870.
• Karen Osterloh, Special Counsel,
Regulations and Legislation Division,
Chief Counsel's Office, (202) 906-6639.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview of the EGRPRA Review and
the Steps Taken so Far
The Agencies 1 are asking for your
comments and suggestions on ways in
which we can reduce regulatory
burdens consistent with our statutory
obligations. Today, we request your
input to help us identify which
regulatory requirements in three
categories-Money Laundering, Safety
and Soundness, and Securities-are
outdated, unnecessary, or unduly
burdensome. We list the rules in these
categories in a chart at the end· of this
notice. Please send us your
recommendations at our Web site,
http://www.EGRPRA.gov, or to one of
the listed addresses.
Today's request for comment is the
fourth notice in our multi-year review of
regulations for burden reduction
required by section 2222 of EGRPRA.2
We described the EGRPRA review's
requirements in our first EGRPRA
notice. In summary, EGRPRA requires
us to:
• Categorize our regulations by type.
• Publish the regulations by category
to request comments on which
regulations contain requirements that
are: outdated, unnecessary, or unduly
burdensome.
• Publish a summary of those
comments.
• Eliminate unnecessary regulations
to the extent appropriate.
1 The National Credit Union Administration has
participated in planning the EGRPRA review but
has issued, and will issue. requests for comment
separately.
2 Public Law 104-208. Sept. 30. 1996.12 U.S.C.
3311. We published our first notice in the Federal
Register on June 16.2003, at 68 FR 35589; our·
second notice on January 21. 2004, at 69 FR 2852;
and our third notice on July 20. 2004, at 69 FR
43347. You may view the notices at our Web site,
http://www.EGRPRA.gov.
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• Report to Congress: summarizing
the significant issues raised and their
relative merits, and analyzing whether
legislative change is required to reduce
burden.
The first publication cycle must be
complete by September 2006.
We have identified 13 categories of
rules to implement our EGRPRA review.
The categories are: Applications and
Reporting; Banking Operations; Capital;
Community Reinvestment Act;
Consumer Protection: Lending Related
Rules; Consumer Protection: Account/
Deposit Relationships and
Miscellaneous Consumer Rules;
Directors, Officers and Employees;
International Operations; Money
Laundering; Powers and Activities;
Rules of Procedure; Safety and
Soundness; and Securities. You may see
the categories and the rules placed
within them at our Web site, http://
l¥ww.EGRPRA.gov.
We previously requested public
comment about possible burden
reduction in five categories of rules. Our
June 16, 2003, notice requested
comment on three categories:
Applications and Reporting, Powers and
Activities, and International Operations.
Our January 21, 2004, notice requested
comment on Consumer Protection:
Lending Related Rules. Our July 20,
2004, notice requested comment on
Consumer Protection: Account/Deposit
Relationships and Miscellaneous
Consumer Rules. Today, we request
comment on rules related to Money
Laundering, Safety and Soundness, and
Securities.
We plan to continue to publish one or
more categories of rules approximately
every six months between 2003 and
2006 and provide a gO-day comment
period for each publication. As noted
-earlier, we must publish all our covered
categories of rules for comment and
review them by the end of September
2006.
In addition to soliciting written
comrnents, we held banker outreach
meetings in Orlando, St. Louis, Denver,
San Francisco, New York City,
Nashville, Seattle, and Chicago to hear
directly from the industry about ways
the Agencies could reduce regulatory
burden. More than 400 representatives
from the industry have attended the
outreach meetings. The Agencies have
also held three outreach meetings with
over 100 participants for representatives
of consumer and community groups to
obtain their input on regulatory burden
reduction. The consumer meetings were
held in Arlington, Virginia; San
Francisco; and Chicago. These meetings
have helped focus our regulatory burden
reduction efforts. We anticipate holding
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additional outreach events this year.
You may learn more about the meetings
and related recommendations at our
EGRPRA Web site, http://
www.EGRPRA.gov.
We received 19 comments in response
to the first notice, about 560 to the
second notice, and over 100 to the third
notice. The Agencies appreciate the
response to our notices and the outreach
meetings. The written comments and
remarks at the meetings came from
individuals, banks, savings associations,
holding companies, industry trade
groups, and consumer and community
groups. You may view the comments at
our EGRPRA Web site, http://
www.EGRPRA. We are actively
reviewing the feedback received about
specific ways to reduce regulatory
burden, as well as conducting our own
analyses.
In addition, Congress considered
various legislative proposals to reduce
burden on the financial services
industry in 2004. Representatives of the
Agencies and industry leaders testified
before congressional committees about
these legislative reform proposals and
other ideas for reducin& burden on the
financial services industry.3 We will
continue to post information about
legislative and regulatory reform efforts
on our Web site.
II. Request for Comment on Money
Laundering, Safety and Soundness, and
Securities Rules
Today, we are asking the public to
identify ways in which the rules related
30n May 12,2004, FDIC Vice Chairman John M.
Reich testified about burden reduction before the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit of the House Committee on
Financial Services. On June 22, agency and industry
leaders testified about regulatory refonn before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs. Agency leaders included: Federal Reserve
Board Governor Donald Kohn. FDIC Vice Chairman
John M. Reich, NCVA Chairman JoAnn Johnson.
acc First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief
Counsel Julie L. Williams, and OTS Chief Counsel
John E. Bowman. On August 27, Senator Mike
Crapo, who is leading a financial services regulatory
reform effort for the Senate Banking Committee.
released a matrix detailing more than 130 burden
reduction proposals that were made in the June
2004 hearing.
to Money Laundering, Safety and
Soundness, and Securities may be
outdated, unnecessary, or unduly
burdensome. As shown on the chart at
the end of this notice, there are 28
regulations in these categories. The
Agencies note that other non-banking
agencies, such as the Department of
Treasury under the Bank Secrecy Act,
have issued rules within these three
categories that apply to our regulated
institutions. Some of the rules of these
other agencies are.beyond our
jurisdiction. However, to the extent that
we receive comments raising significant
issues about these related rules, we will
identify the issues in our Report to
Congress and make those comments
available to the appropriate agencies.
We encourage comments that address
not only individual rules or
requirements but also pertain to certain
product lines. For example. in the case
of an institution's securities activities,
are any of the reporting, recordkeeping
or other requirements of one regulation
inconsistent with or duplicative of the
requirements under another regulation?
A product line approach is consistent
with EGRPRA's focus on how rules
interact, and may be especially helpful
in exposing redundant or potentially
inconsistent regulatory requirements.
We recognize that commenters using a
product line approach may want to
make recommendations about rules that
are not in our current request for
comment. They should do so since we
designed the EGRPRA categories to
stimulate creative approaches rather
than limiting them.
Specific issues to consider. While all
comments are welcome, we specifically
invite comment on the following issues:
A. Need for Statutory Change. (1) Do
any statutory requirements underlying
the rules impose unnecessary,
redundant, conflicting or unduly
burdensome requirements? (2) Are there
less burdensome alternatives?
B.Need and Purpose of the
Regulations. (1) Are the regulations
consistent with the purposes of the
statutes that they implement? (2) Have
circumstances changed so that a rule is
E-9
no longer necessary? (3) Do changes in
the financial products and services
offered to consumers suggest a need to
revise certain regulations (or statutes)?
(1) Do any of the regulations impose
compliance burdens not required by the
statutes they implement?
C. General Approach/Flexibility. (1)
Would a different general approach to
regulating achieve statutory goals with
less burden? (2) Do any of these rules
impose unnecessarily inflexible
requirements?
D. Effect of the Regulations on
Competition. Do any of the regulations
or statutes create competitive
disadvantages for insured depository
institutions compared to the rest of the
financial services industry or
competitive disadvantages for one type
of insured depository institution over
another?
E.Reporting,Recordkeeping, and
Disclosure Requirements. (1) Which
reporting, recordkeeping, or disclosure
requirements impose the most
compliance burdens? (2) Are any of the
reporting or recordkeeping requirements
unnecessary to demonstrate compliance
with the law?
F. Consistency and Redundancy. (1)
Are any of the requirements under one
regulation inconsistent with or
duplicative of requirements under
another regulation? (2) If so, are the
inconsistencies not warranted by the
purposes of the regulations?
G. Clarity. Are any of the regulations
drafted unclearly?
H. Burden on Small Insured
Institutions. We have particular interest
in minimizing burden on small insured
institutions (those with assets of $150
million or less), Are there appropriate
ways to amend these rules to minimize
adverse economic impact on small
insured institutions?
The Agencies appreciate the efforts of
all interested parties to help us
eliminateoutdated, unnecessary, or
unduly burdensome regulatory
requirements.
BILLING CODe 481G-33-P; 6210-Q1-P; 6714-01-P;
672G-01-P
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Rules for which we are requesting comment now:
Money Laundering, Safety and Soundness, and Securities
Subject National State Member State Non- Thrifts Holding
Banks Banks Member Companies
Banks
Bank4
--------
Thrift
"!M:6Ii~Y;iLJlliit<l~tm2
\,. ,
~, ' " "(:
Intera2ency RC2ulations
Bank Secrecy Act 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.63 12 CFRPart 12CFR
Compliance 21, Subpart C [Reg. H] 326, Subpart 563.177
B
Reports of Crimes or 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.62 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 12CFR
Suspected Crimes 21, Subpart B [Reg. H] 353 563.180(d) 225.4(f). ------- ... _------..---.
,'Saf'ety'andSoundness . "':.:';';:","'" -,'··X·,:. '" ..., ... .,;.....,..: .. .''-,;, . .:- G...~Z\.:'.,.t~'"
Interae:ency Ree:ulations
Appraisal Standards for 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.50 1_ CFR Part 12 CFRP'lrt 12 CFR Part
Federally Related 34, Subpart C [Reg. H]; 12 323 564 225, Subpart G
Transactions CFR Part 225, [Reg. Y]
Subpart G [Reg. -------------------
Y]
Frequency of Safety 12 CFR4.6- 12 CFR 208.64 12 CFR 12CFR
and Soundness .7 337.12 563.171; See
Examination also 12 CFR
563.170
Lending Limits 12 CFR Part 12CFR
32 560.93
Real Estate Lending 12 CFRPart 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 12CFR
Standards 34, Subpart 208, Subpart E 365 560.100; 12
D and App. C CFR 563.101
[Reg. H]
Security Devices and 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.61 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
Procedures 21, Subpart [Reg. H] 326,Subpart 568
A A
• Foreign banking organizations that conduct banking operations in the U.S., either directly through branches and
agencies or indirectly through U.S. bank subsidiaries or commercial lending company subsidiaries, generally are
subject to the same regulatory regime as domestic bank holding companies.
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Subject National State Member State Non- Thrifts Holding
Banks Banks Member Companies
Banks
Bank4
--------
Thrift
:;8afetYalld Soundne~s .··.t;_::(c">:\~. ··-.-:,;;";,)s;:,,.~-;., .;:
Interaeencv Reeulations (continued)
Standards for Safety 12 CFRPart 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
and Soundness 30 208, App. D-I 364 570
[Reg. H]
Transactions with 12 CFRPart 12 CFR Part 223 12 CFR
Affiliates 223 [Reg. [Reg. W] 563.41
W]; 12 CFR
Part 31
OCC Refutations
Other Real Estate 12 CFRPart
Owned 34, Subpart E :
Board Refulations
Extensions of Credit by 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 201 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
Federal Reserve Banks 201 [Reg. A] [Reg. A] 201 [Reg. A] 201 [Reg. A]
Limitations on 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 206 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
Interbank Liabilities 206 [Reg. F] [Reg.F] 206 [Reg. F] 206 [Reg. F]
FDIC Refutations
Annual Independent 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 363 12 CFRPart 12 CFR Part
Audits and Reporting 363 363 363; See also
Requirements OTS: 12
CFR 562.4
Unsafe and Unsound 12 CFR
Banking Practices 337.2; 12
(Standby Letters of CFR 337.6
Credit and Brokered
Deposits)
OTS Re2ulations
Audits ofSavings 12 CFR
Associations and 562.4; See ------- ..-----------
Savings Association also FDIC: 12 CFR 562.4
Holding Companies 12 CFR Part
363
Financial~anagement 12 CFR Part
Policies 563, Subpart ---....__..----------
F 12CFR
563.170
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Subject National State Member State Non- Thrifts Holding
Banks Banks Member Companies
Banks
Bank4
--------
Thrift
~;S~feW:2nd 1! ",>n"., ,:', i, ')~:""':'" " "i, "
OTS Reeulations (continued)
Lending and 12 CFR Part
Investment - 560
Additional Safety and
Soundness Limitations
,"'J }7H:, ,';)!;;~i ";, c"J";~,<:s<] ,,:':'''''
Interaeency Reeulations
Banks as Registered 12CFR 12 CFR 208.32- 12 CFR Part
Clearing Agencies 19.135 33 [Reg, H] 308, Subpart
S
Banks as Securities 12 CFR 9.20 12 CFR 208.31 12 CFR Part ..
Transfer Agents [Reg. H] 341
Government Securities 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.37 12 CFR Part
Sales Practices 13 [Reg. H] 368
Recordkeeping and 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.34 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
Confumation of 12 [Reg. H] 344 551 I
Securities Transactions l
Effected by Banks
Reporting 12 CFR Part 12 CFR 208.36 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
Requirements for 11 [Reg. H] 335 563d
Reported Securities
Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
Securities Offerings 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part
16 563g
OCCReeulations
Municipal Securities 12 CFR Part
Dealer Activities of 10
Banks
Board Refulations
Credit by Banks and 12 CFRPart 12 CFR Part 221 12 CFR Part 12 CFR Part 12 CFRPart
Persons Other than 221 [Reg. U] [Reg. U] 221 [Reg. U] 221 [Reg.UJ 221 [Reg. UJ
Brokers or Dealers for ....-_ .._------------
the Purpose of 12 CFRPart
Purchasing or Carrying 221 [Reg. U]
Margin Stock
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Subject National State Member State Non- Thrifts Holding
Banks Banks Member Companies
Banks
Bank~
--------
Sec.urmes·(continUi'd~ #::;}!;;~",;;;,., .,/" <)j;, '.?' <.~, .··.i, ,,,:;:;'.lL·-'L,:; ...;~.."'". "_.',". .;',:,
OTS Reeulations
Accounting 12 CFRPart
RequirementsfFinancial 563c
Statements
Proxies 12 CFR Part
569
Rules on the Issuance 12CFR
and Sale of Institution 563.5; 12
Securities CFR Part
563, Subpart
C
,
I
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Dated: January 13. 2005.
Julie L. Williams,
Acting Comptroller ofthe Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System on January 26, 2005.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 18th day of
January, 2005.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
Dated: January 25, 2005.
James E. Gilleran,
Director, Office ofThrift Supervision.
[FR Doc. 05-2079 Filed 2-2-05; 8:45 am)
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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 1
RIN 3038-AC15
Investment of Customer Funds and
Record of Investments
AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("Commission") is
proposing to amend its regulations
regarding investment of customer funds
and related recordkeeping requirements.
The proposed amendments address
standards for investing in instruments
with embedded derivatives,
requirements for adjustable rate
securities (including auction rate
securities), concentration limits on
reverse repurchase agreements ("reverse
repos"), transactions by futures
commission merchants ("FCMs") that
are also registered as securities broker-
dealers ("FCM/BDs"), rating standards
and registration requirement for money
market mutual funds ("MMMFs"),
auditability standard for investment
records, and certain technical changes.
Among those technical changes is an
amendment to the Commission's
recordkeeping rules in connection with
repurchase agreements ("repos") and
proposed transactions by FCM/BDs.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before March 7, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Comments on the proposed
amendments should be sent to Jean A.
Webb, Secretary, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette
Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20581. Comments may
be sent by facsimile transmission to
(202) 418-5521, bye-mail to
secretary@cftc.gov, or electronically by
accessing http://www.reguJations.gov.
Reference should be made to "Proposed
Amendments to Rule 1.25."
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Phyllis P. Dietz, Special Counsel,
Division of Clearing and Intermediary
Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Three Lafayette Centre,
1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC
20581. Telephone (202) 418-5430.
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Proposed Rules
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Part 25
(Docket No. 05-04]
RIN 1557-AB98
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 228
[Regulation BB; Docket No. R-1225]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 345
RIN 3064-AC89
Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations
AGENCIES: Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Treasury (DCC); Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board); and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Joint notice of proposed
rulemaking.
SUMMARY: The acc, Board, and FDIC
(collectively, "federal banking agencies"
or "the Agencies") are issuing this
notice of proposed rulemaking that
would revise certain provisions of our
rules implementing the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA). We plan to
take this action in response to public
comments received by the federal
banking agencies and the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) on a February
2004 inter-agency CRA proposal and by
the FDIC on its August 2004 CRA
proposal. The current proposal would
address regulatory burden imposed on
some smaller banks by revising the
eligibility requirements for eRA
evaluation under the lending,
investment. and service tests.
Specifically, the proposal would
provide a simplified lending test and a
flexible new community development
test for small banks with an asset size
between $250 million and $1 billion.
Holding company affiliation would not
be a factor in determining which CRA
evaluation standards applied to a bank.
In addition, the proposal would revise
the term "community development" to
include certain community
development activities, including
affordable housing. in underserved rural
areas and designated disaster areas.
DATES: Comments must be received by
May 10, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be
directed to:
acc: You should include ace and
Docket Number 05-04 in your comment.
You may submit comments by any of
the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• acc Web Site: http://
www.occ.treas.gov.Click on "Contact
the OCC," scroll down and click on
"Comments on Proposed Regulations. "
• E-mail Address:
regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
• Fax: (202) 874-4448.
• Mail: Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, 250 E Street, SW., Mail
Stop 1-5, Washington, DC 20219.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: 250 E
Street, SW., Attn: Public Information
Room, Mail Stop 1-5, Washington, DC
20219.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name (DCC)
and docket number or Regulatory
Information Number (RIN) for this
notice of proposed rulemaking. In
general, the DCC will enter all
comments received into the docket
without change, including any business
or personal information that you
provide. You may review comments and
other related materials by any of the
following methods:
• Viewing Comments Personally: You
may personally inspect and photocopy
comments at the acc's Public
Information Room, 250 E Street, SW.,
Washington, DC. You can make an
appointment to inspect comments by
calling (202) 874-5043.
• Viewing Comments Electronically:
You may request e-mail or CD-ROM
copies of comments that the acc has
received by contacting the acc's Public
Information Room at
regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
• Docket: You may also request
available background documents and
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project summaries using the methods
described above.
Board: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R-1225, by any
of the following methods:
• Agency Web Site: http://
www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
http://www·federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• E-mail:
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Include docket number in the subject
line of the message.
• Fax: 202/452-3819 or 202/452-
3102.
• Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551.
All public comments are available
from the Board's Web site at http://
www·federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/
foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted,
except as necessary for technical
reasons. Accordingly, your comments
will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information.
Public comments may also be viewed
electronically or in paper in Room MP-
500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th
and C Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC: You may submit comments,
identified by RIN number by any of the
following methods:
• Agency Website: http://
www·fdic.gov/regulations/laltvs/federal/
propose.html. Follow instructions for
submitting comments on the Agency
Web Site.
• E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov.
Include the RIN number in the subject
line of the message.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street. NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Instructions: All submissions
received must include the agency name
and RIN for this rulemaking. All
comments received will be posted
without change to http://www-.ldic.gov/
regulations/laws/federa]/propose.html
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including any personal information
provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DCC: Michael Bylsma, Director, or
Margaret Hesse, Special Counsel,
Community and Consumer"Law
Division, (202) 874-5750; Karen Tucker,
National Bank Examiner, Compliance
Division, (202) 874-4428; or Patrick T.
Tierney, Attorney, Legislative and
Regulatory Activities (202) 874-5090,
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 250 E Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20219.
Board: William T. Coffey, Senior
Review Examiner, (202) 452-3946;
Catherine M.J. Gates, Oversight Team
Leader, (202) 452-3946; Kathleen C.
Ryan, Counsel, (202) 452-3667; or Dan
S. Sokolov, Senior Attorney, (202) 452-
2412, Division of Consumer and
Community Affairs, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 20th
Street and Constitution Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20551.
FDIC: Richard M. Schwartz, Counsel,
Legal Division, (202) 898-7424; Susan
van den Toorn, Counsel, Legal Division,
(202) 898-8707; or Robert W. Mooney,
Chief, CRA and Fair Lending Policy
Section, Division of Supervision and
Consumer Protection, (202) 898-3911;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
550 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC
20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Advance Notice ofProposed
Rulemaking. In 1995, when the OCC,
the Board, the OTS, and the FDIC
(collectively, "federal banking and thrift
agencies" or "four agencies") adopted
major amendments to regulations,
implementing the Community
Reinvestment Act, they committed to
reviewing the amended regulations in
2002 for their effectiveness in placing
performance over process, promoting
consistency in evaluations, and
eliminating unnecessary burden. (60 FR
22156,22177, May 4,1995). The review
was initiated in July 2001 with the
publication in the Federal Register of an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(66 FR 37602, July 19, 2001). The
federal banking and thrift agencies
indicated that they would determine
whether and, if so, how the regulations
should be amended to better evaluate
financial institutions' performance
under eRA, consistent with the Act's
authority, mandate, and intent. The four
agencies solicited comment on the
fundamental issue of whether any
change to the regulations would be
beneficial or warranted, and on eight
discrete aspects of the regulations.
About 400 comment letters were
received, most from banks and thrifts of
varying sizes and their trade
associations ("financial institutions")
and local and national nonprofit
community advocacy and community
development organizations
("community organizations").
The comments reflected a consensus
that certain fundamental elements of the
regulations are sound, but demonstrated
a disagreement over the need and
reasons for change. Community
organizations advocated that the
regulations needed to be changed to
reflect developments in the industry
and marketplace; financial institutions
were concerned principally with
reducing burden consistent with
maintaining or improving the
regulations' effectiveness. In reviewing
these comments, the federal banking
and thrift agencies were particularly
mindful of the need to balance the
desire to make changes that might "fine
tune" the regulations, with the need to
avoid unnecessary and costly disruption
to reasonable CRA policies and
procedures that the industry has put
into place under the current rules.
Joint Agency Regulatory Proposal to
Address Small Institution Regulatory
Burden and Illegal or Predatory Lending
Practices. In February 2004, the federal
banking and thrift agencies issued
identical proposals to amend their
respective eRA regulations to increase
the limit on the asset size of institutions
classified as "small institutions" that
are eligible for streamlined CRA
evaluations and exempt from CRA data
reporting obligations. (69 FR 5729, Feb.
6, 2004). Under the current rule, a
"small institution" is an institution that
has less than $250 million in assets and
is either independent or a member ofa
holding company with less than $1
billion in assets ..The four agencies
proposed to re-define a "small
institution" as one with fewer than $500
million in assets. The holding company
criterion would have been eliminated
under the proposal.
The commenters were deeply split on
the proposal. A majority of over 250
community bank commenters, and all of
the trade associations commenting on
behalf of community banks, urged the
federal banking and thrift federal
bankIng agencies to extend the proposed
burden relief to all institutions with
assets under $2 billion, or at least to all
institutions with assets under $1 billion;
a few favored the proposed $500 million
threshold. Virtually everyone of over
250 community group commenters
strongly opposed changing the
definition of "small institution" or
exempting any more institutions from
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the three-part test (lending, services,
and investments). These commenters
urged that the threshold not be changed
so that community dev'elopment
activities continue to be evaluated, as
they are today, in banks with $250
million or more in assets.
The federal banking and thrift
agencies also proposed to revise and
clarify the regulations to provide that
evidence of certain abusive and illegal
credit practices will adversely affect an
agency's evaluation of a bank's eRA
performance, including evidence of a
pattern or practice of extending home
mortgage or consumer loans based
predominantly on the foreclosure or
liquidation value of the collateral by the
institution, where the borrower cannot
be expected to be able to make the
payments required under the terms of
the loan. The proposal clarified that a
bank's evaluation will be adversely
affected by such abusive or illegal credit
practices regardless of whether the
practices involve loans in the bank's
assessment area(s) or in any other
location or geography. It also provided
that a bank's CRA evaluation can be
adversely affected by evidence of such
practices by any affiliate, if any loans of
that affiliate have been considered in
the institution's eRA evaluation.
While commenters differed in their
reaction to many aspects of the
proposal, many commenters, including
community organizations and financial
institutions, opposed-as either
inadequate or inappropriate-the
provision that evidence of collateral-
based mortgage lending would
adversely affect a bank's CRA
evaluation.
Recent OTS Rulemaking. On August
18, 2004, the OTS published a final rule
that expanded the category of H small
savings associations" subject to OTS
eRA regulations to those under $1
billion, regardless of holding-company
affiliation. The OTS announced that it
was taking this action on July 16, 2004,
and that same day, the ace and the
Board announced separately that they
would not proceed with their respective
proposals. The Board formally withdrew
its proposal. The acc did not formally
withdraw its proposal, but did not adopt
it.
On November 24, 2004, the OTS
issued another proposed rulemaking to
revise the definition of "community
development" to permit consideration
of such activities in underserved non-
metropolitan areas, and to solicit
comment on the appropriate
consideration of such community
development activities in any areas
affected by natural disasters or major
community disruptions. The OTS
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further solicited comment on providing
substantial flexibility in the way that
CRA ratings are assigned for institutions
subject to the lending, investment, and
service tests (savings associations ,with
assets of $1 billion or more). Under the
OTS proposal, 50% or more of a large
savings association's eRA rating would
be based on lending, and the remaining
percentage would be based on any other
type or types of eRA activity (services
or investments) that the association
elects to have evaluated. The OTS also
asked for comment on whether it should
eliminate the Investment Test entirely.
FDIC Proposal. On August 20, 2004,
the FDIC issued a new proposal on the
eRA evaluation of banks defined as
"small." (69 FR 51611, Aug. 20,2004)
The FDIC's new proposal would expand
the category of H small banks" to those
under $1 billion, regardless of any
holding-company size or affiliation. For
small banks with assets between $250
million and $1 billion, the FDIC
proposal would add to the five
performance criteria of the current
streamlined small bank test a new sixth
criterion taking into account a bank's
record of community development
lending, investments, or services "based
on the opportunities in the market and
the bank's own strategic strengths."
While these community development
activities would not be a separately
rated test, the FDIC requested comment
on whether it should apply a separate
community development test in
addition to the existing streamlined
performance criteria and on what
weighting the community development
test would have in assigning an overall
performance rating. The FDIC also
proposed to expand the definition of
"community development" to include
activities that benefit rural areas and
individuals in rural areas.
The FDIC's proposal generated
approximately 11,500 comment letters.
These comments were sent by a wide
spectrum of commenters, including over
4,000 from community bankers, over
1,500 from various community
organizations, and over 5,000 from
individuals. As with the February 2004
interagency proposal, the commenters
were deeply divided on the issues
presented in the August proposal.
Nearly all of the comments received
from bankers and banking organizations
supported a change in the small bank
dollar threshold, primarily as a way to
reduce administrative burden. Bankers
were mixed on the community
development performance criterion.
Some supported a community
development criterion as-an effective
compromise, while others opposed the
criterion altogether on one of two
grounds: (1) Co~munity development
lending and investments are already
part of the loan-to-deposit performance
criterion assessing the level of lending
activity 1 or (2) community development
activities should be based on an overall
subjective assessment, not an artificial
test. Most of the banking commenters
opposed making the community
development test a separate test.
Community groups almost universally
opposed any increase in the small bank
threshold. These commenters asserted
that the burden argument mada by
banks did not justify a change. This
group also uniformly opposed the
community development performance
criterion on the ground that permitting
banks to choose one or more lending,
investment, and service activities would
lead to cut backs in investments and
services currently required under the
large bank test. The community group
commenters generally supported a
separate community development test.
Commenters were mixed on the
addition of "rural" to the definition of
"community development. H Some
supported the proposal because it
would permit eRA credit for such rural-
based activities as funding local water
projects, school construction, or
rehabilitation of a Main Street retail
district in rural areas lacking sufficient
financial resources. Many commenters
were concerned that the mere inclusion
of the phrase "individuals who reside in
rural areas" would permit banks to get
CRA credit for loans, investments, or
services to middle-class or wealthy
individuals.
Discussion
The CRA requires the federal banking
and thrift agencies to assess the record
of each insured depository institution in
meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, including low-and
moderate-income neighborhoods,
consistent with safe and sound
operation of the institution and to take
that record into account when the
agency evaluates an application by the
institution for a deposit facility.2
The federal banking agencies continue
to believe that it is both worthwhile and
possible to improve the CRA rules in
ways that reduce unnecessary burden
while at the same time mainta'ining and
improving the effective implementation
of the CRA. Moreover, we believe that
it is important to take steps at this time
to develop and propose rules to achieve
these goals, and to work toward
1 Some commenters also noted that, under
existing regulations, small banks can elect to be
evaluated under the large bank lending, investment,
and service tests.
212 U.S.C. 2903.
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achieving standards that ultimately can
apply on a uniform basis to all banks
subject to the CRA. Therefore, the
federal banking agencies request
comment on proposed regulatory
revisions that balance the objective of
providing meaningful regulatory relief
for additional community banks with
the objectives of preserving and
encouraging meaningful CRA activities
by those same banks.
As noted above, commenters were
divided on the merits of that portion of
the February 2004 and August 2004
proposals that would have increased the
limit on the size of banks that would be
eligible for treatment as a "small bank."
The comments in favor of the proposal
focused on the potential regulatory
relief for insured institutions, while
those opposed expressed concern that
the proposal would result in decreased
community development activities in
areas that are particularly in need of
credit and investment, notably rural
areas.
In light of these comments, the federal
banking agencies request comment on
this revised proposal. The new proposal
addresses both the comments from
community banks and comments from
community organizations. It responds to
community banks concerned about the
reduction of undue regulatory burden
by extending eligibility for streamlined
lending evaluations and the exemption
from data reporting to banks under $1
billion without regard to holding
company assets. It addresses the
concerns of community organizations
that urged the federal banking and thrift
agencies to continue to evaluate
community development participation,
by providing that the community
development records of banks between
$250 million and $1 billion would be
separately evaluated and rated, but
provides a more streamlined basis than
the current rule for doing so. It responds
to suggestions from both community
banks and community organizations
that the definition of '~community
developmenf' is too confined by
proposing a more flexible approach to
the types of community development
activities that would be considered, and
by expanding the definition of
community development activities in
underserved rural areas and designated
disaster areas. In short, the new
proposal tries to strike a balance
between burden reduction for
community banks and effective
evaluation of community development
by those banks.
The key differences between this
proposal and the February 2004
interagency proposal are three-fold.
First, as with the FDIC's August2004
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proposal, the new proposal would raise
the threshold for a "small bank" to
banks with assets of less than $1 billion,
not $500 million, regardless of any
holding company size or affiliat~on.
Unlike the prior proposals, the new
proposal would provide an adjustment
of the threshold for inflation, based on
changes to the Consumer Price Index.
Second, the new proposal would add
a flexible new community development
test that would be separately rated in
eRA examinations for banks with at
least $250 million and less than $1
billion in assets (these banks will be
referred to as "intermediate small
banks"). Ratings for intermediate small
banks would be based on a rating on
this community development test and
on a separate rating for the streamlined
small bank lending test. An
intermediate small bank would not be
eligible for an overall rating of
"satisfactory" unless it received ratings
of "satisfactory" on both the lending
and community development tests.
Third, the definition of "community
development" would be expanded to
encompass: (1) Affordable housing for
individuals in underserved rural areas
and designated disaster areas (in
addition to low- or moderate-income
individuals) and (2) community
development activities that revitalize or
stabilize underserved rural areas and
designated disaster areas (in addition to
low- or moderate-income areas).3 The
current definition of "community
development," which hinges on
targeting low- or moderate-income
people or census tracts, has been
criticized by community banks and
community organizations alike for
needlessly excluding rural areas that
often do not have census tracts that
meet the definition of' 'low- or
moderate-income." Indeed, about 60%
of non-metropolitan counties lack such
low- and moderate-income tracts. As a
result, many rural areas in need of
community development activities are
not in low- or moderate-income tracts.
The current definition of "community
development" also does not explicitly
_provide that it encompasses activities in
areas affected by disasters. For example,
there has been unnecessary uncertainty
about the CRA treatment of bank
revitalization activities in areas affected
by natural disasters such as hurricanes
or in, for example, the commercial and
residential areas surrounding the site of
the World Trade Center. Affordable
housing for individuals in underserved
3 This represents a change from the FDIC's August
2004 proposal. In that proposal. FDIC proposed
amending the prong of the definition of community
development relating to community services. See 12
CFR 345.12(g)(2).
rural areas and in designated disaster
areas, and activities that promote the
revitalization and stabilization of such
areas, such as for infrastructure
improvements, community services, and
small business development, are fully
consistent with the goals and objectives
of the CRA because these projects can
benefit the entire community, including,
but not limited to, low- or moderate-
income individuals or neighborhoods.
Size Threshold
Under the proposal, intermediate
small banks would no longer have to
report originations and purchases of
small business, small farm, and
community development loans. This
change would account for most of the
cost savings and paperwork burden
reduction for intermediate small banks.
The proposal also would annually
adjust the asset size for small and
intermediate small banks based on
changes to the Consumer Price Index.
Using an index to adjust dollar figures
for the effects of inflation is
commonplace, and is used in other
federal lending regulations, such as the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 12
U.S.C. 2801 et seq.
Community Development Test for
Intermediate Small Banks
As stated above, comments were
mixed on the FDIC's inquiry as to
whether the community development
test should be separated froin the
current small bank test. Many industry
commenters preferred to have a
community development criterion,
which would permit a bank to engage in
one or more community development
activities, and opposed a separate
community development test. On the
other hand, many community
organizations and others expressed
concern that the criterion was overly
flexible and would result in a narrow
focus that would ignore a broad range of
community needs, in~luding
investments.
The acc, FDIC, and Board believe
that the proposal for a separate
community development rating presents
an appropriate focus on community
development activities for intermediate
small banks and makes transparent the
weight that community development
performance receives in the overall
rating. Under the proposed community
development test for these
"intermediate" small banks, community
development loans, qualified
investments, and community
development services would be
evaluated together, resulting in a single
rating for community development
performance. While the lending test for
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small banks permits consideration of
community development lending and
qualified investments "as appropriate,"
such activities by an intermediate small
bank generally would be considered
under the community development test.
An intermediate small bank's rating for
community development would playa
significant role in the bank's overall
rating, as would its rating on the
separate test of the bank's lending. To
ensure that community development
performance and retail lending are
appropriately weighted under the
proposal, and given the flexibility that
would be available to satisfy the
community development test through a
variety of activities, an intermediate
small bank would have to achieve a
rating of at least satisfactory on both
tests to be assigned an overall rating of
satisfactory.
The number and amount of
community development loans, the
number and amount of qualified
investments, and the provision of
community development services, by an
intermediate small bank, and the bank's
responsiveness through such activities
to community development lending,
investment, and services needs, would
be evaluated in the context of the bank's
capacities, business strategy, the needs
of the relevant community, and the
number and types of opportunities for
community development activities. The
federal banking agencies intend that the
proposed community development test
would be applied flexibly to permit a
bank to apply its resources strategically
to the types of community development
activities (loans, investments, and
services) that are most responsive to
helping to meet community needs, even
when those activities are not necessarily
innovative, complex, or new.
As noted in the February 2004
proposal, some community banks face
intense competition fo~ a limited supply
of qualified investments that are safe
and sound and yield an acceptable
return. Competition for scarce
investments also may result in
uchurning," or the repeated purchase
and sale, of the same pool of
investments. To "fill the silo" of
investments for purposes of the eRA
investment test, these banks may have
made or purchased investments that
may not be meaningful or responsive to
the needs of their community, whereas
additional lending or provision of
services by the bank could have been
more responsive to local community
development needs. The acc, FDIC,
and Board recognize that these
constraints may affect the investment
performance of particular banks, and
believe that a more flexible community
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development test for intermediate small
banks provides a better framework to
evaluate a bank's capacity, the types of
investments that are reasonably
available in a bank's community, and
how a bank fosters community
development goals in its assessment
areas.
As part of the proposed community
development test for intermediate small
banks, the DCC, FDIC, and Board also
anticipate that examiners would use
their discretion, using performance
context, to assign appropriate weight in
a bank's current period rating to prior-
period outstanding investments that
reflect a substantial financial
commitment or outlay by the bank
designed to have a multi-year impact, in
addition to investments made during
the current examination cycle.
In providing this flexibility for
intermediate small banks, it is not the
intention of the federal banking agencies
to permit a bank to simply ignore one
or more categories of community
development. Nor would the proposal
prescribe any required threshold .
proportion of community development
loans, qualified investments, and
community development services for
these banks. Instead, the acc, FDIC,
and Board would expect that a bank will
appropriateIy assess the needs in its
community, engage in different types of
community development activities
based on those needs and the bank's
capacities, and that it will take
reasonable steps to apply its community
development resources strategically to
meet those needs.
Under the proposal, retail banking
services provided by intermediate small
banks would no longer be evaluated in
a separate service test. Instead, services
for low- and moderate-income people
would be taken into account in the
community de'velopment test. Under
that test, the federal banking agencies
would consider bank services intended
primarily to benefit low- and moderate-
income people, such as low-cost bank
accounts and banking services such as
low-cost remittance services.
Giving banks more flexibility on how
to apply their community development
resources to respond to community
needs through a more strategic use of
loans, investments, and services is
intended to reduce burden and make the
evaluation of community banks'
community development records more
effective.
Community Development Definition
The regulations' present definition of
ucommunity development" has been
criticized by community banks and
community organizations alike for
failing to recognize the unique
community development needs of
certain rural areas. The definition covers
four categories of activities, three of
which (affordable housing, community
services, and economic development)
are defined in terms of the activity's
targeting of low- or moderate-income
people or small businesses or farms, and
one of which (revitalization and
stabilization activities) is defined in
terms of its targeting of low- or
moderate-income census tracts. The
acc, FDIC, and Board propose to
amend two of the categories-affordable
housing and revitalization and
stabilization activities-by adding
references to individuals in
C'underserved rural areas" and in
"designated disaster areas. ,j 4
In response to the FDIC's August 2004
proposal to revise the definition of
"community development" to include
the provision of affordable housing to
individuals in rural areas (in addition to
low- or moderate-income individuals
under the current rule), several
commenters noted that the provision of
affordable housing was critical in
certain rural areas. Some community
organizations serving rural areas
commented that the eRA process
should promote affordable housing in
rural areas across the country.
As described in the "Request for
Comments" discussion below, the acc,
FDIC, and Board seek comment on a
variety of approaches to identify the
community development needs of rural
areas. The approach reflected in the
proposed amendments is based on the
premise that the provision of affordable
housing-in addition to activities that
revitalize and stabilize underserved
rural areas-may meet a critical need of
individuals in certain underserved rural
areas, even if those individuals may not
meet the technical requirements of the
definition of "low- or moderate-income"
in the current regulation. The proposed
amendment would clarify that bank
support of affordable housing that
benefits individuals in need of
affordable housing in underserved rural
areas will qualify as a community
development activity.
With respect to the current definition
covering revitalization and stabilization
activities, this category does not address
revitalization and stabilization activities
in most rural counties, since most rural
counties do not have any low- or
4 Staff interpretations of "affordable housing" and
"revitalization and stabilization" can be found in
Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding
Community Reinvestment, (66 FR 36620.36625-
36626, July 12, 2001) (Q&A _.12(h)(l)-1, _.12(h)(4)-
1).
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moderate-income census tracts. 5 Under
the CRA regulation, a tract's income
classification derives from its
relationship to the median family
income of the state's rural, or non-
metropolitan areas as a whole, which
could be relatively low and declining.
Community banks and community
organizations have said that the tract-
income limitation has made the
definition of "community development"
ineffective for addressing the needs of
rural areas that do not have low- or
moderate-income tracts, but are in
decline, have been designated for
redevelopment, or need revitalizing or
stabilizing. This aspect of the proposed
amendment to the definition of
"community development" is designed
to recognize the benefits of activities
that revitalize and stabilize underserved
rural areas that do not meet the
technical definition of Hlow- or
moderate-income" census tracts. Such
activities might include, depending
upan the circumstances, state or local
infrastructure bonds and loans to
construct healthcare facilities. They
would not include, however, activities
that benefit primarily higher-income
individuals in underserved rural areas
or rural areas that are not underserved.
In evaluating the responsiveness of
community development activities in
underserved rural areas, examiners
would give significant weight to factors
such as the extent to which low- or
moderate-income individuals benefited
from the activities.
Under the revised community
development definition, a "designated
disaster area" is an area that has
received an official designation as a
disaster area.
5 Under the definition of "low- or moderate-
income" census tract in the CRA regulations, 57
percent of non-metropolitan counties have no low-
or moderate-income tracts. compared to 13 percent
of metropolitan counties. The reason for this
disparity is that rural census tracts are drawn over
relatively large geographic areas, often having
relatively heterogeneous populations that. when
averaged, tend toward the middle. This leads to a
concentration of 72 percent of rural census tracts in
the middle-income category. which leaves a small
share (15 percent) in the low- and moderate-income
categories. Moreover. because most rural counties
have relatively few census tracts. the relatively few
low- or moderate-income rural census tracts are
distributed unevenly among rural counties. As
would be expected. they also appear to be
distributed unevenly among bank CRA assessment
areas. About 42 percent of non-metropolitan
assessment areas reported by large banks in 2003,
compared to 14 percent of the metropolitan
assessment areas they reported. lacked such tracts.
(The regulation requires large banks to report their
assessment areas; the assessment areas of small
banks are not required to be reported.)
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Effect ofCertain Credit Practices on
eRA Evaluations
The acc, FDIC, and Board again
propose to revise the regulations to
address the impact on a bank's eRA
rating of evidence of discrimination or
other illegal credit practices. The
regulations would provide that evidence
of discrimination, or evidence of credit
practices that violate an applicable law,
rule, or regulation, will adversely affect
an agency's evaluation of a bank's CRA
performance. The regulations also
would be revised to include an
illustrative list of such practices,
including evidence of discrimination
against applicants on a prohibited basis
in violation of, for example, the Equal
Credit Opportunity (15 U.S.C. 1691 et
seq.) or Fair Housing Acts (42 U.S.C.
3601 et seq.); evidence of illegal referral
practices in violation of section 8 of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(12 U.S.C. 2607); evidence of violations
of the Truth in Lending Act (12 U.S.C.
1601 et seq.) concerning a consumer's
right to rescind a credit transaction
secured by a principal residence;
evidence of violations of the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(15 U.S.C~ 1639); and evidence of unfair
or deceptive credit practices in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)).6
We believe that specifying examples of
violations that give rise to adverse CRA
consequences in the CRA regulations,
rather than solely in interagency
guidance on the regulations, will
improve the usefulness of the
regulations and provide critical
information in primary compliance
source material.
Under the proposal, a bank's
evaluation will be adversely affected by
such practices regardless of whether the
practices involve loans in the bank's
assessment area(s) or in any other
location or geography. In addition, a
bank's CRA evaluation also can be
adversely affected by evidence of such
practices by any affiliate, if any loans of
that affiliate have been considered in
the bank's CRA evaluation.
In response to comments on the
February 2004 proposal, the federal
banking agencies do not propose to
include in the CRA regulations a
provision that evidence of collateral-
based lending also can adversely affect
an agency's evaluation of a bank's CRA
performance.
6 Evidence of credit practices that violate other
laws. rules or regulations, including a federal
banking agency regulation or a state law. if
applicable, also may adversely affect a bank's eRA
evaluation.
Request for Comments
The acc, FDIC, and Board welcome
comments on any aspect of this
proposal, particularly, those issues
noted below.
• TheJederal banking agencies invite
comment on whether other approaches
would be more appropriate to
addressing the eRA burdens and
obligations of banks with less than $1
billion in assets. Is there another
appropriate asset threshold to use when
defining intermediate small banks, and,
ifso, why?
• We seek comment on the proposal
to adjust the asset size for small and
intermediate small banks on an ongoing
basis, based on changes to the Consumer
Price Index.
• Under the proposal, banks with
assets between $250 million and $1
billion will no longer be required to
report data on small business, small
farm, and community development
lending. The federal banking agencies
seek comment specifically addressing
whether and how the public has used
the loan information that has been
reported to date by such intermediate
small banks (for example, by reference
to specific studies on bank lending
patterns that used the datal, and
whether other sources of data about this
lending can be used for such purposes
going forward.
• Does the proposal provide more
flexibility in how an intermediate small
bank may apply its community
development resources through a more
strategic use of loans, investments and
services? Does the proposal to permit
examiners to use performance context to
give consideration in a current-period
rating, to prior-period outstanding
investments that reflect a substantial
financial commitment by the bank, also
provide m'ore flexibility for intermediate
small banks?
• Does the proposal to evaluate all
community development activities of
intermediate small banks under one test
have the potential to make the
evaluations of those banks' community
development performance more
effective than under the current
regulation?
• Should the community
development test for intermediate small
banks be separately rated as proposed?
If so, should an intermediate small bank
be required to achieve a rating of at least
"satisfactory" under both the small bank
lending and community development
tests to achieve an overall "satisfactory"
CRA rating? Should the bank's
community development test
performance be weighted equally with
its lending test performance in assigning
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an ov~ralleRA rating? Would other
ratings floors or weights be appropriate
to provide greater flexibility in certain
circumstances? If so, under what
circumstances?
• The federal banking agencies seek
comment on whether the existing
definition of "community development'''
provides sufficient recognition for
community services to individuals
residing in underserved rural areas and
designated disaster areas and, if not,
how to encourage the provision of such
services to persons in underserved rural
areas and designated disaster areas that
have the greatest need. 7
• We also seek comment on the
merits of the proposed treatment of the
definition of"community development"
in underserved rural and designated
disaster areas and invite suggestions for
alternatives.
• We seek comment on the proper
way to define "rural." Should we adopt
a definition and, if so, which one? For
example, should all areas outside a
metropolitan area be considered
"rural"? Alternatively, should the
federal banking agencies define rural
consistent with the definition employed
by the Census Bureau? The Census
Bureau defines any territory or
population not meeting its criteria for
"urban" to be "rural." Are there other
definitions the federal banking agencies
should consider?
• We also seek comment on the
proper way to define "underserved"
when used in connection with rural
areas. Should we adopt a definition and,
if so, which one? For example, should
the term refer solely to those rural areas
showing signs of economic distress or
lack of investment? If so, what indicia
should the federal banking agencies use
to identify such rural areas? Should we
use criteria from other federal programs,
such as the Community Development
7 The FDIC's August NPRM added individuals in
rural communities to the community services
category. Comments were mixed in response to this
part of that proposal. Some commenters expressed
the concern that a.broader definition would permit
consideration of activities that benefit middle· and
upper-income individuals. On the other hand,
others stated that the regulations should recognize
that some rural communities lack financial
resources for economic and infrastructure
improvement such as school construction,
revitalizing Main Street. and maintaining or
improving water and sewer systems. Banks are
frequently called upon to help meet these needs. In
light of these comments. this proposal would not
change the definition of community development
regarding conununity services provided to low- or
moderate-income individ uals. Rather. the proposal
recognizes that activities that revitalize and
stabilize underserved areas may also include many
activities that benefit rural residents. We also seek
comment on whether the definition of "community
development" should be amended to explicitly
include community services targeted to individuals
in undeserved rural and designated disaster areas.
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Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI)
rules? Indicators used by the CDFI Fund
to define "investment areas" include
counties with (a) unemployment rates
one-and-a-half times the national
average, (b) poverty rates of 200/0 or
more, or (c) population loss of 10
percent or more between the previous
and most recent census, or a net
migration loss of 5 percent or mQre over
the five-year period preceding the most
recent census.
• Should "underserved rural area" be
defined in the regulation to also
encompass those rural areas that have
been targeted by a governmental agency
for redevelopment, without regard to
median income characteristics of the
area?
• Should "underserved rural area" be
limited to low- and moderate-income
areas, without regard to whether those
areas show signs of economic distress,
lack of investment, or are targeted for
redevelopment by a gov'ernmental
agency? If so, should the acc, FDIC,
and Board adopt a different method
than currently exists in the regulation
for determining when a rural area is
low- or moderate-income? For example,
under the current regulations, the area
must be a low- or moderate-income
census tract, which the regulations
define as a tract with median family
income that does not exceed 80% of the
statewide non-metropolitan median
family income. Would raising the low-
and moderate-income threshold in non-
metropolitan communities from 800/0 of
non-metropolitan median family income
to some higher figure, such as 850/0,
90% , or 1000/0, more appropriately
identify underserved rural areas?
Alternatively, would identifying another
measure of median income instead of
the non-metropolitan median income,
such as the statewide median income,
more appropriately define low- and
moderate-income for purposes of
defining underserved rural areas by
reference to low- and moderate-income
characteristics?
• As proposed, the definition of
"community development" would
encompass affordable housing for
people who do not meet the regulatory
definition of "low- or moderate-income"
if, and only if, they reside in
underserved rural areas. The federal
banking agencies seek comment on
whether the current regulatory
definition of "low- or moderate-income
individual" is unduly restrictive for
purposes of identifying individuals in
rural areas who need affordable
housing. If so, in what ways?
Solicitation of Conunents on Use of
Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, sec. 722,
113 Stat. 1338, 1471 (Nov. 12, 1999),
requires the federal banking agencies to
use plain language in all proposed and
final rules published after January 1,
2000. We invite your comments on how
to make the proposal easier to
understand. For example:
• Have we organized the material to
suit your needs? If not, how could this
material be better organized?
• Are the requirements in the
proposal clearly stated? If not, how
could the regulation be more clearly
stated?
• Does the proposal contain language
or jargon that is not clear? If so, which
language requires clarification?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the regulation
easier to understand? If so, what
changes to the format would make the
regulation easier to understand?
• What else could we do to make the
regulation easier to understand?
Community Bank Comment Request
In addition, we invite your comments
on the impact of this proposal on
community banks. The federal banking
agencies recognize that community
banks operate with more limited
resources than larger institutions and
may present a different risk profile.
Thus, the federal banking agencies
specifically request comments on the
impact of the proposal on community
banks' current resources and available
personnel with the requisite expertise,
and whether the goals of the proposal
could be achieved, for community
banks, through an alternative approach.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
acc and FDIC: Under section 605(h)
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
5 U.S.C. 605(b), the regulatory flexibility
analysis otherwise required under
section 604 of the RFA is not required
if an agency certifies, along with a
statement providing the factual basis for
such certification, that the rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
The acc and FDIC have reviewed the
impact of this proposed rule on small
banks and certify that the proposed rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
The Small Business Administration
(SBA) has defined "small entities" for
banking purposes as a bank or savings
institution with less than $150 million
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in assets. See 13 CFR 212.01. This
proposed rule primarily affects banks
with assets of at least $250 million and
under $1 billion. The proposed
amendments decrease the regulatory
burden for banks within that asset range
by relieving them of certain reporting
and recordkeeping requirements
applicable to larger institutions.
The proposal to eliminate the $1
billion holding company threshold as a
factor in determining whether banks
will be subject to the streamlined CRA
examination or the more in-depth eRA
examination applicable to larger
institutions will impact a limited
number of small banks, which are
affiliated with holding companies with
assets over $1 billion. The FDIC
estimates that only 110 of
approximately 5,300 FDIC-regulated
banks had assets of under $150 million
and were affiliated with a holding
company with over $1 billion in assets.
The acc estimates that only 36 of
approximately 2,000 aCC-regulated
banks met these criteria. Because so few
small banks will be affected by the
proposed revisions to Parts 25 and 345,
a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. Nevertheless, the acc and
FDIC are willing, in response to any
comments received regarding the
proposal's economic impact on small
banks with assets of under $150 million,
to reevaluate the RFA certifications and,
if appropriate, publish regulatory
flexibility analyses in conjunction with
the issuance of any final rule.
Board: Subject to certain exceptions,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
601-612) (RFA) requires an agency to
publish an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis with a proposed rule whenever
the agency is required to publish a
general notice of proposed rulemaking
for a proposed rule. The Supplementary
Information describes the proposed
regulations and the proposal's
objectives. The Board, in connection
with its initial regulatory flexibility
analysis, requests public comment in
the following areas.
A. Reasons for the Proposed Rule
As described in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section, the Board, together
with the other Agencies, seek to
improve the effectiveness of the CRA
regulations in placing performance over
process, promoting consistency in
evaluations, and eliminating
unnecessary burden. The proposed rule
is intended to reduce unnecessary
burden while maintaining or improving
CRA's effectiveness in evaluating
performance.
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B. Statement of Objectives and Legal
Basis
The Supplementary Information
describes the proposal's objectives. The
legal basis for the proposed rule is
section 806 of the CRA.
C. Description of Small Entities To
Which the Rule Applies
The proposed rule would apply to all
state-chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System; there are
approximately 932 such banks. The RFA
requires the Board to consider the effect
of the proposal on small entities, which
are defined for RFA purposes as all
banks with assets of less than $150
million. There are 473 state member
banks with less than $150 million of
assets. All but about 12 state member
banks with assets of less than $150
million are already subject to a
streamlined CRA process that is
unaffected by this proposal. The rule
would eliminate data reporting
requirements for these 12 state member
banks by eliminating holding-company
affiliation as a disqualification for
treatment as a "small bank" under the
CRA regulations.
D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping
and Other Compliance Requirements
The Board does not believe that the
proposed rule imposes any new
reporting or recordkeeping
requirements, as defined in section 603
of the RFA. As noted, the rule would
eliminate holding-company affiliation
as a disqualification for treatment as a
"small bank" under the CRA
regulations. Accordingly, the rule would
eliminate data reporting requirements
for about 12 state member banks with
assets of less than $150 million. As
noted above, all other state member
banks with assets under $150 million
are already exempt from this reporting
requirement.
The Board believes that the proposed
revisions to the definition of
"community development" would not
place additional compliance costs or
burdens on small institutions. Instead,
this proposal would add greater
flexibility to the definition in response
to requests made by many small banks.
The Board believes the same of the
provisions regarding the effect of
evidence of illegal credit practices on
CRA evaluations. State banks of all sizes
are already subject to laws against such
practices, and the proposal would not
affect that.
The Board seeks information and
comment on whether application of the
proposed rule would impose any costs,
compliance requirements, or changes in
operating procedures in addition to or
which may differ from those arising
from the application of the statute.
E. Identification ofDuplicative,
Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal
Rules
The Board does not believe there are
any federal statutes or regulations that
would duplicate, overlap, or conflict
with the proposed rule. The Board seeks
comment regarding any statues or
regulations, .including state orlocal
statutes or regulations, that would
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the
proposed rule.
F. Discussion of Significant Alternatives
The proposed rule maintains the
approach of the existing CRA
regulations in exempting small entities
from reporting requirements and
providing for streamlined lending
evaluations for small entities. A
complete exemption of small entities
from all of the CRA's requirements
would be impermissible under the CRA
statute. The Board welcomes comments
on any significant alternatives that
would minimize the impact of the
proposed rule on small entities.
Executive Order 12866
The acc has determined that this
proposed rule is not a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order
12866.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104-4 (2 U.S.C. 1532) (Unfunded
Mandates Act), requires that an agency
prepare a budgetary impact statement
before promulgating any rule likely to
result in a Federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by State, local,
and tribal governments, in the aggregate,
or by the private sector of $100 million
or more in anyone year. Ifa budgetary
impact statement is required, section
205 of the Unfunded Mandates Act also
requires an agency to identify and
consider a reasonable number of
regulatory alternatives before
promulgating a rule. The DCC has
determined that the proposal will not
result in expendi tures by State, local,
and tribal governments, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in anyone year. Accordingly, the
proposal is not subject to section 202 of
the Unfunded Mandates Act.
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Paperwork Reduction Act
Request for Comment on Proposed
Information Collection
In accordance with the requirements
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
the Agencies may not conduct or
sponsor, and the respondent is not
required to respond to, an information
collection (Ie) unless it displays a
currently valid Office of Management
and Budget (DMBYcontrol number
(OCC, 1557-0160; Board, 7100-0197;
and FDIC, 3064-0092).
The FDIC has obtained OMB-approval
for the paperwork burden associated
with its eRA regulation at 12 CFR Part
345 under DMB IC 3064-0092. The
change in burden to Ie 3064-0092
associated with this proposal to raise
the threshold for small banks from those
with under $250 million in assets to
those with under $1 billion in assets
was submitted to and approved by OMB
in connection with a similar proposal
published by the FDIC in August 2004
(69 FR 51611, Aug. 20,2004). This
interagency proposal would not, if
adopted as final, result in any added
change in burden to IC 3064-0092.
Therefore, the FDIC is not required to
make a submission to OMB under the
Paperwork Reduction Act at this time.
Nevertheless, the FDIC joins the acc
and the Board in seeking additional
comment on the paperwork burden
associated with the current ~roposal.
The Agencies give notice that, at the
end of the comment period, the
proposed collections of information,
along with an analysis of the comments,
and recommendations received~ will be
submitted to OMB for review and
approval.
Comments are invited on:
(al Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the Agencies' functions,
including whether the information has
practical utility;
(b) The accuracy of the estimates of
the burden of the information
collection, including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
(cl Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected;
(d) Ways to minimize the burden of
the information collection on
respondents, including through the use
of automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology;
and
(e) Estimates of capital or start up
costs and costs of operation,
maintenance, and purchase of services
to provide information.
At the end of the comment period, the
comments and recommendations
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received will be analyzed to determine
the extent to which the information
collections should be modified prior to
submission to OMB for review and
approval. The comments will also be
summarized or included in the
Agencies' requests to OMB for approval
of the collections. All comments will
become a matter of public record.
Comments should be addressed to:
OCC: Mary H. Gottlieb or Camille
Dixon, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Legislative and Regulatory
Activities Division, Attention: Docket
No. 05-04, 250 E Street, SW., Mailstop
8-4, Washington, DC 20219. Due to
delays in paper mail in the Washington
area, commenters are encouraged to
submit their comments by fax to (202)
874-4889 or bye-mail to
camille.dixon@occ.treas.gov.
Board: Comments should refer to
Docket No. R-1225 and may be mailed
to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 20th Str~et and Constitution
Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 20551.
Please consider submitting your
comments through the Board's Web site
at http://WWlv.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm, by
e-mail to
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov, or
by fax to the Office of the Secretary at
(202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
Rules proposed by the Board and other
federal agencies may also be viewed and
commented on at http://
www.regulations.gov.
All public comments are available
from the Board's Web site at http://
www·federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/
foialProposedRegs.cfm as submitted,
except as necessary for technical
reasons. Accordingly, your comments
will not be edited to remove any
identifying or contact information.
Public comments may also be viewed
electronically or in paper in Room MP-
500 of the Board's Martin Building (C
and 20th Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m. on weekdays.
FDIC: Leneta G. Gregorie, Legal
Division, Room MB-3082, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429. All
comments should refer to the title of the
proposed collection. Comments may be
hand-delivered to the guard station at
th~ rear of the 17th Street Building
(located on F Street), on business days
between 7 a.m. and 5p.rn., Attention:
Comments/Executive Secretary, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Comments should also be sent to
Mark D. Menchik, Desk Officer, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Room 10235, Washington, DC 20503.
Comments may also be sent bye-mail to
Mark_D....;..Menchik®omb.eop.gov.
Title of Information Collection:
acc: Community Reinvestment Act
Regulation-12 CFR 25.
Board: Recordkeeping, Reporting, and
Disclosure Requirements in ·Connection
with Regulation BB (Community
Reinvestment Act).
FDIC: Community Reinvestment-12
CFR 345.
Frequency ofResponse: Annual.
Affected Public:
OCC: National banks.
Board: State member banks.
FDIC: State nonmember banks.
Abstract: This Paperwork Reduction
Act section estimates the burden that
would be associated with the
regulations were the agencies to change
the definition of "small institution" as
proposed, that is, increase the asset
threshold from $250 million to $1
billion and eliminate any consideration
of holding-company size. The two
proposed changes, if adopted, would
make "small" approximately 1,522
insured depository institutions that do
not now have that status. That estimate
is based on data for all FDIC-insured
institutions that filed Call Reports in
2004. Those data also underlie the
estimated paperwork burden that would
be associated with the regulations if the
proposals were adopted by the agencies.
The proposed change to amend the
intermediate small bank performance
standards to incorporate a separate
community development test would
have no impact on paperwork burden
because the evaluation is based on
information prepared by examiners.
Estimated Paperwork Burden under
the Proposal:
acc:
Number ofRespondents: 1,877.
Estimated Time per Response: Small
business and small farm loan register,
219 hours; Consumer loan data, 326
hours; Other loan data, 25 hours;
Assessment area delineation, 2 hours;
Small business and small farm loan
data, 8 hours; Community development
loan data, 13 hours; HMDA out-of-MSA
loan data, 253 hours; Data on lending by
a consortium or third party, 17 hours;
Affiliated lending data, 38 hours;
Request for designation as a wholesale
or limited purpose bank, 4 hours;
Strategic Plan, 275 hours; and Public
file, 10 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden:
160,782 hours.
Board:
Number ofRespondents: 934.
Estimated Time per Response: Small
business and small farm loan register,
219 hours; Consumer loan data. 326
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hours; Other loan data, 25 hours;
Assessment area delineation, 2 hours;
Small business and small farm loan
data, 8 hours; Community development
loan data, 13 hours; HMDA out-of-MSA
loan data, 253 hours; Data on lending by
a consortium or third party, 17 hours;
Affiliated lending data, 38 hours;
Request for designation as a wholesale
or limited purpose bank, 4 hours; and
Public file, 10 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden:
114,580 hours.
FDIC:
Number ofRespondents: 5,296.
Estimated Time per Response: Small
business and small farm loan register,
219 hours; Consumer loan data, 326
hours; Other loan data, 25 hours;
Assessment area delineation, 2 hours;
Small business and small farm loan
data, 8 hours; Community development
loan data, 13 hours; HMDA out-of-MSA
loan data, 253 hours; Data on lending by
a consortium or third party, 17 hours;
Affiliated lending data, 38 hours;
Request for designation as a wholesale
or limited purpose bank, 4 hours; and
Public file, 10 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Burden:
193,975 hours.
Executive Order 13132
The acc has determined that this
proposal does not have any Federalism
implications, as required by Executive
Order 13132.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 25
Community development, Credit,
Investrnent~, Nationalbanks, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
12 CFR Part 228
Banks, Banking, Community
development, Credit, Investments,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
12 CFR Part 345
Banks, Banking, Community
development, Credit, Investments,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Department of the Treasury
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Chapter I
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons. discussed in the joint
preamble, part 25 of chapter I of title 12
of the Code of Federal Regulations is
proposed to be amended as follows:
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(c) Effect ofevidence of
discriminatory or other illegal credit
practices. .
(1) The OCC's evaluation of a bank's
eRA performance is adversely affected
by evidence of discriminatory or other
illegal credit practices in any geography
by the bank or in any assessment area
by any affiliate whose loans have been
considered as part of the bank7s lending
performance. In connection with any
type of lending activity described in
§ 25.22(a), evidence of discriminatory or
other credit practices that violate an
applicable law, rule, or regulation
includes, but is not limited to:
(0 Discrimination against applicants
on a prohibited basis in violation, for
example, of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing
Act; .
to th~ criteria set forth in paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this section.
(b) Lending test. A small bank's
lending performance is evaluated
pursuant to the following criteria:
(1) The bank's loan-to-deposit ratio~
adjusted for seasonal variation, and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities, such as loan originations for
sale to the secondary markets,
community development loans, or
qualified investments;
(2) The percentage of loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities located in the bank's
assessment area(s);
(3) The bank's record of lending to
and, as appropriate, engaging in other
lending-related activities for borrowers
of different income levels and
businesses and farms of different sizes;
(4) The geographic distribution of the
bank's loans; and
(5) The bank's record of taking action,
if warranted, in response to written
complaints about its performance in
helping to meet credit needs in its
assessment area(s).
(c) Community development test. An
intermediate small bank's community
development performance also is
evaluated pursuant to the following
criteria:
(1) The number and amount of
community development loans;
(2) The number and amount of
qualified investments;
(3) The extent to which the bank
provides community development
services; and
(4) The bank's responsiveness through
such activities to community
development lending, investment, and
services needs.
3a. Revise § 25.28, paragraph (cl to
read as follows:
§ 25.28 Assigned ratings.
(ii) Violations of the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act;
(iii) Violations of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act;
(iv) Violations of section 8 of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act; and
(v) Violations of the Truth in Lending
Act provisions regarding a consumer's
right of rescission.
(2) In determining the effect of
evidence of practices described in
paragraph (c)(1) of this section on the
bank's assigned rating, the ace
considers the nature, extent, and
strength of the evidence of the practices;
the policies and procedures that the
bank (or affiliate, as applicable) has in
place to prevent the practices; any
corrective action that the bank (or
affiliate, as applicable) has taken or has
committed to take, including voluntary
corrective action resulting from self-
assessment; and any other relevant
information.
4. In Appendix A to part 25, revise
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 25-Ratings
(d) Banks evaluated under the small bank
performance standards.-(l) Lending test
ratings.-(i) Eligibility for a satisfactory
lending test rating. The ace rates a small
bank's lending performance "satisfactory" if,
in general, the bank demonstrates:
(A) A reasonable loan-lo-deposit ratio
(considering seasonal variations) given the
bank's size, financial condition, the credit
needs of its assessment area(s), and taking
into account, as appropriate, other lending-
related activities such as loan originations for
sale to the secondary markets and
community development loans and qualified
investments;
(B) A majority of its loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities,
are in its assessment area;
(e) A distribution of loans to and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities
for individuals of different income levels
(including low- and moderate-income
individuals) and businesses and farms of
different sizes that is reasonable given the
demographics of the bank's assessment
area{s);
(D) A record of taking appropriate action,
when warranted, in response to written
complaints, if any, about the bank's
performance in helping to meet the credit
needs of its assessment area(s); and
(El A reasonable geographic distribution of
loans given the bank's assessment area(s).
(ii) Eligibility for an "outstanding" lending
test rating. A small bank that meets each of
the standards for a "satisfactory" rating
under this paragraph and exceeds some or all
of those standards may warrant consideration
for a lending test rating of "outstanding. tt
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. A small bank may
also receive a lending test rating of "needs to
improye" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
***
****
(u) Small bank-(1) Definition. Small
bank means a bank that, as of December
31 of either of the prior two calendar
years t had assets of less than $1 billion.
Intermediate small bank means a small
bank with assets of at least $250 million
and less than $1 billion as of December
31 of both of the prior two calendar
years.
(2) Adjustment. The dollar figures in
paragraph (~)(1) of this section shall be
adjusted annually and published by the
ace, based on the year-to-year change
in the average of the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers, not seasonally
adjusted, for each twelve-month period
ending in November, with rounding to
the nearest million.
(4) Activities that revitalize or
stabilize low- or moderate-income
geographies, underserved rural areas, or
designated disaster areas.
(g) Community development means:
(1) Affordable housing (including
multifamily rental housing) for low- or
moderate-income individuals,
individuals in underserved rural areas,
or individuals located in designated
disaster areas;
1. The authority citation for part 25
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 u.s.e. 21, 22, 26, 27,30,36,
93a, 161, 215, 215a, 481,1814,1816, 1828(cl.
1835a, 2901 through 2907 t and 3101 through
3111.
2. In § 25.12 t revise paragraphs (g)(1),
(g)(4), and (u) to read as follows:
§ 25.12 Definitions.
PART 25-COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT AND
INTERSTATE DEPOSIT PRODUCTION
REGULATIONS
3. Revise § 25.26 to read as follows:
§ 25.26 Small bank performance
standards.
(a) Performance criteria-ell Small
banks with assets of less than $250
million. The OCC evaluates the record
of a small bank that is not, or that was
not during the prior calendar year, an
intermediate small bank, of helping to
meet the credit needs of its assessment
area(s) pursuant to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) Intermediate small banks. The
acc evaluates the record of a small
bank that is, or that was during the prior
calendar year, an intermediate small
bank, of helping to meet the credit
ne.eds of its assessment area(s) pursuant
E - 24
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improve" or Hsubstantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standards
for a "satisfactory" rating.
(4) Activities that revitalize or
stabilize low- or moderate-income
geographies, underserved rural areas, or
designated disaster areas.
3. Revise § 228.26 to read as follows:
§ 228.26 Small bank performance
standards.
(a) Performance criteria-(1) Small
banks with assets of less than $250
miJIion. The Board evaluates the record
of a small bank that is not, or that was
not during the prior calendar year, an
intermediate small bank, of helping to
meet the credit needs of its assessment
area(s) pursuant to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) Intermediate small banks. The
Board evaluates the record of a small
bank that is, or that was during the prior
calendar year, an intermediate small
bank, of helping to meet the credit
needs of its assessment area(s) pursuant
to the criteria set forth in paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this section.
(b) Lending test. A small bank's
lending performance is evaluated
pursuant to the following criteria:
(1) The bank's loan-to-deposit ratio,
adjusted for seasonal variation, and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities, such as loan originations for
sale to the secondary markets,
community development loans, or
qualified investments;
(2) The percentage of loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities located in the bank's
assessment area(s);
(3) The bank's record of lending to
and, as appropriate, engaging in other
lending-related activities for borrowers
of different income levels and
businesses and farms of different sizes;
(4) The geographic distribution of the
bank's loans; and
(5) The bank's record of taking action,
if warranted, in response to written
complaints about its performance in
helping to meet credit needs in its
assessment area(s).
(c) Community development test. An
intermediate small bank's community
development performance also is
evaluated pursuant to the following
criteria:
(1) The number and amount of
comm"unity development loans;
(2) The number and amount of
qualified investments;
(3) The extent to which the bank
provides community development
services; and
(4) The bank's responsiveness through
such activities to community
development lending, investment, and
services needs.
3a. Revise § 228.28(c) to read as
follows:
§ 228.28 Assigned ratings.
* *
(c) Effect ofevidence of
discriminatory or other illegal credit
practices. (1) The Board's evaluation of
a bank's CRA performance is adversely
affected by evidence of discriminatory
or other illegal credit practices in any
geography by the bank or in any
assessment area by any affiliate whose
**
(g) Community development means:
(1) Affordable housing (including
multifamily rental housing) for low-or
moderate-income individuals,
individuals in underserved rural areas,
or individuals located in designated
disaster areas;
Federal Reserve System
12 CFR Chapter II
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the joint
preamble, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System proposes to
amend part 228 of chapter II of title 12
of the Code of Federal Regulations as
follows:
PART 228-COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT (REGULATION BB)
1. The authority citation for part 228
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 321, 325, 1828(c),
1842, 1843, 1844, and 2901 et seq.
2. In § 228.12, revise paragraphs (g)(l),
(g)(4), and (u) to read as follows:
§ 228.12 Definitions.
(u) Small bank-(l) Definition. Small
bank means a bank that, as of December
31 of either of the prior two calendar
years, had assets of less than $1 billion.
Intermediate small bank means a small
bank with assets of at least $250 million
and less than $1 billion as of December
31 of both of the prior two calendar
years.
(2) Adjustment. The dollar figures in
paragraph (u){l) of this section shall be
adjusted annually and published by the
Board, based on the year-to-year change
in the average of the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers, not seasonally
adjusted, for each twelve-month period
ending in November, with rounding to
the nearest million.
performance has failed to meet the standard
for a "satisfactory" rating.
(2) Community development test ratings for
intermediate small banks-{i) Eligibility for a
satisfactory community development test
rating. The ace rates an intermediate small
bank's community development performance
Hsatisfactory" if the bank demonstrates
adequate responsiveness to the community
development needs of its assessment area(s)
or a broader statewide or regional area that
includes the bank's assessment area(s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services. The adequacy of the
bank's response will depend on its capacity
for such community development activities,
its assessment area's need for such
community development activities, and the
availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area(s l.
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding
community development lest rating. The
ace rates an intermediate small bank's
community development performance
"outstanding" if the bank demonstrates
excellent responsiveness to community
development needs in its assessment area(s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services, as appropriate,
considering the bank's capacity and the need
and availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area(s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. An intennediate
small bank may also receive a cornmunity
development test rating of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standards
for a "satisfactorytt rating.
(3) Overall rating-(i) Eligibility for a
satisfactory overall rating. No intermediate
small bank may receive an assigned overall
rating of "satisfactory" unless it receives a
rating of at least H satisfactory" on both the
lending test and the community development
test.
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding overall
rating. (A) An intermediate small bank that
receives an "outstanding" rating on one test
and at least "satisfactory" on the other test
may receive an assigned overall rating of
"outstanding."
(8) A small bank that is not an
intermediate small bank that meets each of
the standards for a "satisfactory" rating
under the lending test and exceeds some or
all of those standards may warrant
consideration for an overall rating of
"outstanding." In assessing whether a bank's
performance is "outstanding," the aec
considers the extent to which the bank
exceeds each of the performance standards
for a "satisfactory" rating and its
performance in making qualified investments
and its performance in providing branches
and other services and delivery systems that
enhance credit availability in its assessment
area(s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance overall ratings. A small bank
may also receive a rating of "needs to
E - 25
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(d) Banks evaluated under the small bank
performance standards.-{l) Lending test
ratings.-U) Eligibility for a satisfactory
lending test rating. The Board rates a small
bank's lending performance ccsatisfactory" if,
in general, the bank demonstrates:
(A) A reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio
(considering seasonal variations) given the
bank's size, financial condition, the credit
needs of its assessment area(s), and taking
into account, as appropriate, other lending-
related activities such as loan originations for
sale to the secondary markets and
community development loans and qualified
investments;
(B) A majority of its loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities,
are in its assessment area;
(C) A distribution of loans to and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities
for individuals of different income levels
(including low- and moderate-income
individuals) and businesses and farms of
different sizes that is reasonable given the
demographics of the bank's assessment
area(s);
(D) A record of taking appropriate action,
when warranted, in response to written
complaints, if any, about the bank's
loans have been considered as part of
the bank's lending performance. In
connection with any type of lending
activity described in § 228.22(a),
evidence of discriminatory or other
credit practices that violate an
applicable law, rule, or regulation
includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Discrimination against applicants
on a prohibited basis in violation, for
exampIe, of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing
Act;
(ii) Violations of the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act;
(iii) Violations of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act;
(iv) Violations of section 8 of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act; and
(v) Violations of the Truth in Lending
Act provisions regarding a consumer's
right of rescission.
(2) In determining the effect of
evidence of practices described in
paragraph (c)(l) of this section on the
bank's assigned rating, the Board
considers the nature, extent, and
strength of the evidence of the practices;
the policies and procedures that the
bank (or affiliate, as applicable) has in
place to prevent the practices; any
corrective action that the bank (or
affiliate, as applicable) has taken or has
committed to take, including voluntary
corrective action resulting from self-
assessment; and any other relevant
information.
4. In Appendix A to part 228, revise
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 228-Ratings
(4) Activities that revitalize or
stabilize low- or moderate-income
geographies, underserved rural areas~ or
designated disaster areas.
(g) Community development means:
(1) Affordable housing (including
multifamily rental housing). for low- or
moderate-income individuals,
individuals in underserved rural areas,
or individuals located in designated
disaster areas;
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
**
*
*
all of those standards may warrant
consideration for an overall rating of
"outstanding." In assessing whether a bank's
perfonnance is "outstanding." the Board
considers the extent to which the bank
exceeds each of the perfonnance standards
for a CIsatisfactory" rating and its
performance in making qualified investments
and its performance in providing branches
and other services and delivery systems that
enhance credit availability in its assessment
area(s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance overall ratings. A small bank.
may also receive a rating of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
perfonnance has failed to meet the standards
for a "satisfactory" rating.
*
(u) Small bank-ell Definition. Small
bank means a bank that, as of December
31 of either of the prior two calendar
years, had assets of less than $1 billion.
Intermediate small bank means a small
bank with assets of at least $250 million
and less than $1 billion as of December
31 of both of the prior two calendar
years.
(2) Adjustment. The dollar figures in
paragraph (u)(1) of this section shall be
adjusted annually and published by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
12 CFR Chapter III
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the joint
preamble, the Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
proposes to amend part 345 of chapter
III of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows:
PART 345-COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT
1. The authority citation for part 345
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1814-1817, 1819-
1820,1828, 1831u and 2901-2907, 3103-
3104, and 310B{a).
2. In § 345.12, revise paragraphs (g)(1),
(g)(4), and (u) to read as follows:
§345.12 Definitions.
perfonnance in helping to meet the credit
needs of its assessment area{s); and
(El A reasonable geographic distribution of
loans given the bank's assessment area(s).
(ii) Eligibility for an Uoutstanding" lending
test rating. A small bank that meets each of
the standards for a "satisfactory" rating
under this paragraph and exceeds some or all
of those standards may warrant consideration
for a lending test rating of Uoutstanding."
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. A small bank may
also receive a lending test rating of Hneeds to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standard
for a "satisfactory" rating.
(2) Community development test ratings for
intermediate small banks-(i) Eligibility for a
satisfactory community development test
rating. The Board rates an intermediate small
bank's community development performance
"satisfactory" if the bank demonstrates
adequate responsiveness to the community
development needs of its assessment area(s)
or a broader statewide or regional area that
includes the bank's assessment area(s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services. The adequacy of the
bank's response will depend on its capacity
for such community development activities,
its assessment area's need for such
community development activities, and the
availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area(s).
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding
community'development test rating. The
Board rates an intermediate small bank's
community development performance
"outstanding" if the bank demonstrates
excellent responsiveness to community
development needs in its assessment area(s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services, as appropriate,
considering the bank's capacity and the need
and availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area(s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. An intermediate
small bank. may also receive a community
development test rating of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standards
for a "satisfactory" rating.
(3) Overall rating-U) Eligibility for a
satisfactory overall rating. No intermediate
small bank may receive an assigned.overall
rating of "satisfactory" unless it receives a
rating of at least IIsatisfactory" on both the
lending test and the community development
test.
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding overall
rating. (A) An intermediate small bank that
receives an Uoutstanding" rating on one test
and at least "satisfactory" on the other test
may receive an assigned overall rating of
"outstanding."
(B) A small bank that is not an
intermediate small bank that meets each of
the standards for a IIsatisfactory" rating
under the lending test and exceeds some or
**
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FDIC, based on the year-to-year change
in the average of the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers, not seasonally
adjusted, for each twelve-month period
ending in November, with rounding to
the nearest million.
3. Revise § 345.26 to read as follows:
§ 345.26 Small bank performance
standards.
(a) Performance criteria-ell Small
banks with assets of less than $250
million. The FDIC evaluates the record
of a small bank that is not, or that was
not during the prior calendar year, an
intermediate small bank, of helping to
meet the credit needs of its assessment
area(s) pursuant to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (b) of this section.
(2) Intermediate small banks. The
FDIC evaluates the record of a small
bank that is, or that was during the prior
calendar year, an intermediate small
bank, of helping to meet the credit
needs of its assessment area(s) pursuant
to the criteria set forth in paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this section.
(b) Lending test. A small bank's
lending performance is evaluated
pursuant to the following criteria:
(1) The bank's loan-to-deposit ratio,
adjusted for seasonal variation, and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities, such as loan originations for
sale to the secondary markets,
community development loans, or
qualified investments;
(2) The percentage of loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related
activities located in the bank's
assessment area(s);
(3) The bank's record of lending to
and, as appropriate, engaging in other
lending-related activities for borrowers
of different income levels and
businesses and farms of different sizes;
(4) The geographic distribution of the
bank's loans; and
(5) The bank's record of taking action,
if warranted, in response to written
complaints about its performance in
helping to meet credit needs in its
assessment area(s).
(c) Community development test. An
intermediate small bank's community
development performance also is
evaluated pursuant to the following
criteria:
(1) The number and amount of
community development loans;
(2) The number and amount of
qualified investments;
(3)The extent to which the bank
provides community development
services; and
(4) The bank's responsiveness through
such activities to community
development lending, investment, and
services needs.
3a. Revise § 345.28(c) to read as
follows:
§ 345.28 Assigned ratings.
(c) Effect ofevidence of
discriminatory or other illegal credit'
practices. (1) The FDIC's evaluation of a
bank~s eRA performance is adver~ely
affected by evidence of discriminatory
or other illegal credit practices in any
geography by the bank or in any
assessment area by any affiliate whose
loans have been considered as part of
the bank~s lending performance. In
connection with any type of lending
activity described in § 345.22(a),
evidence of discriminatory or other
credit practices that violate an
applicable law, rule, or regulation
includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Discrimination against applicants
on a prohibited basis in violation, for
example, of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing
Act;
(ii) Violations of the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act;
(iii) Violations of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act;
(iv) Violations of section 8 of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act; and
(v) Violations of the Truth in Lending
Act provisions regarding a consumer's
right of rescission.
(2) In determining the effect of
evidence of practices described in
paragraph (cHI) of this section on the
bank's assigned rating, the FDIC
considers the nature, extent, and
strength of the evidence of the practices;
the policies and procedures that the
bank (or affiliate, as applicable) has in
place to prevent the practices; any
corrective action that the bank (or
affiliate, as applicable) has taken or has
committed to take, including voluntary
corrective action resulting from self-
assessment; and any other relevant
information.
4. In Appendix A to part 345, revise
paragraph (d) to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 345-Ratings
(d) Banks evaluated under the small bank
performance standards-ell Lending test
ratings.-
(i) Eligibility for a satisfactory lending test
rating. The FDIC rates a small bank's lending
performance"satisfactory" if, in general, the
bank demonstrates:
(Al A reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio
(considering seasonal variations) given the
bank's size, financial condition, the credit
needs of its assessment area(s), and taking
into account. as appropriate. other lending-
related activities such as loan originations for
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sale to the secondary markets and
community development loans and qualified
investments;
(B) A majority of its loans and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities,
are in its assessment area;
(C) A distribution of loans to and, as
appropriate, other lending-related activities
for individuals of different income levels
(including low- and moderate-income
individuals) and businesses and farms of
different sizes that is reasonable given the
demographics of the bank's assessment
area(s};
(D) A record of taking appropriate action,
when warranted. in response to written
complaints, if any, about the bank's
performance in helping to meet the credit
needs of its assessment area(s}; and
(El A reasonable geographic distribution of
loans given the bank's assessment area(s).
(ii) Eligibility for an "outstanding" lending
test rating. A small bank that meets eachof
the standards for a usatisfactory" rating
under this paragraph and exceeds some or all
of those standards may warrant consideration
for a lending test rating of Houtstanding."
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. A small bank may
also receive a lending test rating of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standard
for a "satisfactoryH rating.
(2) Community development test ratings for
intermediate small banks-(i) Eligibility for a
satisfactory community development test
rating. The FDIC rates an intennediate small
bank's community development performance
Hsatisfactory" if the bank demonstrates
adequate responsiveness to the community
development needs of its assessment area{s)
or a broader statewide or regional area that
includes the bank's assessment area{s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services. The adequacy of the
bank's response will depend on its capacity
for such community development activities,
its assessment area's need for such
community development activities, and the
availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area(s).
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding
community development test rating. The
FDIC rates an intermediate small bank's
community development performance
"outstanding" if the bank demonstrates
excellent responsiveness to community
development needs in its assessment area{s)
through community development loans,
qualified investments, and community
development services, as appropriate,
considering the bank's capacity and the need
and availability of such opportunities for
community development in the bank's
assessment area{s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance ratings. An intennediate
small bank may also receive a community
development test rating of uneeds to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standards
for a Itsatisfactory" rating.
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14 CFR Part 71
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. FAA 2005-20248; Airspace
Docket No. 05-AWP-l]
RIN 212o-AA66
Proposed Establishment of Class 0
Airspace; front Airport, Denver, CO
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
Communications should identify both
docket numbers and be submitted in
triplicate to the address listed above.
Commenters wishing the FAA to
acknowledge receipt of their comments
on this notice must submit with those
comments a self-addressed, stamped
postcard on which the following
statement is made: "Comments to
Docket No. FAA-2005-20248/Airspace
Docket No. 05-AWP-l."The postcard
will be date/time stamped and returned
to the commenter. All communications
received before the specified closing
date for comments will be considered
before taking action on the proposed
rule. The proposal contained in this
notice may be changed in light of the
comments received. A report
summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerned
with this Tulemakingwill be filed in the
docket.
Availability of NPRMs
An electronic copy of this document
may be downloaded through the
Internet at http://dms.dot.gov. Recently
published rulemaking documents can
also be accessed through the FAA's Web
page at http://~vw.fQa.govor the
Superintendent of Document's Web
page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara.
Additionally, any person may obtain a
copy of this notice by submitting a
request to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Air Traffic
Airspace Management, ATA-400, 800
Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591, or by calling
(202) 267-8783. Communications must
identify both docket numbers for this
notice. Persons interested in being
placed on a mailing list for future
NPRM's should contact the FAA's
Office of Rulemaking, (202) 267-9677,
to request a copy of Advisory Circular
No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Distribution System, which
describes the application procedure.
The Proposal
The FAA is considering an
amendment to part 71 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFRpart 71) to
establish Class D airspace at Front
Range Airport, Denver, CO. An ATCT is
being constructed at Front Range
Airport, and Class D airspace is required
during the hours the ATCf is open.
Class D controlled airspace is necessary
for the safety of aircraft executing SlAPs
and other IFR operations at Front Range
Airport. Class D airspace will be
effective during specified dates and
times established in advance by a Notice
to Airmen. The effective date and time
will, thereafter be published in the
Airport/Facility Directors.
SUMMARY: This notice proposes to
establish Class D airspace at Front
Range Airport, Denver, Co. An Airport
Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) is being
constructed at Front Range Airport,
Denver, CO which will meet criteria for
Class D airspace, Class D airspace is
required when the ATCT is open, and
to contain and protect Standard
Instrument Approach Procedures
(SIAPs) and other Instrument Flight
Rules (IFR) operations at the airport.
This action would establish ClassD
airspace extending upward from the
surface to 8,000 feet Mean Sea Level
(MSL) within a 5.1 nautical mile radius
of the airport.
OATES: Comments must be received on
or before April 11, 2005.
ADDRESSES: Send comments on this
proposal to the Docket Management
System', U.S. Department of
Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590-0001. You must identify the
docket number FAA-2005-20248/
Airspace Docket No. 05-AWP-1, at the
beginning of your comments. You may
also submit comments on the Internet at
http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the
public docket containing the proposal,
any comments received, and any final
disposition in person in the Dockets
Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Office (telephone
1-800-647-5527) is on the plaza level
of the Department of Transportation
NASSIF Building at the above address.
An informal docket may also be
examined during normal business hours
at the office of the Regional Air Traffic
Division, Federal Aviation
Administration, Room 2010, 15000
Aviation Boulevard, Lawndale
California, 90261.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Larry Tonish, Airspace Specialist,
Airspace Branch, Air Traffic Division,
Federal Aviation Administration, 15000
Aviation Boulevard, Lawndale,
California; telephone (310) 725-6613.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
Interested parties are invited to
participate in this proposed rulemaking
by submitting such written data, views
or arguments as they may desire.
Comments that provide the factual basis
supporting the views and suggestions
presented are particularly helpful in
developing reasoned regulatory
decisions on the proposal. Comments
are specifically invited on the overall
regulatory, aeronautical, economic,
environmental. and energy-related
aspects of the proposal.
***
Dated: February 22, 2005.
Julie L. Williams,
Acting ComptroJIer ofthe Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, March 4, 2005.
Jennifer J.. Johnson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 22nd day of
February, 2005.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05-4797 Filed 3-10-05; 8:45 am]
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(3) Overall rating-(i) Eligibility for a
satisfactory overall rating. No intermediate
small bank rnay receive an assigned overall
rating of "satisfactory" unless it receives a
rating of at least "satisfactory" on both the
lending test and the community development
test.
(ii) Eligibility for an outstanding overall
rating. (Al An intermediate small bank that
receives an H outstanding" rating on one test
and at least "satisfactory" on the other test
may receive an assigned overall rating of
"outstanding. "
(B) A small bank that is not an
intermediate small bank that meets each of
the standards for a H satisfactory" rating
under the lending test and exceeds some or
all of those standards may warrant
consideration for an overall rating of
"outstanding." In assessing whether a bank's
performance is "outstanding," the FDIC
considers the extent to which the bank
exceeds each of the performance standards
for a "satisfactory" rating and its
performance in making qualified investments
and its performance in providing branches
and other services and delivery systems that
enhance credit availability in its assessment
area(s).
(iii) Needs to improve or substantial
noncompliance overall ratings. A small bank
may also receive a rating of "needs to
improve" or "substantial noncompliance"
depending on the degree to which its
performance has failed to meet the standards
for a "satisfactory" rating.
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FDIC Revises Payday Lending Guidance
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PR-19-2005 (3-2-2005)
Media Contact:
David Barr (202) 898-6992
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) today revised and clarified its July 2003 examination
guidance for FDIC-supervised institutions that offer payday loans. Payday loans are small-dollar,
unsecured, short-term advances that have high fees relative to the size of the loan. When used
frequently or for long periods, the costs can rapidly exceed the amount borrowed and can create a
serious financial hardship for the borrower. The FDIC believes that providing high-cost, short-term credit
on a recurring basis to customers with long-term credit needs is not responsible lending, and increases
banks' credit, legal, reputational and compliance risks. If institutions engaged in payday lending activities
fail to limit their risk exposure, operate in a safe and sound manner, or comply with all applicable laws,
the FDIC may take a range of actions, including formal and informal enforcement actions, which may
require institutions to discontinue payday lending.
The revised guidance targets frequent borrower use of this short-term credit product. It states that banks
should ensure that payday loans are not provided to customers who have had payday loans outstanding
from any lender for a total of three months in the previous 12-month period. FDIC-supervised institutions
currently engaged in payday lending were instructed to submit plans detailing how they will address the
revised guidance. Of the more than 5,200 FDIC-supervised institutions, 12 are engaged in payday
lending.
"We are troubled when we see banks extending these very high-cost loans to customers who really
need an alternative longer-term credit product. The revised guidance being issued today places more
responsibility on banks to ensure that the payday loans they are making to customers are what they are
being billed as - short-term emergency cash - rather than a regular source of funds," said Michael
Zamorski, Director of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection.
In addition, the FDIC announced that it anticipates using a mystery shopper program in conjunction with
its examination process of institutions involved in payday lending.
###
Attachment: Guidelines for Payday Lending
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the
nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,975 banks and savings
associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring
and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax dollars - insured
institutions fund its operations.
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet via the World Wide Web at
~JQjc;.gQY and may also be obtained through the FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or
202-416-6940).
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Guidelines for Payday Lending
Purpose
This guidance provides information about payday lending, a particular type of subprime lending, and
supplements and clarifies previously issued guidance about such programs, including the July 2003
Guidelines for Payday Lending) It describes safety and soundness and compliance considerations for
examining and supervising state nonmember institutions that have payday lending programs.
This guidance is necessitated by the high risk nature of payday lending and the substantial growth of
this product. It describes the FDIC's expectations for prudent risk-management practices for payday
lending activities, particularly with regard to concentrations, capital, allowance for loan and lease losses,
classifications, and protection of consumers. The guidelines also address recovery practices, income
recognition, and managing risks associated with third-party relationships.
When examiners determine that management of safety and soundness or compliance risks is deficient,
they should criticize management and initiate corrective action. Such actions may include formal or
informal enforcement action. When serious deficiencies exist, enforcement actions may instruct
institutions to discontinue payday lending.
Background
In recent years a number of lenders have extended their risk selection standards to attract subprime
loans. Among the various types of subprime loans, "payday loans" are now offered by an increasing
number of insured depository institutions.
Payday loans (also known as deferred deposit advances) are small-dollar, short-term, unsecured loans
that borrowers promise to repay out of their next paycheck or regular income payment (such as a social
security check). Payday loans are usually priced at a fixed dollar fee, which represents the finance
charge to the borrower. Because these loans have such short terms to maturity, the cost of borrowing,
expressed as an annual percentage rate (APR), is very high3
In return for the loan, the borrower usually provides the lender with a check or debit authorization for the
amount of the loan plus the fee. The check is either post-dated to the borrower's next payday or the
lender agrees to defer presenting the check for payment until a future date, usually two weeks or less.
When the loan is due, the lender expects to collect the loan by depositing the check or debiting the
borrower's account or by having the borrower redeem the check with a cash payment. If the borrower
informs the lender that he or she does not have the funds to repay the loan, the loan is often refinanced
;,1 through payment of an additional fee. If the borrower does not redeem the check in cash and the loan
is not refinanced, the lender normally puts the check or debit authorization through the payment system.
If the borrower's deposit account has insufficient funds, the borrower typically incurs a NSF charge on
this account. If the check or the debit is returned to the lender unpaid, the lender also may impose a
returned item fee plus collection charges on the loan.
Significant Risks
Borrowers who obtain payday loans generally have cash flow difficulties, and few, if any, lower-cost
borrowing alternatives. In addition, some payday lenders perform minimal analysis of the borrower's
ability to repay either at the loan's inception or upon refinancing; they may merely require a current pay
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stub or proof of a regular income source and evidence that the customer has a checking account. Other
payday lenders use scoring models and consult nationwide databases that track bounced checks and
persons with outstanding payday loans. However, payday lenders typically do not obtain or analyze
information regarding the borrower's total level of indebtedness or information from the major national
credit bureaus (Equifax, Experian, TransUnion). In addition, payday lenders generally do not conduct a
substantive review of the borrower's credit history. The combination of the borrower's limited financial
capacity, the unsecured nature of the credit, and the limited underwriting analysis of the borrower's
ability to repay pose substantial credit risk for insured depository institutions.
Insured depository institutions may have payday lending programs that they administer directly, using
their own employees, or they may enter into arrangements with third parties. In the latter arrangements,
the institution typically enters into an agreement in which the institution funds payday loans originated
through the third party. These arrangements also may involve the sale to the third party of the loans or
servicing rights to the loans.1. Institutions also may rely on the third party to provide additional services
that the bank would normally provide, including collections, advertising and soliciting applications. The
existence of third party arrangements may, when not properly managed, significantly increase'
institutions' transaction, legal, and reputation risks.
Federal law authorizes federal and state-chartered insured depository institutions making loans to out of
state borrowers to "export" favorable interest rates provided under the laws of the state where the bank
is located. That is, a state-chartered bank is allowed to charge interest on loans to out of state
borrowers at rates authorized by the state where the bank is located, regardless ofusury limitations
imposed by the state laws of the borrower's residence.·~· Nevertheless, institutions face increased
reputation risks when they enter into certain arrangements with payday lenders, including arrangements
to originate loans on terms that could not be offered directly by the payday lender.
Payday loans are a form of specialized lending not typically found in state nonmember institutions, and
are most frequently originated by specialized ~onbank firms subject to state regulation. Payday loans
can be subject to high levels of transaction risk given the large volume of loans, the handling of
documents, and the movement of loan funds between the institution and any third party originators.
Because payday loans may be underwritten off-site, there also is the risk that agents or employees may
misrepresent information about the loans or increase credit risk by failing to adhere to established
underwriting guidelines.
Procedures
General
Examiners should apply this guidance to banks with payday lending programs that the
bank administers directly or that. are administered by a third party contractor. This
guidance does not apply to situations where a bank makes occasional low-denomination,
short-term loans to its customers.
As described in the 2001 Subprime Guidance, a program involves the regular origination
of loans, using tailored marketing, underwriting standards and risk selection. The 2001
Subprime Guidance applies specifically to institutions with programs where the aggregate
credit exposure is equal to or greater than 250/0 or more of tier 1 capital. However,
because of the significant credit, operational, legal, and reputation risks inherent in payday
lending, this guidance applies regardless of whether a payday loan program meets that
credit exposure threshold.
All examiners should use th~ procedures outlined in the Subprime Lending Examination
Procedures, as well as those described here. While focused on safety and soundness
issues, segments of the Subprime Lending Examination Procedures also are applicable to
compliance examinations. They will need to be supplemented with existing procedures
relating to specific consumer protection laws and regulations.
Due to the heightened safety and soundness' and compliance risks posed by payday
lending, concurrent risk management and consumer protection examinations should be
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conducted absent overriding resource or scheduling problems. In aU cases, a review of
each discipline's examinations and workpapers should be part of the pre-examination
planning process. Relevant state examinations also sh~uld be reviewed.
Examiners may conducttargeted examinations of the third party where appropriate.
Authority to conduct examinations of third parties may be established under several
circumstances, including through the bank's written agreement with the third party, section
7 of the Bank Service Company Act, or through powers granted under section 10 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Third party examination activities would typically include,
but not be limited to, a review of compensation and staffing practices; marketing and
pricing policies; management information systems; and compliance with bank policy,
outstanding law, and regulations. Third party reviews should also include testing of
individual loans for compliance with underwriting and loan administration guidelines,
appropriate treatment of loans under delinquency, and re-aging and cure programs.
Third-Party Relationships and Agreements
The use of third parties in no way diminishes the responsibility of the board of directors
and.management to ensure that the third-party activity is conducted in a safe and sound
manner and in compliance with policies and applicable laws. Appropriate corrective
actions, including enforcement actions, may be pursued for deficiencies related to a third-
party relationship that pose concerns about either safety and soundness or the adequacy
of protection afforded to consumers.
The FDIC's principal concern relating to third parties is that effective risk controls are
implemented. Examiners should assess the institution's risk management program for
third-party payday lending relationships. An assessment of third-party relationships should
include an evaluation of the bank's risk assessment and strategic planning, as well as the
bank's due diligence process for selecting a competent and qualified third party provider.
(Refer to the Subprime Lending Examination Procedures for additional detail on strategic
planning and due diligence.)
Examiners also·should ensure that arrangements with third parties are guided by written
contract and approved by the institution's board. At a minimum, the arrangement should:
• Describe the duties and responsibilities ofeach party, including the scope of the
arrangement, performance measures or benchmarks, and responsibilities for
providing and receiving information;
• Specify that the third party will comply with all applicable laws and regulations;
• Specify which party will provide consumer compliance related disclosures;
• Authorize the institution to monitor the third party and periodically review and verify
that the third party and its representatives are complying with its agreement with the
institution;
• Authorize the institution and the appropriate banking agency to have access to such
records of the third party and conduct onsite transaction testing and operational
reviews at third party locations as necessary or appropriate to evaluate such
compliance;
• Require the third party to indemnify the institution for potential liability resulting from
action of the third party with regard to the payday lending program; and
• Address customer complaints, including any responsibility for third-party forwarding
and responding to such complaints.
Examiners also should ensure that management sufficiently monitors the third party with
respect to its activities and performance. Management should dedicate sufficient staff with
the necessary expertise to oversee the third party. The bank's oversight program should
monitor the third party's financial condition, its controls, and the quality of its service and
support, including its resolution of consumer complaints if handled by the third party.
Oversight programs should be documented sufficiently to facilitate the monitoring and
management of the risks associated with third-party relationships.
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Safety and Soundness Issues
Concentrations
Given the risks inherent in payday lending, concentrations of credit in this line of business
pose a significant safety and soundness concern. In the context of these guidelines, a
concentration would be defined as a volume of payday loans totaling 25 percent or more
of a bank's Tier 1 capital. Where concentrations of payday lending are noted, bank
management should be criticized for a failure to diversify risks. Examiners will work with
institutions on a case-by-case basis to determine appropriate supervisory actions
necessary to address concentrations. Such action may include directing the institution to
reduce its loans to an appropriate level, raise additional capital, or submit a plan to
achieve compliance.
Capital Adequacy
The FDIC's minimum capital requirements generally apply to portfolios that exhibit
substantially lower risk profiles and that are subject to more stringent underwriting
procedures than exist in payday lending programs. Therefore, minimum capital
requirements are not sufficient to offset the risks associated with payday lending.
As noted in the 2001 Subprime Guidance, examiners should reasonably expect, as a
starting point, that an institution would hold capital against subprime portfolios in an
amount that is one and a half to three times greater than what is appropriate for non-
subprime assets of a similar type. However, payday lending is among the highest risk
subsets of subprime lending, and significantly higher levels of capital than the starting
point should be required.
The 2001 Subprime Guidance indicates that institutions that underwrite higher risk
subprime pools, such as payday loans, need significantly higher levels of capital, perhaps
as high as 100% of the loans outstanding (dollar-for-dollar capital), depending on the level
and volatility of risk. Risks to consider when· determining capital requirements include the
unsecured nature of the credit, the relative levels of risk of default, loss in the event of
default, and the level <;>f classified assets. Examiners should also consider the degree of
legal or reputational risk associated with the payday business line, especially as it relates
to third-party agreements.
Because of the higher inherent risk levels and the increased impact that payday lending
portfolios may have on an institution's overall capital, examiners should document and
reference each institution's capital evaluation in their comments and conclusions regarding
capital adequacy. (Refer to the 2001 Subprime Guidance for further information on capital
expectations.)
Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) Adequacy
As with other segments of an institution's loan portfolio, examiners should ensure that
institutions maintain an ALLL that is adequate to absorb estimated credit losses within the
payday loan portfolio. Consistent with the Interagency Policy Statement on Allowance for
Loan and Lease Losses Methodologies and Documentation for Banks and Savings
Associations (Interagency Policy Statement on ALLL),§ the term "estimated credit losses"
means an estimate of the current amount of loans that is not likely to be collected; that is,
net charge-ofts that are likely to be realized in a segment of the loan portfolio given the
facts and circumstances as of the evaluation date. Although the contractual term of each
payday loan may be short, institutions' methodologies for estimating credit losses on these
loans should take into account the fact that many payday loans remain continuously
outstanding for longer periods because of renewals and rallovers. In addition, institutions
should evaluate the collectibility of accrued fees and finance charges on payday loans and
employ appropriate methods to ensure that income is accurately measured.
Examiners should ensure that institutions engaged in payday lending have methodologies
and analyses in place that demonstrate and document that the level of the ALLL for
payday loans is appropriate. The application of historical loss rates to the payday loan
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portfolio, adjusted for the current environmental factors, is one way to determine theALLL
needed for these loans. Environmental factors include levels of and trends in
delinquencies and charge-ofts, trends in loan volume, effects of changes in risk selection
and underwriting standards and in account management practices, and current economic
conditions. For institutions that do not have loss experience of their own, it may be
appropriate to reference the payday loan loss experience of other institutions with payday
loan portfolios with similar attributes. Other methods, such as loss estimation models, are
acceptable if they estimate losses in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. Examiners should review documentation to ensure that institutions loss
estimates and allowance methodologies are consistent with the Interagency Policy
Statement on ALLL.
Classification Guidelines
The Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy (Retail
Classification Policy)? establishes general classification thresholds for consumer loans
based on delinquency, but also grants examiners the discretion to classify individual retail
loans that exhibit signs of credit weakness regardless of delinquency status. An examiner
also may classify retail portfolios, or segments thereof, where underwriting standards are
weak and present unreasonable credit risk, and may criticize account management
practices that are deficient.
Most payday loans have well-defined weaknesses that jeopardize the liquidation of the
debt. Weaknesses include limited or no analysis of repayment capacity and the unsecured
nature of the credit. In addition, payday loan portfolios are characterized by a marked
proportion of obligors whose paying capacity is questionable. As a result of these
weaknesses, payday loan portfolios should be classified Substandard.
Furthermore, payday loans that have been outstanding for extended periods of time
evidence a high risk of loss. While such loans may have some recovery value, it is not
practical or desirable to defer writing off these essentially worthless assets. Payday loans
that are outstanding for greater than 60 days from origination generally meet the definition
of Loss. In certain circumstances, earlier charge off may be appropriate (Le., the bank
does not renew beyond the first payday and the borrower is unable to pay, the bank closes
an account, etc.). The institution's policies regarding consecutive advances also should be
considered when determining Loss classifications. Where the economic substance of
consecutive advances is substantially similar to "rollovers" - without appropriate
intervening "cooling off" or waiting periods - examiners should treat these loans as
continuous advances and classify accordingly.
When classifying payday loans, examiners should reference the Retail Classification
Policy as the source document. Examiners would normally not classify loans for which the
institution has documented adequate paying capacity of the obligors and/or sufficient
collateral protection or credit enhancement.
Renewals/Rewrites
The Retail Classification Policy establishes guidelines for extensions, deferrals, renewals,
or rewrites of closed-end accounts. Despite the short-term nature of payday loans,
borrowers that request an extension, deferral, renewal, or rewrite should exhibit a renewed
willingness and ability to repay the loan. Ex;aminers should ensure that institutions adopt
and adhere to the Retail Classification Policy standards that control the use of extensions,
deferrals, renewals, or rewrites of payday loans. Under the Retail Classification Policy,
institutions' standards should:
• Limit the number and frequency of extensions, deferrals, renewals, and rewrites;
• Prohibit additional advances to finance unpaid interest and fees and simultaneous
loans to the same customer; and
• Ensure that comprehensive and effective risk management, reporting, and internal
controls are established and maintained.
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In addition to the above items, institutions should also:
• Establish appropriate "cooling off' or waiting periods between the time a payday
loan is repaid and another application is made;
• Establish the maximum number of loans per customer that are allowed within one
calendar year or other designated time period; and
• Provide that no more than one payday loan is outstanding with the bank at a time to
anyone borrower.
• Ensure that payday loans are not provided to customers who had payday loans
outstanding at any lender for a total of three months during the previous 12
months. When calculating the three-month period, institutions should consider the
customers' total use of payday loans at all lenders.
When a customer has used payday loans more than three months in the past 12 months,
institutions should offer the customer, or refer the customer to, an .alternative longer-term
credit product that more appropriately suits the customer's needs. Whether or not an
institution is able to provide a customer alternative credit products, an extension of a
payday loan is not appropriate under such circumstances.
Accrued Fees and Finance Charges--S
Examiners should ensure that institutions evaluate the collectibility of accrued fees and
finance charges on payday loans because a portion of accrued interest and fees is
generally not collectible. Although regulatory reporting instructions do not require payday
loans to be placed on nonaccrual based on delinquency status, institutions should employ
appropriate methods to ensure that income is accurately measured. Such methods may
include providing loss allowances for uncollectible fees and finance charges or placing
delinquent and impaired receivables on nonaccrual status. After a loan is placed on
nonaccrual status, subsequent fees and finance charges imposed on the borrower would
not be recognized in income and accrued~ but unpaid fees and finance charges normally
would be reversed from income.
Recovery Practices
After a loan is charged off, institutions must properly report any subsequent collections on
the 10an.Q-Typically, some or all of such collections are reported as recoveries to the ALLL.
In some instances, the total amount credited to the ALLL as recoveries on an individual
loan (which may have included principal, finance charges, and fees) may exceed the
amount previously charged off against the ALLL on that loan (which may have been
limited to principal). Such a practice understates an institution's net charge-off experience,
which is an important indicator of the credit quality and performance of an institution's
portfolio.
Consistent with regulatory reporting instructions and prevalent industry practice,
recoveries represent collections on amounts that were previously charged off against the
ALLL. Accordingly, institutions must ensure that the total amount credited to the ALLL as
recoveries on a loan (which may include amounts representing principal, finance charges,
and fees) is limited to the amount previously charged off against the ALLL on that loan.
Any amounts collected in excess of this limit should be recognized as income.
Compliance Issues
Payday lending raises many consumer protection issues and attracts a great deal of attention from
consumer advocates and other regulatory organizations, increasing the potential for litigation.
Regardless of whether state law characterizes these transactions as loans, they are considered
extensions of credit for purposes of federal consumer protection law. Laws and regulations to be closely
scrutinized when reviewing payday lending during consumer compliance examinations include:
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)I Part 345
Under interagency eRA regulations and interpretive guidance, a payday lending program
may adversely affect eRA performance. For example, evidence of discriminatory or other
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illegal credit practices are inconsistent with helping to meet community credit needs and
adversely affect an evaluation of a financial institution's performance. Examples of illegal
credit practices include, but are not limited to violations of: the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, concerning discouraging or discriminating against consumers on a prohibited basis;
the Truth in Lending Act, regarding disclosures and certain loan restrictions; and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, concerning unfair and deceptive acts or practices. Under
longstanding interagency regulatory guidance, only illegal credit practices adversely affect
eRA performance and may result in a lower CRA rating. As in all other aspects of the CRA
evaluation, FDIC examiners will continue to follow the CRA regulations and guidance
issued jointly by the federal banking agencies (FDIC, Federal Reserve, OTS and aCe)
and in effect at the time of an examination.
However, other questionable payday lending practices, while not specifically prohibited by
law, may be inconsistent with helping to meet the convenience and needs of the
community. For example, payday loans to individuals who do not have the ability to repay,
or that may result in repeated renewals or extensions and fee payments over a relatively
short span of weeks, do not help to meet credit needs in a responsive manner. A full
description of the payday lending program and such practices should be included in the
section of the CRA Public Performance Evaluation that describes the institution. This
section provides a description of the institution's profile, business strategy, and product
offerings inside and outside the assessment area(s). As with any public comment, public
comments regarding payday lending practices should be discussed.appropriately in a
financial institution's CRA Public Performance Evaluation, and included in the institution's
CRA Public File.
Truth in Lending Actl Regulation Z
TILA and Regulation Z:U} require banks engaged in consumer lending to ensure that
accurate disclosures are provided to customers. A bank that fails to disclose finance
charges and APRs accurately for payday loans - considering the small dollar tolerance for
inaccuracies - risks having to pay restitution to consumers, which in some instances could
be substantial. This risk remains even if the bank provides loans through a third-party
agreement.
TILA and Regulation Z also require banks to advertise their loan products in accordance
with their provisions. For example, advertisements that state specific credit terms may
state only those terms that actually are or will ·be arranged or offered by the creditor. If an
advertisement states a rate of finance charge, it must state the rate as an APR, using that
term. If the APR may be increased after the initial origination date, the advertisement must
so state. Additional disclosures also may be required in the advertisements.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act! Regulation B
Illegal discrimination may occur when a bank has both payday and other short-term
lending programs that feature substantially different interest rate or pricing structures.
Examiners should determine to whom the products are marketed, and how the rates or
fees for each program are set, and whether there is evidenc~ of potential discrimination.
Payday lending, like other forms of lending, is also susceptible to discriminatory practices
such as discouraging applications, requesting information or evaluating applications on a
prohibited basis. If the lender requires that a borrower have income from a job, and does
not consider income from other sources such as social security or veterans benefits, then
it is illegally discriminating against applicants whose income derives from public
assistance.
ECOA and Regulation B limit the type of information that may be requested of applicants
during an application for credit. A creditor may not refuse to grant an individual account to
a creditworthy applicant on the basis of sex, marital status or any other prohibited basis. A
state nonmember bank must ensure that its payday lending program complies with these
limitations.
ECOA and Regulation 8 require creditors to notify applicants of adverse actions taken in
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connection with an application for credit. Notices of adverse action taken must be provided
within specified time frames and in specified forms. State nonmember banks involved in
payday lending must ensure that such notices are given in an accurate and timely manner.
Fair Credit Reporting Act
A bank engaged directly or indirectly in payday lending is responsible for complying with
requirements to provide notice to a consumer when it declines an application for credit or
takes other adverse action based on certain information. If adverse action is taken based
on information received from a consumer reporting agency, the consumer must be notified
and provided the name and address of the consumer reporting agency. It is important to
note that information in "bad check lists" or databases that track outstanding payday loans
are considered to be consumer reports, and therefore the companies that provide such a
tracking service (such as Teletrack) are consumer reporting agencies. If adverse action is
taken based on information received from a third party that is not a consumer reporting
agency, the adverse action notice must direct the consumer to the bank, and not any third
party, for details regarding the character of the information (even where the payday loan
applications are received by the bank through a third, party such as a payday lend~r).
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA)I Regulation E and Truth in Savings Act (TISA)
Payday lending arrangements that involve the opening of a deposit account or the
establishment of "electronic fund transfers" must meet the disclosure and other
requirements of both the EFTA and TISA. Examples include providing a device to access
funds from a deposit account, or depositing a payday loan directly in a borrower's account
and debiting the subsequent payment.
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
If a bank engages in payday lending through an arrangement with a third party, and the
third party collects defaulted debts on behalf of the bank, the third party may become
subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. Although the bank itself may not be subject to the
FDCPA, it may face reputational risk if the third party violates the FDCPA in collecting the
bank's loans. A compliance program should provide for monitoring of collection activities,
including collection calls, of any third party on behalf of the bank.
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) declares that unfair or deceptive trade
practices are illegal. (See 15 USC § 45(a)). State nonmember banks and their institution-
affiliated parties will be cited for violations of section 5 of the FTC Act and the FDIC will
take appropriate action pursuant to its authority under section 8 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act when unfair or deceptive trade practices are discovered. Examiners should
focus attention on marketing programs for payday loans, and also be alert for potentially
abusive collection practices. Of particular concern is the practice of threatening, and in
some cases pursuing, criminal bad check charges, despite the payment of offsetting fees
by the consumer and the lender's knowledge at the time the check was accepted that
there were insufficient funds to pay it. If evidence of unfair or deceptive trade practices is
found, examiners should consult with the regional office and the region should consult with
Washington.
Where entities other than banks engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices, the FDIC
will coordinate its response with the Federal Trade Commission. (Refer to FIL-57-2002,
dated May 30,2002, for further information.)
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information/Part 332
Payday lending arrangements are subject to the same information sharing restrictions and
requirements as any other type of financial service or product provided by FDIC-
supervised.institutions to consumers. The bank should ensure consumers are
appropriately provided with a copy of the bank's initial, revised, and annual notices, as
applicable. In addition, the bank should ensure that a consumer's nonpublic personal
information is used and disclosed only as permitted and described in the privacy notice.
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Safeguarding Customer Information
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information, Appendix B to Part 364, require banks to implement a written information
security program to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer
information. The guidelines require banks to assess reasonably foreseeable internal and
external threats that could result in unauthorized uses or destruction of customer
information systems, and to design·a security program to control those risks. A bank's
board of directors should approve the written program and oversee its implementation.
Examiners should ensure the bank has appropriately addressed the security risks in
payday lending arrangements to safeguard customer information, whether in paper,
electronic, or other form, maintained by or on behalf of the bank.
1 See January 31, 2001, interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (FIL 9-2001)
(2001 Subprime Guidance); January 24,2000, Subprime Lending Examination Procedures (RD Memo
No. 00-004); March 4, 1999, Interagency Guidelines on Subprime Lending (FIL-20-99); and May 2,
1997, Risks Associated with Subprime Lending (FIL-44-97).
2 The typical charge is $15 to $20 per $100 advanced for a two-week period, resulting in an APR of
nearly 400%.
3 Payday lenders generally use the term "rollover." Other terms used may include extension, deferral,
renewal or rewrite.
4 Insured depository institutions also may fund payday lenders through a lending relationship. This
guidance does not address such situations.
5 See section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (enacted as section 521 of
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary C<;>ntrol Act of 1980 [the "DIDMCAtf]). The
authority of national banks to export favorable interest rates on loans to borrowers residing in other
states was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First
Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), in the context of section 85 of the National Bank Act. That
authority was subsequently extended to credit unions, savings associations, state nonmember banks
and insured foreign branches in the DIDMCA to provide competitive lending equality with national
banks.
6 See July 25,2001, Interagency Policy Statement on Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL)
Methodologies and Documentation for Banks and Savings Associations (FIL 63-2001).
7 See June 29, 2000, Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account Management Policy (FIL -40-
2000).
8 AICPA Statement of Position 01-6 Accounting by Certain Entities (Including Entities with Trade
Receivables) That Lend to or Finance the Activities of Others, provides guidance for accounting for
delinquency fees.
9 AICPA Statement of Position 01-6 provides recognition guidance for recoveries of previously charged-
off loans.
10 Federal Reserve Board staff considered payday loans in the context of Regulation Z, and found that
they are a form of credit under the Truth in Lending Act. 12 CFR Part 226, Supplement I, Subpart A,
Section 226.2(a)(14), note 2. If the fees are finance charges, as they usually will be, see 12 CFR Part
226.4, they must be disclosed as an APR, regardless of how the fee is characterized under state law.
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Press Releases
FDIC to Hold Public Hearing on Preemption Petition
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PR-25-2005 (3-16-2005)
Media Contact:
David Barr (202-898-6992)
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has scheduled a public hearing on May 24, 2005, on
a preemption petition from the Financial Services Roundtable (Roundtable), a trade association for
integrated financial services companies.
The Roundtable has asked the FDIC to issue a rule that would provide that a state bank's home state
law governs its interstate activities and those of its subsidiaries to the same extent that the National
Bank Act governs a national bank's interstate business. In its request, the Roundtable indicated its belief
that such a rule would create parity between state-chartered banks and national banks with interstate
activities and operations.
The FDIC is holding the hearing to obtain the public's views on the petition. The FDIC believes that
public participation will provide valuable insight into the issues presented by the petition and will assist
the FDIC in responding to the rulemaking request. The FDIC is interested in obtaining the views of the
financial institutions industry, consumer groups, state financial institution supervisors, other state
authorities, industry trade groups and the general public on the legal, policy and other issues raised in
the petition.
The hearing will be held on Tuesday, May 24, 2005, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in the FDIC's Board
Room. Anyone interested in making an oral presentation at the hearing must deliver a written request to
the FDIC no later than 5:00 p.m., Monday, May 9 and deliver a copy of the written statement and a two-
page (or shorter) summary to the FDIC no later than 5:00 p.m., Monday, May 16. Each participant will
be limited to a 15-minute oral presentation at the hearing. There is no limit on the length of a
participant's written statement. Opportunities to make an oral presentation at the hearing are limited; not
all requests may be granted.
Anyone interested in sUbmitting a written statement without making an oral presentation at the hearing
may do so. All such statements must be received by the FDIC no later than 5:00 p.m., Monday, May 16.
Attendance at the hearing is not required in order to submit a written statement.
Requests to make oral presentations and written statements can be delivered to the FDIC bye-mail,
mail or hand-delivery - e-mail: ~Qrrlm~llts@fdic.gQ.Y; mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, 550
17th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20429; or hand-delivery: Guard station at the rear of 550 17th Street
(located on F Street, N.W.) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
A copy of the Roundtable's petition ·and the Federal Register notice about the hearing and questions the
FDIC has about the rulemaking request are available on the FDIC's Web site,
hHp;jfw.Y!Y'!..[qi.G..gQYlmg!J1ClJi9.n§1[i!w:s/f~~~raJfR!9-P.Q'§_~J]tm!.
For more information about the hearing, please contact Valerie Best, Assistant Executive Secretary, at
202-898-3812.
###
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Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the
nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 8,975 banks and savings
associations and it promoted the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring
and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax dollars - insured
institutions. fund its operations.
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet via the World Wide Web at
~w.Jq.tG~QY and may also be obtained through the FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or
202-416-6940.
Last Updated 03/16/2005
tlQ.m_e C-O.n1a.c.t.J,Js. S.e.ar~.h J:leJR SileM~pEQr.m~
Fre_~QQmJ2tlnforrn~tiol1.AG! Website Pqlicies. fir~tGQ~gQ'.{
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defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), because the
majority of applicants (grain industry)
that apply for these official services, and
are subjected to GIPSA supervision fees,
do not meet the requirements for small
entities. This rule will affect entities
engaged in shipping grain to and from
points within the United States and
exporting grain from the United States.
GIPSA estimates there are
approximately 9,500 off-farm storage
facilities and 18 export elevators in the
United States that could receive services
from delegated States or designated
agencies. Official services are available
from 7 delegated States and 49
designated agencies. For clarification,
any and all grain that is exported from
the U.S. export port locations must, as
required by the USGSA, be inspected
and/or weighed. These services are
either performed by GIPSA or delegated
States. Further, some grain exported
from interior locations may also require
inspection and/or weighing services
unless the services are waived as
provided in section 800.18 of the
regulations. These services are provided
by designated agencies. The USGSA
does not require inspection or weighing
services for grain marketed within the
U.S. Consequently, these services are
permissive and may be performed by
official agencies. The USGSA (7 U.S.C.
71 et seq.) authorizes GIPSA to provide
supervision of official grain inspection
and weighing services, and to charge
and collect reasonable fees for
performing these services. The fees
collected are to cover, as nearly as
practicable, GIPSA's costs for
performing these services, including
related administrative and supervisory
costs.
GIPSA realizes that any increase in
supervision fees will be charged by
official agencies to the users (grain
industry) of the official grain inspection
and weighing system. Although, the
overall effect of this proposal will be
passed on to the users of official grain
inspection and weighing services,
mostly large corporations, David R.
Shipman, Deputy Administrator,
GIPSA, has determined that this
proposed rule will not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small
entities as defined in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 800
Administrative practice and
procedure, Grain.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, 7 CFR part 800 is proposed to
be amended as follows:
PART 80o-GENERAL REGULATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 800
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Public Law 94-582, 90 Stat.
2867, as amended (7 U.S.C. 71 et seq.)
2. In §800.71(a), Schedule C is
amended by removing Table 1 and
adding introductory text in its place as
set forth below, and by redesignating
Table 2 as Table 1.
§ 800.71 Fees assessed by the Service.
(a) * * *
Schedule C-Fees for FGIS Supervision
of Official Inspection and Weighing
Services Performed by Delegated States
and/or Designated Agencies in the
United States.
The supervision fee is charged at
$0.011 per metric ton inspected and/or
weighed.
*
David R. Shipman,
Acting Administrator, Grain Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration.
[FR Doc. 05-5501 Filed 3-18-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 341O-EN-P
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Chapter III
Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt
Certain State Laws
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of public hearing.
SUMMARY: This document announces a
public hearing on a petition for
rulemaking ("Petition") that would
preempt certain state laws. Generally,
the Petition asks the FDIC to issue a rule
that preempts the application of certain
state laws to the interstate operations
and activities of state banks. The stated
purpose of the requested rulemaking is
to establish parity between state-
chartered banks and national banks in
interstate activities and operations. A
copy of the Petition is attached to this
document. The FDIC has scheduled a
hearing to obtain the public's ·views on
the issues presented by the Petition.
This document sets forth the date, time,
location, and other details of the
hearing; it also summarizes the Petition
and highlights several issues that
participants in the hearing may wish to
address. Opportunities to make an oral
presentation at the hearing are limited,
and not all requests may be granted.
Attendance at the hearing is not
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required in order to submit a written
statement.
OATES: The hearing will be held on
Tuesday, May 24, 2005, from 8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Anyone wishing to make an
oral presentation at the hearing must (i)
deliver a written request to the
Executive Secretary of the FDIC, no later
than 5 p.m. on Monday, May 9, 2005;
and (ii) deliver a copy of his or her
written statement plus a two-page (or
less) summary of the statement to the
Executive Secretary no later than 5 p.m.
on Monday, May 16, 2005. All limited-
appearance statements submitted in lieu
of an oral p~esentationmust be received
by the Executive Secretary no later than
5 p.m. on Monday, May 16, 2005.
ADDRESSES: The hearing will be held in
the Board room at the FDIC's
headquarters, 550 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC.
You may submit a written request to
make an oral presentation at the
hearing, a copy of the written statement
you will present, and the two-page (or
less) summary, or a limited-appearance
statement by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web site: http://
ltvww.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.html. Click on Submit
Comment.
• E-mail: commentS@FDIC.gov.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments/Legal
ESS, Room 3060, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Str~et,
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivered/Courier: The guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street), on
business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: All statements
and summaries may be inspected and
photocopied in the FDIC Public
Information Center, Room 100, 801 17th
Street, NW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on business days.
• Internet Posting: Statements and
summaries received will be posted
without change to http://www.FDIC.gov/
regulalions/Ia ws/federal/propose.html,
including any personal information
provided. .
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions regarding the conduct of the
hearing: contact Valerie Best, Assistant
Executive Secretary, (202) 898-3812; for
questions regard ing substantive issues:
contact Robert C. Fick, Counsel, (202)
898-8962; or Joseph A. DiNuzzo.
Counsel, (202) 898-7349, Legal
Division, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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I. Overview of the Rulemaking Petition
The FinancialServices Roundtable, a
trade association for integrated financial
services companies ("Petitioner"),
submitted the Petition to the FDIC. The
Petition asks that the FDIC adopt rules
concerning the interstate activities of
insured state banks and their
subsidiaries that are intended to provide
parity between state banks and national
banks. Generally, the requested rules
would provide that a state bank's home
state law governs the interstate activities
of state banks and their subsidiaries to
the same extent that the National Bank
Act ("NBA") governs a national bank's
interstate activities. A copy of the entire
Petition is appended to this notice. The
Petitioner requests that the FDIC adopt
rules with respect to the following areas:
• The law applicable to activities
conducted in a host state by a state bank
that has an interstate branch in that
state,
• The law applicable to activities
conducted by a state bank in a state in
which the state bank does not have a
branch,
• The law applicable to activities
conducted by an operating subsidiary
("OpSub")1 of a state bank,
• The scope and application of
section l04(d) of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act ("GLBA") regarding
preemption of certain state laws or
actions that impose a requirement,
limitation, or burden on a depository
institution, or its affiliate, and
• Implementation of section 27 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDI
Act") (which permits state depository
institutions to export interest rates).
The Petitioner argues that it is both
necessary and timely for the FDIC to
adopt rules that clarify the ability of
state banks operating interstate to be
governed by a single framework of law
and regulation to the same extent as
national banks. According to the
Petitioner, over the last decade the
federal charters for national banks and
federal thrifts have been correctly
interpreted by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(HOTS"), with the repeated support of
the federal courts, to provide broad
federal preemption of state laws that
might otherwise apply to the activities
or operations of federally-chartered
banking institutions within a state. The
result, it asserts, is that national banks
and federal savings associations now
can do business across the country
1 Generally. an operating subsidiary is subsidiary
of a hank or savings association that only engages
in activities that its parent bank or savings
association may engage in.
under a single set of federal rules. In
contrast, the Petitioner believes that
there is widespread confusion and
uncertainty with respect to the law
applicable to state banks engaged in
interstate banking activities.
Furthermore, it argues, this uncertainty
produces the potential for litigation and
enforcement actions, deters state banks
from pursuing profitable business
opportl.;lnities, and causes substantial
expense to a state bank that decides to
convert to a national bank in order to
gain greater legal certainty. Finally, the
Petitioner asserts that the FDIC has the
authority, tools and responsibility to
correct this imbalance.
II. The FDIC's Approach to the Petition
The FDIC will hold a hearing to
obtain the public's views on the
Petition. The FDIC believes that public
participation will provide valuable
insight into the issues presented by the
Petition and will assist the FDIC in
deciding how to respond to the
rulemaking request. The FDIC's options
include: (i) Denying the entire Petition,
(ii) granting the entire Petition, (iii)
granting the Petition in part and
denying the Petition in part, and (iv)
seeking further clarification of the
Petition from the Petitioner. If the FDIC
grants all or part of the Petition, a notice
of proposed rulemaking will be
published in the Federal Register, and
an additional opportunity for public
comment will be provided. The FDIC is
interested in obtaining the views of the
financial institutions industry,
consumer groups, state financial
institution supervisors, other state
authorities, industry trade groups and
the general public on the legal, policy,
and other issues raised in the Petition.
III. Issues Presented by the Petition
Although the FDIC is particularly
interested in obtaining the public's
views on the general and specific issues
highlighted in this notice, we also are
interested in the public's views on any
other legal or policy issues implicated
by the Petition. As a result, the FDIC
encourages interested parties to address
not only the highlighted issues, but also
all other issues raised by the Petition.
A. General Issues
With respect to the general issues
raised by the Petition, the FDIC requests
the public's views on the following:
G-1. Is a preemptive rule in these
areas necessary to preserve the dual
banking system?
G-2. What would be the impact on
consumers if a preemptive rule were
issued in these areas?
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G-3. What are the implications of
rulemaking in these areas for state
banking regulation?
G-4. Would the measures urged by
Petitioner achieve competitive balance
between federally-chartered and state;..
chartered financial institutions as
advocated by the Petitioner?
G-5. Are there alternative
mechanisms available that would
achieve the policy goals advocated by
the Petitioner? '
G-6. Should the issue of competitive
parity in interstate operations be left to
Congress?
G-7. If the FDIC determines that it has
the legal authority to proceed with a
preemptive rule, are there reasons why
the FDIC should decline to do so? If so,
what are they?
G-8. What would be the negative
impact, if any, of the FDIC adopting a
preemptive regulation as suggested by
the Petitioner?
G-9. Do the states have a legitimate
interest in how banks conduct business
within their borders that would be
undermined by the Petitioner's request?
G-10. Can state banks be expected to
benefit if the FDIC were to preempt state
law in the area of interstate banking
operations? If so, how?
G-ll.What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that Congress intended to provide the
comprehensive parity envisioned by the
Petition?
G-12. Is there a need for clarification
on what law applies to the interstate
operations of state banks?
B. Specific Issues
Each of the five subject are~s
addressed by the Petition is described in
summary fashion below. However, you
are encouraged to read the Petition itself
(which is attached) to gain complete
details on the requested action. Each of
the five subject areas is followed
immediately by specific issues upon
which the FDIC requests public input.
1. The law Applicable to Activities
Conducted in a Host State by a State
Bank That has an Interstate Branch in
That State
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
(Riegle-Neal I") 2 generally established a
federal framework for interstate
branching for both state banks and
national banks. Both Riegle-Neal I and
amendments made to Riegle-Neal I by
the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of
2 Public Law 103-328. 108 Stat. 2338 (t994)
(codified to various sections of title 12 of the United
States Code).
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1997 ("Riegle-Neal 11")3 contain express
preemption provisions regarding which
host state laws apply to a branch of an
out-of-state bank.
The Petitioner asserts that Congress
enacted Riegle-Neal II to provide
competitive equality between state
banks and national banks with respect
to interstate banking. Riegle-Neal II
revised the language of section 24(j)(1)
of the FDI Act to read as follows:
The laws of the host state, including laws
regarding community reinvestment,
consumer protection, fair lending, and
establishment of intrastate branches, shall
apply to any branch in the host state of an
out-of-state state bank to the same extent as
such state laws apply to a branch in the host
state of an out-of-state national bank. To the
extent host state law is inapplicable to a
branch of an out-of-state state bank in such
host state pursuant to the preceding sentence,
home state law shall apply to such branch.
Riegle-Neal II, therefore, provides that
host state law does not apply to a
branch in the host state of an out-of-
state, state bank to the same extent that
host state law does not apply to a
branch in the host state of an out-of-
state national bank. When host state law
does not apply, Riegle-Neal II provides
that home state law applies. The
Petition raises the issue of what law
applies to activities of an out-of-state,
state bank in a host state in which the
bank maintains a branch, when those
activities are conducted by the bank
directly, or through an OpSub, or by
some means other than the branch. The
Petitioner argues that the FDIC should
issue a rule that provides that home
state law applies uniformly to all
business of the bank in that State,
whether by the bank directly, through
the host state branch, through a loan
production office ("LPO"), or through
some other non-branch office, or
through an OpSub.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issues:
1-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that Congress granted the FDIC the
authority to make home state law apply
to all business conducted by a state
bank in a host state in which the bank
has a branch, whether conducted
directly, or through a branch, a loan
production office (an LPO), other office,
orOpSub?
1-2. If the FDIC were to adopt a rule
as requested, who should determine for
each state whether the NBA and OCC
rules would preempt host state law for
national banks?
J Public Law 105-24 (1997).
1-3. If the FDIC were to adopt a rule
as requested, how should the applicable
home state law be determined when the
home state statute law is silent?
2. The law Applicable to Activities
conducted by a State Bank in a State in
Which the State Bank Does Not Have. a
Branch
The Petitioner requests that the FDIC
adopt rules to provide that the home
state law of a state bank will apply to
its activities in other states (i.e., any
state other than its home state) to the
same extent as the NBA applies to the
activities of national banks. The
Petitioner cites Riegle-Neal II and
section 104(d) of GLBA as an indication
of Congressional intent on this issue. In
addition, Petitioner refers to principles
of administrative law that permit an
agency to reasonably fill in statutory
gaps and address the application of
existing laws to new developments.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issue(s):
2-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an out-of-state, state bank should be
able to operate in a state where the bank
has no branches under the bank's home
state law to the same extent that an out-
of-state national bank can operate under
the NBA and DCC rules?
3. The law Applicable to Activities
Conducted by an Operating Subsidiary
("OpSub") of a State Bank
The Petitioner requests that FDIC
adopt a rule that expressly provides that
an DpSub of a state bank will be
governed by the same law that is
applicable to its parent state bank,
except when state law applies to an
OpSub of a national bank.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issues:
3-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an OpSub should be able to operate
under the bank's home state law to the
same extent that an OpSub of a national
bank can operate under the NBA and
DCC rules?
3-2. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an DpSub should be deemed
equivalent to a division of the bank
itself?
3-3. If the FDIC were to adopt the
requested rule, what requirements
should the subsidiary meet in order to
be considered an OpSub, e.g., should it
be wholly-owned, majority-owned, or
just controlled by the bank?
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4. The Scope and Application of Section
104(d) of GLBA Regarding Preemption
of Certain State Laws or Actions That
Impose a Requirement, Limitation, or
Burden on a Depository Institution, or
Its Affiliate
Section 104 of the GLBA ("section
104") 4 is titled "Operation of State
Law." It expresses the intent of Congress
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
is entitled "An Act to express the intent
of Congress with reference to the
regulation of the business of
insurance" s "remains the law of the
United States." (Section 104(a)). In
addition, it: (a) Addresses insurance
licensing requirements for persons
engaged in the business of insurance; (b)
addresses the extent to which a state
may regulate affiliations between
depository institutions and insurers; (c)
addresses the extent to which states may
impose restrictions on insurance sales
by depository institutions; (d) indicates
that states may not prevent or restrict
depository institutions or their affiliates
from engaging in activities authorized or
permitted under GLBA; 6 and (e) limits
the ability of states to discriminate
between depository institutions engaged
in insurance activities authorized or
permitted by GLBA or other federal law
and others engaged in such activities.
The Petitioner contends that section
104(d) expressly preempts state laws or
actions that discriminate against
"depository institutions" or their
affiliates. It urges the FDIC to exercise
its authority under sections 8 and 9 of
the FDI Act to adopt rules to make it
clear that state laws, rules, or actions are
preempted under section 104(d) when
they provide for disparate treatment
between an out-of-state national bank or
in-state bank and an out-of-state state
bank, or its affiliates. The Petitioner
suggests, alternatively, that the FDIC
adopt a statement of policy addressing
the scope and effect of section 104(d) for
state banks. The Petitioner asserts that
although state banks subject to FDIC
regulation are the intended beneficiaries
of this express preemption, the
preemption is not being utilized by state
banks because the statute is relatively
new and complex and the relevant
provisions have not be construed by any
415 U.S.c. 6701.
s 15 U.S.c. 1011 et seq. Among other things. the
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "the business
of insurance. and every person engaged therein,
should be subject to the laws of the several states
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business." (15 U.S.C. 10121a)) and that "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance
• • • unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance." (15 U.S.C. 1012(b)).
6 See section 104(d)(I).
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agency or court. It states that rules are
needed in view of the complexity and
general lack of understanding of section
104(d).
The Petitioner argues that the breadth
of section 104(d) preemption and its
purpose to reach state law or actions
that would provide disparate treatment
for any type of depository institution
(including an out-of-state state bank) in
relation to its competitors is evident
from section 104(d)'s language.
The Petitioner has described certain
actions that if taken by the FDIC will, in
its opinion, clarify by regulation or
policy statement that state laws, rules,
or actions cannot differentiate between
in-state and out-of-state banks. The
Petitioner specifically requests that the
FDIC issue a rule or policy statement: (a)
Stating that the section 104 preemption
applies to insured banks and their
subsidiaries, affiliates and associated
persons; (b) defining a Hperson" to
include a depository institution,
subsidiary, affiliate, and associated
person; (c) stating that the word restrict"
in section 104(d)(1) includes any state
law, rule, interpretation or action that
calls for any limitation or requirement;
(d) addressing each of the four non-
discrimination provisions in section
104(d)(4) to confirm that each is a
distinct test and that any state law or
action that fails one test is preempted;
(e) addressing the scope of "actions" in
section l04(d)(4) to include all types of
formal or informal administrative
actions by any state or local
governmental entity, including
decisions with respect to civii
enforcement of state rules; (f) addressing
section 104(d)(4)(D)(i) in light of the
terms used in subparagraph (ii) to
specify that paragraph (i) addresses
treatment under state law of an out of
state, state bank which would be an
Hinsured depository institution," that is
different from the treatment of any
national bank or in-state state bank
which would be an Hother person
engaged in the same activity" under
these provisions; and (g) defining "state
law" to include laws, ordinances and
rules of political subdivisions, including
any counties and municipalities.
The FDIC requests the public'S views
on the following specific issues:
4-1. GLBA is a not codified as part of
the FDI Act, is silent as to rulemaking
and applies to all insured depository
institutions. What barriers, if any,
would there be to the FDIC adopting a
regulation or policy statement
implementing section 104?
4-2. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that section 104 preempts state law in
the manner described by Petitioner?
4-3. What barriers, if any, would
there be to the FDIC adopting a
regulation or policy statement
applicable to all insured depository
institutions based on section 104?
4-4. Is it reasonable for the FDIC to
read section 104 as having some
application to interstate banking
operations in general?
4-5. The areas of section 104
Petitioner identifies for rulemaking are
very discrete but taken'together may
have a broad impact. What are the
overall implications (favorable as well
as negative) of adopting the section 104
regulatory guidance suggested by the
Petitioner?
5. Implementation of Section 27 of the
FDI Act (Which Permits State
Depository Institutions To Export
Interest Rates)
Section 27 of the FDI Act (Usection
27") 7 establishes the maximum amount
of interest that a state-chartered insured
depository institu tion or insured branch
of a foreign bank (collectively, "state
bank") may charge its borrowers.
Generally, the statute authorizes a state
bank to charge interest at the greater of
the rate allowed by the laws of the State,
territory, or district where the bank is
located or not more than one percentage
point above the discount rate on gO-day
commercial paper at the Federal Reserve
bank for the Federal Reserve district
where the bank is located.8 The statute
also specifies that state banks may
charge the rates authorized by the
statute "notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this
section." 9 As is the case under section
85 of the NBA for national banks,
section 27 allows state banks to charge
out-of-state borrowers interest at the
rates allowed by the law of the State
where the bank is located, even if such
rates exceed the usury limitations
imposed by the borrower's state of
residence. 10
Section 27 contains two subsections
which are patterned after provisions in
the NBA. Subsection (a) corresponds to
section 85 of the NBA ("section 85 "),11
which addresses the interest rates that
7 12 U.S.C. 1831d.
8 Section 27 was added to the FDI Act by section
521 of t~e Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA").
9 Section 27(a) of the FDI Act; see generally
Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (lst CiL). celt. denied,
506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
l°This ability to charge interest at the rates
allowed by the state where the bank is located is
often referred to as the "exportation doctrine...
11 12 U.S.C. 85.
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national banks are authorized to charge
their borrowers. Subsection (b)
corresponds to section 86 of the NBA
("section 86"),12 which addresses
penalties and limitations of actions for
charging interest in excess of the
amount allowable under section 85.
Because section 27 was enacted to
provide state banks "competitive
equality" with national banks and is
patterned after the corresponding
provisions in the NBA, the FDIC and the
courts have construed section 27 in
virtually the same manner as the acc
and the courts have construed sections
85 and 86. For example, in General
Counsel's Opinion No. 10 ("GC Opinion
No. 10"),13 the FDIC's General Counsel
concluded that section 27 and section
85 should be construed in pari materia
and that the term interest, for purposes
of section 27, includes those charges
that a national bank is authorized to
charge under section 85 and the acc's
interpretive rule defining interest for
purposes of section 85.14 In General
Counsel's Opinion No. 11 ("GC Opinion
No. 11 tt) 15 the FDIC's General Counsel
interpreted section 27 as applying to
state banks operating interstate branches
in a manner similar to the OCC's
interpretation of the application of
section 85 to national banks operating
interstate branches. In GC Opinion No.
11 it was observed that, like an
interstate national bank under section
85, a state bank is "located" in the state
where it is chartered and in each state
where it has a branch. GC Opinion No.
11 also addressed the criteria for
determining when the state laws
imposed by the bank's home state or
host state should govern the amount of
interest authorized on a loan
transaction. In addition, the FDIC has
interpreted section 27 as providing state
banks: (a) The same "most favored
lender" status under section 27 as
national banks are provided under
section 85; (b) the same right to export
interest authorized by the state laws of
the state where the bank is located to
out-of-state borrowers; and (cl the same
exclusive remedy for usury violations as
is provided national banks under
section 86.16
12 12 U.S.C. 86.
13 GC Opinion No. 10, 63 FR 19258 (Apr. 17.
1998).
14 12 CFR 7.4001(a).
15GC Opinion No. 11.63 FR 27282 (May 18.
1998).
16 FDIC Advisory Opinion No. 81-3. February 3.
1981, reprinted in (1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) en 81,006; FDIC Advisory
Opinion No. 81-7, March 17,1981. reprinted in
(1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) en 81,008; FDIC Advisory Opinion No. 02-06,
December 19, 2002. reprinted in Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) en 82-256.
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The Petitioner observes that the OCC
and OTS have adopted rules codifying
the scope of the relevant parallel
interest provisions 17 contained in their
respective statutes.18 Therefore, the
Petitioner requests that the FDIC adopt
parallel provisions by rule to allow state
banks to operate in a matching legal
framework under section 27.
Therefore, the FDIC requests the
public's views on the following specific
issues:
5-1. Should the FDIC adopt a parallel
rule implementing section 27 for state
banks similar to 12 CFR 7.4001 and 12
CFR560.110?
5-2. Should any other issues be
addressed by rulemaking to provide
state banks competitive equality with
national banks regarding section 27? For
example, 12 CFR 7.5009 addresses the
location under section 85 Qf national
banks operating exclusively through the
Internet. Is a similar rule needed for
state banks under section 27?
Under section 525 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act states may Hopt-out" of
coverage under section 27 at any time.19
The FDIC believes that Iowa, Puerto
Rico, and Wisconsin are the only
jurisdictions that have exercised this
authority and not rescinded it.
Therefore, the FDIC requests the
public's views on the following specific
issue:
5-3. What effect would the exercise of
the authority to opt-out of coverage
under section 27 have on the rule or
rules the Petitioner is requesting?
IV. Public Hearing
The FDIC will hold a hearing to
obtain the public's views on all issues
raised by the Petition. The hearing will
be held on Tuesday, May 24th, 2005
from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. in the Board
room at the FDIC's headquarters, 550
17th Street, NW., Washington, DC.
Hearing Officers designated by the FDIC
will preside over the hearing. The
hearing will be informal, and the rules
of evidence will not apply. However,
only the Hearing Officers may question
a participant during a presentation.
Each participant making an oral
presentation at the hearing will be
limited to 15 minutes. While oral
presentations are limited to 15 minutes,
17 12 CFR 7.4001; 12 CFR 560.110.
18 The relevant parallel interest provision for the
OTS is section 4(g) of the Home Owners Loan Act
(12 U.S.C. 1463(g)), which was derived from section
522ofDIDMCA.
19 Section 525 of DIDMCA, like section 528 that
provides lenders a choice of interest rates, is
contained in various notes in the United States
Code following the various sections that they affect.
See. e.g.. 12 U.S.C. 1831d (note).
there is no limit on the length of a
participant's written statement.
Anyone wishing to make an oral
presentation at the hearing must (i)
deliver a written request to the
Executive Secretary, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street,
NW., Washington, DC 20429 no later
than 5 p.m. on Monday, May 9th, 2005;
and (iil deliver a copy of his or her
written statement plus a two-page (or
less) summary to the Executive
Secretary no later than 5 p.m. on
Monday, May 16th, 2005. Anyone
wishing to submit a written statement of
his or her views without making an oral
presentation at the hearing may submit
a limited-appearance statement. All
limited-appearance statements must be
received by the Executive Secretary no
later than 5 p.m. on Monday, May 16th,
2005. Attendance at the hearing is not
required in order to submit a written
statement. Each request to make an oral
presentation and each participant's
statement must include the participant's
name, address, telephone number, e-
mail address, and, if applicable, the
name and address of the institution or
organization the participant represents.
Opportunities to make an oral
presentation at the hearing are limited,
and not all requests may be granted. The
FDIC will notify each person who has
submitted a request to make an oral
presentation at the hearing whether the
FDIC will be able to accommodate his
or her request. The notice for each
person whose request has been granted
will include the time scheduled for his
or her presentation and a tentative
agenda. Depending upon the number of
participants requesting an oral
presentation, participants may be
organized into panels of two or three to
accommodate as many participants as
possible.
The hearing will be transcribed. The
FDIC will provide attendees vvith any
auxiliary aids (e.g., sign language
interpretation) required for this meeting.
Those attendees needing such assistance
should call (202) 416-2089 (Voice); or
(202) 416-2007 (TTY), to make
necessary arrangements.
Dated in Washington DC, this 16th day of
March, 2005.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
Appendix: Petition for FDIC
Rulemaking Providing Interstate
Banking Parity for Insured State
Banks, by Letter From the Financial
Services Roundtable, 1001
Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Suite 500
South, Washington, DC 20004, Tel 202-
289-4322, Fax 202-628-2507, dated
March 4, 2005
March 4, 2005
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550
Seventeenth Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20429.
Re: Petition for FDIC Rulemaking
Providing Interstate Banking Parity
for Insured State Banks
Dear Mr. Feldman: The Financial
Services Roundtable 1 ("Roundtable")
respectfully petitions the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
to promulgate rules under the Federal
Deposit Insurance ("FDI") Act and
Section 104(d) of the Gramm-Leach-
BHley ("GLB") Act, 15 V.S.C.6701, to
provide parity for state banks and
national banks. Specifically, the
proposed rule would provide that a state
bank's home state law governs the
interstate activities of insured state
banks and their subsidiaries to the same
extent that the National Bank Act
governs a national bank's interstate
business.
The FDIC has ample authority to take
each of the requested actions pursuant
to the broad delegation of authority in
the FDI Act. It is now clear that FDIC
action is required to achieve the result
that Congress sought in the 1997
amendment to the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994 ("Riegle-Neal I"), Pub. L. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 238. See Riegle-Neal
Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-
24 (1997) (amending 12 U.S.C. 1831a(j))
("Riegle-Neal II"). The requested
rulemaking would implement the
historic decision of Congress in 1997 to
provide competitive equality for state
banks and national banks in interstate
banking.
The Roundtable submits that it is both
necessary and timely for the FDIC to
adopt rules making clear the ability of
state banks operating interstate to be
1 The Financial Services Roundtable represents
100 of the largest integrated financial services
companies providing banking. insurance. and
investment products and services to the American
consumer. Roundtable member companies provide
fuel for America's economic accounting directly for
$18.3 trillion in managed assets, $678 billion in
revenue, and 2.1 million jobs.
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governed by a single framework of law
and regulation to the same extent as
national banks. Such an action would
ensure the continued vitality of the dual
banking system. Accordingly, the
Roundtable requests that the FDIC
promulgate rules that:
1. Clarify that the governing law
applicable to activities conducted in a
host state by a state bank that has an
interstate branch in that state is its home
state law to the same extent that host
state law is preempted by the National
Bank Act. The FDIC should make clear
that "home" state law applies to an out-
of-state state bank in a "host" state to
the same extent as the National Bank
Act applies to an out-of-state national
bank, whether the·business of the bank
is conducted by the bank through the
host state branch, by or through an
operating subsidiary, or by any other
lawful means.
2. Clarify that the governing law
applicable to activities conducted by a
state bank in a state in which the state
bank does not have a branch is its home
state law to the same extent that host
state law is preempted by the National
Bank Act. The FDIC should make clear
that a state bank may operate under
home state law in any other state to the
same extent that an out-of-state national
bank may operate under the National
Bank Act or under rules promulgated by
the Comptroller of the Currency
(HOCC"). Such a rule would give effect
to the policy underlying Riegle-Neal II
and the preemption of discriminatory
state law provided in Section 104(d) of
the Gramm-Leach-BHley ("GLB") Act
(HSection 104(d)"), 15 U.S.C. 6701(d).
3. Clarify that the law applicable to
activities conducted by an operating
subsidiary of a state bank is the same
law applicable to the bank itself. The
FDIC should clarify that when a state
bank has established an "operating
subsidiary" pursuant to its home state
law, that subsidiary will be treated
under FDIC rules as if it were the state
bank itself. Thus, the operating
subsidiary will be subject to state law
outside its home state in the same
manner as its bank parent is subject to
such state law. Such rules would allow
state bank operating subsidiaries to
engage in interstate business under the
same uniform rules as its parent bank,
just as national bank operating
subsidiaries operate under uniform OCC
rules.
4. Adopt rules construing the scope
and application of Section 104(d) to
make clear that a state law or action is
expressly preempted under Section
104(d) when it imposes a requirement,
limitation, or burden on a state bank, or
its affiliate, that does not also apply to
an out-of-state national bank or in-state
bank. Section 104(d)expressly preempts
state laws or actions that discriminate
against "insured depository
institutions'," or their affiliates, as
defined in the FDI Act. Accordingly,
Section l04(d) provides independent
basis and support for each of the above
requests. Moreover, through
implementing rules, the FDIC would
provide greater certainty to insured state
banks with respect to the scope of this
express federal preemption in general.
This provision is not well understood
and we believe that. a rulemaking, not
litigation, is the appropriate means to
carry out Congressional intent and
achieve needed clarity.
5. Implement Section 27 of the FDI
Act by adopting a rule parallel to the
rules promulgated by the acc and
Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS").
The scope and implementation of the
express preemption for the "interest
rate" charged in interstate lending
transactions by state and national banks
under Section 2 7 of the FDI Act and
Section 85 of the National Bank Act has
been authoritatively addressed by the
courts and in agency interpretations.
The OCC and OTS have adopted rules
codifying the scope of the respective
statutory provisions for federal
institutions. The FDIC should adopt a
parallel rule for insured state banks and
thus codify existing agency
interpretations.
In this letter, we will address (A) the
urgent need for the requested
rulemaking and the real costs of
inaction, (B) the FDIC's authority to
promulgate rules of the scope requested,
(C) the legislative history demonstrating
that Congress specifically intended in
Riegle-Neal II to prevent erosion of the
dual banking system and in Section
104(d) to prevent disparate treatment
and ensure that all banks could compete
on relatively equal terms in today's
interstate financial services
marketplace, and (D) the scope of the
proposed rule provisions in greater
detail. The Roundtable appreciates the
FDIC's consideration of this petition.
A. A Rulemaking Is Necessary and the
Costs of Inaction Will Be Significant
The requested FDIC action in this
petition is necessary to complete the
task of restoring balance in the dual
banking system that Congress sought to
achieve in 1997. Riegle-Neal II reversed
a decision in 1994 to treat state and
national banks differently with respect
to "applicable law." In Riegle-Neal I,
state and national banks were under the
same rules for the establishment of
interstate branches. However, Riegle-
Neal I provided that when a national
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bank branched interstate into a host
state, it was in effect generally subject
to the National Bank Act,2 while the
state bank in a parallel case was made
subject to host state law. While
interstate national banks could operate
under a single law, interstate state banks
were subjected to multiple state laws.
That disparity led Congress in 1997 to
amend Riegle-Neal to adopt an
applicable law provision for state banks
that closely tracked the national bank
provision in Section 36(0 of the
National Bank Act. 3 The purpose of the
1997 amendment, which was stated
repeatedly by its sponsors, was to
provide parity between state banks and
national banks with respect to interstate
banking.4 By "parity," they plainly
meant the ability of state banks to do
business interstate under a uniform law
(home state law) just as national banks
were authorized to do under Riegle-
Neal. 5
Over the last decade, the federal
charters for national banks and federal
thrifts have been correctly interpreted
by the OCC and OTS, with the repeated
support of the federal courts, to provide
broad federal preemption of state laws
that might appear to apply to the
activities or operations of a banking
institution in that state. The result is
that, in general, national banks and
2 The Riegle-Neal applicable law provision for
national banks states: "(A) In general The laws of
the host State regarding community reinvestment.
consumer protection. fair lending, and
establishment ofintrastate branches shall apply to
any branch in the host State of an out-of-State
national bank to the sarne extent as such State laws
apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that State.
except-(i) when Federal law preempts the
application of such State laws to a national bank;
or (iil when the Comptroller of the Currency
determines that the application of such State laws
would have a discriminatory effect on the branch
in comparison with the effect the application of
such State laws would have with respect to
branches of a bank chartered by the host State." 12
U.S.C. 36(f)(1)(A). The effect of this provision is that
any host state law, including a community
reinvestment, consumer protection. fair housing, or
intrastate branching law, that is preempted under
the National Bank Act does not apply to the
national bank branch (or the bank) in the host state.
3 Compare 12 U.S.C.1831a(j)(1) (text in footnote
9) with 12 U.S.C. 36(f)(t)(A) (text in footnote 2).
4 As stated by the led sponsor in the House. Rep.
Roukema: "The essence of this legislation is to
provide parity between state-chartered banks and
national banks." 143 Congo Rec. H3088 (daily ed.
May 21. 1997).
5 See, e.g., statements by the principal sponsors
of the 1997 Amendment. Rep. Roukema (U * * * we
have * * * with this action. protected the dual
banking system while at the sarne time gaining the
advantages of interstate banking"), 143 Congo Rec.
H4231 (daily ed. June 24,1997), and Chairman
D'Amato ("Enactment of H.R. 1306 also would
bolster efforts of New York and other states to make
sure that State[-}chartered banks have the powers
they need to compete efficiently and effectively in
an interstate environment"). 143 Congo Rec. 55637
(daily ed. June 12. 1997).
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federal thrifts now can do business
across the country under a single set of
federal rules. This framework is
appropriate for these federal entities in
a national financial marketplace. At the
same time, in this marketplace a
uniform national bank system based on
preemption and interstate banking
undoubtedly presents a major challenge
to the dual banking system and state
banks.
In contrast to the general certainty
enjoyed by federal institutions, there is
widespread confusion and uncertainty
with respect to applicable law governing
state banks engaged in interstate
banking activities. The current
uncertainty governing the interstate
activities of state banks has had, and
will continue to have, several significant
adverse effects. Uncertainty carries the
potential for litigation and enforcement
actions arising from disagreements
between regulators, or between a host
state regulator and a state bank engaged
in interstate activity. Regulatory
uncertainty deters state banks from
pursuing profitable business
opportunities. When a state bank
converts to a national charter to gain
greater legal certainty, it incurs
substantial expense. Each of these
consequences has economic significance
for state banks and direct implications
for the FDIC's enforcement and safety-
and-soundness responsibilities.
Moreover, a series of recent major
merger and conversion transactions has
resulted in an unprecedented migration
of assets to the national banking system.
It is now apparent that, absent a more
certain federal regulatory environment,
the state charter will continue to be
perceived as less competitive than a
national bank charter.
This is the very result that Congress
intended to prevent.6 In 1994, 1997 and
1999 Congress took bold and historic
actions to· provide uniform federal rules
to govern all interstate banking and to
ensure that individual state laws could
not disfavor any type of depository
institution in the multistate financial
services marketplace. It is now apparent
that the express terms of these statutes
have not on their own force been able
6 The statement by Rep. LaFalce before final
House passage of the 1997 amendments captures
the purpose to redress the negative effects of the
1994 Riegle-Neal applicable provision for state
banks: <4Why [must we act now]? Well, it is due to
the fact that the national bank regulator has the
authority to permit national banks to conduct
operations in all the states with some level of
consistency. In contrast, under the existing
interstate legislation, state banks branching outside
their home state must comply with a multitude of
different state banking laws in each and every state
in which they operate." 143 Congo Rec. H3094
(daily ed. May 27. 1997). See the discussion ofthe
legislative history in the next section.
to ensure, as Congress intended in
enacting Riegle-Neal II, that state banks
can participate in interstate banking
business on a par with national banks
and that state banks face significant
state law obstacles when they seek to do
business outside their home state. As a
consequence, the state banking system,
as we have known it, is fundamentally
threatened.
In the national financial services
marketplace, consumers and providers
benefit when banks can provide
products and services under a single
legal framework applicable across state
lines. At the same time, bank customers
and the economy also benefit from the
diversity, innovation and checks
provided by a strong and dynamic dual
banking system involving large,
regional, and small banks. From the
perspective of all parties-consumers,
financial institutions, and regulators-
further development of a framework of
state bank regulation and supervision
that is effective, efficient, and seamless
across state lines is the right goal. In
today's multistate system, that is an
essential goal. A banking system in
which virtually all interstate banks have
national charters and state banks are
overwhelmingly local is not the dual
banking system this country has
historically enjoyed. The dual banking
system will retain the dynamic vitality
that has made it a mainspring for
progress and strength in banking only if
it can provide meaningful interstate
competitive parity for all interstate state
banks, whether cross-border, regional,
or national. Significant and
unacceptable disparity exists today.
The FDIC has the authority, tools, and
responsibility under the FDI Act to
correct this imbalance. To implement
Congressional intentions it now must
promptly provide a uniform interstate
applicable law regime for state banks
and give practical reality to the express
preemption of discriminatory state laws.
B. The FDIC Has Authority To Adopt
the Requested Rules
The FDIC has ample rulemaking
authority to address each of the
Roundtable's requests. Section 9 of the
FDI Act vests the FDIC with broad
authority to adopt rules "it may deem
necessary to carry out the provisions of,
this Act or of any other law which it has ~
the responsibility of administering or
enforcing." 12 U.S.C. 1819.7
7 The FDIC's rulemaking authority parallels the
GCC's authority. See 12 U.S.C. 93(a) (("the
Comptroller of the Currency is authorized to
prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the
responsibilities of the office"). The statutory
provision authorizing the GCC to issue rules is
directly analogous to Section 9 of the FDI Act.
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The FDIC is vested with responsibility
for administering Sections 24 and 27 of
the Act to accomplish what Congress
intended. Congress, through Section 9,
has vested the FDIC with authority to
carry out Sections 24 and 27. Moreover,
under basic principles of administrative
law, agency rules that fill or address a
statutory gap generally are afforded
considerable deference by courts. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837,865 (1984) ("Chevron").
Section9's "generally conferred
authority" makes it apparent "that
Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when
it addresses ambiguity in the statute or
fills a space in the enacted law, even
one about which 'Congress did not
actually have an intent' as to a
particular result." United States v.
Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
Riegle-Neal I and II fundamentally
changed federal law for state and
national banks by authorizing banks to
engage fully in banking transactions in
other states through interstate
branching.8 As a corollary, Riegle-Neal
I provided federal "applicable law"
statutes to govern the new interstate
banking regime. As originally enacted,
the respective applicable law provisions
treated national and state banks
differently. Riegle-Neal II sought to
redress that disparity and provided
substantively the same rule for state
banks as was originally provided for
national banks.9 The FDIC plainly has
authority to implement Riegle-Neal II.
Compare 12 U.S.C. 1819 (FDIC vested with
authority "to prescribe * * * such rules and
regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out
the provisions of this chapter or of any other law
which it has the responsibility of administering or
enforcing * * *").
8 Prior to enactment of Riegle-Neal. neither state
nor national banks could establish branches outside
their home state. Moreover. except with respect to
interest charges under 12 U.S.C. 85 and 12 U.S.C.
1831d, federal law did not provide guidance to
either state banks or national banks regarding the
law applicable to transactions that banks made with
customers outside their home states.
9 See generally section 240):
(j) ACTIVITIES OF BRANCHES OF QUT-OF-
STATE BANKS.-
(1) APPUCATION GF HOST STATE LAW.-The
laws of a host State, including laws regarding
community reinvestment, consumer protection. fair
lending. and establishment of intrastate branches.
shall apply to any branch in the host State of an
out-of-State national bank. To the extent host State
law is inapplicable to a branch of an out-of-State
bank in such host State pursuant to the preceding
sentence, home State law shall apply to such
branch.
(2) ACTIVITIES OF BRANCHES.-An insured
State bank that establishes a branch in a host State
may conduct any activity at such branch that is
permissible under the laws of the home State of
Continued
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The FDIC also has the authority to
implement the nondiscrimination
provisions of Section 104(d) insofar as
the GLB Act addresses state insured
depository institutions and to construe
the express preemption of
discriminatory state law provided in
Section 104(d). Section 9 vests the FDIC
with authority to promulgate rules to
carry out any statute the FDIC is
responsible for administering or
enforcing. The provisions of the GLB
Act that touch upon state depository
institutions fall within the regulatory
ambit of the FDIC.
A statutory gap, or a clarification of a
statute to effect Congressional intent,
can be-and should be-addressed by
an agency rule. Where, as here, a statute
is ambiguous regarding its application
to "a particular result" (Mead, 533 U.S.
at 229), courts have long recognized that
agencies with rule-making authority
must be permitted to address the
statutory gap as "necessary for the
orderly conduct of its business." United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192,202-03 (1956) (finding also
that the statute "must be read as a whole
and with appreciation of the
responsibilities of the body charged
with its fair and efficient operation"),
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n, 482
F.2d at 681. ("[T]here is little question
that the availability of substantive. rule-
making gives any agency an invaluable
resource-saving flexibility in carrying
out its task of regulating parties subject
to its statutory mandate."). Courts have
consistently applied these
administrative law principles-and
extended Chevron deference-to rules
and regulations issued by the FDIC
under its broad rulemaking authority.lo
such bank, to the extent such activity is permissible
either for a bank chartered by the host State (subject
to the restrictions in this section) or for a branch
in the host State of an out-of-State national bank.
(3) SAVINGS PROVISION.-No provision of this
subsection shall be construed as affecting the
applicability of-
(A) any State law of any home State under
subsection (b), (e), or (d) of section 44; or
(B) Federal law to State banks and State bank
branches in the home State or the host State.
(4) DEFINITIONS.-The terms "host State",
"home State", and "out-of-State bank" have the
same meanings as in section 44(f). 12 U.S.C.
1831a(j).
10 See, e.g., National Council ofSavings
Institutions v. FDIC, 664 F.Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1987)
(sustaining FDIC regulation governing the proper
relationship between FDIC-insured banks and their
securities-dealing "subsidiaries" or "affiliates") See
also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 310 F.3d 202,
208 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affording Cbevron deference to
FDIC rule for "second generation" transactions,
because statute was silent as to treatment of these
transactions and rule would "implement
Congressional intent because it prevents financial
institutions from manipulating the system");
America's Communi(y Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d
822. 834 (D.C. Cir '2000) (upholding FDIC denial of
There can be little doubt that Section 9
of the FDI Act vests the FDIC with
authority to address these issues. 11 .
There is no reason that a rulemaking
by the FDIC similar to ones conducted
by the ace should be analyzed any
differently. The National Bank Act does
not expressly address the law applicable
to a national bank outside states where
it has branches. Prior to the adoption of
the acc rules, a number of courts
determined that national banks were
subject to state laws that did not conflict
with the provisions of the National Bank
Act.12 Nonetheless, the courts have
upheld the acc rules and
determinations that make clear that
national banks and their operating
subsidiaries are governed by the
National Bank Act wherever they do
business. These acc rules have
generally received Chevron deference.13
Further, under Section 8 of the FDI
Act, an insured bank may be subject to
an enforcement action of the FDIC if "in
the opinion of the appropriate Federal
banking agency, any insured depository
institution, depository institution which
has insured deposits, or any institution-
affiliated party is engaging or has
engaged, or the agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the depository
institution or any institution-affiliated
party is about to engage, in an unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the
business of such depository institution,
or is violating or has violated, or the
agency has reasonable cause to believe
that the depository institution or any
institution-affiliated party is about to
violate, a law, rule, or regulation." 12
V.S,C. 1818(b)(1). The FDIC has
refund assessment under Chevron, where statute
merely stated that FDIC could utilize "any other
factors" to "set" the assessment amount and thus
was "facially ambiguous"); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Sumner Financial Corp., 451 F.2d 898,
902-903 (5th Cir. 1971) (affording "great deference"
to FDIC interpretation of FDI Act through regulation
concerning advertising by regulated banks).
1 t Riegle-Neal I and II provide express ability for
a state bank to establish a branch in a host state,
to thus gain the ability to engage in any or all of
its permitted activities in that host state, and to
apply its home state law (unless a national bank,
and thus the state bank, must apply host state law)
to that branch. But the statutory text does not
directly address the governing law applicable to the
state bank's activities permitted in the host state
under the authority provided by Riegle-Neal, but
conducted by the bank outside of its branch; by an
operating subsidiary or another means. An ordinary
task of a regulatory agency is to construe such a
statutory provision in a rule.
12 See National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981
(3d Cir. 1980); Perdue v. Crocker National Bank,
702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985); Best v. U.S. National
Bank, 739, P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).
13 See, e.g.• NationsBank of N. C. v. VALIC, 513
U.S. 251 (1995); Barnett Bank of Marion County v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25.33 (l996); Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d, 957, 963-65 (W.D.
Mich. 2004); Wachovia v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d
275 (D. Conn. 2004).
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authority to adopt rules with respect to
legal compliance by insured banks that
provide guidance to those banks and
agency staff charged with making
supervisory, enforcement and
examination decisions. That can be
accomplished by using authority under
Section 9 to address issues of
compliance with state law, including
the meaning and scope of Section 104.14
C. The Requested Rulemakings Would
Advance the Congressional Purpose To
Prevent Erosion of the Dual Banking
System by Maintaining Parity Between
State and National Banks
Beginning with the enactment of
Section 27, Congress has taken bold and
historic action on more than one
occasion to preempt a wide range of
state laws so that state banks can
operate on a par with national banks in
the multistate financial services
marketplace that has come into
existence in recent decades. The broad
sweep of what Congress intended to
accomplish is evident in the terms and
legislative history of Riegle-Neal II and
Section 104(d). Those statutes further
the decades-old principle of competitive
equality embodied in federal law and
repeatedly recognized by the courts and
the FDIC.15 The requested FDIC rule
would implement these Congressional
purposes.
The principle of fundamental
competitive parity has been woven by
Congress and the courts into the very
fabric of the dual banking system. The
dual system was created when Congress
created the national bank system
alongside the state banking system. In
the Federal Reserve Act, Congress
expressly provided for state banks, as
well as national banks, to be member
14 The FDIC previously has engaged in a
rulemaking in comparable circumstances. In 1982.
the FDIC adopted a Statement of Policy addressing
the applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to
securities activities of subsidiaries of insured
nonmember banks. 47 FR 38984, September 3,
1982. That Statement of Policy construed Section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act and concluded that the
restrictions in that section on securities affiliates of
insured banks did not prevent insured nonmember
banks subject to the FDIC's regulation and
supervision from having "bona fide" securities
affiliates or subsidiaries. The provisions of Glass-
Steagall construed in the Statement of Policy (like
the provisions of GLB at issue here) were not part
of the FDI Act, but the FDIC issued a rule to provide
clear guidance to insured state banks, and the
exercise of the FDIC's rulemaking authority in that
case was upheld. See National Council of Savings
Institutions v. FDIC, 664 F.Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1987).
Issuing guidance to state insured banks concerning
the scope of Section 104 of the GLB Act is a
necessary and appropriate exercise of the FDIC's
authority to carry out its regulatory mandate.
15 See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank &' Trust
Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); First Nat'l Bank in Plant
Cityv. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); FDIC
Advisory Letter 00-5.
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banks. The McFadden Act as passed and
as amended in the 1930s embodied a
federal policy of competitive equality in
branching. In the FDI Act, deposit
insurance was made available to all
state and national banks.
Since 1980, Congress has amended
the FDI Act to ensure state-national
bank parity, to ensure a strong and
balanced dual banking system, and to
prevent discriminatory state laws from
favoring one type of charter over
another. In 1980, in response to the
challenges presented by the 1978
Marquette case, Congress provided
interstate usury parity for state banks in
Section 27 of the FDI Act.16 See·12
U.S.C. 1831d(a). In 1991, Congress
addressed state laws providing state
banks more expansive powers than
national banks, a disparity in favor of
state banks that Congress believed had
implications for safety-and-soundness,
bank competitiveness, and the dynamic
for change in the dual banking system.
That enactment provided that state bank
activities would be limited to activities
permissible for national banks, unless
the FDIC determined that for a state
bank to engage in an otherwise
impermissible activity would not pose a
significant risk to the deposit insurance
fund. See 12 U.S.C. 1831a(a)-(e). This
policy of parity was continued in
Riegle-Neal and the GLB Act.
1. The Legislative History ofRiegle-Neal
Amendments Demonstrates
Congressional Purpose to Provide Parity
Between National Banks and State
Banks
In Riegle-Neal, Congress reversed
more than 150 years of federal policy
and enacted comprehensive federal laws
governing interstate banking for all
banks. Except for the applicable law
provisions, Riegle-Neal as originally
enacted gave parallel treatment to state
and national banks. In 1997, Congress
recognized that the original state bank
applicable law provision was placing
state banks at a substantial disadvantage
and was undermining the state system.
It acted swiftly to redress the state- .
national bank balance in Riegle-Neal II.
The specific drafting approach, the
underlying policy and the express
purpose of that 1997 statute all sought
to ensure that state banks would operate
under a uniform interstate "applicable
law" regime based on home state law
parallel to the national bank regime. It
sought t-o ensure parity in the dynamic
interstate banking environment. ..
The legislative history of Riegle-Neal
II makes clear that Congress' goal was to
16 See Marquette Nafl Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Servo Corp.• 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
facilitate competitive equality for state
banks and national banks in interstate
banking. The 1997 amendments
originated in the H'ouse Banking
Committee. At final passage, the
principal sponsor of the bill, Rep. Marge
Roukema (R-NJ), chair of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions,
and senior members of the House
Banking Committee, on a bipartisan
basis, expressed the intent to provide a
level playing field, not narrowly in
terms of competition between state and
national bank branches, but broadly in
terms of the ability of state banks to
match national banks in doing business
across the country.
As Rep. Roukema stated when
introducing the bill for vote on the
House floor: "The essence of this
legislation is to provide parity between
state-chartered banks and national
banks. * * * This legislation is critical
to the survival of the dual banking
system. * * * [A) strong state banking
system is necessary for the economic
well-being of the individual States and
for innovation in financial institutions."
In her final statement before final
passage, she repeated the necessity and
purpose of the bill: "[W]e have * * *
with this action, protected the dual
banking system while at the same time
gaining the advantages of interstate
banking. "17 No contrary statement was
made by any House or Senate member
during the floor debates preceding final
passage.
Representative Roukema's statements
were echoed and reinforced by senior
members from each political party. On
the Republican side, Rep. Mike Castle
(R-DEL) addressed state bank's
competitive needs "across the Nation":
"As we enter the age of interstate
banking and branching, it is necessary
to ensure that state banks can compete
fairly with national banks as more
banking is done between States and
across the Nation. This legislation will
ensure that there is a level playing field
between state and national banks. "18
Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NEB)
emphasized the benefits for the state
system, "This Member was intimately
involved in the original Riegle-Neal Act
and was concerned at that time that
States' rights were protected. * * * This
Member believes that this measure
actually reinforces States' rights by
maintaining the viability of the state
charter by ensuring parity with the
national bank charter * * * {and] urges
his colleagues to join him in approving
17 See 143 Congo Roc. HJ088 (daily edt May 21.
1997). H4231 (daily edt June 24, 1997).
18 143 Congo Rec. H3095 (daily edt May 27. 1997).
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this important protection of the dual
banking system. "19
A senior Democrat, Rep John LaFalce
(D-NY), articulated the purpose clearly:
"* * * I do believe [the bill's] passage
is vital to maintain the dual banking
system. It is the dual banking system
that by giving banks a choice of Federal
or state charters has helped to ensure
that our U.S. banking industry has
remained strong and competitive. * * *
[In 1994, Congress did not adequately
anticipate the negative impact the
interstate law would have on state
banks.] Why so? Well, it is due to the
fact that the national bank regulator has
the authority to permit national banks to
conduct operations in all the states with
some level of consistency. In contrast,
under the existing interstate legislation,
state banks branching outside their
home state must comply with a
multitude of different state banking laws
in each and every state in which they
operate. "20
When the Riegle-Neal II bill was
considered in the Senate, concern also
was expressed about the erosion of the
dual banking system caused by the
disparity in applicable law enacted in
Riegle-Neal. In his floor statement
preceding final Senate passage, Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Alphonse
D'Amato (R-NY) stated the importance
of Riegle-Neal II for the continued
vitality of the dual banking system:
[T]he trigger date for nationwide
interstate branching has passed-June 1,
1997. This important legislation will
preserve the benefits of the dual banking
system and keep the state banking
charter competitive in an interstate
environment. * * *
The bill is necessary to preserve
confidence in a state banking charter for
banks with such a charter that wish to
operate in more than one state. In
addition, it will curtail incentives for
unnecessary Federal preemption of
State laws. Finally, the bill will restore
balance to the dual banking system by
ensuring that neither charter operates at
an unfair advantage in this new
interstate environment. * * *
New York has more than 90 State
'[-]chartered banks. * * * Without this
19Id. at H3094. Rep. Spencer Bacchus (R-ALA)
similarly stated: ,,* * * we have heard almost
unanimous testimony that the unfortunate and
unintended consequences of our failure to make
these clarifications will be the devaluation of state
banking charters in favor of national charters' and
the gradual decline of the state banking system
* * *" Id. at H3095.
2°ld. at H3094. Rep. Bruce Vento (D-MN)
similarly stated: "The legislation will maintain the
dynamic balance between the chartering of national
and state banks and banking systems. This is a
necessary measure. It must be enacted to clarify and
ensure the viability of America's dual banking
system." Id. at H3093.
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legislation, the largest of these
institutions may be tempted to convert
to a national charter in order to operate
in more than one State. * * *
The current law may be unclear as to
whether consistent rules are used to
determine what laws and powers apply
to the out-of-state branches of state and
federally chartered banks. * * *
[Summary of the bill's terms omitted)
Enactment of H.R. 1306 also would
bolster efforts of New York and other
states to make sure that Statel-)chartered
banks have the powers they need to
compete efficiently and effectively in an
interstate environment. 21
2. Section 104 of the GLB Act Reflects
Congress' Intent To Preempt
Discriminatory State Laws Adversely
Affecting Any Depository Institution
Congress enacted Section 104 as part
of the GLB Act in 1999 to address state
laws providing competitive inequalities
among entities offering the same
financial products and services. Section
104 originated as a provision intended
to sweep away a variety of state laws
that had blocked or imposed special
requirements or conditions on banks
seeking to engage in insurance activities
permitted under their charter law.
During the legislative process, the
section was expanded to provide
express preemption of not just state
insurance laws, but any state law that
placed impediments or burdens on any
insured depository institution seeking to
provide financial services across the
country. Even though the non-insurance
provisions of Section 104(d) are far less
detailed than the insurance provisions
of Section 104, the Congressional
purpose and breadth of preemption with
respect to non-insurance activities are
express in the nature and scope of the
words used.
Congress determined that in a
national financial services marketplace
individual states should not be able to
impose burdens or requirements
adversely affecting any depository
institution, or its affiliates. As enacted,
Section 104(d) provides broad
preemption of discriminatory state laws
adversely affecting any type of
depository institution or any affiliate of
a depository institution. It was enacted
for the purpose of ensuring that no
insured depository institution-
including a state bank and its financial
affiliates-would be disadvantaged
competitively by the operation of state
law when it engages in a financial
activity, whether on its own, with an
affiliate or with "any other person."
21 143 Congo Rec. S5637 (daily ed. June 12, 1997).
The legislative history of Section
104(d), and particularly the paragraph
(4) nondiscrimination provisions, is
sparse, and thus its purpose and intent
are best drawn from its terms. It is
important to note that Section 104
addresses how banking organizations
conduct the full range of permitted
financial activities, whether by the
depository institution itself or by an
affiliate, including both "traditional"
affiliates such as mortgage or finance
companies' and the new affiliations
permitted under the GLB Act. It focuses
on state laws that affect how depository
institutions or its affiliates engage in any
of their permitted activities. This focus
is evident in the Senate Banking
Committee report in 1999. That
Committee had taken the lead role in
fashioning Section 104 in the form
ultimately enacted. Its report expressly
addressed the section's broad,
preemptive purpose with respect to
state laws that impinge on how financial
activities are conducted: "(T]he
Committee is aware that some States
have used their regulatory authority to
discriminate against insured depository
institutions, their subsidiaries and
affiliates. The Committee has no desire
to have State regulation prevent or
otherwise frustrate the affiliations and
activities authorized or permitted by
this bill. Thus, Section 104 clarifies the
application of State law to the
affiliations and activities authorized or
permitted by the bill (or other Federal
law), and ensures that applicable State
law cannot prevent, discriminate
against, or otherwise frustrate such
affiliations or activities." 22
Section 104(d) has a purpose parallel
to Riegle-Neal II-to ensure that
depository institutions will be able to
compete across the country on equal
terms and to prevent state laws or
actions from providing disparate
treatment that would disadvantage any
bank vis-a.-vis its competitors. When an
out-of-state state bank is subject to a
state law imposing any requirement,
limitation, or burden to which a
national bank or in-state bank is not
subject, Section 104(d) by its literal
terms preempts that state law.
D. In the Requested Rulemaking, the
FDIC Should Clarify the Applicable
Law Governing the Interstate Activities
of State Banks To Provide Parallel
Uniformity for State Banks With
National Banks
In light of the FDIC's authority under
its statute and the express purposes and
policies of Congress enacted in recent
22 S. Rept. 106--44 (April 28, 1999) at 11 [Senate
Banking Committee) (emphasis added).
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statutes I the Roundtable believes that
the FDIC can, and should, adopt rules
so that state banks can operate interstate
under uniform rules based on home
state law and thus parallel to national
banks. We now address in turn the
specific parts of the requested
rulemaking.
1. The FDIC Should Clarify That in
General Home State Law Is the
Governing Law Applicable to All
Activities Conducted in a Host State by
a State Bank That Has an Interstate
Branch in That State to the Same Extent
That Host State Law Is Preempted by the
National Bank Act
This petition seeks a rule addressing
the appropriate applicable law to govern
the activities of a state bank when it has
entered a host state with a branch as
permitted by Riegle-Neal and thus has a
federal law authorization to transact all
its legally permissible activities within
that host state. The requested rule
would expressly permit a state bank to
apply home state law uniformly to all its
business done in a host state parallel to
the ability of national banks to apply the
National Bank Act under ace rules.
Riegle-Neal II plainly provides that if
the National Bank Act preempts host
state law for national banks, home state
law is the applicable law when the out-
of-state bank engages in any or all of its
permissible activities in or through its
host state branch. The Riegle-Neal
applicable law provisions for both state
and national banks are silent, however,
with respect to the governing law
applicable to a transaction that the bank
could conduct through its branch, but is
effecting without any involvement by
the host state branch.
Riegle-Neal I authorized the bank to
engage in any or all of its permitted
activities in the host state once it has a
single branch there and to apply its
home state law. The only question
under Riegle-Neal II is whether
Congress intended different law to
apply depending on the means used by
the bank to conduct its permitted
business in the host state or the
structure of the transaction (that is,
whether use of home state law as the
applicable law depends on some actual
branch involvement in the bank's
transaction).23 The legislative purpose is
clear: Congress was focused on the
23 For example, although the statutory text
directly addresses the law applicable to a Tennessee
bank with a branch in Oklahoma that makes a loan
to an Oklahoma resident through its Oklahoma
branch (Tennessee law applies), the text does not
speak directly to the governing law applicable to
the identical loan originated by the Tennessee bank
from its home office in Tennessee {or through an
operating subsidiary}.
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bank's interstate activities, not the
means used by the bank. By adopting
the requested rule, the FDIC will
achieve the result Congress intended.
The FDIC should fill the statutory gap
and clarify the application of-home state
law to host state activities by adopting
a rule for state banks that provides for
uniform application of horne state law
whenever a national bank can apply the
National Bank Act. The FDIC rule
should make it clear that the state
bank's home·state law will apply to all
of the bank's activities in a host state
whenever a host state law would be
preempted by acc rules for a national
bank.
Specifically, the rule should make it
plain that any host state statute, rule,
order, etc., that would be preempted
under the terms of the acc preemption
rule, or an acc interpretive letter,
would also be preempted for a state.
bank. If there is any uncertainty about
the application of the acc rules in any
case, the rule might allow the home
state regulator, or the FDIC, to
determine in writing whether acc rules
would provide preemption for national
banks. The FDIC should reserve the
ability to make any final determination
(with cOJ:lsultation with the acc as
needed). In parallel fashion, the rule
should provide that if home state statute
law is silent, the home state regulator
can determine by rule, order, or
interpretative statement/letter what
applicable home state law is. In general,
the home state regulator's written
determinations, whether by rule, order,
or interpretative statement/letter, should
govern, but could be subject to review
by the FDIC, upon request of the host
state regulator or upon the FDIC's own
initiative.
The rule might also address another
Riegle-Neal provision addressing the
home-host state relationship. Section
lO(h)(3) of the FDI Act expressly
provides that the"State bank
supervisors from 2 or more States may
enter into cooperative agreements to
facilitate State regulatory supervision of
State banks, including cooperative
agreements relating to the coordination
of examinations and joint participation
in ~xaminations." The state regulators,
through the Cpnference of State Bank
Supervisors, have entered into a
landmark nationwide cooperative
agreement, as well as agreements
involving a specific bank by the states
where that bank has branches. The FDIC
rule could provide guidance on the
effect of Section lO(h)(3).
2. The FDIC Should Clarify That Home
State Law is the Governing Law
Applicable to Activities Conducted by a
State Bank in a State in Which the State
Bank Does Not Have a Bmnch to the
Same Extent That State Law Is
Preempted by the National Bank Act
The Roundtable requests that the
FDIC adopt parallel rules under its
Section 9 authority to provide that the
home state law of a state bank will
apply to its activities in other states to
the same extent as the National Bank
Act applies to the activities of national
banks. The rule should provide that
whenever a state law is preempted by
the National Bank Act or ace rules, it
also would not apply to an out-of-state
insured bank, which would be governed
by its horne state charter law. The
requested rule thus would implement
the terms and policies of Section l04(d)
and the policies of Riegle-Neal II and
address gaps in ex.isting law. Like the
parallel acc rules, the requested rules
would reduce legal risk, guide legal
compliance by insured banks, and aid
the FDIC in making enforcement
decisions under Section 8 of the FDI
Act. Further, by promoting operating
efficiency and competitiveness in
interstate banking and by reducing the
real costs arising from legal uncertainty
and risk, the proposed rule would
contribute to the safe and sound
operation of state banks.
To a large extent, the Riegle-Neal and
GLB legislation confirmed the existence
of a robust interstate marketplace for
financial services and provided a federal
legal framework for the conduct of this
interstate·commerce. Although the
express purpose of Riegle-Neal II was to
provide state banks competitive equality
with national banks in interstate
banking, it did not by its terms address
the law applicable to banks outside
states where they maintain a branch.
The GLB Act addressed the entire
financial services marketplace and, like
Riegle-Neal I and II, adopted broad
federal rules to i.mplement the goal of a
ulevel playing field". In Section 104(d)
Congress plainly recognized the need
for financial services providers,
including insured depository
institutions, that operate across the
country to do so under uniform rules
and not to be subject to individual state
rules or actions that would disadvantage
some or all depository institutions.
Accordingly, Congress provided the
very broad express preemption stated in
Section l04(d) to address this perceived
need.
As is often the case, Congress did not
address in those acts every issue
presented by the developments and
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problems it was considering, nor did it
address future developments. Under
established principles of administrative
law, as discussed above, the federal
agencies that administer and implement
statutory grants of authority have an
important role in adopting rules that
implement Congressional purposes,
reasonably fill in statutory gaps and
address the application of existing laws
to new developments and contexts.
The policy of Section 104 has a
similar goal as Riegle-Neal II, but
plainly addresses a different aspect of
the same problem-discriminatory state
laws that disadvantage depository.
institutions, including state banks,
seeking to compete in interstate
financial service markets. Section l04(d)
thus directly informs and supports this
requested rule. Under Section l04(d),
when state law provides for a different
result for out-of-state state banks
compared to national and in-state state
banks, that law is preempted. Given
Section l04(d) and the FDIC's authority
to address compliance with law under
FDI Act Section 8, the FDIC can adopt
a rule consistent with the logic and
policy of Riegle-Neal II that will provide
state banks competitive equality in
every state so that no insured state bank
will be required to comply with a state
law unless a national bank also would
be subject to that law.
acc rules have provided national
banks substantial certainty and clar~ty
concerning the law governing national
bank activities across the country.24
These ace actions have had the effect
of making national banks more
competitive and efficient in interstate
24 The Comptroller has addressed the reality of
multistate banking by adopting rules that provide
that a national bank and its operating subsidiaries
operate solely under the National Bank Act and
OCC rules wherever they do business across the
country. The acc rules expressly provide that the
National Bank Act. not state law, governs the
deposit. lending, and other activities of national
banks. except as specifically provided in the OCC
rules. See 12 CFR 7.4007-7.4009. The National
Bank Act does not expressly address the law
applicable to a national bank outside states where
it has branches. Indeed, prior to the adoption of
ace rules addressing these issues in recent years,
a number of courts determined that national banks
were subject to state laws that did not conflict with
the provisions of the National Bank Act. E.g.,
National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir.
1980); Perdue v. Cracker National Bank. 702 P.2d
503 (Cal. 1985); Best v. U.S. National Bank, 739
P.2d 554 (Or. 1987). Nevertheless. the courts
including the U.S. Supreme Court, have upheld
OCC rules and determinations since 1944 that flesh
out the National Bank Act and spell out the ability
of national banks and their operating subsidiaries
to apply the National Bank Act wherever· they do
business. These OCC determinations have generally
received Chevron deference. E.g., NationsBank of
N.C. v. VALlC, 513 U.S. 251 (1995), Barnett Bank
ofMarian Countyv. Nelson. 517 U.S. 25.33 (1996),
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d.
957,963-65 (W.O. Mich. 2004).
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banking and have reduced legal risk.
These rules, as supplemented by
interpretations and guidance issued by
the acc, also have clarified the scope
of the acc's compliance and
enforcement responsibilities and
standards with respect to the safe and
sound operation of national banks. The
FDIC has authority to provide a parallel
result for state banks in its rules.
3. The FDIC Should Clarify That Home
State Law Governs the Activities ofan
Operating Subsidiary ofa State Bank to
the Same Extent as Home State Law
Applies to the Parent Bank
In a 1996 rulemaking, which codified
existing interpretations, and in
subsequent modifications, the ace has
adopted comprehensive rules
concerning the establishment and
operation of operating subsidiaries.·See
12 CFR 5.34; 69 FR 64478 (Nov. 5,
2004). The acc rules as amended in
2001 further specify that state law
applies to a national bank operating
subsidiary to the same extent state law
would apply to the national bank itself.
See 12 CFR 7.4006. The FDIC should
similarly make clear that an operating
subsidiary established by a state bank
under its home state law, like the
operating subsidiary of a national bank,
will be governed by the same law as
would its insured state bank parent,
except when a state law would apply to
the activities of a national bank
operating subsidiary.
The Roundtable recognizes that the
authority of an insured state bank to
establish an operating subsidiary must
arise under its charter law. Whether a
state bank can have an CCoperating
subsidiary" will be determined by
appropriate home state authorities
under the bank's charter law.
II Nevertheless, the FD_IC plainly has
authority to determine that a state bank
operating subsidiary that is treated for
all purposes as if it were a division of
the bank will be subject to the FDI Act
and FDIC rules in the same way as its
insured bank parent, parallel to a
national bank operating subsidiary. The
ace rules concerning operating
subsidiaries were adopted without the
existence of any express provision in
the National Bank Act.25
The FDIC has discretion under
Section 9 and Section 24(0 to determine
by rule that a subsidiary that is an
operating subsidiary under home state
law will be treated under the FDI Act as
25 When the authority for a national bank to
establish a financial subsidiary was authorized
under the GLB Act in 1999. new Section 24a in the
National Bank Act implicitly confirmed the existing
acc approach to establishing operating
subsidiaries. See 66 FR 34784, 34788 (July 2,2001).
if it were a division or branch of the
state bank.26 This rule provision would
thus allow a state bank operating
subsidiary to engage in interstate
banking activities in host states and
other states on the same terms on which
its state bank parent operates~
4. The FDIC Should Adopt Rules
Construing the Scope and Application
of Section 104(dj To Make Clear that
State Laws, Rules, or Actions Are
Preempted Under Section 104(dj When
They Provide for Disparate Treatment
Between an Out-of-State National Bank
or In-State Bank and an Out-of-State
State Bank, or an Affiliate Thereof
The Roundtable also requests that the
FDIC provide greater clarity and
certainty to insured state banks with
respect to the scope of the federal
preemption provided in Section 104(d)
of the GLB Act. In view of the
complexity of Section 104(d) and the
general lack of understanding of its
provisions, FDIC rules are needed.
Moreover, a rulemaking is a preferable
means for providing needed clarity than
either litigation or an enforcement
proceeding.
Section 104(d) provides express
federal preemption of certain state laws
that affect "insured depository
institutions", as defined in the FDI Act.
Insured state banks subject to FDIC
regulation are the intended beneficiaries
of the Section 104(d) preemption. Yet
state banks today are not utilizing this
preemption, because the statute is
relatively new and complex and the
relevant provisions have not been
construed by any agency or court. Given
the complexity of the Section 104(d)
provisions, FDIC guidance would
provide much needed clarity and
certainty. Accordingly, we request the
FDIC to exercise its authority under FDI
Act Sections 8 and 9 to adopt rules that
specify the scope of the express
preemption provided under Section
104(d) for insured state banks.
Alternatively, the FDIC might adopt a
statement of policy addressing the scope
and effect of Section 104(d) for state
banks.
26 The FDIC has recognized in Advisory Letter
99-5 that a state bank operating subsidiary may be
treated the same as a state bank branch if the
operating subsidiary engages in activities that
would require a branch designation. Advisory
Letter 99-5 recognizes that because a bank
established and controls its operating subsidiary.
the offices of an operating subsidiary are similarly
"established" by the bank for branching purposes.
This result is also consistent with the terms of
Section 1813(0} of the FDI Act, in which a
"domestic branch" is defined to include any
"additional office" of a bank. The FDIC thus has
recognized the concept underlying the "operating
subsidiary" and thus Can apply it more uniformly
to all state bank activities by rule.
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The breadth of the Section 104(d)
preemption and its purpose to reach
state law or actions that would provide
disparate treatment for any type of
depository institution, including the
distinct class of out-of-state state banks,
vis-a.-vis its competitors are evident in
the language of the statute. Section
104(d)(4)(D) provides four distinct
nondiscrimination tests for any state
law or action that Hrestricts" any
depository institution or any affiliate. 27
These provisions of Section 104 were
carefully drafted and the text
demonstrates that Congress made
careful distinctions when determining
whether state discrimination between
competitors should be impermissible,
and thus and preempted, under federal
law.28 The distinctions in the statutory
27 The pertinent portions of Section 104(d) are as
follows:
(d) Activities.
(l) In general. Except as provided in paragraph
(3). and except with respect to insurance sales.
solicitation, and cross marketing activities. which
shall be governed by paragraph (2), no State may.
by statute, regulation, order. interpretation. or other
action. prevent or restrict a depository institution or
an affiliate thereof from engaging directly or
indirectly, either by itself or in conjunction with an
affiliate. or any other person, in any activity
authorized or permitted under this Act and the
amendments made by this Act. * * *"
(4) Financial activities other than insurance. No
State statute, regulation, order, interpretation. or
other action shall be preempted under paragraph (1)
to the extent that-
(A) It does not relate to, and is not issued and
adopted, or enacted for the purpose of regulating.
directly or indirectly, insurance sales, solicitations,
or cross marketing activities covered under
paragraph (2);
(B) It does not relate to, and is not issued and
adopted. or enacted for the purpose of regulating,
directly or indirectly, the business of insurance
activities other than sales, solicitations, or cross
marketing activities, covered under paragraph (3);
(C) It does not relate to securities investigations
or enforcement actions referred to in subsection (0;
and
(D) it-
(i) Does not distinguish by its terms between
depository institutions, and affiliates thereof,
engaged in the activity at issue and other persons
engaged in the same activity in a manner that is in
any way adverse with respect to the conduct of the
activity by any such depository institution or
affiliate engaged in the activity at issue;
(ii) As interpreted or applied, does not have. and
will not have, an impact on depository institutions.
or affiliates thereof, engaged in the activity at issue,
or any person who has an association with any such
depository institution or affiliate, that is
substantially more adverse than its impact on other
persons engaged in the same activity that are not
depository institutions or affiliates thereof. or
persons who do not have an association with any
such depository institution or affiliate;
(iii) Does not effectively prevent a depository
institution or affiliate thereof from engaging in
activities authorized or permitted by this Act or any
other provision of Federal law; and
(iv) Does not conflict with the intent of this Act
generally to permit affiliations that are authorized
or pennitted by Federal law. 15 U.S.C. 6701(d).
28 Compare the Uother person" language in
subparagraphs (i) and (ii). Subparagraph (i)
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 53/ Monday, March 21, 2005/ Proposed Rules 13425
29 Greenwood Trust Co. v. Mass., 971 F.2d 818
(1st Cir. 1992), SmiJeyv. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735
(1996).
30 See FDIC General Counsel Opinions 10 and 11.
The Roundtable appreciates the
FDIC's consideration of this petition.
We recognize that it is very broad and
asks the FDIC to undertake a major
rulemaking. We believe that such an
effort is urgently needed to preserve a
strong dual banking system, to maintain
safety and soundness, and to ensure that
it is attractive to both large and small
banks. Such a system is an integral,
essential part of the framework for
banking in the United States. While we
strongly support the development of
interstate banking and federal
preemption over the last decade, we
believe that the modernization of
American banking requires a parallel
modernization of the state half of the
dual banking system. Since the issues
concern interstate business and
preemption, the needed actions must
come at the federal level. As discussed
above, we believe that Congress has
given the FDIC both the tools and
responsibility to ad«:iress these needs.
The Roundtable and its members
stand ready to work with the FDIC and
but not out-of-state state banks insured
institutions), by operation of law (e.g.,
when state law is preempted for
national banks or federal thrifts, and
federal credit unions, but not for out-of-
state state banks), or by an
administrative determination to enforce
a state rule against an out-of-state state
bank or affiliate, but not against a
federal entity. The rule could give
examples.
• The rule should define "state law"
to include laws, ordinances, rules, etc.
of political subdivisions (including any
county, municipality, etc.).
5. The FDIC Should Implement Section
27 of the FDI Act by Adopting a Rule
Parallel to the Rules Promulgated by the
OCCandOTS
The scope and implementation of the
express preemption for the "interest
rate" charged in interstate lending
transactions by state and national banks
under Section 27 of the FDI Act and
Section 85 of the National Bank Act
have been authoritatively addressed by
the courts 29 and in agency
interpretations.3o Nevertheless, both the
acc and OTS have adopted rules
codifying the scope of the respective
statutory provisions. We request that the
FDIC adopt parallel provisions by rule
so that state banks will operate in a
matching legal framework under these
parallel statutes.
language permit the FDIC to address the
meaning of Section 104(d) for a state
bank confronting state laws outside its
home state that disadvantage it by
putting it in a different legal or
competitive position than its national
bank or in-state state bank competitors.
The following specific items might be
covered in an FDIC rule or statement of
policy:
• The rule should state that the
Section 104(d) preemption applies to
insured banks, and to their subsidiaries,
affiliates and associated persons.
• The rule should define a "person"
to include a depository institution,
subsidiary, affiliate, and associated
person.
• The rule should state that in view
of the breadth of the nondiscrimination
requirements stated in Section 104(d)
the word "restrict" in Section l04(d)(1)
is to be read broadly to include any state
law, rule, interpretation or action that
calls for any limitation or requirement.
Any state law that "restricts" but is
nondiscriminatory under Section
l04(d)(4) is not preempted under
Section l04(d). By the same token, any
state law that "restricts" and is
discriminatory under Section 104(d)(4)
is preempted under Section 104(d).
• The rule should address each of the
four nondiscrimination provisions in
Section 104(d)(4) to confirm that each is
a distinct test and that any state law or
action that fails 'anyone test is
preempted.
• The rule should address the scope
of "actions" in Section 104(d)(4) to
include all types of formal or informal
administrative actions by any state or
local governmental entity, including
decisions with respect to civil
enforcement of state rules.
• The rule should address Section
104(d)(4)(D)(i) in light of the terms used
in subparagraph (ii) to specify that
subparagraph (i) addresses treatment
under state law of an out-of-state
insured state hank, which is plainly an
"insured depository institution," that is
different from the treatment of any
national bank or in-state state bank and
banks, which is an "other person
engaged in the same activity" under
these provisions. It should also specify
that this discrimination can take various
forms, including state laws, rules, or
Uactions" that treat out-of-state state
banks or their subsidiaries differently
from in-state or federal institutions,
whether expressly (e.g., through a state
law exemption for federal institutions,
addresses Ctother persons engaged in the same
activity", while Subparagraph (ii) addresses "other
persons engaged in the same activity that are not
depository institutions or affiliates thereof."
* * * *
its staff to achieve these important
objectives. If you have any further
questions or comments, please do not
hesitate to contact me or John Beccia at
(202) 289-4322.
Sincerely,
Richard M. Whiting,
Executive Director and General Counsel.
ee: Chairman Donald E. Powell, William F.
Kroener III, Esq.
[FR Doc. 05-5499 Filed 3-18-05; 8:45]
BILLING CODe 6714-01-P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Parts 52 and 81
[AZ131-o078; FRL-7887-1]
Approval and Promulgation of
Implementation Plans and Designation
of Areas for Air Quality Planning
Purposes; Arizona
AGENCY: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to approve
the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality'S submittals of
revisions to the Arizona state
implementation plan that include
substitution of the clean fuel fleet
program requirement with the cleaner
burning gasoline program, adoption of
the serious area 1-hour ozone plan, and
adoption of the 1-hour ozone
maintenance plan for the Phoenix
(Arizona) metropolitan l-hour ozone
nonattainment area. We are also
proposing to approve Arizona's request
to redesignate the Phoenix metropolitan
1-hour ozone nonattainment area from
nonattainment to attainment. EPA
proposes these actions pursuant to those
provisions of the Clean Air Act that
obligate the agency to take action on
submittals of revisions to state
implementation plans and requests for
redesignation. In addition, under
section 107 of the Clean Air Act, we are
proposing to revise the boundary of the
Phoenix metropolitan 1-hour ozone
nonattainment area to exclude the Gila
River Indian Reservation. EPA is
proposing this last action consistent
with the Federal trust responsibility to
the Tribes and for the purpose of
relieving the Agency or the Gila River
Indian Community of the need to
promulgate and implement plans and
measures for the Community that are
not needed for attainment or
maintenance of the 1-hour or 8-hour
ozone national ambient air quality
standard.
E - 55

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
John T. McGarvey
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas C. Fenton
Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2005. John T. McGarvey, Thomas C. Fenton and UK/CLE. All Rights Reserved.
SECTIONF

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 1 F-l
ARTICLE 2 - SALES F-2
ARTICLE 2A - LEASES F-3
RECENT CASE LAW UNDER ARTICLES 2 AND 2A F-3
ARTICLES 3 AND 4 - NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND BANK
DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS F-5
RECENT CASE LAW UNDER ARTICLES 3 AND 4 F-6
ARTICLE 4A - FUNDS TRANSFERS F-8
ARTICLE 7 - DOCUMENTS OF TITLE F-8
ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS F-9
RECENT CASE LAW UNDER ARTICLE 9 F-9
KENTUCKY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FILING SYSTEM F-I0
SECTIONF

2005 CONFERENCE ON LEGAL ISSUES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM
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and
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Article 1
Article 1 may be the most important Article of the Uniform Commerical Code! because
its general provisions and definitions apply to all of the other Articles. While Article 1 has been
amended piecemeal as other Articles of the UCC have been updated, it was not until 2001 that it
was first subject to a general redrafting.
The 2001 version of Article 1 has been adopted by 12 states, including our border state of
Virginia. It is currently before the legislatures of 8 other states, including our border state of
Illinois.
Substantive changes include:
• Expanded definition of "good faith" - "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." KRS 355.1-201(19) now defines
good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." This change
brings Article 1 into conformity with the "reasonable commercial standards"
requirement found in other Articles.
• "Course of performance" is added as a rule of construction for interpretation of
contracts, along with course of dealing and usage of trade. Course of performance
now exists in Articles 2 and 2A, but has not been expressly extended to the rest of the
VCC.
• Integrates the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.
The VCC, as adopted in Kentucky, is found at KRS Chapter 355.
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• Major shift in choice of law rules. Existing law provides that the parties to a contract
may agree that it is governed by the law of any jurisdiction with a reasonable
relationship to the contract. For commercial situations, Revised Article 1 provides
that the law of any state may be adopted without regard to the reasonable relationship
test. For consumer contracts, Revised Article 1 allows for the same rule, except that a
consumer may not be deprived of legal rights afforded by the law of the state where
the consumer resides or takes delivery of the goods. Most states that have adopted
Revised Article 1 have carved out this revision and carry forward some version of the
reasonable relationship test.
Revised Article 1 will likely be offered to the Kentucky Legislature with the next
significant amendments to the VCC.
Article 2 - Sales
Kentucky and all of its sister states cling to the 1960 version of Article 2 on sales.
Amendments to Article 2, offered to the states in 2003, are before the legislatures of Kansas and
Nevada but have not been introduced in any other state. No state has yet adopted the proprosed
amendments. Significant changes in Article 2 include:
• Newly defined terms and new provisions to facilitate electronic transactions.
• Increase in the statute of frauds dollar amount from $500 to $5,000.
• Special protections afforded consumers in consumer contracts, a departure from the
existing unitary approach.
• Two new statutory express warranties available to remote purchasers based on
statements that articulate an affirmation of fact, promise, or description, where the
statements are on a record packaged with or accompanying goods, or in an
advertisement or similar communication to the public.
• Shipment terms such as FOB, FAS, and CIF would be repealed as outmoded.
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The warranty provisions have been particularly controversial. The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has expressed concern over the slowness of the states
in adopting the proposed amendments to Article 2. There is little likelihood the amendments will
be introduced in the Kentucky Legislature in the near future.
Article 2A - Leases
Kentucky quickly adopted both the original verSIon of Article 2A and its 1990
amendments. There are proposed changes for Article 2A that reflect the changes in Article 2 on
sales. However, as with the amendments to Article 2, there is little likelihood of adoption in
Kentucky in the foreseeable future.
Recent Case Law Under Articles 2 and 2A
Wise v. Alpha Leasing Company, Inc., 2002-CA-001254 (Ky. App. Aug. 8, 2003) (Not to be
published).
The leasing company was protected from an action based on breach of implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose through application of KRS 355.2A-
212 and 355.2A-213, which contain exceptions for a "finance lease." The lessor is
protected from these claims when the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the
leased goods.
Goodin v. TBF Financial, 2004 WL 813352, 53 UCC Rep. Serve 2D 265, 2002-CA-001336 (Ky.
App. April 16, 2004) (Not to be published).
Lessors have the right to calculate damages due on the default of a lessee under KRS
355.2A-528, or by any method adopted by the parties in the lease agreement.
Barnes v. Community Trust Bank, 121 S.W.3d 520 (Ky. App. 2003).
The bank obtained summary judgment in the Madison Circuit Court for a deficiency due
under a retail installment contract. (Retail installment contracts for the purchase of a
motor vehicle are governed by KRS 190.090 et seq.) The lawsuit to enforce the contract
was filed five and one half years after the bank repossessed and sold its collateral. The
issue raised by Barnes on appeal was whether the action was barred by the 4-year statute
of limitation in KRS 355.2-725. Until Barnes, purchasers/assignees of retail motor
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vehicle paper in Kentucky had always assumed the applicable statute of limitation was
the 15-year contract statute, KRS 413.090.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Barnes and held that "an action for breach of a
contract for sale ... should have been brought within four years of defendant's breach."
Although deciding the case under Article 2, Judge Huddleston, writing for a unanimous
court, reached out to the commercial reasonability test of Article 9 in writing the
decision, despite Article 2's exclusion of security transactions. See, KRS 355.2-102.
In its Opinion, the Court neither discussed nor analyzed KRS 355.2-102, the scope
section of Article 2, that holds transactions intended to operate only as a security
transaction, are excluded from Article 2, even if the transaction is in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell. Professor Hawkland harmonizes the intersection of Article
2 and Article 9 in this manner: "If a question arises as to the quality of the goods sold, the
warranty sections of Article 2 will govern, but the rights of the seller to foreclose will be
governed by Part [6] of Article 9." Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series, § 2-
102:5. Presumably the right to foreclose also included the right to collect the deficiency.
Neither does the Kentucky decision address a decision of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina that found that state's legislature intended Article 9 to govern the security
aspects of purchase money security agreements (including retail installment sale
contracts), rejected the application of the 4-year statute of Article 2 § 725, and applied
that state's 10-year statute of limitation for "sealed instruments."
Kentucky became the eighth state in the nation to apply the 4-year statute of Article 2 to
the enforcement of motor vehicle retail installment contracts. (Maryland, one of the other
states, applied the 4-year statute in lieu of a shorter statute for the enforcement of general
contract obligations.)
When a purchaser finances a motor vehicle by means of a note and security agreement,
with a bank or credit union, the applicable statute of limitation is the new 6-year statute
under KRS 355.3-118. Senate Bill 114, in the 2005 Legislature, sought to harmonize the
statutes of limitation for the two primary means of financing motor vehicles by adopting
a similar 6-year statute to enforce contracts under KRS Chapter 190. The bill passed the
senate and died in house committee.
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The Barnes decision requires the holders of motor vehicle retail installment contracts to
decide from what date the 4-year statute of limitation runs. Options are the date the
customer first misses a payment, the date the holder accelerates the balance due under the
contract, the date of sale in the event of repossession, or the maturity date. There is also
the issue of whether payments subsequent to any of these events toll the statute of
limitation. There are Kentucky cases, outside the area of retail installment contracts, that
suggest subsequent payments on a debt toll a statute of limitation. However, without
legislative relief, it is safe to say that if there has ever been a four year gap in payments,
the statute has run.
Articles 3 and 4 - Negotiable Instruments and Bank Deposits and Collections
Kentucky and 45 other states use the 1990 amendments to Articles 3 and 4. Two states,
New York and South Carolina, have not yet adopted the 1990 amendments. Arkansas and
Minnesota have adopted the limited amendments promulgated in 2002, and the amendments
have been introduced in Nevada. The 2002 amendments:
• Allow reversal of payment on "preauthorized drafts" drawn on consumer accounts,
allowing fraud losses to be shifted to the bank of first deposit.
• Revise 3-603 to make a debtor on a note subject to double liability only if the debtor
continues to make payments to the original holder after receiving notice of a transfer,
conforming to real estate mortgage law.
• Confirms the right of an assignee to recover on an instrument lost by the assignor.
• Conform the suretyship rules of 3-419 and 3-605 to the Restatement of Suretyship
and Guaranty.
• Make various amendments to implement the policy of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act.
• Provide, similar to 9-404, that a note for which the FTC requires a notice to be
included will be treated as if the notice has been included whether it appears on the
note or not.
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Technology has so outpaced Articles 3 and 4, even the 2002 amendments, that there has
been no rush to adopt the amendments and an overhaul, particularly to address ACH
transactions, is being considered.
Recent Case Law Under Articles 3 and 4
Bradley v. National City Bank of Kentucky, 2004 WL 3017297, 2003-CA-002711 (Ky. App.
December 30, 2004) (Not to be published).
Action against a bank to recover on converted negotiable instruments was barred by the
three-year statute of limitation under KRS 355.3-118(7)(a). The discovery rule does not
apply to the statute of limitation on a suit against a depository bank.
Jones v. Christian County School Employees Federal Credit Union, 2002-CA-001635 (Ky. App.
Jan. 23, 2004) (Not to be published).
Jones sought recovery from the credit union for conversion of a draft through forgery of
Jones' endorsement as a co-payee. This is another action involving the statute of
limitation under KRS 355.3-118, where the Court correctly applied subsection 7(a) to bar
an action for conversion of an instrument more than three years after the claim for relief
accrues.
Morgan v. Crawford, 106 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. App. 2003).
This case correctly applied Revised Article 3 regarding payment in full checks. The court
noted that revisions to KRS 355.1-207(2) and KRS 355.3-311 in 1997 overruled the
earlier Court of Appeals decision in Ditch Witch Trenching Co., of Ky., Inc. v. C & S
Carpentry Services, Inc., 812 S.W. 2d 171 (Ky. App. 1991).
KRS 355.3-311 (effective January 1,1997) specifically provides that if a person against
whom a claim is asserted proves (a) that he in good faith tendered an instrument as
payment in full satisfaction, (b) the amount was unliquidated or subject to a bone fide
dispute, (c) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, and (d) the instrument, or
an accompanying writing, contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the
instrument was.tendered as full satisfaction of the claim, then the claim is discharged.
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In this case, the appellant had stricken the payment in full language from a check,
negotiated the instrument, and brought a claim for an alleged balance due. Under former
Article 3 this was the equivalent of negotiating under protest. It does not work today.2
The Cecilian Bank v. Sarver, 2003 WL 23005721, 2002-CA-000076 (Ky. App. Dec. 24,2003)
(Not to be published) (Motion for discr. review granted Nov. 20, 2004, in 2004-SC-000036;
dismissed as settled Feb. 8, 2005).
The appeal on this case was dismissed by agreement of parties following the grant of
discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The decision of the Court of
Appeals will not be published. However, the underlying decision from the Court of
Appeals is instructive as to the transition between the former 15 year statute of limitation
on enforcement of a note and the 6 year statute adopted effective January 1, 1997.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals vacated a judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court which
ruled the bank's suit on a note was outside the applicable statute of limitation. The 1990
revisions to Article 3 (effective in Kentucky January 1, 1997) provide, at KRS 355.3-
118(1): "[A]n action to enforce the obligation of a party to a note payable at a definite
time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note
or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date."
The note matured January 15, 1994. The suit to enforce the note was not brought until
August 31, 2000. The trial court found the action untimely and entered judgment for the
defendant. Applying KRS 446.080(3), the Kentucky Court of Appeals found the new
statute of limitation to be only prospective in nature and inappropriately applied by the
trial court as retroactive.
Prior to the enactment of KRS 355.3-118, the applicable statute of limitation was the 15-
year statute for written contracts, KRS 413.090. Now, 3-118 sets out a series of statutes
of limitation for various forms of instruments, note~, and drafts.
2 Section 3-311(3) includes certain exceptions to the discharge rule - one for organizations
that published a designation of a person or office for handling disputed claims, and
another for refunds of the amount tendered within 90 days. However, actual knowledge
of the payer's "full satisfaction" intent will defeat either exception and result in
discharge. 3-311 (4).
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Article 4A - Funds Transfers
In Re calumet Farm, Inc, In Re Calumet Farm, Inc.: First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Brandt,
398 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2005), reh. en banc denied, March 16, 2005.
A wire transfer was botched to the extent that $770,301.58 was wired rather than
$77,301.58. The bank attempted to recover the overpayment from the recipient of the
wire transfer. The recipient defended on the discharge for value rule. The Court ruled that
under Kentucky law a beneficiary of a wire transfer may properly invoke the discharge
for value rule, and retain funds erroneously transmitted, unless the beneficiary is notified '
of the error before it discharges debt based on the receipt of value. In essence, the Court
ruled that a creditor becomes a bona fide purchaser and may keep a payment made by
mistake as long as the creditor discharges an obligation of its debtor before it becomes
aware of the mistake. However, the Sixth Circuit found the recipient had prior notice of
the mistake and could not retain the funds based on the discharge for value rule.
Article 7 - Documents of Title
A Revised Article 7 was offered to the states in 2003 and has been adopted by 8 states,
including Kentucky's neighboring state of Virginia. The Article is before the legislatures of 12
additional states, including the bordering states of Illinois and West Virginia. The primary
purpose of the revision is to allow for the development of electronic documents of title and to
update the original 1960 Article for modem times in light of state, federal, and international
developments.
Revised Article 7 provides for the legal recognition of electronic documents of title,
issues of authentication, application of the statute of frauds to electronic documents, and
interchangeability of electronic and paper documents. The revision adopts the concept of
"control" first developed in Article 8 for investment securities. The concept of "control" is also
used in Article 9 with respect to security interests in securities, financial assets, and investment
accounts. "Control" also applies in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act regarding the
negotiation of promissory notes. In Revised Article 7, "control" likewise provides the electronic
equivalent ofnegotiation.
There have been so few cases under Article 7 in Kentucky that any effort to adopt the
revisions in Kentucky will probably be paired with the revision effort for some other Article of
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the VCC. However, the modernization of Kentucky's law may be of great importance to the
growth in logistics businesses, and to those who finance such businesses.
Article 9 - Secured Transactions
Recent Case Law Under Article 9
Layne v. Bank One, Kentucky, NA., 395 F.3d 271 (6th eire 2005).
The plaintiffs borrowed money and secured their loans with shares of publicly traded
common stock in the company of which they were principals. When the market price of
the stock fell precipitously, the bank did not sell the stock but entered into discussions
with its borrowers to obtain additional collateral.
The debtors argued that the bank's failure to promptly sell the shares that held the
collateral constituted the failure to exercise reasonable care in the custody and
preservation of its collateral. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that duty does not include
the duty to sell stock before a stock declines in value, even if the bank was at one time
over secured.
There was proof in the case that the debtors never specifically requested that the bank sell
the stock after it declined below the required loan to value ratio. Predicting how
Kentucky would rule, the Sixth Circuit held that a lender is under no obligation to sell
shares of stock, and that if a borrower is concerned about share value it is the borrower's
responsibility to take remedial steps such as paying off a loan or substituting other assets
for the pledged shares. The Sixth Circuit further held that the sale of the publicly traded
shares on a recognized national market was per se commercial reasonable; citing Revised
Article 9, KRS 355.9-610 and KRS 355.9-627(2).
Brock v. Community Trust Bank, 2005 WL 37146, 2004-CA-000301 (Ky. App. Feb. 11,2005)
(Not to be published).
The bank's notice of sale for a repossessed motor vehicle notified the debtor that the
vehicle would be sold on January 18,2001. However, the notice cut off the debtor's right
of redemption at 5:00 p.m. on January 15,2001. Although there is case law in other states
that a debtor's right of redemption continues until the auctioneer's hammer falls, in this
unpublished decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the bank's contract with
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the auction company constituted the fonn of contract for sale referred to in fonner KRS
355.9-506 and that the notice of disposition was sufficient under fonner KRS 355.9-504.
Another important point of the case is the allegation by debtor's counsel that the bank
violated KRS 190.090 (motor vehicle installment contracts) by assessing a $75
processing fee to creditor as part of the principal balance on the contract. The court found
that the $75 fee was initially added to the balance, but subsequently deducted on a line
titled "Less: Prepaid Finance Charges." The court thus concluded that the processing fee
was not included in the principal balance of the contract and that the bank did not violate
the motor vehicle installment contract act.
In Re Howard: Howard v. Whitesville Credit Union, 312 Bankr. 840 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 2004).
The court found a note's future advance clause enforceable under Kentucky law and held
that collateral for the first note served as security for a second note and that the motor
vehicle in question remained encumbered until the second note was paid in full. The
court specifically held that "(f)uture advances clauses are generally enforceable in
Kentucky." The court noted that in consumer credit cases the future advance should be of
the same class as the general advance but under the facts of the case found the
appropriate tests were met in that both transactions involved the purchase of vehicles.
Kentucky's Secretary of State Filing System
Kentucky completes the transition period from fonner Article 9 to Revised Article 9 at
12:01 a.m. July 1, 2006. All locally filed financing statements (except those covering as-
extracted collateral, timber to be cut, or made as fixture filings) will cease to be effective June
30, 2006,3 unless they have been refiled through an initial in-lieu-of continuation statement with
the Kentucky Secretary of State, or, for debtors that are organizations organized under the laws
of another state or who are natural persons resident in another state, the appropriate central filing
office of that state (usually the secretary of state's office). Except for the narrow classes of
collateral in which local filing remains appropriate, after June 30, 2006, it will no longer be
3 Presumably at the end of June 30, 2006. The statute, KRS 355.9-705(3)(b), indicates the
date but not a time. The official comments to 9-705 offer no help. However, Part 7 of
Article 9 includes several references to financing statements filed before July 1, 2001,
leading to the inference that 12:00 p.m. June 30 is the time intended.
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necessary to search the records of county clerk's offices, and a complete VCC financing
statement search can be accomplished on the web site of the Kentucky Secretary of State.
Incomplete and incorrect in-lieu filings will continue to cause confusion and problems for
years to come. Common problems include omission of a collateral description, omission of the
local office filing date or file numbers, omission of the magic words "which financing statement
remains effective," and attaching as exhibits (some with and sometimes without a reference
incorporating the exhibits) the prior financing statement that does not use the collateral
terminology now in Revised Article 9. In Kentucky, these problems can arise only with paper
filings - these mistakes cannot be made with electronic filings because the Secretary's web site
prevents these errors. While in-lieu filings will not be made after June 30, 2006, creditors will
continue to rely on in-lieu filings that were made, and junior creditors and trustees in bankruptcy
will examine the in-lieu filings in search of such errors.
A potential safety net may exist in KRS 355.9-506, which states what is known as the
minor errors rule. It provides: "A financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of
this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make
the financing statement seriously misleading." The reference to "this part" means Part 5 of
Article 9, but the in-lieu requirements are set out in Part 7, specifically, KRS 355.9-706(3). The
additional information requirements for an in-lieu initial financing statement are: (a) to identify
the financing statement being continued by the office in which it was filed, the date of filing and
file numbers of the financing statement, and the date of filing and file number (if any) of the
most recent continuation statement, and (b) to affirmatively declare that the now identified prior
financing statement "remains effective." On its face, the minor errors rule does not apply to the
in-lieu information. It is therefore unclear whether the minor errors rule would save an in-lieu
financing statement that omitted a filing date or transposed a filing number. If the minor errors
rule does not apply, such an in-lieu financing statement is potentially defective, and the creditor's
security interest would be unperfected. However, the drafters of Revised Article 9 agree that it
was intended that the minor errors rule should apply to all financing statements, including those
filed under 9-706. Professor Richard H. Nowka has written an excellent article arguing that the
minor errors rule of 9-506 covers the information required by 9-706(3). See, Minor Errors in "In-
Lieu-Of' Statements Under V.C.C. Section 9-706: Did The Drafters Of Revised Article 9 Forget
The Safety Net?, 42 Brandeis L.J. 721, Summer 2004.
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The drafters of Revised Article 9 inadvertently created one potential glitch for secured
parties. For a financing statement that would have expired during the last six months of 2001, a
continuation statement filed locally during the six months preceding that expiration date would.
under prior law. have continued the effective period of the financing statement for another five
years from the expiration date. For instance, a continuation statement filed in the appropriate
county clerk's office on May 1, 2001, would have continued a financing statement that had been
filed on November 1, 1996, and established a new expiration date of November 1, 2006.
However, June 30, 2006, is a "drop dead" date for the transition from former Article 9 to Revised
Article 9. All financing statements continued with local filings during January through June 2001
will cease to be effective, regardless of the expiration date under former Article 9, at the end of
June 30, 2006.
Secretary of State Trey Grayson continues to build on the accomplishments of his
predecessor, John Y. Brown, III (both University of Kentucky College of Law graduates), in
establishing for Kentucky one of the best, most utilitarian, and most economic electronic filing
systems in the nation. The only glitch thus far discovered in the electronic system is the
availability of information on amendments that electronically terminate either paper or
electronically filed financing statements. To amend a financing statement, including an
amendment of termination, Revised Article 9 requires the name of the secured party of record
that authorized the amendment or an affirmative indication that the termination is authorized by a
debtor, providing the name of the debtor authorizing the amendment. This data is not now being
displayed by the computer system for terminations filed electronically, although the data is
required to be input by the person doing the filing. The fraud implications are apparent. While an
unauthorized termination is not effective as to the properly perfected secured party, a subsequent
secured party that relies on the electronic termination cannot verify from the system that a
termination was properly authorized.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
The issue of federal preemption of state banking law arises in a variety of contexts, from
interest rate exportation, to the substantive regulation of abusive lending practices, even to the
regulation of ATM charges. Traditionally, it has arisen with regard to national banks and federal
thrift institutions, but increasingly, some suggest that state banks insured by the FDIC may also
invoke preemption under a variety of theories.
This outline briefly reviews the theoretical basis for the doctrine of federal preemption,
the steps the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") is taking to address abusive
lending practices, the concerns of state banking regulators, the implications of proposed federal
predatory lending law, and finally, a new FDIC rulemaking scheduled to begin in May 2005.
In a speech on February 11, 2002, former Comptroller John D. Hawke, Jr., laid out the
theoretical case for federal preemption for national banks in a nutshell:
"There is no question that national banks' immunity from many
state laws is a significant benefit of the national charter - a benefit
tha.t the OCC has fought hard over the years to preserve. The
ability ofnational banks to conduct a multi-state business subject
to a single uniform set of federal laws, under the supervision of a
single regulator, free from visitorial powers of various state
authorities, is a major advantage of the national charter."
Many state regulators and legislators, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors,
consumer groups and others believe the agency's preemption efforts are nothing more than a
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power grab. While the OCC has generally been thought to be on firm ground in defending its
preemption authority in the courts, the agency may have been less successful in defending
preemption in the press and the court of public opinion.
This most recent preemption controversy is largely centered around whether a national
bank is subject to a host of relatively new state laws pertaining to unfair, deceptive, predatory or
abusive lending practices and other state instituted consumer protection issues. Furthermore, the
controversy extends to who has the authority to enforce compliance with these state laws. The
OCC's position is generally that these state laws are largely preempted by federal law and,
accordingly, not applicable to national banks and their operating subsidiaries and the OCC has
sole "visitorial" authority (i.e., supervisory and enforcement authority) over national banks and
their operating subsidiaries, except where federal law permits states to act. According to the
acc, the doctrine of federal preemption is nothing new; it has been well established for more
than one hundred years. The states largely argue that preemption undercuts their ability to
regulate abusive lending practices within their jurisdictions, thereby damaging the state bank
system, and ultimately destroying the "dual banking system." (See Press Release concerning
New York v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., Exhibit D.)
Meanwhile, Congress is again turning its attention to the problem of abusive lending
practices. Congress had enacted the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA")
back in 1994. Many states felt that the federal act provided insufficient protection to consumers,
and moved to adopt their own, more restrictive, predatory lending acts (including Kentucky, at
KRS 360.100(2003)). However, Congress continues to entertain more extensive regulation in
the area, and such regulation could preempt state predatory lending laws. For example, currently
G - 2
under consideration is H.R. 1182, which is based on the original North Carolina predatory
lending bill, and would preempt state law in this area.
Finally, on March 21, 2005, the FDIC announced the initiation of a rulemaking to
consider a petition to preempt certain state laws as applied to regulate the activities of federally-
insured state banks. 70 Fed. Reg. 13413 (March 21, 2005). The petitioners argue that the
regulation is necessary to protect parity with national banks. The state regulatory authorities
rejoin that such preemption would create a unitary banking system and render state bank
regulation irrelevant. If adopted, such FDIC rules would indeed have far-reaching implications
for the regulation of state banks.
II. What is the Dual Banking System?
The OCC describes the Dual Banking System as follows:
"The 'dual banking system' refers to the parallel state and federal
banking systems that co-exist in the United States. The federal
system is based on a federal bank charter, powers defined under
federal law, operation under federal standards, and oversight by a
federal supervisor. The state system is characterized by state
chartering, bank powers established under state law, and operation
under state standards, including oversight by state supervisors."
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks and the
Dual Banking System (2003).
III. What is the Role of Federal Preemption?
In a news release for a speech given on February 12, 2002, Comptroller Hawke described
the role ofpreemption by saying:
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"In his speech, the Comptroller described the role of federal
preemption. Acting under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, the courts have consistently limited the ability of
states to prevent or significantly interfere with lawful activities of
national banks. The courts have held that states may not prevent
national banks from engaging in congressionally-granted powers,
or stand as an obstacle to the purposes for which the national bank
charter was created. In addition, the states may not regulate at all
in areas where federal interest predominates or where Congress has
fully 'occupied the field ..... ' The Comptroller noted that
preemption must be 'value-blind' with respect to the desirability of
the state law involved. In preemption situations, the only relevant
issue is whether the state law would impair or significantly
interfere with a national bank's exercise of powers granted to it
under federal law."
IV. What is the Rule Dealing with Visitorial Powers for National Banks?
In September 2003, the acc released a paper entitled National Banks and the Dual
Banking System, which describes dual banking and visitorial powers by the acc for a national
bank as follows:
"Preemption of state laws that would 'retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control' national banks' ability to exercise powers
authorized under federal law, and the acc's extensive, virtually
exclusive 'visitorial powers' over national banks, are differences in
national and state bank powers and supervisory implementation
that are not inconsistent with the dual banking system; they are the
defining characteristics of it....The allocation of any supervisory
responsibility for the new national banking system to the states
would have been inconsistent with this need to protect national
banks from state interference. Congress, accordingly, established a
federal supervisory regime and vested responsibility to carry it out
in the newly created acc. Congress granted the acc the broad
authority 'to make a thorough examination into all the affairs of [a
national bank],17 and solidified this federal supervisory authority
by vesting the acc with exclusive 'visitorial powers' over
national banks. These provisions assured, among other things, that
the acc would have comprehensive authority to examine all the
affairs of a national bank and protect national banks from potential
state hostility by establishing that the authority to examine national
banks is vested only in the acc, unless otherwise provided by
federal law. 18"
17Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 54, 13 Stat. 116, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 481.
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18Writing shortly after the Currency Act and National Bank Act were enacted,
then-Secretary of the Treasury, and formerly the fITst Comptroller of the
Currency, Hugh McCulloch observed that "Congress has assumed entire control
of the currency of the country, and, to a very considerable extent, of its bankin!
interests, prohibiting the interference of State governments." Congo Globe, 39
Cong., 1st Sess., Misc. Doc. No. 100, at 2 (Apr. 23, 1866).
v. How is the acc Regulating National Banks in the Predatory or Abusive Lending Area?
In 2002, the acc issued two advisory letters containing guidance to national banks
pertaining to unfair or deceptive acts or practices and applicability and enforcement of state laws.
1. Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practice (OCC Advisory Letter
2002-3)
a. The advisory letter advises national banks and their operating
subsidiaries pertaining to risks of engaging in lending or
marketing practices that may constitute unfair or deceptive
acts that would likely mislead a reasonable consumer in a
material way. The acc noted concern that increased
competition may have permitted more aggressive marketing
by banks to borrowers who cannot afford the terms offered.
b. The advisory letter cautions national banks and their operating
subsidiaries about the consequences of engaging in unfair or
deceptive practices which include litigation, enforcement
actions, monetary judgments, penalties and reputational risks.
c. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15
USC 45(a)(I), prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce." Under Section 8 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §1818, the OCC may take
appropriate enforcement actions against national banks and
their subsidiaries for violations of any law or :regulation.
d. The advisory letter provides other examples of federal statutes
regulating unfair or deceptive practices include "Credit
Practices Rule, 12 C.F.R. 227 (Regulation AA); Truth in
Lending Act and the Federal Reserve's Regulation Z; Equal
Credit Opportunity Act; Privacy Regulations, 12 C.F.R. 40;
and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
e. The advisory letter provides practical guidelines to assist a
bank manage risks in this area and improve consumer
information and service.
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2. Questions Concerning Applicability ofEnforcement ofState Laws:
Contacts from State Officials (aCC Advisory Letter 2002-9)
a. The advisory letter reviews general principles to determine if
a state law applies to a national bank or its operating
subsidiary and provides statutory authority of the ace to
regulate national banks, to examine national banks for
compliance with federal and applicable state laws, and to
enforce these laws.
b. The advisory letter notes that "state retain some power to
regulate national banks in areas such as "contracts, debt
collection, acquisition and transfer ofproperty, and taxation,
zoning, criminal, and tort laws."
c. The advisory letter states that national banks are not subject to
state visitorial powers other than as authorized by federal law.
The advisory letter requests national banks to consult with the
·ace if contacted by state officials.
In 2003, the ace issued two advisory letters containing guidance to national banks to
prevent abusive lending practices in connection with direct or brokered loan transactions. In
addition, the ace won a case establishing that its visitorial authority extended to operating
subsidiaries of national banks.
1. Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive
Lending Practice (Oee Advisory Letter 2003-2)
a. The advisory letters provide guidance to national banks and
their operating subsidiaries on lending practices that are
considered "predatory" or "abusive" to ensure that national
banks do not undertake predatory lending.
b. National banks should adopt policy and procedures that a
borrower has the capacity to make scheduled payments for a
loan and the making of a loan to a consumer is not based
solely upon the foreclosure value of the collateral.
c. National banks and their subsidiaries are cautioned against the
following practices which should be addressed in their loan
policies that would be considered abusive practices:
(i) frequent sequential loan refinancings with little benefit
to consumer but generating fees for lender ("loan
flipping");
G - 6
(ii) refinancing of special subsidized mortgages (that
contain favorable terms which may be lost in a
refinancing) (for example, low-interest loans made by
governmental or nonprofit lenders to low-income
borrowers);
(iii) balloon payments to conceal true burden of financing;
(iv) "packing" of excessive and sometimes hidden fees;
(v) using loan terms such as negative amortization - to
make it difficult to repay debt;
(vi) targeting elderly or uneducated for abusive loans;
(vii) inadequate disclosure of true costs, risks, and
appropriateness to the borrower of a loan transaction.
d. Policies and procedures should prevent customer
misunderstanding of the terms and relative costs, risks and
benefits of the loan.
e. National banks should adopt policies and procedures that
provide for reporting of good credit histories to the major
credit reporting bureaus.
2. Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Brokered and
Purchased Loan (OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3)
a. The advisory letter cautions national banks and their operating
subsidiaries when purchasing or making loans that are
originated through mortgage brokers or other intermediaries,
when such loans contain abusive features or reflect predatory
lending practices.
b. National banks and their operating subsidiaries are to have
clear procedures for entering into broker and third party
originator relationships that delineate any unacceptable
characteristics for loans the national bank will acquire.
c. National banks should perform appropriate due diligence on
all third party sources before entering into business
arrangements, including background checks on compliance
with applicable licensing and consumer protection laws and
reviewing litigation, enforcement actions and consumer
complaints.
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d. National banks should develop approved lists of brokers and
originators with whom it will do business and maintain
written agreements with third parties to ensure that loans
offered to a national bank abide by the bank's policies and to
make best efforts to ensure the loans offered are consistent
with the borrower's needs, objectives and financial situation.
e. National banks should obtain written agreements between the
borrower and broker disclosing the services the broker will
provide; contain an acceptance of the services by the borrower
and the fees to be paid to the broker including a signed and
dated acknowledgement of receipt by the borrower.
f. National banks should monitor all broker and third-party loan
originations for compliance and take appropriate corrective
action where appropriate to include modification of loans and
termination of business arrangements with third parties.
3. Wells Fargo Bankv. Boutris, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (E.D.Cal. 2003). The
California corporations commissioner sought to audit the mortgage loan
subsidiary of a national bank. The U.S. District Court held that the
exclusive visitorial authority accorded the acc to inspect and regulate
national banks under the National Banking Act extends to national bank
operating subsidiaries. Thus, the California corporations commissioner's
state law authority to audit mortgage loan subsidiaries ofnational banks
was preempted by federal law.
an January 13, 2004, the acc published two final regulations that the acc has referred
to as the Preemptive Rule and the Visitorial Powers Rule. The Preemptive Rule amends 12
C.F.R. Parts 7 and 34 to add provisions clarifying the applicability of state laws to national banks
and their operating subsidiaries. The Visitorial Powers Rule amends 12 C.F.R. Part 7 and
clarifies the scope of the acc's "visitorial powers" over a national bank and its subsidiaries.
(The acc's "Questions and Answers" on these rules is attached.)
PREEMPTION RULE
Generally, the rule provides that state laws do not apply to national banks if they
"obstruct, impair or condition" a national bank's exercise of its federally authorized lending,
deposit-taking, and other powers. The rule adopts an anti-predatory lending standard for
consumer loans which prohibits national banks from making any type of consumer based loans
predominantly on the bank's realization of the foreclosure value of the borrower's collateral
without regard to the borrower's ability to repay the loan according to its terms. The rule also
invokes Section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit a national bank from engaging in unfair and
deceptive trade practices.
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1. The types of state laws that the regulation preempts includes laws
regulating loan terms, imposes conditions on lending and deposit relationships, and requires state
licenses.
2. The types of laws that are not preempted and do not affect the manner or
content ofnational bank activities such as those dealing with contracts, rights to collect debts,
acquisition and transfer of property, torts, taxation, crimes or zoning.
VISITORIAL POWERS RULE
The visitorial powers rule clarifies issues related to the OCC's exclusive visitorial powers
over national banks and their operating subsidiaries, except where federal law authorizes states to
act.
1. Visitorial powers refer to the authority to examine, supervise and regulate
the affairs of a corporate entity.
2. The OCC has exclusive visitorial powers over national banks, except
where federal laws authorize states to act.
3. State authorities may not exercise, indirectly, through the courts, rights of
visitation that the statute precludes them from exercising directly.
4. States retain the right to enforce fire codes, environmental laws, zoning
ordinances, generally applicable criminal laws, and the like.
On February 2, 2005, the OCC issued DCC Guidelines Establishing Standards for
National Banks' Residential Mortgage Lending Practices (OCC Bulletin 2005-3). The purpose
of the guidelines is to ensure that national banks and their operating subsidiaries do not become
involved in predatory, abusive, unfair, or deceptive residential mortgage lending practices.
1. Part II of the guideline requires the national bank to manage the various
risks associated with residential mortgage lending - including credit, legal, compliance and
reputational risks. Additionally, it warns banks not to become involved in abusive, predatory,
unfair or deceptive practices directly or indirectly, through mortgage brokers, or other
intermediaries or through purchased loans.
2. Part III describes certain standards for the implementation of a residential
mortgage lending program.
a. Lending practices inconsistent with sound residential
mortgage practices are as follows.
(i) Equity stripping.
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(ii) Fee packing.
(iii) Loan flipping.
(iv) Refinancing of special subsidized mortgages on terms
adverse to consumer.
(v) Encouraging a borrower to breach a contract and
default on an existing loan in connection with a
refinancing.
b. Cautions banks to use care and heightened diligence when
they offer loans that include single premium insurance,
negative amortization and mandatory arbitration that may be
susceptible to abusive, predatory, unfair or deceptive
practices. Heightened diligence is particularly required when
loans are to be provided to the elderly, to persons substantially
indebted, to persons not financially sophisticated, to persons
who have language barriers, to persons who have limited or
poor credit histories; or to persons who have other
characteristics which limit their credit choices.
c. National Banks are also cautioned to always be mindful to
mitigate risks as they go forward with real estate lending and
to insure that compliance is ongoing on a continuing basis.
d. The standards set forth in the guidelines are enforceable under
Section 39 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
§1831 p-l) and the implementing process in the OCC's
regulations at 12 C.F.R. 30.
e. This final rule is effective April 8, 2005.
VI. FDIC RULEMAKING.
On March 21, 2005, the FDIC announced a rulemaking to consider preemption of certain
state laws. The rulemaking was prompted by a petition from the Financial Services Roundtable,
a trade association of large financial institutions. The petition argues that the FDIC should adopt
rules that clarify that state banks operating across state lines should be governed by a single
framework of law and regulation to the same extent as national banks.
A. Specifically, the petition requests the FDIC to establish preemptive rules for state
insured banks "clarifying" the following areas:
1. The law applicable to activities conducted in a host state by a state bank
that has an interstate branch in that state;
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2. The law applicable to activities conducted by a state bank in a state in
which the bank does not have a branch;
3. The law applicable to activities conducted by an operating subsidiary of a
state bank;
4. The scope and application of GLBA §104(d) preemption; and
5. Implementation of interest rate exportation under the preemptive authority
ofFDIA §27.
B. The petitioner asserts that the broad preemptive authority asserted by the OCC
and supported by the courts over the last decade have given national banks a significant
competitive advantage. The petitioner argues that the survival of the 'dual banking system'
depends on clarifying and extending preemptive authority to state banks.
C. Some critics of the proposal, such as New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer,
argue that the proposal will diminish a state's ability to regulate financial institutions within their
borders, and will result in a "race to the bottom", as some states eliminate regulatory burdens in
order to entice banks to establish home offices in their jurisdiction (as South Dakota has done in
the credit card business).
D. Other critics believe that the use of federal preemption by FDIC lacks the historic
precedent that underlies the OCC's doctrine, which is based on the National Banking Act, and
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The adoption of the proposed rules risks the
demise of the 'dual banking system', in that most state rules would be subject to preemption, and
there would be a very narrow area of activity subject to state banking regulation. In the light of
these risks and the lack of established authority, such critics believe that the assertion of such a
new preemptive power must be left to Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
The OCC continues to zealously assert the doctrine of federal preemption of state laws
for national banks and their operating subsidiaries under the National Banking Act as a major
advantage of a national bank charter. In apparent response to state bank regulators and consumer
groups who charge that the OCC fails to adequately protect consumers from predatory lending,
the OCC has initiated a number of advisory letters and rules to ensure that national banks do not
engage in abusive consumer practices.
Congress may eventually choose to adopt a comprehensive national lending rule dealing
with predatory lending that would, by preempting local authority over predatory lending, create a
level playing field for all commercial banks. The importance of ratings agencies in the
securitization market is already applying pressure toward a uniform national solution.
The resolution of the recent FDIC petition concerning the use of federal preemption
powers for the benefit of state insured banks will have important consequences for the future of
the "Dual Banking System."
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Preemption Final Rule
Questions and Answers
January 7, 2004
I. INTRODUCTION
What action is the DeC taking today?
The DCC is issuing a final rule (Final Rule) amending its regulations to add provisions clarifying
the applicability of state law to national banks' lending, deposit-taking, and other operations.
The Final Rule identifies types of state laws that are preempted by Federallaw and therefore not
applicable to national banks. Most of these laws have already been found to be preempted by a
Federal cowt, the acc, or the Office ofThrift Supervision in its comparable rules applicable to
Federal thrifts.1
In addition, the Final Rule identifies types of state laws that are not preempted. These types of
laws generally create the legal infrastructure that enables or facilitates the exercise of a Federal
banking power.
Along with these preemption provisions, we are also adopting important new anti-predatory
lending standards governing national banks t lending activities - nationwide.
What action is the OeC!!!l!. taking today?
The acc is not authorizing any new national bank activities or powers, such as the ability to
engage in real estate brokerage.
In addition, although we believe the statute authorizing national banks' real estate lending
activities (12 U.S.C. § 371) could permit the acc to occupy the field ofnational bank real estate
lending through regulation, we have declined to announce such a position in the Final Rule.
Finally, the Final Rule makes no changes to the acc's rules governing the activities of operating
subsidiaries. As already set out in 12 CFR 5.34, 7.4006, and 34.1 (b), national bank operating
subsidiaries conduct their activities subject to the same terms and conditions as apply to the
parent banks. Therefore, by virtue o/regulations already in place, the Final Rule applies equally
to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
What types ofstate laws will be preempted under the Final Rule?
The Final Rule sets out types of state statutes that are preempted in the areas of real estate
lending, other lending, and deposit taking. For lending, they include licensing laws, laws that
address the terms of credit, permissible rates of interest, escrow accounts, and disclosure and
advertising. For deposit-taking (in addition to laws dealing with disclosure requirements and
1 See attached chart comparing the OCC's regulations with the regulations of the OTS and NellA.
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EXHIBIT
A.
licensing and registration requirements), they include laws that address abandoned and dormant
accounts, checking accounts, and funds availability. These lists reflect DCC opinions, court
decisions, comparable rules applicable to Federal thrifts, and the application of traditional,
judicially recognized standards ofpreemption. These lists are not intended to be exhaustive - the
ace may identify, and address on a case-by-case basis, other types of state laws that are
preempted.
In addition, with regard to bank operations, the Final Rule states that except where made
applicable by Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's exercise
ofpowers granted under Federal law do not apply to national banks. This provision applies to
any national bank power or aspect of a national bank's powers that is not covered by another
ace regulation specifically addressing the applicability of state law.
What types ofstate laws will NOT be preempted under the Final Rule?
The Final Rule also sets out examples of the types of state laws that are not preempted and would
be applicable to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the lending,
deposit-taking, or other operations of national banks. These include laws on contracts, rights to
collect debts, acquisition and transfer ofproperty, taxation, zoning, crimes, and torts. In
addition, any other law that the OCC determines to only incidentally affect national banks'
lending, deposit-taking, or other operations would not be preempted under the Final Rule.
What changes have been made in the final rule that differ from the proposal?
The final rule makes several changes to the anti-predatory lending standard. First,· the final rule
revises the anti-predatory lending standard so that it expressly prohibits national banks from
engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act in making any
loans. In addition, the final rule revises the anti-predatory lending standard to clarify that it
applies to consumer loans only (those for personal, family, and household purposes). Finally, it
clarifies that the anti-predatory lending standard is not intended to prohibit legitimate collateral-
based loans, such as reverse mortgages, where the borrower understands that it is likely or
expected that the collateral will be used to repay the debt.
The final rule states that except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that "obstruct,
impair, or condition" a national bank's exercise ofpowers granted under Federal law do not
apply to national banks. These tenns, which are drawn directly from Supreme Court precedents,
differ somewhat from the wording in ~e proposal, but the substantive effect - which is to
encapsulate the preemption standards used by the Supreme Court - is the same.
The lists of the types of state laws that are and are not preempted in the final rule are
substantially the same as the lists in the proposal.
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II. REASONS AND AUTHORITY FOR THIS RULE
Why is the DeC taking this action now?
Markets for credit, deposits, and many other financial products and services are now national, if
not international, in scope, as a result of technological innovations, erosions of legal barriers, and
our increasingly mobile society. These changes mean that now, more than ever, the imposition
ofan overlay of state and local standards and requirements on top of the Federal standards to
which national banks already are subject, imposes excessively costly, and unnecessary,
regulatory burdens.
In recent years, this burden has been getting worse, as states and localities have increasingly tried
to apply state and local laws to national bank activities that are already subject to Federal
regulation, curtailing national banks' ability to conduct operations to the full extent authorized by
Federal law.
These state and local laws - including laws regulating fees, disclosures, conditions on lending,
and licensing - have created higher costs, potential litigation exposure, and operational
challenges. As a result, national banks must absorb the costs, pass the costs on to consumers, or
discontinue offering various products in jurisdictions where the costs or exposure to uncertain
liabilities are prohibitive.
When national banks are unable to operate under uniform, consistent and predictable standards,
their business suffers, which negatively affects their safety and soundness. This rulemaking will
enable national banks to exercise fully their Federal powers pursuant to uniform standards,
applied by the acc. As a result, national banks will be able to operate with more predictability
and efficiency, consistent with the national character of the national banking system, and in
furtherance of the safe and sound operations ofall national banks.
What authorizes the OCC to issue the Final Rule?
The OCC's authority to issue the preemption regulation comes from both 12 U.S.C. § 93a (for all
activities) and 12 U.S.C. § 371 (specifically relating to real estate lending). In CSBS v. Conover,
the D.C. Circuit expressly held that the Comptroller has the authority under § 93a to issue
regulations preempting state laws that are inconsistent with the activities pennissible under
Federal law for national banks and under § 371 to issue a regulation that preempts aspects of
state laws regarding real estate lending.2
Does the OTS have broader authority under the Home Owners' Loan Act to preempt the
application ofstate laws to federal thrifts than the oec has for national banks?
No. While the HOLA uses a different formulation to describe the authority of the OTS, we
believe those differences are not material for purposes ofour rulemaking authority.
2 CSBS v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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The HOLA directs the OTS to "provide for the examination, safe and sound operation, and
regulation of savings associations," and authorizes the OTS to issue "such regulations as the
Director determines to be appropriate to carry out the responsibilities of the Director or the
Office." Elsewhere, the HOLA states that the Director is authorized "to provide for the
organization,. incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known
as Federal savings association and to issue charters therefore, giving primary consideration of the
best practices of thrift institutions in the United States."
The National Bank Act, at 12 U.S.C. § 93a, states that, "Except to the extent that authority to
issue such rules and regulations has been expressly and exclusively granted to another regulatory
agency, the Comptroller ofthe Currency is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry
out the responsibilities of the office, except that the authority conferred by this section does not
apply to section 36 of this title [governing branching] or to securities activities ofNational Banks
under the Act commonly known as the 'Glass-Steagall Act. n,
In addition to the general authority vested by section 93a, other statutes vest the acc with
authority to issue regulations to implement a specific statutory grant of authority. For instance,
12 U.S.C. § 371 vests the OCC with the authority to impose "restrictions and requirements" on
national banks' authority to make real estate loans. The general rulemaking authority vested in
the ace by section 93a, coupled with the more specific grants ofauthority in section 371 and
elsewhere, provide the oce with rulemaking authority that is comparably broad to that of the
OTS.
Won't the OCC's preemption rule have the effect ofgiving national banks a competitive
advantage over state-chartered institutions?
OUf actions are part of the oce's ongoing effort to ensure that national banks are able to meet
the needs of their communities in the most effective and efficient manner possible. As part of
that effort, we periodically see a need to respond to attempts by states and municipalities to
regulate the exercise of Federal powers permitted under the National Bank Act.
States remain free to be the laboratories of change that have led to many significant
improvements in the delivery offmancial products and services. Each ofus is responsible for
ensuring that the institutions we regulate remain fmancially strong and competitive. However,
when the states act in a way that conflicts with the powers granted to national banks by Federal
law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution dictates that the state law is
preempted.
III. PREEMPTION STANDARDS
Is the oecoccupying thefleld with regard to national banks' real estate lending acti'Vities?
No. Part 34 of our rules implements 12 U.S.C. § 371, which provides a broad grant ofauthority
to national banks to engage in real estate lending. The only qualification in the statute is that
these Federal powers are subject "to section 1828(0) of this title [which requires the adoption of
uniform Federal safety and soundness standards governing real estate lending] and such
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restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by regulation or
order."
As originally enacted, § 371 contained a limited grant ofauthority to national banks to engage in
real estate lending. Over the years, Congress broadened § 371, giving the acc the wide-ranging
regulatory authority it has today. While we believe the history of § 371 indicates that Congress
left open the possibility that the ace would occupy the field ofnational bank: real estate lending
through regulation, the OCC has not exercised the full authority inherent in § 371 in the Final
Rule. Thus, in the proposal, we invited comment on whether it would be appropriate to assert
occupation of the entire field of real estate lending.
Upon further consideration of this issue and careful review of comments submitted pertaining to
this point, we have concluded that the effect of such labeling is largely immaterial, and thus we
decline to attach a particular label to the approach reflected in the Final Rule. We rely on our
authority under both §§ 93a and 371, and to the extent that an issue arises concerning the
application ofa state law not specifically addressed in the final regulation, we retain the ability to
address those questions through interpretation of the regulation, issuance oforders pursuant to
our authority under § 371, Of, if warranted by the significance of the issue, by rulemaking to
amend the regulation.
How does the preemption standard included in the Final Rule - "obstruct, impair, or
condition" - fit with the United States Supreme Court precedents?
The preemption standard in the Final Rule is a distillation of the many preemption standards
applied by the Supreme Court over the years. These include "obstruct," "stands as an obstacle
to," "impair the efficiency of," "condition the grant ofpower," "interfere with," "impair,~'
"impede,n and so on. Courts have recognized that no one phrase necessarily captures the full
range of conflicts· that will lead to a preemption of state law. We are not applying a standard that
is inconsistent with those applied by the Supreme Court. Rather, we are adopting a standard that
captures the essence of the tests used in various Supreme Court decisions. The preamble to the
final role expressly states that we are not trying to create a standard different from what the
Court has expressed.
Is the final rule consistent with the standards ofthe Riegle-Neal Act, where Congress
endorsed the application ofstate laws to national banks?
Yes. The Riegle-Neal Act sorted out which state's laws - host state or home state - regarding
community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate
branches, would apply to interstate branches of national banks, and provided that the host state's
laws in those areas would apply to national banks "except when Federal law preempts the
application of such State laws to a national bank." Potential preemption of state laws thus
was expressly recognized as possible in the Riegle-Neal legislation itself.
Legislative history of the Riegle-Neal Act indicates that Congress expected the oce to apply
traditional, recognized preemption standards in deciding preemption issues, which is exactly
what the ace is doing.
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The Riegle-Neal Act also specifically provided that the provisions of any state law to which a
branch of a national bank is subject under the Act "shall be enforced, with respect to such
branch, by the Comptroller of the Currency."
IV. IMPACT ON THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
What impact will this rule have on the dual banking system?
This rule will enhance the dual banking system. This system refers to the chartering, powers,
and supervision of state-chartered banks by state authorities and the chartering, powers, and
supervision ofnational banks by Federal authority, the acc. By its very nature, the dual
banking system represents and embraces differences in national and state bank powers and in the
supervision and regulation ofnational and state banks.
One of the key differences between national and state banks is that national banks operate
pursuant to a Federal grant ofnational bank powers, subject to uniform national standards,
administered by a Federal regulator. Preemption is a key principle that enables national banks to
operate nationwide, under unifonn national standards, subject to the oversight of a Federal
regulator, just as Congress intended it. This distinction between national and state banks is one
of the defming characteristics of the dual banking system.
The national and state charters each have their own distinct advantages. But many national
banks engage in multi-state businesses that require the efficiency of a uniform, nationwide
system of laws and regulations. Customers ofnational banks enjoy protections that are as strong
as -- and in some cases stronger than -- those available to customers of state banks. But they also
benefit from the efficiencies of the national banking system, which lead to lower costs and
expanded product offerings. It is important to remember that the dual banking· system offers
American consumers a choice -- those who believe the state system offers greater protections can
vote with their pocketbooks.
v. IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
Isn'tfederal preemption ofstate laws inconsistent with consumer protection?
Absolutely not. Today's action is fully consistent with the twin goals ofpromoting consumer
protection and ensuring a safe, sound, and competitive, national banking system. Because of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, many state standards do not apply to national banks.
The ace's action will not leave a void, but instead promote consumer protections for customers
of national banks.
Rather than being subject to varying state standards, when they exist, under the new oce
regulations, all national banks and their operating subsidiaries are made subject to uniform,
consistent, and predictable rules of fair conduct wherever they do business throughout the United
States. National banks and their operating subsidiaries are subject to comprehensive supervision,
aCe-administered supervisory standards (for example to prevent predatory, unfair, or deceptive
lending practices), and vigorous and effective enforcement of these consumer protection laws,
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rules, and standards. The acc's new regulations and supervisory approach offer real benefits to
consumers. State consumer protection laws, by contrast, cannot effectively protect consumers in
a similarly comprehensive, uniform, or nationwide basis.
As a result of the ace's regulations, consumers will benefit from consistent, comprehensive
protection against predatory, unfair, or deceptive lending practices, regardless of the state in
which they live, when they do business with a national bank or national bank operating
subsidiary. The acc's recent actions also are complementary to state protection ofconsumers
who deal with state-regulated lenders: while customers of national banks will be protected under
the uniform federal consumer protections adopted by the acc, customers of state-regulated
lenders will continue to be protected to the extent that consumer protection laws exist in their
home state that apply to their transactions.
Predatory lending is said by ItUlny to be an inherently local issue. Why is a national standard
better in this area? Are,. 't states in a betterposition than is the oce to understand the
problems consumers encounter with abusive lendingpractices and, therefore, better able to
fashion responses that are mUored to particularproblems?
If taken to its logical conclusion, this position would lead to the regulation of abusive lending
practices at the municipal level. However, many state antipredatory lending laws - such as the
Georgia Fair Lending Act - prohibit municipalities from regulating in areas covered by the state
law. In this way, a state is able to avoid subjecting institutions within its jurisdiction to
inconsistent obligations, an objective shared by the ace for national banks.
In the few instances where national banks have engaged in abusive lending practices, the
problems have been specific to the bank in question and.were not prevalent throughout a
geographic region. Thus, we believe it is appropriate to focus on a given institution's lending
practices to determine whether there are problems that require attention. This bank-specific
focus, against the backdrop ofan extensive array of Federal consumer protections, enables the
ace to identify and respond to consumer problems when they arise.
To the extent that it is a local issue, it is worth remembering that the ace's examination staff of
more than 1,800 is housed in field offices in every state in the country and on-site in our largest
banks, giving us a very strong local presence.
How do the DeC's new regulations protect consumers?
First, the oce regulations prohibit a national bank from making any consumer loan -- including
any form of mortgage loan, automobile loan, and student loan - that is based predominantly on
the bank's expectation that it will be repaid through foreclosure or liquidation of collateral that
the consumer used to secure the loan. This rule targets a fundamental characteristic ofpredatory
lending - lending to consumers who cannot be expected to be able to make the payments
required under the terms of the loan, and will.be effective in enswing that home equity stripping,
auto title lending, and other forms of abusive credit practices that injure individual consumers
and communities will not occur in the national banking system.
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As a result of this regulation, national banks are subject to the most comprehensive federal anti-
predatory lending standard in existence today: unlike HOEPA, the ace rules are not limited to
"high cost" home mortgages, but instead apply to all types of consumer loans and mortgages
made by national banks. Consequently, they will have a substantially broader reach than not
only HOEPA, but also state predatory lending laws.
Second, the ace regulations also explicitly prohibit a national bank from engaging in unfair or
deceptive practices that violate the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) in connection with
any consumer loan, including mortgages. While the acc does not have the authority under the
Federal Trade Commission Act to adopt rules defining particular acts or practices as unfair or
deceptive under that Act (that authority is only conferred on the Federal Reserve Board), we do
have authority to take enforcement action where we find unfair or deceptive practices. OCC
case-by-case enforcement actions under the FTC Act have had a real and meaningful impact on
correcting abuses and helping consumers by providing hundreds of millions of dollars in
restitution to consumers who have been harmed by unfair, deceptive, or abusive lending
practices. The oeets new regulations provide greater clarity to the application of this
prohibition to aillending by national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
Whatfederal consumerprotection standards apply to national banks and national bank
operating subsidiaries in the absence ofstate laws?
National banks and national bank operating subsidiaries are subject to extensive federal
consumer protection laws and regulations, administered and enforced by the oce. acc
examinations ofnational banks and national bank operating subsidiaries are conducted to ensure
and enforce compliance with these laws and regulations, and supplemental ace supervisory
standards. Federal consumer protection laws and regulations that apply to national banks and to
national bank operating subsidiaries include:
• Federal Trade Commission Act
• Truth in Lending Act
• Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
• Fair Housing Act
• Equal Credit Opportunity Act
• Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
• Community Reinvestment Act
• Truth in Savings Act
• Electronic Fund Transfer Act
• Expedited Funds Availability Act
• Flood Disaster Protection Act
• Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
• Fair Housing Home Loan Data System
• Credit Practices Rule
• Fair Credit Reporting Act
• Federal Privacy Laws
• Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
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• acc anti-predatory lending rules in Parts 7 and 34;
• OCC rules imposing consumer protections in connection with the sales ofdebt
cancellation and suspension agreements;
• DCC standards on unfair and deceptive practices
(http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc.); and
• acc standards on preventing predatory and abusive practices in direct lending and
brokered and purchased loan transactions (httl'://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-
2.doc. and http://www.acc.treas.gov/ftp/advisoty/2003-3 .doc.).
WhllJ willprotect consulllers who receive real estate loalls from lIatiolUll banks now thllt
various stllJe laws arepreempted?
Consumers will continue to be protected by an extensive array ofFederal protections, enforced
by the ace (see above). Preemption of state laws governing. national banks' real estate lending
certainly does not mean that such lending would be unregulated. On the contrary, national
banks' real estate lending is highly regulated under Federal standards and subject to
comprehensive supervision. In addition to the many standards that apply to national banks under
various Federal laws, the ace recently issued comprehensive supervisory standards to address
predatory and abusive lending practices, acc Advisory Letter 2003-2, Guidelines for National
Banks to Guard Against Predatory andAbusive Lending Practices and acc Advisory Letter
2003-3, Avoiding Predatory andAbusive Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans.
Moreover, the final rule adds an explicit safety and soundness-based anti-predatory lending
standard to the general statement of authority concerning lending. The regulation states that a
national bank shall not make a consumer loan subject to 12 CFR part 34 based predominantly on
the bank's realization of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower's collateral, without
regard to the borrower's repayment ability, including current and expected income, current
obligations, employment status, and other relevant fmancial resources. The regulation further
provides that, in making any real estate loan, a national bank shall not engage in unfair or
deceptive practices within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
regulations promulgated thereunder. As described in the preamble to the regulation, the ace's
pioneering commitment to using the FTC Act to address consumer abuses is demonstrated by a
number of recent actions against national banks that have resulted in the payment of hundreds of
millions ofdollars in restitution to consumers.
The new anti-predatory lending standard and the multitude ofother existing Federal laws such as
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), ensure that national banks are subject to consistent and
uniform Federal standards, administered and enforced by the OCC,.that provide strong and
extensive customer protections and appropriate safety and soundness-based criteria for their real
estate lending activities.
What does the rule mean/or consumer protection in lIon-relll estate loans?
The Final Rule regarding non-real estate lending contains the same safety and soundness-based
anti-predatory lending standard included in the real estate lending portion of the Final Rule.
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Together, this new prudential standard, and Federal laws such as TILA and the FTC Act, ensure
that national banks are subject to consistent and uniform Federal standards, administered and
enforced by the acc, that provide strong and extensive customer protections and appropriate
safety and soundness-based criteria for their lending activities.
How does the oec supervise natio1Ul1 banks and national bank operating subsidiariesfor
cOIIJpliance with consumerprotection laws and standards?
The oce supervises national banks' compliance with consumer protection laws and anti-
predatory lending standards through programs ofongoing supervision that are tailored to the
size, complexity and risk profile ofdifferent types ofbanks, and through targeted enforcement
actions. National banks and national bank operating subsidiaries are subject to comprehensive-
and in the case of the largest banks, continuous - supervision. With a network of approximately
1,800 examiners, the oce conducts risk-based examinations of national banks and national bank
operating subsidiaries throughout the United States. Thus, for example, whether a national bank
conducts its mortgage lending business in a department of the bank, in a branch, or in an
operating subsidiary, oce supervision focuses on that line ofbusiness wherever and however
the bank conducts it.
The acc's Customer Assistance Group (CAG) in Houston, Texas, also plays an important role
in helping to identify potential violations ofconsumer protection law and unfair or deceptive
practices. CAG provides immediate assistance to consumers and also collates and disseminates
complaint data that help direct acc examination resources to banks, activities, and products that
present compliance risks and that require further investigation. In addition to information
obtained in on-site examinations and through consumer complaints, the ace evaluates
information about abusive lending and illegal practices by national banks and their subsidiaries
that it obtains from other sources, including community organizations and state enforcement
agencies.
Where violations of law are found, the ace takes appropriate action to remedy the problem and
to address consumer harm. In this regard, the oce is the frrst and only federal banking agency
to take action to combat unfair and deceptive lending practices by enforcing the Federal Trade
Commission Act. For example, the ace recently entered into a consent agreement with a bank
that the ace concluded had engaged in predatory mortgage lending practices, including making
a loan without regard to the borrower's ability to repay the loan, "equity stripping," and "fee
packing." See, In the Matter of Clear Lake National Bank, San Antonio, TX, Enforcement
Action 2003-135 (November 6, 2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003-
135.pdf. No other federal banking agency has taken enforcement action to address predatory
mortgage lending or deceptive marketing practices affecting subprime borrowers. The DCC's
enforcement actions have provided over $300 million in restitution thus far to consumers of
modest means and limited or impaired credit histories who have been hanned by abusive
practices.
It also. is our hope that states will cooperate with the DCC to try to maximize the protection of
consumers. If the states and the ace work together, we can leverage all of our resources to
combat abusive financial providers. The acc has adopted special procedures to expedite
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referrals of consumer complaints regarding national banks from state Attorneys General and state
banking departments, and we have offered to enter into formal information-sharing agreements
with states to formalize these arrangements. We recently concluded the first of these
arrangements and hope that other states will soon follow suit.
How can the oec IIssure that customers ofnational bank operllting subsidiaries are
adequatelyprotected ifthe oeehas lIotprovided a list ofthose operating subsidiaries?
The oee supervises the activities ofnational banks and their operating subsidiaries based on a
line of business approach, not based on the corporate form in which it is conducted. For
example, the OCC will apply a comprehensive approach to supervising a bank's mortgage
banking activities whether they are conducted in departments of the bank, branches, or one or
more operating subsidiaries. We do not maintain an aggregate count ofnational bank operating
subsidiaries just as we do not maintain an aggregate count of the number of departments banks
use to do business. Operating subsidiary information is available to ace supervisors at the
individual bank level, is included in our supervisory data system for community and Mid-Size
banks, and for Large Banks, all significant subsidiaries are listed in the quarterly risk analysis
prepared by each bank's examiner-in-charge.
Most national bank operating subsidiaries use names that clearly identify them with their parent
bank, thus a customer with a complaint would know they are dealing with a bank-related
business and could expect that he or she could lodge the complaint by contacting the acc's
Customer Assistance Group. In some instances, however, the operating subsidiary may have a
Dame that does not readily connect it with its parent bank. In order to better address those
situations, the acc will be establishing a link from the Consumer Assistance web page to a
searchable database ofnational bank subsidiaries that do business directly with consumers, and
that are not functionally regulated by other regulators. We are compiling this information from
our various databases and will begin with a listing ofthese types of subsidiaries ofour Large
Banks.
The oec's traditional mission has been to audit banks for safety alld soundness. How does
the oec'spreemption rule further safety lind soundness?
To the extent that the question implies that preemption will result in a lack of consumer
protections, we would disagree. It is not a question of whether national banks will be subject to
consumer protection laws, but only a question ofwhich laws apply. National banks are subject
to a comprehensive regimen ofFederal consumer protection laws and regulations, including the
new anti-predatory lending standard included in this rulemaking.
We examine our banks to ensure that they are complying with these protections and, where we
fmd that a bank is not, we take appropriate action against that bank. This approach enables us to
tailor the regulatory response to the problem, rather than impose a one-size-fits-all rule that
prohibits all national banks from offering certain financial products. In this way, banks are free
to offer products and services that meet the needs of their customers and communities, in a
manner that is consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
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Visitorial Powers Final Rule
Questions and Answers
January 7, 2004
I. INTRODUCTION
What are "visitorialpowers"?
The term "visitorial powers" refers to the power ofa regulator or superintendent to inspect,
examine, supervise, and regulate the affairs of an entity.
What is the effect ofyour recently publishedfinal rule amending your visitorialpowers
regulation ?
The fmal rule clarifies two points concerning our existing regulation regarding the acers
exclusive visitorial authority under 12 U.S.C. § 484. The Federal statute that addresses this area,
12 U.S.C. § 484, states that "[n]o national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts ofjustice or such as shall be, or have been
exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by any committee ofCongress
or ofeither House duly authorized. It
Our regulation clarifies that the scope of the ace's exclusive visitorial authority applies to the
content and conduct ofnational bank activities authorized under Federal law. In other words, the
ace is the exclusive supervisor of a national bank's banking activities; the ace does not
enforce fIre codes, environmental laws, etc.
Our final rule also clarifies that the exception to the oce's exclusive visitorial powers for
"visitorial powers...vested in the courts ofjustice" in section 484 pertains to powers inherent in
the judiciary and does not grant state or other governmental authorities any right that they do not
otherwise possess to inspect, superintend, direct, regulate, or compel compliance by a national
bank with any law regarding the content or conduct of activities authorized for national banks
under Federal law.
What changes have been made in the final rule that differ from the proposal ?
We have amended the language in § 7.4000(a)(3) to simplify it. This provision clarifies that the
ace has exclusive visitorial powers just with respect to the content and conduct of activities that
are authorized for national banks under Federal law.
We have also amended the regulation text in the fmal rule concerning the "visitorial
powers...vested in the courts ofjustice" exception. This provision no longer makes reference to
specific powers of the courts ofjustice "to issue orders or writs compelling the production of
information or witnesses" since that description may be too limiting. This provision now simply
states that the exception pertains to powers inherent in the judiciary. The language that stated
EXHIBIT
I
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that the exception for courts ofjustice does not authorize states or other governmental entities to
exercise visitorial powers over national banks also has been simplified.
What does the final rule !!!!J. do?
The rule does not prevent state officials from enforcing state laws that do not pertain to a
national bank's banking activities, such as environmental laws, fire codes, zoning ordinances or
criminal laws ofgeneral applicability.
The fmal rule makes no change to the treatment of operating subsidiaries. An existing acc
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, states that "[u]nless otherwise provided by Federal law or oce
regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those
laws apply to the parent national bank. II Thus, states generally can exercise visitorial powers
over operating subsidiaries only to the extent that they could exercise visitorial powers over a
national bank.
The final rule does not change the ability of states to seek a declaratory judgment from a court as
to whether a particular state law applies to the Federally-authorized business of a national bank
or is preempted.
II. IMPACT ON DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
Isn't the final rule inconsistent with the dU1l1 banking system?
No. The dual banking system refers to the chartering and supervision of state-chartered banks by
state authorities and the chartering and supervision of national banks by Federal authority, the
OCC. By its very nature, the dual banking system represents and embraces differences in
national and state bank powers and in the supervision and regulation of state and national banks.
Dual banking does not mean that national banks are subject to state supervision or regulation of
activities they are authorized to conduct under Federal banking law.
Is it the ClISe, as certain state officials suggest, that this rule would disrupt the current system
u"der which states enforce consumer compliance lllws?
No. There may have been some misunderstanding over the years about the limits of state
visitorial authority. For 140 years, the national banking statutes have said that no national bank
shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law. Federal law - at 12
U.S.C. § 484 -- clearly vests the oce with exclusive visitorial powers over the business of
banking conducted by national banks. Equally clearly, courts have stated that visitorial powers
include the power to enforce compliance with applicable law. With certain narrow exceptions,
Federal law does not grant visitorial authority over national banks to the states. In fact, in the
area of consumer protection, Congress stated explicitly, in the Riegle-Neal Act, that the oec
enforces any state consumer protection law that applies to interstate branches ofnational banks.
Recent debate about enforcement has centered recently on the ability of states to enforce their
laws against operating subsidiaries ofnational banks. Operating subsidiaries are Federally
authorized means through which national banks can conduct business. The only court cases to
decide the issue of the OCC's visitorial authority over national bank operating subsidiaries have
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held that our exclusive visitorial authority - including the authority to enforce compliance with
applicable law - extends to operating subsidiaries. Thus, while states are free to enforce
consumer compliance laws as they apply to institutions within their primary jurisdiction, they are
not free to do so in the context ofnational banks or their operating subsidiaries, except where
Federal law authorizes them to do so.
What role may states play under thejinal rule?
The states have a crucial role to play. It is our hope that states will cooperate with the acc to
try to maximize the protection of consumers. If the states and the ace work together, we can
leverage all of our resources to combat abusive financial providers. The acc has adopted
special procedures to expedite referrals of consumer complaints regarding national banks from
state Attorneys General and state banking departments, and we have offered to enter into formal
information-sharing agreements with states to formalize these arrangements. We recently
concluded the first of these arrangements and hope that other states will soon follow suit.
Isn't it true that the Household case recently concluded by the New York Attorney General
would not have been possible ifthe preemption rule had been in effect?
No. There have been several actions against financial entities that are within the Household
corporate family. One such action was brought by the OCC, against Household Bank (SB), N.A.
In that action, the court stated that "[t]he restitution and remedial action ordered by the acc is
comprehensive and significantly broader in scope than that available through these state court
proceedings. The DCC Agreement [with the bank] provides significantly more relief to Arizona
consumers than this Court fmds a legal basis for imposing under state law."
The State ofNew York also recently concluded an action against Household International, the
parent company of Household Finance Corporation and Beneficial Finance Corporation. Those
entities are outside the jurisdiction of the OCC, and will remain so after this mle becomes
effective. Thus, our actions in this rulemaking will not affect in any way the state's ability to
bring the enforcement action in question.
Ill. AUTHORITY FOR THE RULE
A. National banks
On what does the oec base its conclusion that its visitorial authority is exclusive?
Federallaw. Section 484 explicitly states that "[n]o national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts ofjustice or such as
shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by any
committee ofCongress or of either House duly authorized." The statute first sets forth a
complete prohibition, then subjects that prohibition to certain exceptions. In other words, the
prohibition applies unless a visitorial power is covered by one of the enumerated exceptions.
None of the exceptions in the statute allows for the allocation ofany general bank supervisory
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responsibility to the states. Further, such an allocation to the states would be inconsistent with
the history and purpose of the National Bank Act and judicial precedent interpreting the Act.
B. Operating subsidiaries
By what authority do you claim that the DeC has exclusive visitorialpower over national bank
operating subsidiaries ?
Federal law. Pursuant to their authority under 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh), national banks have long
used separately incorporated entities as a means to engage in activities that the bank itself is
authorized to conduct. When established in accordance with oce regulations and approved by
the OCC, an operating subsidiary is a Federally authorized, Federally licensed means by which a
national bank may conduct Federally authorized activities.
Courts have consistently treated operating subsidiaries as equivalent to national banks, unless
Federal law reqUire's otherwise. As a matter of Federal law, operating subsidiaries conduct their
activities subject to the same terms and conditions as apply to the parent bank, including being
subject to the exclusive visitorial authority of the DeC.
Courts that have considered the issue have confirmed recently that the acc has exclusive
visitorial authority over national bank operating subsidiaries. In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Boutris, a Federal district court issued a permanent injunction enjoining the California
Department of Corporations from exercising visitorial powers over a national bank operating
subsidiary. The court noted the existing case law and concluded that the DCC's operating
subsidiary regulation is within the agency's authority delegated to it by Congress and is a
reasonable interpretation.
Didn't GLBA make clear that operating subsidiaries are explicitly NOT to be treated as part of
thei,. parent bank?
No, to the contrary. Section 121 ofGLBA recognizes the authority ofnational banks to own
subsidiaries that engage "solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in
directly and are conducted subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of
such activities by national banks." This underscores the point that an operating subsidiary is
treated, for regulatory and supervisory purposes, the same as its parent bank.
Why shouldn't states havejurisdiction over entities that are created under state law - namely,
operating subsidiaries?
States do have jurisdiction over operating subsidiaries for matters concerning the corporate
existence or corporate governance of operating subsidiaries. However, the states' jurisdiction
stops at the point of regulating Federally-authorized banking activities that the operating
subsidiary conducts.
Under Federal law, a national bank may exercise the Federal banking powers available to it
either directly in the bank or indirectly through an operating subsidiary. If the bank elects to use
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an operating subsidiary, the bank is required to obtain a Federal license to do so pmsuant to the
procedures set forth in the ace's regulations. Once the license is obtained, the activity will be
subject to the same terms and conditions that would apply if the bank conducted the activity
directly.
IV. IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
Why isn't it better to have more than one cop on the beat looking out/or consumers? The
oechas relatively little experience i1l investigating banks for compliance with consumer
protection laws. Why 1Iot accept help from the stllte A Ga, which have II great deal of
experience in this area?
Under Federal law, only the acc can examine or bring action against a national 'bank. And, in
fact, the system works best when we each focus on our separate jurisdictions, as was
demonstrated recently by a joint action taken against Security Trust Company and three of its
executives by the OCC, the New York Attorney General, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The OCC is well equipped to handle enforcement matters for entities within our jurisdiction.
Through a network ofapproximately 1,800 examiners located throughout the U.S., we monitor
conditions and trends in individual banks and groups ofbanks. Our supervisory activities home
in on risks identified by surveillance tools and subject matter experts. In the consumer area,
consumer complaint information is used to identify potential problems in a bank's dealings with
customers.
As part of our ongoing supervision ofnational banks, examiners look at bank policies and
procedures. These policies and procedures are reviewed to evaluate if they adequately address
the particular risks that the bank may face, given the nature and scope of its business. Depending
on the nature of that business, we would expect bank policies and controls to reflect the
considerations we have identified in our two advisories on how national banks should avoid
becoming involved in predatory lending practices.
Our Customer Assistance Group in Houston, Texas (CAG) plays an important role in helping to
identify potentially unfair and deceptive practices. In addition to providing immediate assistance
to consumers, the CAG collates and disseminates complaint data that help point our field
examiners toward banks, activities, and products that require further investigation.
We obtain additional valuable insight and surveillance from community and consumer groups,
internal and extemal auditors, other Federal, state and local authorities, and competing banks.
Thus, national banks' compliance with applicable laws is subject to comprehensive - and in the
case of the largest national banks, continuous - supervision. Where violations of law are found,
we take appropriate action to remedy the problem and to address consumer harm.
As previously noted, it is our hope that states will cooperate with the oce to try to maximize the
protection of consumers. We have encouraged states to work with us to expedite referrals of
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consumer complaints regarding national banks from state Attorneys General and state banking
departments, and have offered to enter into formal information-sharing agreements with states to
formalize these arrangements.
Has the OCC ever brought II case chargingpredatory lending?
In fact, we are the first - and thus far, only - Federal banking regulator to bring enforcement
actions under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act against financial institutions for
abusive lending practices. The most recent case, against Clear Lake National Bank, involved
home equity loan tenns that we considered to be unfair to consumers. We required the bank to
reimburse the borrowers in question. We have brought five other cases since 2001 under the
FTC Act that have led to restitution ofaffected consumers. Moreover, we have moved
aggressively to require national banks to terminate their relationships with "payday lenders." We
share the states' concerns about the impact ofpredatory and abusive lending practices on
consumers, and have moved aggressively to stop it whenever it is located in an institution we
supervise.
Even the state Attorney Generals have acknowledged that it has not been a widespread problem
inside the regulated banking industry. Having said that, however, the oce has a strong track
record of taking quick and decisive action against lenders that engage in abusive practices.
The oec's traditional mission has been to audit banks for safety and soundness. How does
the oec's visitorialpowers rllie/urthel'sa/ety and soundness?
To the extent that the question implies that preemption will result in a lack ofconsumer
protections, we would disagree. It is not a question of whether national banks will be subject to
consumer protection laws, but only a question ofwhich laws apply. National banks are subject
to a comprehensive regimen of Federal consumer protection laws and regulations, including the
new anti-predatory lending standard included in this rulemaking.
We examine our banks to ensure that they are complying with these protections and, where we
find that a bank is not, we take appropriate action against that bank. This approach enables us to
tailor the regulatory response to the problem, rather than impose a one-size-fits-all rule that
prohibits all national banks from offering certain financial products. In this way, banks are free
to offer products and services that meet the needs of their communities, in a manner that is
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
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COMPARISON OF THE OCC'S PREEMPTION RULES
WIm THE OTS's AND NCUA's CURRENT RULES
JANUARY 7,2004
:i[ii:t~~~'~·~<·,., <,< ~'\:~.:~~:.
Abandoned and dorm~an~t~~2.f.i.t:2:.~i:.i:;~£:il2;
accounts
(deposit-taking)
Aggregate amount offunds that
may be lent on the security of
real estate
Checking/share accounts
(deposit-taking)
Covenants and restrictions
necessary to qualify a leasehold
as security property for a real
estate loan
Access to, and use of, credit
orts
Terms ofcredit
Creditor's ability to require or
obtain insurance ofcollateral or
other risk mitigantslcredit
enhancements
Due-on-sale clauses
Escrow, impound, and similar
accounts
Funds availability
(deposit-taking)
Interest rates
Fees
Licensing, registration, filings
and reports
Loan-to-value ratios
Mandated statements and
disclosure requirements
Mortgage origination,
processing and servicing
Disbursements and repayments
Savings account orders of
withdrawal
de osit-takin
Security property, including
leaseholds
Special purpose saving services
(deposit-taking)
,f**
,f***
• Already preempted by the OCC's existing real estate lending regulation at 12 C.F.R. Part 34.
•• National banks' authority to charge interest is established by 12 U.S.C. § 85, and the OCC's existing regulation at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4001.
••• National banks' authority to charge fees is already addressed by the OCC's existing regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002.
G·30
G' 31
Federal Register/Vol. 70, No. 53/Monday. March 21. 2005/Proposed Rules 13413
defi.ned in the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), because the
majority of applicants (grain industry)
that apply for these official services, and
are subjected to GIPSA supervision fees,
do not meet the requirements for small
entities. This rule will affect entities
engaged in shipping grain to and from
points within the United States and
exporting gl'ain from the United States.
GIPSA estimates there are
approximately 9,500 off-farm storage
facilities and 18 export elevators in the
United States that could receive services
from delegated States or designated
agencies. Official services are available
from 7 delegated States and 49
designated agencies. For clarification.
any and all grain that is exported from
the U.S. export port locations must. as
required by the USGSA. be inspected
and!or weighed. These services are
either performed by GIPSA or delegated
States. Further, some grain exported
from interior locations may also require
inspection and/or weighing services
unless the services are waived as
provided in section 800.18 of the
regulations. These services are provided
by designated agencies. The USGSA
does not require inspection or weighing
services for grain marketed within the
U.S. Consequently, these services are
permissive and may be performed by
official agencies. The USGSA (7 U.S.C.
71 et seq.) authorizes GIPSA to provide
supervision of official grain inspection
and weighing services, and to charge
Bnd collect reasonable fees for
performing these services. The fees
collected are to cover, as nearly as
practicable. GIPSA·s costs for
performing these services, including
related administrative and supervisory
costs.
GIPSA realizes that any increase in
supervision fees will be charged by
official agencies to the users (grain
industry) of the official grain inspection
and weighing system. Although, the
overall effect of this proposal will be
passed on to the users of official grain
inspection and weighing services,
lnostly large corporations. David R.
Shipman. Deputy Administrator.
GIPSA. has determined that this
proposed rule will not have a significant
impact on a substantial number of small
entities as defined in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 V.S.C. 601 et seq.).
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 800
Administrative practice and
procedure, Grain.
For the reasons set out in the
prea.mble, 7 CFR part 800 is proposed to
be anlended as follows:
PART SOo-GENERAL REGULATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 800
continues to read as follows:
Authority: Public Law 94-582,90 Stat.
2867. as amended (7 U.S.C. 71 at seq.)
2. In §800.71(a), Schedule C is
amended by removing Table 1 and
adding introductory text in its place as
set forth below, and by redesignating
Table 2 as Table 1.
S800.71 Fees ISseSSed by the service.
(a) * * *
Schedule C-Fees for FGIS Supervision
of Official Inspection and Weighing
Services Performed by Delegated States
and/or Designated Agencies in the
United States.
The supervision fee is charged at
$0.011 per metric ton inspected and/or
weighed.
* * * *
David R. Shipman.
Acting Administrator, GJ'oin Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards A dnlinistration.
[FR Doc. 05-5501 Filed 3-18-05; 8:45 am]
BIWNG CODe 341o-EN-P
FEDERALDEPosrrlNSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Chapter III
Petition 10r Rulemaklng to Preempt
Certain State Laws
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of public hearing.
SUMMARY: This document announces a
public hearing on a petition for
rulemaking ("Petition") that would
preempt certain state laws. Generally.
the Petition asks the FDIC to issue a rule
that preempts the application of certain
state laws to the interstate operations
and activities of state banks. The stated
purpose of the requested rulemaking is
to establish parity between state-
chartered banks and national banks in
interstate activities and operations. A
copy of the Petition is attached to this
document. The FDIC has scheduled a
hearing to obtain the public's views on
the issues presented by the Petition.
This document sets forth the date, time,
location, and other details of the
hearing; it also summarizes the Petition
and highlights several issues that
participants in the hearing may wish to
address. Opportunities to make an oral
presentation at the hearing are limited,
and not all requests may be granted.
Attendance at the hearing is not
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required in order to submit a written
statement.
DATES: The hearing will be held on
Tuesday, May 24, 2005, from 8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Anyone wishing to make an
oral presentation at the hearing must (i)
deliver a written request to the
Executive Secretary of the FDIC. no later
than 5 p.m. on Monday, May 9,2005;
and (Ii) deliver a copy afhis or her
written statement plus a two-page (or
less) summary of the statement to the
Executive Secretary no later than 5 p.m.
on Monday, May 16, 2005. All limited-
appearance statements submitted in lieu
of an oral presentation must be received
by the Executive Secretary no later than
5 p.m. on Monday. May 16, 2005.
ADDRESSES: The hearing will be held in
the Board room at the FDIC's
headquarters. 550 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC.
You may submit a written request to
make an oral presentation at the
hearing, a copy of the written statement
you will present, and the two-page (or
less) summary. or a limited-appearance
statement by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web site: http://
www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.htmI. Click on Submit
Comment.
• E-mail: comments@FDIC.gov.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman. Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments/Legal
ESS, Room 3060, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. 550 17th Street.
NW., Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivered/Courier: The guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street), on
business days between 7 a.nl. and 5 p.m.
• Public Inspection: All statements
and summaries may be inspected and
photocopied in the FDIC Public
Information Center, Room 100, 80117th
Street, NW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on business days.
• Internet Posting: Statelnents and
summaries received will be posted
without change to http://www.FDIC.govl
regulations/laws/fedel'al/propose.htmJ.
including any personal information
provided.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
questions regarding the conduct of the
hearing: contact Valerie Best, Assistant
Executive Secretary, (202) 898-3812; for
questions regarding substantiva issues:
contact Robert C. Pick, Counsel, (202)
898-89.62; or Joseph A. DiNuzzo,
Counsel. (202) 898-7349, Legal
Division, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMA~TilIOiiiNiiiI:••••••••
EXHIBIT
I
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I. Overview of the Rulemaking Petition
The Financial Services Roundtable, a
trade association for integrated financial
services companies ("Petitioner").
submitted the Petition to the FDIC. The
Petition asks that the FDIC adopt rules
concerning the interstate activities of
insured state banks and their
subsidiaries that are intended to provide
parity between state banks and national
banks. Generally, the requested rules
would provide that a state bank's home
state law govems the interstate activities
of state banks and their subsidiaries to
the same extent that the National Bank
Act ("NBAU ) governs a national bank's
interstate activities. A copy of the entire
Petition is appended to this notice. The
Petitioner requests that the FDIC adopt
rules with respect to the following areas:
• The law applicable to activities
conducted in a host state by a state bank
that has an interstate branch in that
state.
• The law applicable to activities
conducted by a state bank in a state in
which the state bank does not have a
branch,
• The law applicable to activities
conducted by an operating subsidiary
(CCOpSUb")l of a state bank,
• The scope and application of
section 104(d) of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act ("GLBA") regarding
preemption of certain state laws or
actions that impose a requirement,
limitation, or burden on a depository
institution, or its affiliate, and
• Implementation of section 27 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (UFO!
Act") (which permits state depository
institutions to export interest rates).
The Petitioner argues that it is both
necessary and timely for the FDIC to
adopt rules that clarify the ability of
state banks operating interstate to be
governed by a single framework of law
and regulation to the same extent as
national banks. According to the
Petitioner, over the last decade the
federal charters for national banks and
federal thrifts have been correctly
interpreted by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("DCC")
and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(HOTSU). with the repeated support of
the federal courts, to provide broad
federal preemption of state laws that
might otherwise apply to the activities
or operations of federally-chartered
banking institutions within a state. The
result, it asserts, is that national banks
and federal savings associations now
can do business across the country
1 Generally, an operating subsidiary is subsidiary
of a bank or savings association that only engages
in activities that its parent bank or savings
association may engage in.
under a single set of federal rules. In
contrast. the Petitioner believes that
there is widespread confusion and
uncertainty with respect to the law
applicable to state banks engaged in
interstate banking activities.
Furthermore, it argues, this uncertainty
produces the potential for litigation and
enforcement actions, deters state banks
from pursuing profitable business
opportunities, and causes substantial
expense to a state bank that decides to
convert to a national bank in order to
gain greater legal certainty. Finally, the
Petitioner asserts that the FDIC has the
authority, tools and responsibility to
correct this imbalance.
II. The FDIC's Approach to the Petition
The FDIC will hold a hearing to
obtain the public's views on the
Petition. The FDIC believes that public
participation will provide valuable
insight into the issues presented by the
Petition and will assist the FDIC in
deciding how to respond to the
rulemaking request. The FDIC's options
include: (i) Denying the entire Petition,
(il) granting the entire Petition, (iii)
granting the Petition in part and
denying the Petition in part, and (iv)
seeking further clarification of the
Petition from the Petitioner. If the FDIC
grants all or part of the Petition, a notice
of proposed rulemaking will be
published in the Federal Register, and
an additional opportunity for public
comment will be prOVided. The FDIC is
interested in obtaining the views of the
financial institutions industry,
consumer groups, state financial
institution supervisors, other state
authorities, industry trade groups and
the general public on the legal, policy,
and other issues raised in the Petition.
lli. Issues Presented by the Petition
Although the FDIC is particularly
interested in obtaining the public's
views on the general and specific issues
highlighted in this notice, we also are
interested in the public's views on any
other legal or policy issues implicated
by the Petition. As a result, the FDIC
encourages interested parties to address
not only the highlighted issues. but also
all other issues raised by the Petition.
A. General Issues
With respect to the general issues
raised by the Petition, the FDIC requests
the public's views on the following:
G-l. Is a preemptive rule in these
areas necessary to preserve the dual
banking system1
G-2. What would be the impact on
consumers if a preemptive rule were
issued in these areas?
G· 33
G-3. What are the implications of
rulemaking in these areas for state
banking regulation?
G-4. Would the measures urged by
Petitioner achieve competitive balance
between federally-chartered and state-
chartered financial institutions as
advocated by the Petitioner?
G-5. Are there alternative
mechanisms available that would
achieve the policy goals advocated by
the Petitioner?
G-6. Should the issue of competitive
parity in interstate operations be left to
Congress?
G-7. If the FDIC determines that it has
the legal authority to proceed with a
preemptive rule. are there reasons why
the FDIC should decline to do so? If so,
what are they?
G-B. What would be the negative
impact, if any, of the FDIC adopting a
preemptive regulation as suggested by
the Petitioner?
G-9. Do the states have a legitimate
interest in how banks conduct business
within their borders that would be
undermined by the Petitioner's request?
G-10. Can state banks be expected to
benefit if the FDIC were to preempt state
law in the area of interstate banking
operations? If so. how?
G-l1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that Congress intended to provide the
comprehensive parity envisioned by the
Petition?
G-12. Is there a need for clarification
on what law applies to the interstate
operations of state banks?
B. Specific Issues
Each of the five subject areas
addressed by the Petition is described in
summary fashion below. However, you
are encouraged to read the Petition itself
(which is attached) to gain complete
details on the requested action. Each of
the five subject areas is followed
immediately by specific issues upon
which the FDIC requests publie input.
1. The law Applicable to Activities
Conducted in a Host State by a State
Bank That has an Interstate Branch in
That State
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
(Riegle-Neal Itt) 2 generally established a
federal framework for interstate
branching for both state banks and
nationaLbanks.. Both Riegle-Neal I and
amendments made to Riegle-Neal I by
the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of
Z Public Law 103-328. 108 Stat. 2338 (1994)
(codified to various sections of title 12 of the United
States Code).
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1997 ("Riegle-Neal IIn) 3 contain express
preemption provisions regarding which
host state laws apply to a branch of an
out-of-state bank.
The Petitioner asserts that Congress
enacted Riegle-Neal II to provide
competitive equality between state
banks and national banks with respect
to interstate banking. Riegle-Neal II
revised the language of section 24(j)(1)
of the FOI Act to read as follows:
The laws of the host state, including laws
regarding community reinvestment.
consumer protection. fair lending. and
establishment of intrastate branches, shall
apply to any branch in the host state of an
out-of-state state bank to the same extent as
such state laws apply to a branch in the host
state of an out-of-state national bank. To the
extent host state law is inapplicable to a
branch of an out-of-state state bank in such
host state pursuant to the preceding sentence,
home state law shall apply to such branch.
Riegle-Neal II. therefore. provides that
host state law does not apply to a
branch in the host state of an out-of-
state. state bank to the same extent that
host state law does not apply to a
branch in the host state of an out-of-
state national bank. When host state law
does not apply, Riegle-Neal IT provides
that home state law applies. The
Petition raises the issue of what law
applies to activities of an out-of-state.
state bank in a host state in which the
bank maintains a branch, when those
activities are conducted by the bank
directly, or through an OpSub, or by
some means other than the branch. The
Petitioner argues that the FDIC should
issue a rule that provides that home
state law applies uniformly to all
business of the bank in that State,
whether by the bank directly. through
the host state branch. through a loan
production office (uLPO"), or through
some other non-branch office. or
through an OpSub.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issues:
1-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that Congress granted the FDIC the
authority to make home state law apply
to all business conducted by a state
bank in a host state in which the bank
has a branch. whether conducted
directly, or through a branch, a loan
production office (an LPO), other office,
or OpSub?
1-2. If the FDIC were to adopt a rule
as requested. who should determine for
each state whether the NBA and acc
rules would preempt host state law for
national banks?
3 Public Law 105-24 (1991).
1-3. If the FDIC were to adopt a rule
as requested. how should the applicable
home state law be determined when the
home state statute law is silent?
2. The law Applicable to Activities
conducted by a State Bank in a State in
Which the State Bank Does Not Have a
Branch
The Petitioner requests that the FDIC
adopt rules to provide that the home
state law of a state bank will apply to
its activities in other states (i.e., any
state other than its home state) to the
same extent as the NBA applies to the
activities of national banks. The
Petitioner cites Riegle-Neal II and
section 104(d) of GLBA as an indication
of Congressional intent on this issue. In
addition, Petitioner refers to principles
of administrative law that permit an
agency to reasonably fill in statutory
gaps and address the application of
existing laws to new developments.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issue(s):
2-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an out-of-state, state bank should be
able to operate in a state where the bank
has no branches under the bank's home
state law to the same extent that an out-
of-state national bank can operate under
the NBA and OCC rules?
3. The law Applicable to Activities
Conducted by an Operating Subsidiary
(UOpSubtt) of a State Bank
The Petitioner requests that FDIC
adopt a rule that expressly provides that
an OpSub of a state bank will be
governed by the same law that is
applicable to its parent state bank,
except when state law applies to an
OpSub of a national bank.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issues:
3-1. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an OpSub should be able to operate
under the bank's home state law to the
same extent that an OpSub of a national
bank can operate under the NBA and
acc rules?
3-2. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that an OpSub should be deemed
equivalent to a division of the bank
itself?
3-3. If the FDIC were to adopt the
requested rule, what requirements
should the subsidiary meet in order to
be considered an OpSub, e.g., should it
be wholly-owned, majority-owned, or
just controlled by the bank?
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4. The Scope and Application of Section
104(d) of GLBA Regarding Preemption
of Certain State Laws or Actions That
Impose a ReqUirement. Limitation. or
Burden on a Depository Institution. or
Its Affiliate
Section 104 of the GLBA (Iesection
104") 4 is titled "Operation of State
Law!' It expresses the intent of Congress
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
is entitled "An Act to express the intent
of Congress with reference to the
regulation of the business of
insurance" 5 "remains the law of the
United States." (Section 104(a)). In
addition. it: (al Addresses insurance
licensing requirements for persons
engaged in the business of insurance; (b)
addresses the extent to which a state
may regulate affiliations between
depository institutions and insurers; (c)
addresses the extent to which states may
impose restrictions on insurance sales
by depository institutions; (d) indicates
that states may not prevent or restrict
depository institutions or their affiliates
from engaging in activities authorized or
permitted under GLBA; 6 and (e) limits
the ability of states to discriminate
between depository institutions engaged
in insurance activities authorized or
permitted by GLBA or other federal law
and others engaged in such activities.
The Petitioner contends that section
104(d) expressly preempts state laws or
actions that discriminate against
"depository institutions" or their
affiliates. It urges the FDIC to exercise
its authority under sections 8 and 9 of
the FDI Act to adopt rules to make it
clear that state laws, rules. or actions are
preempted under section l04(d) when
they provide for disparate treatment
between an out-of-state national bank or
in-state bank and an out-of-state state
bank, or its affiliates. The Petitioner
suggests. alternatively. that the FDIC
adopt a statement of policy addressing
the scope and effect of section 104(d} for
state banks. The Petitioner asserts that
although state banks subject to FDIC
regulation are the intended beneficiaries
of this express preemption. the
preemption is not being utilized by state
banks because the statute is relatively
new and complex and the relevant
provisions have not be construed by any
415 U.S.C. 6701.
Ii 15 U.S.C. 1011et seq. Among other things, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "the business
of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
should be subject to the laws of the several states
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business." (15 U.S.C. 1012(a)) and that UNo Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted. by any state for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance
* * * unless such Act specifically relates to the
business of insurance. II (15 U.S.C. 1012(b)).
IS See section 104(d)(1).
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agency or court. It states that rules are
needed in view of the complexity and
general lack of understanding of section
104(d).
The Petitioner argues that the breadth
of section 104(d) preemption and its
purpose to reach state law or actions
that would provide disparate treatment
for any type of depository institution
(including an out-of-state state bank) in
relation to its competitors is evident
from section l04(d)'s language.
The Petitioner has described certain
actions that if taken by the FDIC will. in
its opinion, clprify by regulation or
policy statement that state laws, rules.
or actions cannot differentiate between
in-state and out-of-state banks. The
Petitioner specifically requests that the
FDIC issue a rule or policy statement: (a)
Stating that the section 104 preemption
applies to insured banks and their
subsidiaries, affiliates and associated
persons; (b) defining a "person" to
include a depository institution,
subsidiary. affiliate, and associated
person; (c) stating that the word restrict"
in section 104(d)(1) includes any state
law, rule, interpretation or action that
calls for any limitation or requirement;
(d) addressing each of the four non-
discrimination provisions in section
104(d)(4) to confirm that each is a
distinct test and that any state law or
action that fails one test is preempted;
(e) addressing the scope of "actions" in
section 104(d)(4) to include all types of
formal or informal administrative
actions by any state or local
governmental entity, including
decisions with respect to civil
enforcement of state rules; (t) addressing
section 104(d)(4)(D)(i) in light of the
terms used in subparagraph (ii) to
specify that paragraph (i) addresses
treatment under state law of an out of
state, state bank which would be an
"insured depository institution," that is
different from the treatment of any
national bank or in-state state bank
which would be an "other person
engaged in the same activity" under
these provisions; and (g) defining "state
law" to include laws, ordinances and
rules of political subdivisions, including
any counties and municipalities.
The FDIC requests the public's views
on the following specific issues:
4-1. GLBA is a not codified as part of
the FDI Act, is silent as to rulemaking
and applies to all insured depository
institutions. What barriers. if any,
would there be to the FDIC adopting a
regulation or policy statement
implementing section 1041
4-2. What considerations should the
FDIC take into account that either
support or challenge the proposition
that section 104 preempts state law in
the manner described by Petitioner?
4-3. What barriers. if any. would
there be to the FDIC adopting a
regulation or policy statement
applicable to all insured depository
institutions based on section 104?
4-4. Is it reasonable for the FDIC to
read section 104 as having some
application to interstate banking
operations in general?
4-5. The areas of section 104
Petitioner identifies for rulemaking are
very discrete but taken together may
have a broad impact. What are the
overall implications (favorable as well
as negative) of adopting the section 104
regulatory guidance suggested by the
Petitioner?
5. Implementation of Section 27 of the
FOI Act (Which Permits State
Depository Institutions To Export
Interest Rates)
Section 27 of the FDI Act ("section
27") 7 establishes the maximum amount
of interest that a state-chartered insured
depository institution or insured branch
of a foreign bank (collectively, "state
bank") may charge its borrowers.
Generally, the statute authorizes a state
bank to charge interest at the greater of
the rate allowed by the laws of the State I
territory, or district where the bank is
located or not more than one percentage
point above the discount rate on gO-day
commercial paper at the Federal Reserve
bank for the Federal Reserve district
where the bank is located.8 The statute
also specifies that state banks may
charge the rates authorized by the
statute "notWithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby
preempted for the purposes of this
section."9 As is the case under section
85 of the NBA for national banks,
section 27 allows state banks to charge
out-of-state borrowers interest at the
rates allowed by the law of the State
where the bank is located. even if such
rates exceed the usury limitations
imposed by the borrower's state of
residence.10
Section 27 contains two subsections
which are patterned after provisions in
the NBA. Subsection (a) corresponds to
section 85 of the NBA ("section 85"),11
which addresses the interest rates that
712 U.s.c. 1831d.
8 Section 21 was added to the FDI Act by section
521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (UDIDMCAU ).
9 Section 27(a) of the FDI Act: see generally
Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (lst Cir.), cert. denied.
506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
10 This ability to charge interest at the rates
allowed by the state where the bank is located is
often referred to as the "exportation doctrine. II
1112 U.S.C. 85.
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national banks are authorized to charge
their borrowers. Subsection (b)
corresponds to section 86 of the NBA
("section 86"),12 which addresses
penalties and limitations of actions for
charging interest in excess of the
amount allowable under section 85.
Because section 27 was enacted to
provide state banks "competitive
equality" with national banks and is
patterned after the corresponding
provisions in the NBA. the FDIC and the
courts have construed section 27 in
virtually the same manner as the acc
and the courts have construed sections
85 and 86. For example, in General
Counsel's Opinion No. 10 ("GC Opinion
No. 10"),13 the FDIC's General Counsel
concluded that section 27 and section
85 should be construed in pari materia
and that the term interest, for purposes
of section 27, includes those charges
that a national bank is authorized to
charge under section 85 and the acc's
interpretive rule defining interest for
purposes of section 85.14 In General
Counsel's Opinion No. 11 (uGC Opinion
No. 11") 15 the FDIC's General Counsel
interpreted section 27 as applying to
state banks operating interstate branches
in a manner similar to the oec's
interpretation of the application of
section 85 to national banks operating
interstate branches. In GC Opinion No.
11 it was observed that, like an
interstate national bank under section
85, a state bank is UlocatedII in the state
where it is chartered and in each state
where it has a branch. GC Opinion No.
11 also addressed the criteria for
determining when the state laws
imposed by the bank's home state or
host state should govern the amount of
interest authorized on a loan
transaction. In addition, the FDIC has
interpreted section 27 as providing state
banks: (a) The same "most favored
lender" status under section 27 as
national banks are provided under
section 85; (b) the same right to export
interest authorized by the state laws of
the state where the bank is located to
out-of-state borrowers; and (c) the same
exclusive remedy for usury vfolations as
is provided national banks under
section 86.16
n 12 U.S.C. 86.
13 GC Opinion No. 10.63 FR 19258 (ApI'. 11,
1998).
14 12 CFR 7.4001(a).
15CCOpinion No. 11, 63 FR 27282 (May 18,
1998).
1G FDIC Advisory Opinion No. 81-3. Febl·uary 3,
1981. reprinted in 11988-1989 Transfer Binder) Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) , 81,006j FDIC Advisory
Opinion No. 81-1, March 17. 1981, reprinted in
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder) Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) en 81,008; FDIC Advisory Opinion No. 02-06,
December 19,2002. reprinted in Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH)' 82-256.
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The Petitioner observes that the acc
and OTS have adopted rules codifying
the scope of the relevant parallel
interest provisions 11 contained in their
respective statutes.18 Therefore, the
Petitioner requests that the FDIC adopt
parallel provisions by rule to allow state
banks to operate in a matching legal
framework under section 27.
Therefore, the FDIC requests the
public's views on the following specific
issues:
5-1. Should the FDIC adopt a parallel
rule implementing section 27 for state
banks similar to 12 CFR 7.4001 and 12
CFR 560.110?
5-2. Should any other issues be
addressed by rulemaking to provide
state banks competitive equality with
national banks regarding section 271 For
example. 12 CFR 7.5009 addresses the
location under ·section 85 of national
banks operating exclusively through the
Internet. Is a similar rule needed for
state banks under section 271
Under section 525 of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act states may Uopt-out" of
coverage under section 27 at any time.19
The FDIC believes that Iowa, Puerto
Rico. and Wisconsin are the only
jurisdictions that have exercised this
authority and not rescinded it.
Therefore, the FDIC requests the
public's views on the following specific
issue:
5-3. What effect would the exercise of
the authority to opt·out of coverage
under section 27 have on the rule or
rules the Petitioner is requesting?
IV. Public Hearing
The FDIC will hold a hearing to
obtain the public's views on all issues
raised by the Petition. The hearing will
be held on Tuesday. May 24th. 2005
from 8:30 8.m. to 5 p.m. in the Board
room at the FDIC's headquarters, 550
17th Street. NW., Washington, DC.
Hearing Officers designated by the FDIC
will preside over the hearing. The
hearing will be informal. and the rules
of evidence will not apply. However.
only the Hearing Officers may question
a participant during a presentation.
Each participant making an oral
presentation at the hearing will be
limited to 15 minutes. While oral
presentations are limited to 15 minutes,
17 12 CFR 7.4001; 12 CFR 560.110.
U The relevant parallel interest provision for the
OTS is section 4(8) of the Home Owners Loan Act
(12 U.S.C. 1463(8)). which wu derived from section
522ofDIDMCA.
19 Section 525 of DIDMCA.like section 528 that
provides lenders a choice of interest ratu. is
contained in various notes in the United States
Code following the various sections that they affect.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1831d (note).
there is no limit on the length of a
participant's written statement.
Anyone wishing to make an oral
presentation at the hearing must (i)
deliver a written request to the
Executive Secretary, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. 550 17th Street.
NW., Washington. DC 20429 no later
than 5 p.m. on Monday, May 9th. 2005;
and (ii) deliver a copy of his or her
written statement plus a two..page (or
less) summary to the Executive
Secretary no later than 5 p.m. on
Monday, May 16th. 2005. Anyone
wishing to submit a written statement of
his or her views without making an oral
presentation at the hearing may submit
a limited-appearance statement. All
limited-appearance statements must be
received by the Executive Secretary no
later than 5 p,m. on Monday, May 16th.
2005. Attendance at the hearing is not
required in order to submit a written
statement. Each request to make an oral
presentation and each participant's
statement must include the participant's
name, address. telephone number. e-
mail address, and, if applicable, the
name and address of the institution or
organization the participant represents.
Opportunities to make an oral
presentation at the hearing are limited,
and not all requests may be granted. The
FDIC will notify each person who has
submitted a request to make an oral
presentation at the hearing whether the
FDIC will be able to accommodate his
or ber request. The notice for each
person whose request has been granted
will include the time scheduled for his
or her presentation and a tentative
agenda. Depending upon the number of
participants requesting an oral
presentation, participants may be
organized into panels of two or three to
accommodate as many participants as
possible.
The hearing will be transcribed. The
FDIC will provide attendees with any
auxiliary aids (e.g., sign language
interpretation) required for this meeting.
Those attendees needing such assistance
should call (202) 416-2089 (Voice); or
(202) 416-2007 (TTY), to make
necessary arrangements.
Dated in Washington DC. this 16th day of
March, 2005.
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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
Appendix: Petition for FDIC
Rulemaking Providing Inter.tate
Banking Parity for Insured State
Banks, by Letter From the Financial
Services Roundtable, 1001
Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Suite 500
South, Washington, DC 20004, Tel 202-
289-4322. Fax 202-628-2507, dated
March 4, 2005
March 4, 2005
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 550
Seventeenth Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20429.
Re: Petition for FDIC Rulemaking
Providing Interstate Banking Parity
for Insured State Banks
Dear Mr. Feldman: The Financial
Services Roundtable 1 ("Roundtable'l)
respectfully petitions the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
to promulgate rules under the Federal
Deposit Insurance (UFD!") Act and
Section 104(d) of the Gramm·Leach..
Bliley (uGLB") Act, 15 U.S.C. 6701, to
provide parity for state banks and
national banks. Specifically, the
proposed rule would provide that a state
bank's home state law governs the
interstate activities of insured state
banks and their subsidiaries to the same
extent that the National Bank Act
governs a national bank's interstate
business.
The FDIC has ample authority to take
each of the requested actions pursuant
to the broad delegation of authority in
the FDI Act. It is now clear that FDIC
action is reqUired to achieve the result
that Congress sought in the 1997
amendment to the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994 (URiegle-Neal IUl. Pub. L. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 238. See Riegle-Neal
Amendments Act of 1991, Pub. L. 105-
24 (1991) (amending 12 U.S.C. 1831a(j))
("Riegle-Neal II"). The requested
rulemaking would implement the
historic decision of Congress in 1997 to
provide competitive equality for state
banks and national banks in interstate
banking.
The Roundtable submits that it is both
necessary and timely for the FDIC to
adopt rules making clear the ability of
state banks operating interstate to be
1 The Financial Services Roundtable represents
100 of the largest integrated financial services
companies providing banking. insurance. and
investment products and services to the American
consumer. Roundtable member companies prOVide
fuel for America's economic accounting directly for
$18.3 trillion in managed assets, $678 billion in
revenue. and 2.1 million jobs.
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governed by a single framework of law
and regulation to the same extent as
national banks. Such an action would
ensure the continued vitality of the dual
banking system. Accordingly, the
Roundtable requests that the FDIC
promulgate rules that:
1. Clarify that the governing law
applicable to activities conducted in a
host state by a state bank that has an
interstate branch in that state is its home
state law to the same extent that host
state law is preempted by the National
Bank Act. The FDIC should make clear
that "home" state law applies to an out-
of-state state bank in a "host" state to
the same extent as the National Bank
Act applies to an out-of-state national
bank, whether the business of the bank
is conducted by the bank through the
host state branch. by or through an
operating subsidiary. or by any other
lawful means.
2. Clarify that the governing law
applicable to activities conducted by a
state bank in a state in which the state
bank does not have a branch is its home
state law to the same extent that host
state law is preempted by the National
Bank Act. The FDIC should make clear
that a state bank may operate under
home state law in any other state to the
same extent that an out-of-state national
bank may operate under the National
Bank Act or under rules promulgated by
the Comptroller oftha Currency
("DCC"). Such a rule would give effect
to the policy underlying Riegle-Neal II
and the preemption of discriminatory
state law provided in Section 104(d) of
the Gramm-Leach-BUley ("GLB") Act
("Section 104(d)"J, 15 D.S.C. 6701(d).
3. Clarify that the law applicable to
activities conducted by an operating
subsidiary of a state bank is the same
law applicable to the bank itself. The
FDIC should clarify that when a state
bank has established an U operating
subsidiary" pursuant to its home state
law, that subsidiary will be treated
under FDIC rules as if it were the state
bank itself. Thus, the operating
subsidiary will be subject to state law
outside its home state in the same
manner as its bank parent is subject to
such state law. Such rules would allow
state bank operating subsidiaries to
engage in interstate business under the
same uniform rules as its parent bank,
just as national bank operating
subsidiaries operate under uniform DeC
rules.
4. Adopt rules construing the scope
and application of Section l04(d) to
make clear that a state law or action is
expressly preempted under Section
104(d) when it imposes a requirement,
limitation, or burden on a state bank, or
its affiliate, that does not also apply to
an out-oi-state national bank or in-state
bank. Section 104(d) expressly preempts
state laws or actions that discriminate
against "insured depository
institutions'," or their affiliates. as
defined in the FDI Act. Accordingly,
Section 104(d) provides independent
basis and support for each of the above
requests. Moreover, through
implementing rules. the FDIC would
provide greater certainty to insured state
banks with respect to the scope of this
express federal preemption in general.
This provision is not well understood
and we believe that a rulemaking. not
litigation, is the appropriate means to
carry out Congressional intent and
achieve needed clarity.
5. Implement Section 27 of the FDI
Act by adopting a rule parallel to the
rules promulgated by the Dec and
Office of Thrift Supervision (HOTS").
The scope and implementation of the
express preemption for the "interest
rate" charged in interstate lending
transactions by state and national banks
under Section 27 of the FDI Act and
Section 85 of the Nationa! Bank Act has
been authoritatively addressed by the
courts and in agency interpretations.
The DCC and ors have adopted rules
codifying the scope of the respective '
statutory provisions for federal
institutions. The FDIC should adopt a
parallel rule for insured state banks and
thus codify existing agency
inter~retations.
In this letter, we will address (A) the
urgent need for the requested
rulemaking and the real costs of
inaction, (B) the FDIC's authority to
promulgate rules of the scope requested.
(e) the legislativa history demonstrating
that Congress specifically intended in
Riegle-Neal II to prevent erosion of the
dual banking system and in Section
104(d) to prevent disparate treatment
and ensure that all banks could compete
on relatively equal terms in today's
interstate financial services
marketplace, and (D) the scope of the
proposed rule provisions in greater
detail. The Roundtable appreciates the
FDICls consideration of this petition.
A. A Rulemaking Is Necessary and the
Costs ofInaction Will Be Significant
The requested FDIC action in this
petition is necessary to complete the
task of restoring balance in the dual
banking system that Congress sought to
achieve in 1997. Riegle-Neal IT reversed
a decision in 1994 to treat state and
national banks differently with respect
to "applicable law. u In Riegle-Neal I,
state and national banks were under the
same rules for the establishment of
interstate branches. However, Riegle-
Neal I provided that when a national
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bank branched interstate into a host
state. it was in effect generally subject
to the National Bank Act,2 while the
state bank in a parallel case was made
subject to host state law. While
interstate national banks could operate
under a single law. interstate state banks
were subjected to multiple state laws.
That disparity led Congress in 1997 to
amend Riegle-Neal to adopt an
applicable law provision for state banks
that closely tracked the national bank
provision in Section 36(f) of the
National Bank Act.s The purpose of the
1997 amendment, which was stated
repeatedly by its sponsors. was to
provide parity between state banks and
national banks with respect to interstate
banking.4 By "parity." they plainly
meant the ability of state banks to do
business interstate under a uniform law
(home state law) just as national banks
were authorized to do under Riegle-
Neal.5
Over the last decade. the federal
charters for national banks and federal
thrifts have been correctly interpreted
by the ace and OTS, with the repeated
support of the federal courts, to provide
broad federal preemption of state laws
that might appear to apply to the
activities or operations of a banking
institution in that state. The result is
that, in general, national banks and
2 The Riegle-Neal applicable law provision for
national banks states: "(A) In general The laws of
the host Slate regarding community reinvestment,
consumer protection, fair lending, and
establishment of intrastate branches shall apply to
any branch in the host State of an out-of-State
national banle to the same extent as such State laws
apply to a branc!) of a bank chartered by that State,
except-(i) when Federal law preempts the
application of such State laws to a national bank;
or (ii) when the Comptroller of the Currency
determines that the application of such State laws
would have a discriminatory effect on the branch
in comparison with the effect the application of
such State laws would have with respect to
branches of a bank chartered by the host State." 12
U.S.C. 36(f)(1){A). The effect of this provision is that
any host state law, including a community
l'einvestment, consumer protection, fair housing, or
intl'utate branching law, that is preempted under
the National Bank Act does not apply to the
national bank branch (or the bank) in the host state.
3 Compare 12 U.S.C. 1831a(1)(1) (text in footnote
9) with 12 U.S.C, 36(f)(1)(A) (text in footnote 2).
4 As stated by the led sponsor in the House, Rep.
Roukema: liThe essence of this legislation is to
provide parity between state-chartered banks and
national banks." 143 Congo Ree. H3088 (daily ed.
May 21,1997).
Ii Sse, e.g_, statements by the principal sponsors
afthe 1997 Amendment, Rep. Roukema Cu. * * we
have· * * with this action, protected the dual
banking system while at the same time gaining the
advantages of interstate bankins"). 143 Congo Ree.
H4231 (daily ed. June 24, 1997), and Chairman
D'Amato ("Enactment ofH,R. 1306 also would
bolster efforts of New York. and other states to make
sure that State[-]chartered banks have the powers
they need to compete efficiently and effectively in
an interstate environment"), 143 CODg. Rec. 55637
(daily ed. June 12, 1997).
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federal thrifts now can do business
across the country under a single set of
federal rules. This framework is
appropriate for these federal entities in
a national financial marketplace. At the
same time, in this marketplace a
uniform national bank system based on
preemption and interstate banking
undoubtedly presents a major challenge
to the dual banking system and state
banks.
In contrast to the general certainty
enjoyed by federal institutions, there is
widespread confusion and uncertainty
with respect to applicable law governing
state banks engaged in interstate
banking activities. The current
uncertainty governing the interstate
activities of state banks has had, and
will continue to have, several significant
adverse effects. Uncertainty carries the
potential for litigation and enforcement
actions arising from disagreements
between regulators, or between a host
state regulator and a state bank engaged
in interstate activity. Regulatory
uncertainty deters state banks from
pursuing profitable business
opportunities. When a state bank
converts to a national charter to gain
greater legal certainty, it incurs
substantial expense. Each of these
consequences has economic significance
for state banks and direct implications
for the FDIC's enforcement and safety-
and-soundness responsibilities.
Moreover. a series of recent major
merger and conversion transactions has
resulted in an unprecedented migration
of assets to the national banking system.
It is now apparent that, absent a more
certain federal regulatory environment,
the state charter will continue to be
perceived as less competitive than a
national bank charter.
This is the very result that Congress
intended to prevent.6 In 1994,1997 and
1999 Congress took bold and historic
actions to provide uniform federal rules
to govern all interstate banking and to
ensure that individual state laws could
not disfavor any type of depository
institution in the multistate financial
services marketplace. It is now apparent
that the express terms of these statutes
have not on their own force been able
oThe statement by Rep. LaFalce before final
House passage of the 1997 amendments captures
the purpose to redress the negative effects of the
1994 Riegle-Neal applicable provision for state
banks: "Why [must we act now)? Well. it is due to
the fact that the national bank regulator has the
authority to permit national banks to conduct
operations in all the states with some level of
consistency. In contrast, under the existing
interstate legislation. state banks branching outside
their home state must comply with 8 multitude of
different state banking laws in each and every state
in which they operate. U 143 Congo Rec. H3094
(daily ed. May 27, 1997). See the discussion of the
legislative history in the next section.
to ensure, as Congress intended in
enacting Riegle-Neal II, that state banks
can participate in interstate banking
business on a par with national banks
and that state banks face significant
state law obstacles when they seek to do
business outside their home state. As a
consequence, the state banking system,
as we have known it, is fundamentally
threatened.
In the national financial services
marketplace. consumers and providers
benefit when banks can provide
products and services under a single
legal framework applicable across state
lines. At the same time, bank customers
and the economy also benefit from the
diversity. innovation and checks
provided by a strong and dynamic dual
banking system involving large.
regional, and small banks. From the
perspective of all parties-consumers.
financial institutions, and regulators-
further development of a framework of
state bank regulation and supervision
that is effective, efficient, and seamless
across state lines is the right goal. In
today's multistate system, that is an
essential goal. A banking system in
which virtually all interstate banks have
national charters and state banks are
overwhelmingly local is not the dual
banking system this country has
historically enjoyed. The dual banking
system will retain the dynamic vitality
that has made it a mainspring for
progress and strength in banking only if
it can provide meaningful interstate
competitive parity for all interstate state
banks, whether cross-border, regional,
or national. Significant and
unacceptable disparity exists today.
The FDIC has the authority, tools, and
responsibility under the FDI Act to
correct this imbalance. To implement
Congressional intentions it now must
promptly provide a uniform interstate
applicable law regime for state banks
and give practical reality to the express
preemption of discriminatory state laws.
B. The FDIC Has Authority To Adopt
the Requested Rules
The FDIC has ample rulemaking
authority to address each of the
Roundtable's requests. Section 9 of the
FOI Act vests the FDIC with broad
authority to adopt rules "it may deem
necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act or of any other law which it has
the responsibility of administering or
enforcing." 12 U.S.C. 1819.7
7 The FDIC's rulamaking authority parallels the
QCC's authority. See 12 U.S.C. 93(a) (("the
Comptroller of the Currency is authorized to
prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the
responsibilities of the office"). The statutory
provision authorizing the OCC to issue rules is
directly analogous to Section 9 of the FDI Act.
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The FDIC is vested with responsibility
for administering Sections 24 and 27 of
the Act to accomplish what Congress
intended. Congress. through Section 9,
has vested the FDIC with authority to
carry out Sections 24 and 27. Moreover,
under basic principles of administrative
law, agency rules that fill or address a
statutory gap generally are afforded
considerable deference by courts. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (UChevron").
Section 9's "generally conferred
authority" makes it apparent "that
Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when
it addresses ambiguity in the statute or
fills a space in the enacted law. even
one about which 'Congress did not
actually have an intent' as to a
particular result." United States v.
Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
Riegle-Neal I and II fundamentally
changed federal law for state and
national banks by authorizing banks to
engage fully in banking transactions in
other states through interstate
branching.s As a corollary, Riegle-Neal
I provided federal "applicable law"
statutea to govern the new interstate
banking regime. As originally enacted,
the respective applicable law provisions
treated national and state banks
differently. Riegle-Neal II sought to
redress that disparity and provided
substantively the same rule for state
banks as was originally provided for
national banks.9 The FDIC plainly has
authority to implement Riegle-Neal II.
Compare 12 U.S.C. 1819 (FDIC vested with
authority "to prescribe * * * such rules and
regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out
the provisions of this chapter or of any other law
which it has the responsibility of administering or
enforcing 11 .. *").
a Prior to enactment of Riegle~NeaI.neither state
nor national banks could establish branches outside
their home state. Moreover. except with respect to
interest charges under 12 U.S.C. 85 and 12 U.S.C.
1831d. federal law did not provide guidance to
either state banks or national banks regarding the
law applicable to transactions that banks made with
customers outside theil' home states.
t See generally section 24(j):
(j) ACTIVITmS OF BRANCHES OF OUT~OF­
STATE BANKS.-
(1) APPLICATION OF HOST STATE LAW.-The
laws of a host State, including laws regarding
community reinvestment. consumer protection, fair
lending, and establishment of intrastate branches.
shall apply to any branch in the host State of an
out-of-State national bank. To the extent host State
law is inapplicable to a branch of an out-of-State
bank in such host State pursuant to the preceding
sentence. home State law shall apply to such
branch.
(2) ACTIVITIES OF BRANCHES.-An insured
State bank that establishes a branch in a host State
may conduct any activity at such branch that is
permissible under tbelaws of the home State of
Continued
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The FDIC also has the authority to
implement the nondiscrimination
provisions of Section 104(d) insofar as
the GLB Act addresses state insured
depository institutions and to construe
the express preemption of
discriminatory state law provided in
Section 104(d). Section 9 vests the FDIC
with authority to promulgate rules to
carry out any statute the FDIC is
responsible for administering or
enforcing. The provisions of the GLB
Act that touch upon state depository
institutions fall within the regulatory
ambit of the FDIC. •
A statutory gap. or a clarification of a
statute to effect Congressional intent,
can be-and should be-addressed by
an agency rule. Where, as here, a statute
is ambiguous regarding its application
to "a particular result" (Mead. 533 U.S.
at 229). courts have long recognized that
agencies with rule-making authority
must be permitted to address the
statutory gap as "necessary for the
orderly conduct of its business. II United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192,202-03 (1956) (finding also
that the statute Umust be read as a whole
and with appreciation of the
responsibilities of the body charged
with its fair and efficient operation").
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. 482
F.2d at 681. (U[T]here is little question
that the availability of substantive rule-
making gives any agency an invaluable
resource-saving flexibility in carrying
out its task of regulating parties subject
to its statutory mandate."). Courts have
consistently applied these
administrative law principles-and
extended Chevron deference-to rules
and regulations issued by the FDIC
under its broad rulemaking authority.10
such bank, to the extent such activity is permissible
either for a bank chartered by the host State (subject
to the restrictions in this section) or for a branch
in the host State of an out-of-State national bank.
(3) SAVINGS PROVI5ION.-No provi.ion of this
subsection shall be construed as affecting the
applicability of-
(A) any State law of any home State under
subsection (b), (c). or Cd) of section 44: or
(B) Federal law to State banks and State bank
branches in the home State or the host State.
(4) DEPIN1TIONS.-The terms "host State",
"home State" I and "out-of-State bank" have the
same meanings as in section 44(/). 12 U.S.c.
1831a(j).
\0 See, 8.g., National Council 0/Savings
Institutions v. FDIC, 664 F.Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1987)
(sustaining FDIC regulation governing the proper
relationship between FDIC-insured banks and their
securities.dealing "subsidiaries" or "affiliates") See
also Wsl/s Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FDIC. 310 F.3d 202.
208 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affording Chevron deference to
FDIC rule for "second generation" transactions.
because statute wu silent as to treatment of these
transactions and rule would "implement
Congressional intent because it prevents financial
institutioDs from manipulating the system"):
America's Community Bankers V. FDIC, 200 F.3d
822, 834 (D.C. Cil 2000) (upholding FDIC denial of
There can be little doubt that Section 9
of the FDI Act vests the FDIC with
authority to address these issues.11
There is no reason that a rulemaking
by the FDIC similar to ones conducted
by the DCC should be analyzed any
differently. The National Bank Act does
not expressly address the law applicable
to a national bank outside states where
it has branches. Prior to the adoption of
the DCC rules. a number of courts
determined that national banks were
subject to state laws that did not conflict
with the provisions of the National Bank
ACt.12 Nonetheless. the courts have
upheld the acc rules and
determinations that make clear that
national banks and their operating
subsidiaries are governed by the
National Bank Act wherever they do
business. These acc rules have
generally received Chevron deference.13
Further. under Section 8 of the FDI
Act. an insured bank may be subject to
an enforcement action of the FDIC if "in
the opinion of the appropriate Federal
banking agency. any insured depository
institution. depository institution which
has insured deposits. or any institution-
affiliated party is engaging or has
engaged. or the agency has reasonable
cause to believe that the depository
institution or any institution-affiliated
party is about to engage, in an unsafe or
unsound practice in conducting the
business of such depository institution.
or is violating or has violated, or the
agency has reasonable cause to believe
that the depository institution or any
institutionOoaffiliated party is about to
violate, a law, rule, or regulation." 12
U.S.C. 1818(b)(1). The FDIC has
refund assessment under Chevron. where statute
merely stated that FDIC could utilize"any other
factors" to "set" the assessment amount and thus
was U facially ambiguous"); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Sumner Financial Corp .• 451 F.2d 898,
902-903 (5th Cir. 1971) (affording "great deference"
to FDIC interpretation of FDI Act through regulation
concerning advertising by regulated banks).
'1 '1 Riegle.Neal I and II provide express ability for
a state bank to establish a branch in a host state,
to thus gain the ability to engage in any or all of
its permitted activities in that host state. and to
apply its home state law (unless a national bank,
and thus the state bank, must apply host state law)
to that branch. But the statutory text does not
directly address the governing law applicable to the
state bank's activities permitted in the host state
under the authority provided by Riegle-Neal, but
conducted by the bank outside of its branch. by an
operating subsidiary or another means. An ordinary
task of a regulatory agency is to constnae such a
statutory provision in a rule.
12 See National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981
(3d Cu. 1980); Perdue v. Crocker NationaJ Bank,
702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985); Best v. u.s. National
Bank, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).
13 See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C. v. VAUC, 513
U.S. 251 (1995); Barnett Bank of Marion County v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996); Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. 5upp. 2d, 957, 963-65 (W.D.
Mich. 2004); Wachovia v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d
275 (D. Conn. 2004).
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authority to adopt rules with respect to
legal compliance by insured banks that
provide guidance to those banks and
agency staff charged with making
supervisory, enforcement and
examination decisions. That can be
accomplished by using authority under
Section 9 to address issues of
compliance with state law, including
the meaning and scope of Section 104.14
C. The Requested Rulemakings Would
Advance the Congressional Purpose To
Prevent Erosion of the Dual Banking
System by Maintaining Parity Between
State and National Banks
Beginning with the enactment of
Section 27. Congress has taken bold and
historic action on more than one
occasion to preempt a wide range of
state laws so that state banks can
operate on a par with national banks in
the multistate financial services
marketplace that has come into
existence in recent decades. The broad
sweep of what Congress intended to
accomplish is evident in the terms and
legislative history of Riegle-Neal II and
Section 104(d). Those statutes further
the decades-old principle of competitive
equality embodied in federal law and
repeatedly recognized by the courts and
the FDIC.15 The requested FDIC rule
would implement these Congressional
purposes.
The principle of fundamental
competitive parity has been woven by
Congress and the courts into the very
fabric of the dual banking system. The
dual system was created when Congress
created the national bank system
alongside. the state banking system. In
the Federal Reserve Act, Congress
expressly prOVided for state banks. as
well as national banks, to be member
14 The FDIC previously has engaged in a
rulemaking in comparable circumstances. In 1982.
the FDIC adopted a Statement of Policy addressing
the applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to
securities activities of subsidiaries of insured
nonmember banks. 47 FR 38984, September 3.
1982. That Statement of Policy construed Section
20 of the Glass·Steagall Act and concluded that the
restrictions in that section on securities affiliates of
insured banks did not prevent insured nonmember
banks subject to the FDIC's regulation and
supervision from having "bona fide" securities
affiliates or subsidiaries. The prOVisions of Glass·
Steagall construed in the Statement of Policy (like
the provisions of GtB at issue here) were not part
of the FOI Act, but the FDIC issued a rule to provide
clem' guidance to insured state banks, and the
exercise of the FDIC's rulemaking authority in that
case was upheld. See National Council 0/ Savings
Institutions v. FDIC, 664 F.Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1987).
Issuing guidance to state insured banks concerning
the scope of Section 104 of the GLB Act is a
necessary and appropriate exercise of the FDIC's
authority to carry out its regulatory mandate.
1& See First Nat'] Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); First Nat'l Bank in Plant
City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969): FDIC
Advisory Letter 00-5.
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banks. The McFadden Act as passed and
as amended in the 19308 embodied a
federal policy of competitive equality in
branching. In the FDI Act. deposit
insurance was made available to all
state and national banks.
Since 1980, Congress has amended
the FDI Act to ensure state-national
bank parity. to ensure a strong and
balanced dual banking system, and to
prevent discriminatory state laws from
favoring one type of charter over
another. In 1980, in response to the
challenges presented by the 1978
Marquette case, Congress provided
interstate usury parity for state banks in
Section 27 of the FDI ACt.'16 See 12
U.S.C. 1831d(a). In 1991, Congress
addressed state laws providing state
banks more expansive powers than
national banks, a disparity in favor of
state banks that Congress believed had
implications for safety-and-soundness,
bank competitiveness, and the dynamic
for change in the dual banking system.
That enactment provided that state bank
activities would be limited to activities
permissible for national banks, unless
the FDIC determined that for a state
bank to engage in an otherwise
impermissible activity would not pose a
significant risk to the deposit insurance
fund. See 12 U.S.C. 1831a(a)-(e). This
policy of parity was continued in
Riegle-Neal and the GLB Act.
1. The Legislative History ofRiegle..Neal
Amendments Demonstrates
Congressional Purpose to Provide Parity
Between National Banks and State
Banks
In Riegle-Neal, Congress reversed
more than 150 years of federal policy
and enacted comprehensive federal laws
governing interstate banking for all
banks. Except for the applicable law
provisions, Riegle-Neal as originally
enacted gave parallel treatment to state
and national banks. In 1997, Congress
recognized that the original state bank
applicable law provision was placing
state banks at a substantial disadvantage
and was undermining the state system.
It acted swiftly to redress the state..
national bank balance in Riegle-Neal II.
The specific drafting approach. the
underlying policy and the express
purpose of that 1997 statute all sought
to ensure that state banks would operate
under a uniform interstate "applicable
law" regime based on home state law
parallel to the national bank regime. It
sought to ensure parity in the dynamic
interstate banking environment.
The legislative history of Riegle-Neal
II makes clear that Congress' goal was to
1BSee Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Servo Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
facilitate competitive equality for state
banks and national banks in interstate
banking. The 1997 amendments
originated in the House Banking
Committee. At final passage, the
principal sponsor of the bill, Rep. Marge
Roukema (R-NJ), chair of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions,
and senior members of the House
Banking Committee, on a bipartisan
basis, expressed the intent to provide a
level playing field, not narrowly in
terms of competition between state and
national bank branches, but broadly in
terms of the ability of state banks to
match national banks in doing business
across the country.
As Rep. Roukema stated when
introducing the bill for vote on the
House floor: "The essence of this
legislation is to provide parity between
state-chartered banks and national
banks. * * • This legislation is critical
to the survival of the dual banking
system. * * * fA] strong state banking
system is necessary for the economic
well-being of the individual States and
for innovation in financial institutions."
In her final statement before final
passage, she repeated the necessity and
purpose of the bill: "[Wje have * * *
with this action, protected the dual
banking system while at the same time
gaining the advantages of interstate
banking."17 No contrary statement was
made by any House or Senate member
during the floor debates preceding final
passage.
Representative Roukema's statements
were echoed and reinforced by senior
members from each political party. On
the Republican side, Rep. Mike Castle
(R-DEL) addressed state bank's
competitive needs "across the Nation":
"As we enter the age of interstate
banking and branching, it is necessary
to ensure that state banks can compete
fairly with national banks as more
banking is done between States and
across the Nation. This legislation will
ensure that there is a level playing field
between state and national banks,u18
Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NEB)
emphasized the benefits for the state
system, "This Member was intimately
involved in the original Riegle-Neal Act
and was concerned at that time that
States' rights were protected. * * * This
Member believes that this measure
actually reinforces States t rights by
maintaining the viability of the state
charter by ensuring parity with the
national bank charter * * * [and] urges
his colleagues to join him in approving
'l7 See 143 Congo Rec. H3CB8 (daily ed. May 21.
1997), H4231 (daily ed. June 24, 1997).
18 143 Congo Rec. H309S (daily ed. May 27. 1997).
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this important protection of the dual
banking system."'19
A senior Democrat, Rep John LaFalce
(D-NY), articulated the purpose clearly:
". * * I do believe [the bill's] passage
is vital to maintain the dual banking
system. It is the dual banking system
that by giving banks a choice of Federal
or state charters has helped to ensure
that our U.S. banking industry has
remained strong and competitive.· * •
[In 1994, Congress did not adequately
anticipate the negative impact the
interstate law would have on state
banks.] Why so? Well, it is due to the
fact that the national bank regulator has
the authority to permit national banks to
conduct operations in all the states with
some level of consistency. In contrast,
under the existing interstate legislation,
state banks branching outside their
home state must comply with a
multitude of different state banking laws
in each and every state in which they
operate."20
When the Riegle-Neal II bill was
considered in the Senate, concern also
was expressed about the erosion of the
dual banking system caused by the
disparity in applicable law enacted in
Riegle-Neal. In his floor statement
preceding final Senate passage. Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Alphonse
D'Amato (R-NY) stated the importance
of Riegle-Neal II for the continued
vitality of the dual banking system:
[T]ne trigger date for nationwide
interstate branching has passed-June 1,
1997, This important legislation will
preserve the benefits of the dual banking
system and keep the state banking
charter competitive in an interstate
environment. * * •
The bill is necessary to preserve
confidence in a state banking charter for
banks with such a charter that wish to
operate in more than one state. In
addition, it will curtail incentives for
unnecessary Federal preemption of
State laws. Finally, the bill will restore
balance to the dual banking system by
ensuring that neither charter operates at
an unfair advantage in this new
interstate environment. * * *
New York has more than 90 State
(-]chartered banks. * * * Without this
10Id. at H3094. Rep. Spencer Bacchus (R-ALA)
similarly stated: u. · ·we have heard almost
unanimous testimony that the unfortunate and
unintended consequences of our failure to make
these clarifications will be the devaluation of state
banking charters in favor of national charters and
the gradual decline of the state banking system
.. • *u Id. at H3095.
20 Id. at H3094. Rep. Bruce Vento (D-MN)
similarly stated: uThe legislation will maintain the
dynamic balance between the chartering of national
and state banks and banking systems. This is a
necessal'Y measure. It must be enacted to clarify and
ensure the viability of America's dual banking
system. II Id. at H3093.
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legislation, the largest of these
institutions may be tempted to convert
to a national charter in order to operate
in more than one State. * * *
The current law may be unclear as to
whether consistent rules are used to
determine what laws and powers apply
to the out-of-state branches of state and
federally chartered banks. * * *
[Summary of the bill's terms omitted]
Enactment of H.R. 1306 also would
bolster efforts of New York and other
states to make sure that State[-]chartered
banks have the powers they need to
compete efficiently and effectively in an
interstate environment.21
2. Section 104 of the GLB Act Reflects
Congress' Intent To Preempt
Discriminatory State Laws Adversely
Affecting Any Depository Institution
Congress enacted Section 104 as part
of the GLB Act in 1999 to address state
laws providing competitive inequalities
amoDg entities offering the same
financial products and services. Section
104 originated as a provision intended
to sweep away a variety of state laws
that had blocked or imposed special
requirements or conditions on banks
seeking to engage in insurance activities
permitted under their charter law.
During the legislative process, the
section was expanded to provide
express preemption of not just state
insurance laws. but any state law that
placed impediments or burdens on any
insured depository institution seeking to
provide financial services across the
country. Even though the non-insurance
provisions of Section 104(d) are far less
detailed than the insurance provisions
of Section 104, the Congressional
purpose and breadth of preemption with
respect to non-insurance activities are
express in the nature and scope of the
words used.
Congress determined that in a
national financial services marketplace
individual states should not be able to
impose burdens or requirements
adversely affecting any depository
institution, or its affiliates. As enacted,
Section 104(d) provides broad
preemption of discriminatory state laws
adversely affecting any type of
depository institution or any affiliate of
a depository institution. It was enacted
for the purpose of ensuring that no
insured depository institution-
including a state bank and its financial
affiliates-would be disadvantaged
competitively by the operation of state
law when it engages in a financial
activity, whether on its own, with an
affiliate or with "any other person."
on 143 Congo Rac. 85631 (daily ed. June 12. 1997).
The legislative history of Section
104{d), and particularly the paragraph
(4) nondiscrimination provisions, is
sparse, and thus its purpose and intent
are best drawn from its terms. It is
important to note that Section 104
addresses how banking organizations
conduct the full range of permitted
financial activities, whether by the
depository institution itself or by an
affiliate, including both "traditional"
affiliates such as mortgage or finance
companies and the new affiliations
permitted under the GLB Act. It focuses
on state laws that affect how depository
institutions or its affiliates engage in any
of their permitted activities. This focus
is evident in the Senate Banking
Committee report in 1999. That
Committee had taken the lead role in
fashioning Section 104 in the form
ultimately enacted. Its report expressly
addressed the section's broad,
preemptive purpose with respect to
state laws that impinge on how financial
activities are conducted: U[T]he
Committee is aware that some States
have used their regulatory authority to
discriminate against insured depository
institutions, their subsidiaries and
affiliates. The Committee has no desire
to have State regulation prevent or
otherwise frustrate the affiliations and
activities authorized or permitted by
this bill. Thus, Section 104 clarifies the
application of State law to the
affiliations and activities authorized or
permitted by the bill (or other Federal
law), and ensures that applicable State
law cannot prevent, discriminate
against, or otherwise frustrate such
affiliations or activities. JJ 22
Section 104(d) has a purpose parallel
to Riegle-Neal II-to ensure that
depository institutions will be able to
compete across the country on equal
terms and to prevent state laws or
actions from providing disparate
treatment that would disadvantage any
bank vis-a.-vis its competitors. When an
out-of-state state bank is subject to a
state law imposing any requirement,
limitation, or burden to which a
national bank or in-state bank is not
subject, Section 104(d) by its literal
terms preempts that state law.
D. In the Requested Rulemakingt the
FDIC Should Clarify the Applicable
Law Governing the Interstate Activities
of State Banks To Provide Parallel
Uniformity for State Banks With
National Banks
In light of the FDIC's authority under
its statute and the express purposes and
policies of Congress enacted in recent
22 S. Rept. 106-44 (April 28. 1999) at 11 [Senate
Banking Committee) (emphasis added).
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statutes, the Roundtable believes that
the FDIC can, and should, adopt rules
so that state banks can operate interstate
under uniform rules based on home
state law and thus parallel to national
banks. We now address in tum the
specific parts of the requested
rulemaking.
1. The FDIC Should Clarify That in
General Home State Law Is the
Governing Law Applicable to All
Activities Conducted in a Host State by
a State Bank That Has an Interstate
Branch in That State to the Same Extent
That Host State Law Is Preempted by the
National Bank Act
This petition seeks a rule addressing
the appropriate applicable law to govern
the activities of a state bank when it has
entered a host state with a branch as
permitted by Riegle-Neal and thus has a
federal law authorization to transact all
its legally permissible activities within
that host state. The requested rule
would expressly permit a state bank to
apply home state law uniformly to all its
business done in a host state parallel to
the ability of national banks to apply the
National Bank Act under acc rules.
Riegle-Neal II plainly provides that if
the National Bank Act preempts host
state law for national banks, home state
law is the applicable law when the out-
of-state bank engages in any or all of its
permissible activities in or through its
host state branch. The Riegle-Neal
applicable law provisions for both state
and national banks are silent, however,
with respect to the governing law
applicable to a transaction that the bank
could conduct through its branch, but is
effecting without any involvement by
the host state branch.
Riegle-Neal I authorized the bank to
engage in any or all of its permitted
activities in the host state once it has a
single branch there and to apply its
home state law. The only question
under Riegle-Neal IT is whether
Congress intended different law to
apply depending on the means used by
the bank to conduct its permitted
business in the host state or the
structure of the transaction (that is,
whether use of home state law as the
applicable law depends on some actual
branch involvement in the bank's
transaction).23 The legislative purpose is
clear: Congress was focused on the
:t:l For example. although the statutory text
directly addresses the law applicable to a Tennessee
bank with a branch in Oklahoma that makes a loan
to an Oklahoma resident through its Oklahoma
branch (Tennessee law applies), the text does not
speak directly to the governing law applicable to
the identical loan originated by the Tennessee bank
from its home office in Tennessee (or through an
operating subsidiary).
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bank's interstate activities. not the
means used by the bank. By adopting
the requested rule. the FDIC will
achieve the result Congress intended.
The FDIC should fill the statutory gap
and clarify the application of home state
law to host state activities by adopting
a rule for state banks that provides for
uniform application of home state law
whenever a national bank can apply the
National Bank Act. The FDIC rule
should make it clear that the state
bank's home state law will apply to all
of the bank's activities in a host state
whenever a host state law would be
preempted by acc rules for a national
bank.
Specifically, the rule should make it
plain that any host state statute, rule,
order, etc.• that would be preempted
under the terms of the acc praemption
rule, or an acc interpretive letter.
would also be preempted for a state
bank. If there is any uncertainty about
the application of the acc rules in any
case, the rule might allow the home
state regulator. or the FDIC, to
determine in writing whether OCG rules
would provide preemption for national
banks. The FDIC should reserve the
ability to make any final determination
(with consultation with the acc as
needed). In parallel fashion. the role
should provide that if home state statute
law is silent, the home state regulator
can determine by rule, order, or
interpretative statement/letter what
applicable home state law is. In general.
the home state regulator's written
determinations, whether by rule, order,
or interpretative statement/letter. should
govern, but could be subject to review
by the FDIC, upon request of the host
state regulator or upon the FDIC's own
initiative.
The rule might also address another
Riegle-Neal provision addressing the
home-host state relationship. Section
10(h)(3) of the FDI Act expressly
provides that the I CState bank
supervisors from 2 or more States may
enter into cooperative agreements to
facilitate State regulatory supervision of
State banks, including cooperative
agreements relating to the coordination
of examinations and joint participation
in examinations." The state regulators,
through the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors, have entered into a
landmark nationwide cooperative
agreement, as well as agreements
involving a specific bank by the states
where that bank has branches. The FDIC
rule could provide guidance on the
effect of Section 10(h)(3).
2. The FDIC Should Clarify That Home
State Law is the Governing Law
Applicable to Activities Conducted by a
State Bank in a State in Which the State
Bank Does Not Have a Branch to the
Same Extent That State Law Is
Preempted by the National Bank Act
The Roundtable requests that the
FDIC adopt parallel rules under its
Section 9 authority to provide that the
home state law of a state bank will
apply to its activities in other states to
the same extent as the National Bank
Act applies to the activities of national
banks. The rule should provide that
whenever a state law is preempted by
the National Bank Act or ace rules, it
also would not apply to an out-of-state
insured bank, which would be governed
by its home state charter law. The
requested rule thus would implement
the terms and policies of Section 104(d}
and the policies of Riegle-Neal II and
address gaps in existing law. Like the
parallel acc rules, the requested rules
would reduce legal risk. guide legal
compliance by insured banks, and aid
the FDIC in making enforcement
decisions under Section 8 of the FDI
Act. Further. by promoting operating
efficiency and competitiveness in
interstate banking and by reducing the
real costs arising from legal uncertainty
and risk. the proposed rule would
contribute to the safe and sound
operation of state banks.
To a large extent, the Riegle-Neal and
GLB legislation confirmed the existence
of a robust interstate marketplace for
financial services and provided a federal
legal framework for the conduct of this
interstate commerce. Although the
express purpose of Riegle-Neal II was to
provide state banks competitive equality
with national banks in interstate
banking, it did not by its terms address
the law applicable to banks outside
states where they maintain a branch.
The GLB Act addressed the entire
financial services marketplace and, like
Riegle-Neal I and II, adopted broad
federal rules to implement the goal of a
"level playing field". In Section 104(d)
Congress plainly recognized the need
for financial services providers,
including insured depository
institutions, that operate across the
country to do so under uniform rules
and not to be subject to individual state
rules or actions that would disadvantage
some or all depository institutions.
Accordingly, Congress provided the
very broad express preemption stated in
Section 104(d) to address this perceived
need.
As is often the case. Congress did not
address in those acts every issue
presented by the developments and
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problems it was considering, nor did it
address future developments. Under
established principles of administrative
law. as discussed above. the federal
agencies that administer and implement
statutory grants of authority have an
important role in adopting rules that
implement Congressional purposes,
reasonably fill in statutory gaps and
address the application of existing laws
to new developments and contexts.
The policy of Section 104 has a
similar goal as Riegle-Neal II. but
plainly addresses a different aspect of
the same problem-discriminatory state
laws that disadvantage depository
institutions. including state banks.
seeking to compete in interstate
financial service markets. Section l04(d)
thus directly infonns and supports this
requested rule. Under Section 104(d),
when state law provides for a different
result for out-of-state state banks
compared to national and in-state state
banks, that law is preempted. Given
Section 104(d) and the FDIC's authority
to address compliance with law under
FDI Act Section B, the FDIC can adopt
a rule consistent with the logic and
policy of Riegle-Neal II that will provide
state banks competitive equality in
every state so that no insured state bank
will be required to comply with a state
law unless a national bank also would
be subject to that law.
acc rules have provided national
banks substantial certainty and clarity
concerning the law governing national
bank activities across the country.24
These ace actions have had the effect
of making national banks more
competitive and efficient in interstate
14 The Comptroller has addressed the reality of
multistate banking by adopting rules that provide
that a national bank and its operating subsidiaries
operate solely under the National Bank Act and
ace rules wherever they do business across the
country. The ace rules expressly provide that the
National Banle Act. not state law. governs the
deposit. lending, and other activities of national
banks, except as specifically provided in the ace
rules. See 12 CFR 7.4007-7.4009. The National
Bank Act does not expressly address the law
applicable to It national bank outside states where
it has branches. Indeed, prior to the adoption of
ace rules addressing these issues in recent years.
a number of courts determined that national banks
were subject lo state laws that did not conflict with
the provisions of the National Bank Act. E.g.,
National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir.
1980); Perdue v. Crocker National Bank. 702 P.2d
503 [Cal. 1985): Best v. U.S. National Bank, 739
P.2d 554 (Or. 1987). Nevertheless, the courts
including the U.S. Supreme Court. have upheld
acc rules and determinations since 1944 that flesh
out the National Bank Act and spell out the ability
of national banks and their operating subsidiaries
to apply the National Bank Act wherever they do
business. These ace determinations have generally
received Chevron deference. E.g., NationsBank of
N.C. v. VAUC, 513 U.S. 251 (1995), Barnett Bank
ofMarion County v. Nelson. 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
Wachovia Bank. N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d.
951. 963-65 (w.n. Mich. 2004).
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banking and have reduced legal risk.
These rules, as supplemented by
interpretations and guidance issued by
the DCC, also have clarified the scope
of the acc's compliance and
enforcement responsibilities and
standards with respect to the safe and
sound operation of national banks. The
FDIC has authority to provide a parallel
result for state banks in its rules.
3. The FDIC Should Clarify That Home
State Law Governs the Activities ofan
Operating Subsidiary ofa State Bank to
the Same Extent as Home State Law
Applies to the Parent Bank
In a 1996 rulemaking, which codified
existing interpretations. and in
subsequent modifications, the ace has
adopted comprehensive rules
concerning the establishment and
operation of operating subsidiaries. See
12 CFR 5.34; 69 FR 64478 (Nov. 5,
2004). The acc rules as amended in
2001 further specify that state law
applies to a national bank.operating
subsidiary to the same extent state law
would apply to the national bank itself.
See 12 CPR 7.4006. The FDIC should
similarly make clear that an operating
subsidiary established by a state bank
under its home state law, like the
operating subsidiary of a national bank.
will be governed by the same law as
would its insured state bank parent,
except when a state law would apply to
the activities of a national bank
operating subsidiary.
The Roundtable recognizes that the
authority of an insured state bank to
establish an operating subsidiary must
arise under its charter law. Whether a
state bank can have an ,.operating
subsidiary" will be determined by
appropriate home state authorities
under the bank's charter law.
Nevertheless. the FDIC plainly has
authority to determine that a state bank
operating subsidiary that is treated for
all purposes as if it were a division of
the bank will be subject to the FDI Act
and FDIC rules in the same way as its
insured bank parent, parallel to a
national bank operating subsidiary. The
acc rules concerning operating
subsidiaries were adopted without the
existence of any express provision in
the National Bank Act.2S
The FDIC has discretion under
Section 9 and Section 24(f) to determine
by rule that a subsidiary that is an
operating subsidiary under home state
law will be treated under the FDI Act as
25 When the authority for a Dational bank to
establish a financial subsidiary was authorized
under the eLB Act in 1999. new Section 24a in the
National Bank Act implicitly confirmed the existing
ace approach to establishing operating
subsidiaries. See 66 FR 34784. 34788 (July 2. 2001).
if it were a division or branch of the
state bank.26 This rule provision would
thus allow a state bank operating
subsidiary to engage in interstate
banking activities in host states and
other states on the same terms on which
its state bank parent operates.
4. The FDIC Should Adopt Rules
Construing the Scope and Application
of Section 104(d) To Make Clear that
State Laws, Rules. or Actions Are
Preempted Under Section 104(dj When
They Provide for Disparate Treatment
Between an Out..of-State National Bank
or In ..State Bank and an Out-of-State
State Bank, or an Affiliate Thereof
The Roundtable also requests that the
FDIC provide greater clarity and
certainty to insured state banks with
respect to the scope of the federal
preemption provided in Section 104(d)
of the GLB Act. In view of the
complexity of Section 104(d) and the
general lack of understanding of its
provisions. FDIC rules are needed.
Moreover, a rulemaking is a preferable
means for providing needed clarity than
either litigation or an enforcement
proceeding.
Section 104(d) provides express
federal preemption of certain state laws
that affect "insured depository
institutions" J as defined in the FOI Act.
Insured state banks subject to FDIC
regulation are the intended beneficiaries
of the Section 104(d) preemption. Yet
state banks today are not utilizing this
preemption. because the statute is
relatively new and complex and the
relevant provisions have not been
construed by any agency or court. Given
the complexity of the Section 104(d)
provisions. FDIC guidance would
provide much needed clarity and
certainty. Accordingly, we request the
FDIC to exercise its authority under FDI
Act Sections 8 and 9 to adopt rules that
specify the scope of the express
preemption provided under Section
104(d) for insured state banks.
Alternatively. the FDIC might adopt a
statement of policy addressing the scope
and effect of Section 104(d) for state
banks.
20 The FDIC has recognized in Advisory Latter
99-5 that a state bank operating subsidiary may be
treated the same as a state bank branch if the
operating subsidiary engages in activities that
would require a branch designation. Advisory
Letter 99-5 recognizes that because a bank
established and controls its operating subsidiary.
the offices of an operating subsidiary are similarly
"established" by the bank for branching purposes.
This result is also consistent with the terms of
Section 1813(0) of the FDI Act. in which Ii
"domestic branch" is defined to include any
"additional office" of a bank. The FDIC thus has
recognized the concept underlying the "operating
subsidiary" and thus can apply it more uniformly .
to all state bank activities by rule.
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The breadth of the Section 104(d}
preemption and its purpose to reach
state law or actions that would provide
disparate treatment for any type of
depository institution, including the
distinct class of out..of-state state banks,
vis-a-vis its competitors are evident in
the language of the statute. Section
104(d)(4)(D) provides four distinct
nondiscrimination tests for any state
law or action that "restricts" any
depository institution or any affiliate.27
These provisions of Section 104 were
carefully drafted and the text
demonstrates that Congress made
careful distinctions when determining
whether state discrimination between
competitors should be impermissible.
and thus and preempted, under federal
law.28 The distinctions in the statutory
27 The pertinent portions of Section 104(d) are as
follows:
(d) Activities.
(1) In general. Except as prOVided in paragraph
(3). and except with respect to insurance sales,
solicitation, and cross marketing activities, which
shall be governed by paragraph (2). no State may,
by statute. regulation, order. interpretation. or other
action, prevent or restrict a depository institution or
aD affiliate thereof from engaging directly or
indirectly. either by itself or in conjunction with an
affiliate, or any other person. in any activity
authorized or permitted under this Act and the
amendments made by this Act. * * *
(4) Financial activities other than insurance. No
State statute. regulation. order. interpretation. or
other action shall be preempted under paragraph (l)
to the extent that-
CA) It does not relate to. and is not issued and
adopted, or enacted for the purpose of regulating,
directly or indirectly. insurance sales. solicitations,
or cross marketing activities covered under
paragraph (2);
(B) It does not relate to. and is not issued and
adopted. or enacted for the purpose of regulating.
directly or indirectly. the business of insurance
activities other than sales, solicitations. or cross
marketing activities, covered under paragraph (3);
eel It does not relate to securities investigations
or enforcement actions referred to in subsection (f);
and
(D) it-
(i) Does not distinguish by its terms between
depository institutions. and affiliates thereof.
engaged in the activity at issue and other persons
engaged in the same activity in a manner that is in
any way adverse with respect to the conduct of the
activity by any such depository institution or
affiliate engaged in the activity at issue;
un As interpreted or applied. does not have. and
will not have, an impact on depository institutions,
or affiliates thereof. engaged in the activity at issue.
or any person who has an association with any such
depository institution or affiliate. that is
substantially more adverse than its impact on other
persons engaged in the same activity that are not
depository institutions or affiliates thereof, or
persons who do not have an association with any
such depository institution or affiliate;
(iii) Does not effectively prevent a depository
institution or affiliate thereof from engaging in
activities authorized or permitted by this Act or any
other provision of Federal law; and
(iv) Does not conflict with the intent of this Act
generally to permit affiliations that are authorized
01' permitted by Federal law. 15 U.S.C. 6701(d).
:lBCompare the "other person" language in
subparagraphs (i) and (ii). Subparagraph ei)
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language permit the FDIC to address the
meaning of Section 104(d) for a state
bank confronting state laws outside its
home state that disadvantage it by
putting it in a different legal or
competitive position than its national
bank or in-state state bank competitors.
The following specific items might be
covered in an FDIC rule or statement of
policy:
• The rule should state that the
Section 104(d) preemption applies to
insured banks. and to their subsidiaries,
affiliates and associated persons.
• The rule should define a "person"
to include a depository institution,
subsidiary, affiliate, and associated
person.
• The rule should state that in view
of the breadth of the nondiscrimination
requirements stated in Section 104(d)
the word "restrict" in Section 104(d)(1)
is to be read broadly to include any state
law, rule, interpretation or action that
calls for any limitation or requirement.
Any state law that "restricts" but is
nondiscriminatory under Section
104(d)(4) is not preempted under
Section 104(d). By the same token, any
state law that 'Irestricts" and is
discriminatory under Section 104(d)(4)
is preempted under Section 104(d).
• The rule should address each of the
four nondiscrimination provisions in
Section 104(d)(4) to confirm that each is
a distinct test and that any state law or
action that fails anyone test is
preempted.
• The rule should address the scope
of II actions" in Section 104(d)(4) to
include all types of formal or informal
administrative actions by any state or
local governmental entity, includiIJ.g
decisions with respect to civil
enforcement of state rules.
• The rule should address Section
104(d)(4)(D}(i) in light of the terms used
in subparagraph (ii) to specify that
subparagraph (i) addresses treatment
under state law of an out-of-state
insured state bank, which is plainly an
"insured depository institution," that is
different from the treatment of any
national bank or in-state state bank and
banks, which is an I'other person
engaged in the same activity" under
these provisions. It should also specify
that this discrimination can take various
forms, including state laws, rules, or
"actions" that treat out-of-state state
banks or their subsidiaries differently
from in-state or federal institutions,
whether expressly {e.g.• through a state
law exemption for federal institutions,
addresses Uother persons engaged in the same
activity". while Subparagraph (11) addresses "other
persons engaged in the same activity that are not
depository institutions or affiliates thereof."
but not out-of-state state banks insured
institutionsl, by operation of law (e.g.•
when state law is preempted for
national banks or federal thrifts, and
federal credit unions, but not for out-of-
state state banksl. or by an
administrative determination to enforce
a state rule against an out-of-state state
bank or affiliate, but not against a
federal entity. The rule could give
examples.
-The rule should define "state law"
to include laws. ordinances, rules, etc.
of political subdivisions (including any
county, municipality, etc.).
5. The FDIC Should Implement Section
27 01 the FDI Act by Adopting a Rule
Parallel to the Rules Promulgated by the
OCCandOTS
The scope and implementation of the
express preemption for the "interest
rate" charged in interstate lending
transactions by state and national banks
under Section 27 of the FDI Act and
Section 85 of the National Bank Act
have been authoritatively addressed by
the courts 29 and in agency
interpretations.3o Nevertheless. both the
ace and OTS have adopted rules
codifying the scope of the respective
statutory provisions. We request that the
FDIC adopt parallel provisions by rule
so that state banks will operate in a
matching legal framework under these
parallel statutes.
* * * * *
The Roundtable appreciates the
FDIC's consideration of this petition.
We recognize that it is very broad and
asks the FDIC to undertake a major
rulemaking. We believe that such an
effort is urgently needed to preserve a
strong dual banking system, to maintain
safety and soundness, and to ensure that
it is attractive to both large and small
banks. Such a system is an integral,
essential part of the framework for
banking in the United States. While we
strongly BUpport the development of
interstate banking and federal
preemption over the last decade, we
believe that the modernization of
American banking requires a parallel
modernization of the state half of the
dual banking system. Since the issues
concern interstate business and
preemption, the needed actions must
come at the federal level. As discussed
above, we believe that Congress has
given the FDIC both the tools and
responsibility to address these needs.
The Roundtable and its members
stand ready to work with the FDIC and
29 Greenwood Trust Co. v. Mass., 971 F.2d 818
(1st Cir. 1992), SmilByv. Citibank. 517 U.S. 735
(1996).
30 See FDIC General Counsel Opinions 10 and 11.
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its staff to achieve these important
objectives. If you have any further
questions or comments, please do not
hesitate to contact me or John Beccia at
(202) 289-4322.
Sincerely.
Richard M. Whiting,
Executive Director and General Counsel.
ee: Chairman Donald E. Powell, William F.
Kroener III. Esq.
[FR Doc. 05-5499 Filed 3-18-05; 8:45]
BILLING CODE 1714-01-P
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
40 CFR Parts 52 and 81
[AZ131-o078; FRL-7887-1]
Approval and PromUlgation of
Implementation Plans and Designation
of Areas for Air Quality Planning
Purposes; Arizona
AGENCV: Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: EPA is proposing to approve
the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality's submittals of
revisions to the Arizona state
implementation plan that include
substitution of the clean fuel fleet
program requirement with the cleaner
burning gasoline program, adoption of
the serious area l-hour ozone plan. and
adoption of the 1-hour ozone
maintenance plan for the Phoenix
(Arizona) metropolitan i-hour ozone
nonattainment area. We are also
proposing to approve Arizona's request
to redesignate the Phoenix metropolitan
1-hour ozone nonattainment area from
nonattainment to attainment. EPA
proposes these actions pursuant to those
provisions of the Clean Air Act that
obligate the agency to take action on
submittals of revisions to state
implementation plans and requests for
redesignation. In addition, under
section 107 of the Clean Air Act, we are
proposing to revise the boundary of the
Phoenix metropolitan l-hour ozone
nonattainment area to exclude the Gila
River Indian Reservation. EPA is
proposing this last action consistent
with the Federal trust responsibility to
the Tribes and for the purpose of
relieving the Agency or the Gila River
Indian Community of the need to
promulgate and implement plans and
measures for the Community that are
not needed for attainment or
maintenance of the I-hour or a-hour
ozone national ambient air quality
standard.
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NY SUES NATIONAL BANK SUBSIDIAH.Y FOR
ILLEGAL PRACTICES
Illegal Foreclosure Case May Test Feds' New Preemption Rules
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer today announced he has sued a subsidiary ofa
I!.1Jt~.~ national bank for illegally threatening to foreclose on the home ofa Rensselaer
County homeowner.
friy..cy- Policy
lipdat<'d 1-24-03
The move by Spitzer is designed help a consumer who is facing the loss ofhis
home. The action is also a direct challenge to federal banking regulators who
have sought to insulate national banks from state consumer protection laws.
"The bank's actions in this case are preposterous," Spitzer said. "The consumer
paid offhis mortgage, but the bank continued to bill him for years, and now
threatens to foreclose."
"The case also underscores the misguided policies of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which has directed national banks to ignore
state regulators attempting to enforce long-standing consumer protection laws."
The case arises out of a 1974 mortgage loan issued by Mechanics Exchange
Savings Bank to a resident of East Greenbush in Rensselaer County. The loan
was for $27,000 at 8.5 percent interest, to be paid over a period of 25 years at
$201.31 per month. The loan was assigned several times, and since 1995 has been
held by First Horizon Home Loan Corporation, a Texas-based subsidiary of First
Tennessee Bank, a national bank.
The consumer made all 300 payments due under the loan. Since 1995, the
consumer made payments to First Horizon by automatic debit from his checking
account. Despite the fact that the fmal payment was made on October 15, 1999,
First Horizon continued to debit $201.31 each month from the consumer's
account.
The consumer was unaware that he was making payments in excess of those
required under the mortgage because he thought mistakenly that his mortgage was
for 30 years. In May 2003, First Horizon notified the consumer, for the first time,
that because of an alleged error by Mechanics Savings in 1974, he should have
been paying $16 more per month. Based on this alleged error, First Horizon
advised the consumer that it was extending the maturity date of his mortgage to
March 2010, thus requiring him to pay an additional $25,163.75. --i!EIIIIX"H".lII)IIalllllllT!!!III-.
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The consumer, who had already paid $9,461.57 over the amount required under
the mortgage, stopped the automatic debits going to First Horizon. The bank
responded by threatening to foreclose on the home if the consumer did not pay
$12,320.49 within 30 days.
The Attorney General's action seeks to halt First Horizon's illegal collection and
foreclosure efforts. The action also seeks an order requiring First Horizon to make
restitution to the consumer and provide him with a satisfaction of mortgage, as
required by state law. The Attorney General also seeks civil penalties against the
bank for its illegal and deceptive practices.
Prior to filing the lawsuit, Spitzer's office had attempted to resolve the matter
with First Horizon. But when an attorney from Spitzer's office contacted the
bank, bank officials said they could not discuss the matter because the oee had
issued a directive advising its officials not to talk to state attorneys general.
That directive, issued in November 2002, marked the beginning ofOee's effort
to preempt state enforcement of consumer protection laws. Just last week, the
aee issued final regulations designed to prevent state attorneys general from
enforcing most state laws against national banks. Spitzer and other attorneys
general denounced the oee the move and pledged to continue aggressive
enforcement of state consumer protection laws.
This case is being handled by Assistant Attorneys General Mark Fleischer and
Matthew Barbaro of the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection.
Related Item:
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INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (FinCEN)1
Lawrence R. Ahern, IIll
Member-in-Charge, Atlanta/Nashville
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
www.greenebaum.com
700 Two American Center
3102 West End Avenue
Nashville, TN 37203
E-mail: LRA@GDM.com
As a network, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) functions as a
vehicle for bringing people and information together to ·tight the complex problem of money
laundering. The mission of FinCEN is to safeguard the financial system from the abuses of
financial crime, including terrorist financing, money laundering, and other illicit activity.3
Created in 1990, FinCEN has worked to maximize information sharing among law enforcement
agencies and its other partners in the regulatory and financial communities. Through cooperation
and partnerships, FinCEN's network approach is designed to encourage cost-effective and
efficient measures to combat money laundering domestically and internationally. This is the
objective of at least four areas ofactivity:
I Some of the summary infonnation contained in this introductory paper is based on infonnation posted
on the website of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), <http://www.fincen.govl>,
last visited March 27, 2005.
2 Mr. Ahem was Visiting Professor at Cumberland School of Law, Fall, 2002, teaching Secured Transactions
and Banking. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University Law School, where he has served as Adjunct
Professor of Law, teaching Secured Transactions, since ]998. He serves on the Advisory Board of the St.
John's Law School Bankruptcy LL.M. program.
3 See <http://www.fincen.gov/af_mission.html>. last visited March 27, 2005.
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1. FinCEN administers the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"),4 which authorizes the
collection, analysis and dissemination of financial information related to the prevention
ofmoney laundering and terrorist fi~ancing.
a. FinCEN has been designated by the Department of the Treasury as one
of the primary agencies to establish, oversee and implement policies to detect and
prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 5 The Secretary is authorized to
delegate such responsibilities to FinCEN.6
b. FinCEN has authority' to examine financial institutions for compliance
with the BSA and regulations promulgated under the BSA,8 as well as to take
enforcement actions for violation of the BSA and the implementing regulations.9
c. The Secretary has delegated BSA examination authority, but not
enforcement authority, to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Office of Thrift Supervision. In addition, examination authority is shared by the
Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the National Credit Union Administration. All of those federal
banking agencies share information about administration of the BSA. They have
separate authority to ensure that banking organizations comply with all laws and
4 12 U.S.C. § 1829b; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-32.
5 See Treasury Order 108-01, Sept. 26, 2002.
631 U.S.C. § 310(bX2XI) & (J).
7 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(3).
8 31 C.F.R. Part 103.
9 31 U.S.C. §§ 5320-23.
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regulations. 10 Each agency that performs FinCEN's delegated examination
authority is required by regulation to make periodic reports to FinCEN.ll
2. FinCEN thus supports law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agencies
through sharing and analysis of financial intelligence.
3. FinCEN also builds global cooperation with counterpart financial intelligence
units.
4. FinCEN networks people, ideas, and information.
An organization chart appears as an addendum to this material. The FinCEN
organization consists of approximately 200 employees, the majority of whom are intelligence
professionals, specialists from the financial industry and technology experts. In addition, there
are approximately 40 long-term detailees from 20 different law enforcement and regulatory
agencies. The fourth Director of FinCEN is William J. Fox. He was appointed by Treasury
Secretary John Snow December 1,2003.
10 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786 & 1818.
1131 C.P.R. § I03.56(e).
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MISSION, VISION, AND VALUES
INTRODUCTION
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) plays a critical role in combating money
laundering and the financing of terrorist activity. FinCEN's network links the law enforcement,
financial t and regulatory communitiest domestically and internationally, for the common purpose of
preventingt detecting, and prosecuting financial crime.
FinCEN was established in April 1990, by the U. S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury Order
Number 105-08), to provide a government..wide, multi-source intelligence and analytical network.
FinCEN's operation was broadened in 1994 to include regulatory responsibilities. In October 2001,
the USA PATRIOT Act elevated FinCEN to bureau status and emphasized its role in fighting
terrorist financing.
Today, FinCEN is one of three entities (including the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the
Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division) within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury responsible for combating money laundering and. terrorist financing. These entities work
collaboratively with the Executive Office ofTerrorist Financing and Financial Crimes under
Treasury's Deputy Secretary.
FinCEN works to accomplish its mission in two ways. First, FinCEN administers the Bank Secrecy
Act (BSA), our nation's comprehensive anti-money laundering statute, and is responsible for expand..
ing the regulatory framework to industries vulnerable to money laundering, terrorist financing, and
other crime. Second, FinCEN analyzes and shares the BSA information with U.S. law enforcement
at the federal, state, and local levels, and its international counterpans, to help them identify and
track the financial aspects ofcriminal investigations. Because it both collects and analyzes the BSA
data, FinCEN is able to assess and demonstrate the value of the data and suggest ways to increase its
value. FinCEN seeks to strike a balance between meeting law enforcement's information needs,
minimizing the burden on regulated industry, and protecting individual privacy.
Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years2003-200B
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MISSION
FinCEN's mission is to collect, analyze, andshare information needed
to combat the financial aspects ofcriminalactivity worldwide.
VISION
FinCEN will use innovative methods andstate-ofthe-art technology to collect,
analyze, and deliver valuable information to its customers.
VALUES
• Partnerships - "We listen to our stakeholders and work closely with them.
• Teamwork - "We support each other and work together as a team.
• Innovation - "We encourage creativity and out-ofthe-box thinking in order to
constantly improve ourprocesses, products, and services.
• Respect- "We respect differences in people and ideas; we treat each other and those
we serve withfairness, dignity. and respect; we encourage individual opportunity
andgrowth.
• Excellence - "We strive to achieve the highest level ofperformance and are
results driven.
Strategic Pian, Fiscal Years 2003-2008
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STRATEGIC AREAS AND CHALLENGES
STRATEGIC AREAS
In FY 2003, FinCEN was appropriated
$51.4 million to support a workforce of over
300 employees and contractors and carry out
its program, "Combat Financial Aspects of
Criminal Activity." Within the program are
three strategic areas:
Extending the Regulatory Framework
FinCEN is the nation's central clearinghouse for
broad-based financial intelligence and informa-
tion sharing. The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA),
originally enacted in 1970, authorizes Treasury
to require covered financial instirutionsto file
certain reports (e.g., suspicious activity reports
and currency transaction reports) and keep
records ofcertain types of financial transactions.
As the administrator of the BSA, FinCEN
promulgates regulations, provides outreach and
guidance to the regulated industries, and
initiates regulatory enforcement actions in
certain circumstances. FinCEN relies on its
federal regulatory partners to examine financial
institutions within their respective jurisdictions
regarding compliance with the BSA.
Because money laundering and terrorist financ-
ing do not stop at the U.S. borders, FinCEN is
actively involved in strengthening regulatory
regimes overseas. FinCEN provides training
and technical assistance to a broad spectrum
of foreign government officials, financial
regulators, law enforcement personnel, and
bankers on various aspects of developing and
operating a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),
such as FinCEN.
Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2008
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Collecting and Sharing Information
As the administrator of the BSA, FinCEN is
also responsible for managing the information
filed by the regulated industries. FinCEN has
relied on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as
the primary service provider for the collection,
processing, and retrieval of BSA information.
This arrangement has been viewed as an
effective way for FinCEN to leverage limited
resources.
In order to accelerate the flow ofvaluable
information to law enforcement, FinCEN is
working to modernize the systems and
processes used to collect, maintain, and access
BSA information. One example is the new
PATRIOT Act Communication System
(PACS), initiated in FY 2003, which allows
participating financial institutions to quickly
and securely file BSA reports over the Internet.
This system will allow BSA data to be processed
and made available to law enforcement on an
expedited basis, as well as decrease the volume
of paper filings.
FinCEN continues to promote the use of its
Gateway process, which enables federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies and finan-
cial industry regulators to have direct access to
records filed under the BSA. This access is
provided through a secure web-based network.
The Gateway process empowers FinCENts law
enforcement customers to conduct their own
routine queries of BSA records rather than rely
on FinCEN's analytical resources.
Providing Analytical Services and Products
FinCEN adds value to financial investigations by
providing two types ofanalysis: (1) investigative
case research, and (2) identification of foreign
and domestic money laundering and terrorist
financing trends, patterns, and techniques.
First, FinCEN supports the financial aspects of
investigations by providing quality and timely
investigative case support to its customers.
FinCEN's in-house analysts provide case
support to U.S. law enforcement at the federal J
Treasury Treasury FinCEN General Goal in FinCEN
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state, and local levels, and to their international
counterparts, by preparing reports based on data
collected under the BSA, and other commercial
and law enforcement information. These
reports link together business associates, bank'
accounts, property records, and other informa-
tion to assist law enforcement in conducting
more complete financial investigations. Fin-
eEN also helps law enforcement custom"ers
coordinate their investigations by signaling
when two or more agencies have an interest in
the same subject.
Second, FinCEN provides strategic analytical
support to law enforcement, regulators,
policymakers, and the intelligence community.
FinCEN analysts, working closely with law
enforcement, regulators, and intelligence
analysts in the field, add value to BSA data and
other financial intelligence to identify trends,
patterns, and techniques associated with money
laundering, terrorist financing, and other
financial crimes, worldwide. FinCEN dissemi-
nates this information in a wide range ofprod-
ucts, including geographic threat assessments,
money flow studies, industry studies, statistical
and issues analyses, and bulletins and advisories.
FinCEN also provides feedback, bi-annuall~ to
the financial community on the value of their
Suspicious Activity Reports to investigations.
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
As shown in the diagram below, FinCEN's
Strategic Plan links directly to the Treasury
Strategic Plan through FinCEN's General Goal.
FinCEN's Strategic Plan presents the strategies
used to achieve Treasury's and FinCEN's goals
and the measures used to monitor progress
towards them. The three goals presented in
FinCEN's Strategic Plan will be reflected as
Performance Goals in the Annual Performance
Plan and the budget. The Annual Performance
Report will measure FinCEN's progress towards
achieving annual targets set for each strategy in
FinCEN's Strategic Plan.
STRATEGIC CHALLENGES
Several external factors could affect achievement
of FinCEN's goals:
• Technology - Staying abreast ofadvanced
technologies and their impact on financial
crime trends and patterns. Understanding
technology and how it can be used internally
to improve service efficiency and customer
satisfaction.
• Legislation .. Addressing any new legislative
initiatives through various efforts, such as
rulemaking and outreach programs.
• Human Capital .. Assessing how changing
economic conditions, both nationally and
locally, could affect FinCEN's ability to
attract and retain the technical expertise
required to meet its goals.
• Reorganization .. Maintaining the focus and
ensuring the integrity of FinCEN's mission
within the new federal law enforcement
structure.
Strategic Plan, Fiscal :rears 2003-2008
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GOAL 1: SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE SAFE HAVENS FOR
MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING WORLDWIDE
DISCUSSION
FinCEN's goal is to support Treasury's efforts to
expand the financial regulatory framework, both
domestically and internationally, for the pur-
pose ofeliminating safe havens for money
laundering and terrorist financing. Identifying
vulnerable industries and bringing them under
the regulatory umbrella reduces the financial
avenues available to money launderers and other
criminals, including those involved in terrorist
financing.
Efforts to strengthen the U.S. regulatory
framework have been greatly accelerated
since September ll ch and the subsequent
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. FinCEN
has worked closely with policymakers to put in
place a wide array of new regulations extending
anti-money laundering program requirements
to five additional industries (see table below).
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) require-
ments have also been expanded beyond
depository institutions to money services
businesses, casinos, card clubs, and broker-
dealers. Between FY 2004 and FY 2005,
FinCEN anticipates extending the regulatory
framework to cover five more industries, and
to examine the possibility of covering travel
agencies, vehicle sales, and real estate, as
appropriate. SAR requirements will also be
extended to additional financial institutions.
FinCEN, in conjunction with the regulatory
agencies, will provide the oversight and outreach
Industries Covered by Anti-Money Laundering Regulations
FY 2001 FY 2003 estinlated FY 2005 projected
Strategic Plan, Fiscal }Cars 2003-2008
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activities essential to ensuring compliance with
the new reporting requirements. At the same
time, FinCEN will continue to assess the value
of the information it collects and seek ways to
minimize the burden on regulated industries.
Although FinCEN is responsible for adminis-
tering anti-money laundering regulations and
reporting requirements, it depends on a wide
array of Federal agencies (i.e., the Federal
Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Office ofThrift Supervision, the National
Credit Union Administration, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the IRS) to
enforce compliance. Over the next several
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
years, FinCEN will be working with these
regulators to develop a strategy for evaluating
the levels of industry compliance and the
effectiveness of efforts to promote compliance.
Internationally, FinCEN will continue to
encourage the adoption ofcomprehensive anti-
money laundering regulations worldwide. The
expansion ofanti-money laundering regimes has
accelerated in the last few years, with the number
ofFinancial Intelligence Unit (FlU) counterparts
overseas growing from 58 countries/jurisdictions
in FY 2001 to 84 in FY 2003. To support this
growth, FinCEN anticipates it will need to
continue to expand its efforts to provide or
coordinate training and technical assistance.
10
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STRATEGIES
Strategy 1-1: Expand the U.S. regulatory framework to cover, as appropriate, all vulnerable
industries.
FinCEN will continue to work with Treasury to complete the regulations required to implement
the anti-money laundering provisions ofTitle III of the USA PATRIOT Act. FinCEN will also
work with Treasury to assess how the new regulations are working in practice and what adjustments
are needed to achieve the government's anti-money laundering goals.
FinCEN supports the extension of the regulatory framework by providing guidance to the
regulated industries in a variety ofways. Information is provided via FinCEN's website,
through presentations at industry and association conferences, in FinCEN publications, such as
the bi-annual SAR Activity Review--Trends, Tips ana Issues, and in response to direct queries.
Strategy 1-2: Maximize regulatory effectiveness whHe minimizing the buroen on industry.
FinCEN is working in partnership with the regulated industries to identify ways for encouraging
them to use current statutory exemption provisions as a way of reducing the submission of
Currency Transaction Reports that have little or no value for law enforcement purposes.
Strategy 1-3: Ensure effective and uniform enforcement ofanti-money laundering
regulations.
FinCEN will enhance nationwide compliance with anti-money laundering regulations by reaching
out to other regulatory organizations and industry representatives to strengthen public-private
partnerships. FinCEN will work with federal and state regulators [0 determine the level of
compliance with the BSA regulations and examine the effectiveness and uniformity ofcurrent
enforcement programs and measures. FinCEN will also examine options for delegating portions
of the enforcement responsibilities to its federal regulatory partners.
Strategy 1-4: Promote the adoption of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing
policies globall~
FinCEN works closely with other components of the U.S. government and its partners around
the world to promote the adoption of international anti-money laundering standards and the
formation of FlUs. In addition. FinCEN works with the Department ofState and Treasury's
Office ofTechnical Assistance to provide training and technical assistance to nations seeking to
establish FlUs or enhance fully functional FlUs. Over the next five years, FinCEN anticipates
increased demand from FlUs for information technology assistance.
Strategic Plan, Fiscall'ears 2003-2008
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GOAL 2: MODERNIZE THE COLLECTION, MAINTENANCE, AND
RETRIEVAL OF BSA INFORMATION.
DISCUSSION
FinCEN's goal is to accelerate the flow of
valuable financial information from regulated
industries, and provide that information in a
timely, efficient, and secure manner to law
enforcement. There are several modernization
efforts directed at improving the collection,
maintenance, and retrieval processes. FinCEN
is expediting the collection and processing of
BSA information through the PATRIOT Act
Communication System (PACS) and examining
ways to enhance the paper collection and BSA
form editing processes. Plans are also underway
to redesign the data retrieval systems and
processes to make the BSA data more easily
accessible and understandable to users.
These improvements will be key to achieving the
targeted growth in Gatewa}', the process by which
users directly access records filed under the BSA.
FinCEN anticipates expansion of the Gateway
user base from less than 1,000 users, currendy, to
more than 3,000 in FY 2005. Part of the
expansion will result from encouraging current
FinCEN customers to conduct their own queries
of BSA records, using Gateway; rather than
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
relying on FinCEN's analytical staff The largest
growth. in the Gateway user base will result from
consolidating direct access to the BSA data
through the Gateway process. This effort will
enhance FinCENts ability to: (1) assure that
agencies with interests in the same investigative
subjects are networked, thereby avoiding overlap-
ping investigations; (2) coUect statistics on the
usage ofSARs in order to provide feedback to the
regulatory community and improve overall BSA
reporting; and (3) audit BSA data usage.
FinCEN plays a key role in fostering the secure
exchange of information among FlUs. FinCEN
developed and maintains a secure Internet
website, the Egmont Secure Web, which permits
connected FlUs to communicate with one
another via secure e-mail, and to post and access
information related to money laundering
trends, analytical toolst and technological
developments. Over the next five years, Fin-
CEN is likely to face technological constraints
and increased vulnerabilities in connecting an
increasing number of new FlUs from less
developed countries.
12
Hovv' FlnCEN VVIlI Assess Progress Baseline Target Target
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STRATEGIES
Strategy 2-1: Enhance the timeliness, accuracy; and ease of filing and processing
BSAforms.
The collection of BSA data is being expedited using a highly secure network to allow financial
institutions to file BSA reports electronically. This new system, PACS, is designed to allow partici-
pating financial institutions to quickly and securely file BSA reports over the Internet and reduces a
financial institution's costs in filing BSA reports (Le., elimination of magnetic tape handling, routing
paper forms for approval, and shipping costs). PACS also accelerates the delivery of BSA information to
federal and state law enforcement and reduces the cost to the government of processing paper forms.
Efforts are also under consideration to modernize the paper collection and BSA form editing pro-
cesses. There is a need to examine possible workflow enhancements and to adopt technologies to
automate paper form processing.
Strategy 2-2: Implement BSA data retrieval system that supports expansion of the
Gateway user base.
In order to allow effective use of the BSA data, FinCEN is planning to put in place a secure, web-
based system that will provide a user-friendly interface with quer~ retrieval, reporting, and data
analysis capabilities. Over the next two years, FinCEN plans [0 build and maintain, with contractor
support, a BSA data retrieval system, known as BSA Direct. By using modern technology, the new
system will accommodate the anticipated expansion of the user base, while providing users with
easier access to the data and more sophisticated analytic tools.
Strategy 2-3: Expand access to BSA data through the Gateway process.
FinCEN will continue to encourage law enforcement and regulators to conduct their own basic
queries of BSA data using Gateway, as well as to consolidate access to BSA data through the Gateway
process. To cost-effectively support an expanded Gateway user base, FinCEN will automate the
processes used to audit usage of the BSA data, network customer queries, and provide customer
support and training.
Strategy 2-4: Strengthen on-line information sharing among FlUs
To facilitate the secure exchange of information among the FlUs, FinCEN's goal is to have all FlUs
hooked up to the Egmont Secure Web. The system has encouraged unprecedented cooperation
between FlUs due to security; ease of use, and quick response time.
FinCEN is also sponsoring the Egmont Group's new public Internet site to further encourage
international partnerships. This site will be especially useful for other international organizations
focusing on money laundering and terrorist financing issues and for countries developing anti-
money laundering regimes.
Strategic Plan1 Fiscall'ears 2003-2008
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GOAL 3: ENHANCE THE VALUE OF FINCEN's ANALYrICAL
SERVICES AND PRODUCTS
DISCUSSION
FinCENts goal is to continually enhance its
analytic capability-both for investigative case
research and strategic analysis. FinCEN seeks
feedback from its customers to identify areas for
improvement. In a recent survey, although
customers were very satisfied overall with the
investigative case reports prepared by FinCEN,
timeliness was an issue. FinCEN is working to
enhance timeliness by developing a case
information system that will allow for the
more efficient development and tracking of
case reports.
FinCEN also seeks to enhance the quality and
value of its strategic analytical services. FinCEN
provides a broad range ofshort and long-term
analytical products to law enforcement, regulators,
and the regulated industries. These products are
aimed at identifying U.S. and global trends,
patterns, and techniques associated with money
laundering and terrorist financing, and providing
feedback on the use and utility ofSARs.
FinCEN will continually be challenged to
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
develop or acquire increasingly powerful tools
that will allow its analysts to uncover trends and
patterns, or investigative targets, from large
volumes of data. Increasingly, such analyses
will be conducted jointly with other law
enforcement agencies at home and abroad,
reflecting the growing complexity and
interconnectivity of terrorist financing and
money laundering schemes.
Recend}'t FinCEN has embarked on a new- effort
to support law enforcement investigations. In
response to provision 314 of the USA PATRIOT
Act, FinCEN has developed the Law Enforce-
ment and Financial Institution Information
Sharing (LEFIIS) system, which permits law
enforcement to get expedited feedback from
financial institutions on subjects of money
laundering or terrorism investigations. This
new system is providing law enforcement with
timdy and valuable information about investi-
gative subjects) as well as further opportunities
for coordinating investigations.
Hovv' FlnCEN Will Assess Progress Baseline Target Target
in Achlevin~l ThiS Strategic Goal 2003 Date Anlount
* FY 2002 rating. The FY 2003 survey will be conducted in the last quarter of FY 2003.
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STRATEGIES
Strategy 3-1: Provide valuable investigative case support.
FinCEN will continue to enhance the timeliness and value of its products and the efficiency of
the processes used to develop those products. FinCEN will begin an investigative case report
work process review in FY 2004 to identify opportunities for increasing the efficiency of the process
and the timeliness of the product. FinCEN will also evaluate the potential ofan electronic Case
Information System (CIS) that would allow FinCEN's customers to submit a request for research to
FinCEN electronically and receive the resulting case report back electronically.
Foreign requests for investigative research are increasing rapidly; reflecting the growth in FlUs.
FinCEN is examining various strategies for enhancing its ability to meet the special needs of foreign
requests.
Strategy 3-2: Provide valuable investigative targets.
An increase in information sharing among federal agencies since the enactment of the USA
PATRIOT Act has progressively enhanced FinCEN's proactive initiatives. Various elements of
information are collectively analyzed, along with BSA data, using unique analytical linking techniques.
This process yields valuable leads for law enforcement and government task forces in their efforts to
combat terrorist financing, money laundering, and financial crimes. FinCEN is examining several
methods for expanding its capacity to develop pro-active investigative targets.
Strategy 3-3: Provide valuable analyses on u.s. and global money laundering and terrorist
financing trends.
To assist partners in the improvement of money laundering and terrorist financing prevention and
detection programs, and to keep pace with the evolution ofsystemic money laundering threats,
FinCEN has created new resource centers, such as its Geographic Threat Assessment and Non-
Traditional Methodologies Sections. These sections produce geographic threat assessments for law
enforcement and provide information to FinCEN's partners on the emerging methods for money
laundering and terrorist financing. Over the next few years, FinCEN will be developing a strategy
for measuring and enhancing the value of these products.
Strategy 3-4: Enhance and accelerate information sharing among law enforcement and
financial institutions regarding potential terrorist financing or money
laundering schemes.
FinCEN continues to enhance its new LEFIIS system - a combination ofe-mail and blast fax - that
can quickly transmit names of suspects to financial institutions and get back reports of matches
within days. FinCEN has also devised a system for qualifying financial institutions to share infor-
mation with other similarly qualified institutions regarding individuals and entities suspected of
engaging in terrorist financing or money laundering. This information cannot be used for any other
purpose, and its security and confidentiality are carefully safeguarded.
A
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Strategy 3-5: Ensure that FinCEN's analysts have the latest tools and training.
The extension of the SARs requirement to the money services businesses t securities and futures
industries t broker-dealers) and casinos is generating an increasing volume of filings. FinCEN needs
sophisticated tools to review and analyze these reports for money laundering and other criminal
activities. FinCEN is developing a strong research and development orientation that will enable it to
exploit emerging technologies and identify new techniques for "mining" large amounts of information.
16 Financial Crimes Enforcement Nttwork
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FINCEN MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES
Underlying the success ofFinCEN's strategic goals are key management initiatives or priorities.
These initiatives address how FinCEN will implement the President's Management Agenda (PMA).
Strategy 4-1: Re...engineer the FinCEN processes and approaches for "doing IT" in order
to meet changing requirements and maximize limited IT resources.
FinCEN will refine its Information Technology (IT) governance system as outlined in the PMA. As
part of this process, FinCEN will develop a modernization blueprint (Enterprise Architecture) that
fits within the overall Treasury Enterprise Framework and ensures that IT spending is focused on
high priority modernization initiatives. The governance process will assure continued improvement
in overall project management. It will incorporate tools, such as modular and performance-based
contract methods. to ensure that projects are developed in manageable units to reduce overall risk.
Project development will also adhere to electronic government principles and involve partnering with
other agencies as appropriate to avoid redundancies and achieve overall efficiencies.
FinCEN will ensure that major IT projects are within 10 percent ofcost/schedule/performance
objectives, and IT systems are certified and accredited within one year ofdeployment.
Strategy 4-2: Develop and retain a high-performing, diverse workforce.
FinCEN will continue its efforts to meet the PMA objectives in this area. Those efforts include:
continued development of an effective leadership cadre; implementation of a performance manage-
ment system that links individual performance to organizational goals; continued reduction in
diversity gaps within the organization by enhancing efforts to recruit and retain a diverse workforce;
and enhancement of tools and processes necessary to measure and rate performance.
Strategy 4-3: Maximize business results through efficient and effective business practices.
As pan of a maturing organization, FinCEN will continue to identify ways to integrate its functional
areas and reduce the "silott nature of its operations. FinCEN will also evaluate FinCEN's business
processes and culture and identify opportunities and approaches to instill more mature corporate
processes and culture.
FinCEN will also continue its efforts to meet the PMA objectives in this area. FinCEN will success..
fully complete the Office of Management and Budget's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
process in FY 2004. Management will review financial and performance information periodically
and use it to make informed budget decisions, justify funding requests, and direct program
improvements. The results of program evaluations, which began in FY 2003, will provide a critical
and continuing source ofperformance information.
Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2003-2008
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ApPENDIX A. USE OF PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
Prosperous and Stable American and WOrld Economies
Issue
Regulatory Framework
Analytical Services & Products
Customer Satisfaction
Employee Satisfaction
Program & Internal Control
Reviews
Evaluations
Options to reduce Low Value Currency Transaction Reports:
A report was submitted [0 Congress recommending ways [0
encourage institutions to use the filing exemption process for
CTRs. FinCEN will chair a public-private working group to
identify workable mechanisms to achieve the desired 30 percent
reduction in CTR filings.
Investigative Case Support Work Processes:
A work process review will begin in FY 2004, in anticipation of
the development ofan electronic document management
system.
Customer Satisfaction Surveys:
FinCEN will continue to conduct customer satisfaction surveys,
on a rotating basis, for its key program areas. In FY 2003, a
follow-up survey will be conducted on investigative case
reports, and in FY 2005 on regulatory support. In FY 2004,
plans are to develop a baseline survey for strategic analysis
products.
Employee Satisfaction Survey:
FinCEN conducted a baseline employee satisfaction survey in
FY 2002. Recommendations based on the survey are being
addressed and a follow-up survey will be conducted in FY 2004.
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Programs:
FinCEN will review at least one program annually to identify
ways to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally)
FinCEN will continue reviews in support of its overall
management control program.
Strategic Planl Fisca/Years 2003...2008
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ApPENDIX B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 - Act that authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require
financial institutions to keep records and submit reports the Secretary deems useful for criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations and proceedings. In 1994, the Secretary delegated the BSA regulatory
authority to FinCEN.
Case Information System (CIS) - System that will allow FinCEN to replace its current case receipt,
investigative case research, and case report dissemination processes with a fully-integrated electronic
process.
Currency Transaction Report (CTR) - Report filed by financial institutions regarding currency
transactions of more than $10,000 by, through, or to the financial institution.
Egmont Secure Web (ESW) -A virtual private network maintained by FinCEN. The network
connects Egmont FlUs, allowing information to be passed securely among them via e...mail.
Financial Intelligence Units (FlUs) - Specialized government agencies created by a number of
countries over the last decade to serve as focal points for national anti-money laundering programs.
Since 1995, a number of FlUs began working together in an information organization known as the
Egmont Group, to provide a forum for FlUs around the world to improve support to their respective
governments in the fight against financial crimes.
Law Enforcement and Financial Institution Sharing (LEFlIS) - System implemented by FinCEN,
in accordance with Section 314 (a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, to facilitate the sharing of informa-
tion between federal law enforcement agencies and financial institutions regarding terrorism or
money laundering targets.
Money Laundering - Process by which criminals or criminal organizations seek to disguise the
illegal origin of their proceeds. Crimes such as drug trafficking, smuggling, computer fraud
schemes, and embezzlement can produce substantial profits, creating an incentive to legitimize the
gains through money laundering.
Money Services Businesses (MSBs) - Term used to define over 150,000 entities such as money
transmitters; issuers, redeemers, and sellers of money orders and traveler's checks; check cashers; and
currency exchangers.
[USA] PATRIOT Act Communication System (PACS) -System designed to allow participating
financial institutions to file BSA reports quickly and securely over the Internet.
a(
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President's Management Agenda (PMA) - An aggressive strateror, announced in the summer of
2001, for improving the management of the Federal government. It focuses on five management
areas: Human Capital, Budget and Performance Integration, Competitive Sourcing, E-Government,
and Financial Management.
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) - A systematic, consistent process for developing
program performance ratings and then using that information to make budget decisions. Developed
by OMB, the PART is composed of assessment criteria on program performance and management.
The PART establishes a ccgood government" standard of performance and will be used to rate
programs in an open, public fashion.
Strategic Goals - Overarching statements ofaim or purpose for key FinCEN functions.
Strategies - Statements regarding how FinCEN will achieve its Strategic Goals. These strategies
cover the major functions and operations.
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) - Report filed by financial institutions covered by the Bank
Secrecy Act to identify suspicious transactions relevant to possible violations of the law.
Terrorist financing - Process used to fund terrorist acts. This process shares most of the fundamental
attributes of money laundering (e.g., the need for fundraising, funds transfers, and obfuscation of
funds origins and beneficiaries) and uses similar methods for moving and laundering money,
engaging money professionals such as currency exchangers, bankers, accountants, and lawyers.
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstmet Terrorism) - Legislation seeking to strengthen U.S. anti-money
laundering laws by focusing on offshore banking and related facilities that protect anonymity,
enabling criminals to move funds; correspondent banking which is susceptible to manipulation by
money launderers; and private banking, which is susceptible to manipulation by corrupt foreign
government officials. The Act also expands the Bank Secrecy Act to include additional sectors of
financial services industry. FinCEN was directed to implement 23 of the 44 provisions oflide 11-
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.
22 Financial Crimes Enforcemtnt Network
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COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS?
Comments or questions regarding FinCEN's Strategic Plan can be sent to:
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
P.O. Box 39
Vienna, Virginia 22183
Comments can also be e-mailed to: webmaster@fincen.treas.gov
For more information on FinCEN, please visit our website at:
www.fincen.gov
Strategic Plan, Fiscall'ears 2003-2008
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RIGGS BANK N.A.
CONSENT ORDER OF CIVIL MONEY PENALTY
MAY 13,2004
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#2004-44
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY
In the Matter of: )
)
Riggs Bank N.A., )
_M_c_L_e_an_,:...-V_l__·rg_..i_D_ia )
AA-EC-04-55
CONSENT ORDER OF CIVIL MONEY PENALTY
WHEREAS, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States ofAmerica
("Comptroller") intends to initiate a civil money penalty proceeding against Riggs Bank
N.A., McLean, Virginia ("Bank") pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (as amended) for
violations of the law and regulations regarding compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act
("BSA") and 12 C.F.R. §§ 21.11 and 21.21, and for violations of the Consent Order
issued against the Bank dated July 16, 2003.
WHEREAS, in the interest ofcooperation and to avoid the costs associated with
future administrative and judicial proceedings with respect to the above matter, the Bank,
without admitting or denying any wrongdoing or the findings of fact set forth in Article II
below, desires to enter into this Consent Order of Civil Money Penalty ("Order") issued
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i).
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above premises, it is stipulated by
and between the Comptroller, through his duly authorized representative, and the Bank
that:
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Article I
JURISDICTION
(1) The Bank is a national banking association, chartered and examined by the
Comptroller, pursuant to the National Bank Act of 1864, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq. Accordingly, the Bank is an "insured depository institution" as that term is defined
in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2).
(2) Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q), the Comptroller is the "appropriate
Federal banking agency" to initiate and maintain this civil money penalty proceeding
against the Bank pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i).
(3) The Bank is a subsidiary ofRiggs National Corporation, a publicly-traded
bank holding company.
Article II
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Background
(1) Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(c), all national banks are required to establish
and maintain BSA compliance programs reasonably designed to ensure and monitor their
compliance with 31 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5355 and 31 C.F.R. Part 103. At a minimum, a
bank's BSA compliance program must provide for a system of internal controlsto ensure
ongoing compliance; provide for independent testing for compliance to be conducted by
bank personnel or by an outside party; designate an individual or individuals responsible
for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and provide training for
appropriate personnel.
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(2) Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 21.11, a national bank must file SARs when the
bank detects a known or suspected violation ofFederal law or a suspicious transaction
related to money laundering activity or a violation of the BSA.
(3) The Comptroller and the Bank entered into a Consent Order dated July 16,
2003, designed to address BSA deficiencies identified at the Bank.
(4) The Comptroller and the Bank entered into a supplemental Consent Order
dated May 13,2004.
A. BSA Compliance Program Deficiencies
(5) The Bank violated 12 C.F.R. § 21.21 by failing to comply with the BSA
compliance program requirements and by failing to correct deficiencies in the four
required elements for a BSA compliance program.
(a) Internal Controls: The Bank's internal controls were, and continue
to be, seriously deficient. The Bank's system of internal controls did
not effectively identify or address the BSA-related risks that existed
in various divisions of the Bank or that related to customers,
products, services, or accounts that should have been viewed as high
risk. Moreover, the Bank's Anti-Money Laundering and Enhanced
Due Diligence program and Customer Identification Program
pertaining to areas deemed to be high-risk were not adequately
implemented.
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(i) The Bank did not collect or maintain sufficient information
about its foreign private banking customers. As a result, the
Bank failed to identify approximately one-third ofthe
accounts related to the country of Saudi Arabia and an
unacceptably high number ofaccounts related to the country
ofEquatorial Guinea.
(ii) The Bank omitted disclosure of several Bank aCcoWlts in
response to requests from the ace and other governmental
agencies.
(b) Independent Testing: The Bank's system for independently testing
its BSA compliance was inadequate. Bank audits did not review all
of the necessary areas, did not uncover or disclose the severity or the
extent ofweaknesses in the Bank's BSA compliance, and contained
flawed testing and sampling.
(c) Designation of Individual(s) to Coordinate and Monitor Compliance:
The Bank's management was ineffective in overseeing the Bank's
day-ta-day compliance with the BSA laws and its regulations, as
evidenced by the numerous and substantial deficiencies in the
program.
(d) Training: The Bank's numerous BSA-related deficiencies
demonstrate that the Bank's training program was ineffective, did
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not comply with the Consent Order, and was insufficient to ensure
identification ofand monitoring for suspicious activities.
B. SAR Program Deficiencies
(6) The Bank did not detect or investigate suspicious activities and did not file
SARs as required. In particular, the Bank failed to:
(a) refer specific inquiries from law enforcement to the area that
investigated suspicious activities to determine whether SAR filings
were appropriate;
(b) file accurate Currency Transaction Reports and SARs, in part, based
upon inaccurate or incomplete information maintained about Bank
customers;
(c) file timely SARs for any of the transactions listed in paragraph (7) of
this Article; and
(d) investigate suspicious activities occurring in accounts related to the
countries of Saudi Arabia and Equatorial Guinea.
(7) The Bank did not adequately monitor for suspicious cash, wire, or monetary
instrument transactions. In particular, the Bank failed to identify or to monitor potentially
suspicious activity pertaining to:
(a) tens of millions of dollars in cash withdrawals from accounts related
to the Saudi Arabian embassy;
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(b) dozens of sequentially-numbered international drafts that totaled
millions of dollars, that were drawn from accounts related to officials
of Saudi Arabia, and that were returned to the Bank;
(c) dozens ofsequentially-numbered cashier's checks that were drawn
from accounts related to officials of Saudi Arabia made payable to
the account holder;
(d) millions of dollars deposited into a private investment company
owned by an official of the country ofEquatorial Guinea;
(e) hundreds ofthousands of dollars transferred from an account of the
country ofEquatorial Guinea to the personal account of a
government official of the country; and
(f) over a million dollars transferred from an account of the country of
Equatorial Guinea to a private investment company owned by the
Bank's relationship manager.
c. Risk Management Deficiencies
(8) The Bank did not identify deficiencies in its risk management procedures.
These deficiencies included systemic deficiencies in Bank policies, internal controls, and
staffoversight. In particular, the Bank failed to:
(a) increase its risk management procedures or scrutinize accounts
related to the country ofEquatorial Guinea, until October 2003,
despite information that should have raised concerns for the Bank;
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(b) properly supervise the Bank's relationship manager for the
Equatorial Guinea account relationships; and
(c) discover that a relationship manager had signature authority over two
Equatorial Guinea accounts.
D. Conclusion
(9) The Comptroller has concluded that the Bank engaged in systemic
violations of law, regulations, and a final order and failed to correct those violations. The
Bank failed to comply fully with the requirements of the Consent Order against the Bank
dated July 16, 2003. The Bank's BSA compliance program was deficient in all four
elements: internal controls, independent testing, designation of individual(s) to
coordinate and monitor compliance, and training appropriate personnel. In addition, the
Bank failed to file accurate and timely Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs").
Article III
ORDER OF CIVIL MONEY PENALTY
(1) The Bank is hereby ordered to pay a civil money penalty in the amount of
twenty-five million dollars ($25,000,000).
(2) This penalty assessment shall be concurrent with the twenty-five million
dollars ($25,000,000) penalty assessed against the Bank by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network.
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(3) The payments to the Comptroller and the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network referred to above shall be satisfied by one payment of twenty-five million
dollars ($25,000,000) to the United States Department of the Treasury.
(4) The Bank shall make payment in full upon issuance of this Order by check
or wire transfer. If a check is the selected method ofpayment, it must be made payable to
the United States Department of the Treasury and shall be delivered to: Comptroller of
the Currency, P.O. Box 73150, Chicago, Illinois 60673-7150. The docket number of this
case should be entered on the check. If a wire transfer is the selected method ofpayment,
it must be made to Treasury NYC Bank account #2071-0001. A copy of the check or
wire transfer shall be delivered to the Director, Enforcement and Compliance Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 ESt., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20219.
(5) This Order shall be enforceable to the same extent and in the same manner
as an effective and outstanding order that has been· issued and has become final pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(h) and (i) (as amended).
Article IV
WAIVERS
(1) By executing this Order, the Bank waives:
(a) the right to the issuance ofa Notice ofCivil Money Penalty
Assessment under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i);
(b) all rights to a hearing and a final agency decision pursuant to 12
U.S.C. § 1818(i) and 12 C.F.R. Part 19;
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(c) all rights to seek judicial review of this Order;
(d) all rights in any way to contest the validity of this Order; and
(e) any and all claims for fees, costs or expenses against the
Comptroller, or any ofhis agents or employees, related in any way to
this enforcement matter or this Order, whether arising under
common law or under the terms of any statute, including, but not
limited to, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28
U.S.C. § 2412.
(2) The Bank's Board ofDirectors acknowledges that it has read and
understands the premises and obligations of this Order and declares that no separate
promise or inducement of any kind has been made by the Comptroller, his agents or
employees to cause or induce the Bank to agree to consent to the issuance of this Order
and/or to execute this Order.
(3) It is hereby agreed that the provisions of this Order constitute a settlement
of the civil money penalty proceeding contemplated against the Bank by the Comptroller.
The Comptroller agrees not to institute further civil money penalty proceedings against
the Bank for the acts, omissions or violations alleged in Article II above, unless such acts,
omissions or violations reoccur.
(4) It is further agreed that the provisions ofthis Order shall not be construed as
an adjudication on the merits and, except as set forth above in paragraph (3), shall not
inhibit, estop, bar, or otherwise prevent the Comptroller from taking any action affecting
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the Bank if, at any timet he deems it appropriate to do so to fulfill the responsibilities
placed upon him by the several laws of the United States ofAmerica.
(5) The Bank understands that nothing herein shall preclude any proceedings
brought by the Comptroller to enforce the terms of this Ordert and that nothing herein
constitutest nor shall the Bank contend that it constitutest a waiver of any rightt powert or
authority ofany other representatives of the United States or agencies thereof, including
•
the Department of Justicet to bring other actions deemed appropriate.
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IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the undersigned, authorized by the Comptroller as
his representative, has hereunto set his hand on behalfof the Comptroller.
Is/ Pim £oTl{}
Timothy W. Long
Senior Deputy Comptroller
Date
5-13-04
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, the undersigned, as the duly authorized anq acting
President and ChiefExecutive Officer ofthe Bank, has hereunto set his hands on behalf
of the Bank.
Riggs Bank N.A.
Signed
By: Lawrence I. Hebert
Its: President and ChiefExecutive Officer
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5/13/04
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SECTION I

Recent Developments
under the
Bank Secrecy Act
and the
USA Patriot Act
By Cynthia W. Young and Rick G. Alsip
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Introduction
Enacted in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was intended to prevent banks and other
insured depository institutions from being used to launder money by requiring such institutions
to report certain types of currency transactions (including through currency transaction reports
(CTRs) and suspicious activity reports (SARs)) and maintain certain records and information.
Amended several times since its enactment, including most recently with the passage of the USA
Patriot Act, the BSA has recently undergone a dramatic shift in focus following the terrorist
attacks of September 11 th, 2001. No longer viewed simply as a tool to combat money laundering
arising from drug or other criminal activities, the focus of the BSA now includes even more
important goal - combating and disrupting the financing of international terrorism.
This dramatic shift in focus and the obvious importance of this new goal, coupled with
the Riggs Bank scandal that had members of Congress openly questioning whether banking
regulators were committed to, or even capable of, enforcing the BSA, has dramatically changed
the way banks and their regulators approach the obligations of banks under the BSA. While this
article provides a brief overview of some of the more significant BSA developments for banks
during the past two years, without question, it is this dramatic shift in focus that is the most
significant development under the BSA. As Daniel P. Stipano, Acting Chief Counsel of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), said in a speech in February 2005 when
addressing the changing focus of the BSA, "[I]t is clear that what was good enough in the past
may not be good enough now. The stakes are much, much higher than ever before, and a
'business as usual' approach is not going to be sufficient to meet the challenges at hand."!
1 Remarks of Daniel P. Stipano, Acting Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Before the
Florida International Bankers Association, Miami, Florida, February 10, 2005, available at
http://\'''W\v.occ.gov/ftp/release/2005-13a.pdf.Indeed,Mr. Stipano's remarks clearly demonstrate the importance
and heightened scrutiny regulators are now giving to BSA compliance.
I - 1
Customer Identification Programs
On May 9, 2003, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of
Treasury (FinCEN), the OCC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (Federal Reserve),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision and the
National Credit Union Administration, jointly adopted a final rule implementing Section 326 of
the Patriot Act.2 Section 326 of the Patriot Act called for the adoption of rules that set forth the
minimum standards that banks and other depository institutions must meet regarding the
verifying the identity of their customers when they open an account at the institution. The final
rule required all depository institutions by October 1, 2003 to have adopted a board-approved,
written customer identification program (CIP) as part of the institution's BSA, anti-money
laundering program that is appropriate for the institution's size and types of businesses. Under
the final rule, an institution's CIP must contain the following procedures:
~ Risk-based procedures that enable the institution to form a reasonable belief that it
knows the identity of the customer opening the account, including
o procedures for obtaining specific identifying information about the
customer prior to opening an account, including at a minimum the customer's name, date
of birth, address and taxpayer identification number (or other appropriate identification
number if the customer is not a U.S person);
o procedures for verifying the identity of the customer with a reasonable
period of time after opening the account, including when the institution will use
documents, non-documentary methods or a combination thereof;
o procedures to address situations when the institution cannot verify the
customer's identity;
~ Procedures for making and maintaining a record of all information obtained
under the foregoing procedures (including certain documents relied on and methods followed),
and all identifying information obtained must be maintained for five years after the account is
closed and all other information must be maintained for five years after the record is made;
~ Procedures to determine whether the customer appears on any list of known or
suspected terrorist or terrorists organizations; and
2 The adopting release and final rule is available at http://\V\V\v.occ.gov/fr/fedregister/68fr25090.pdf.
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» Procedures to provide customers with adequate notice that the institution IS
requesting information to verify their identity.
A depository institution's CIP may also contain procedures for addressing its reliance on another
financial institution for certain of its CIP procedures.
In January 2004, the federal banking regulators issued interpretive guidance in the form
of a set of frequently asked questions with respect to the new CIP rule.3 This FAQ provides
guidance on issues such as the meaning of the terms "account" and "customer", identifying
information required to be obtained and identity verification procedures. In July 2004, the
federal banking regulators also issued examination procedures with respect to CIPs.4 These
examination procedures were developed jointly by the regulators to evaluate compliance by
depository institutions with the new CIP rule as well as establish a consistent supervisory
approach among those regulators with respect to CIP issues.
OCC Enforcement Guidance for BSA Program Deficiencies
In November 2004, the acc issued enforcement guidance aimed at creating a consistent
approach among acc examiners for citing violations of and bringing enforcement actions with
respect to violations by national banks of the BSA compliance program rule and the SAR filing
requirements. 5 The guidance notes that the BSA and the acc's implementing regulations
requires national banks to maintain a written, board-approved program to ensure their
compliance with the BSA (including the CIP program addressed above), which at a minimum
must include:
» a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance with the BSA;
» a system of independent testing of such compliance to be conducted by bank
personnel or by an outside party;
» an individual designated as responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-
day compliance with the BSA; and
» appropriate training for bank personnel.
The enforcement guidance indicates that unlike other situations in which regulators have
considerable discretion, the BSA mandates that the acc issue a cease-and-desist order whenever
3 The FAQ guidance is available at http://w\vw.fdic.gov/news/news/t1.nancial/2004/fil0404a.htrnl.
4 The elP examination procedures are available at
http://\v\vw.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2004/sr0413al.pdf.
5 The enforcement guidance is available at http://www.occ.gov/ftp/bulletinJ2004-50.doc.
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a national bank fails to establish and maintain an appropriate BSA compliance program or fails
to correct any problem with its program previously cited by its regulators.6 The guidance then
lists situations in which a violation citation and" accompanying C&D are appropriate, noting that
the acc may choose to address BSA compliance program deficiencies as safety and soundness
concerns rather than BSA compliance program violations, depending on the severity of the
violation, bank management's capability and cooperation and the acc's confidence that the
bank will fix the problem.
With respect to a national bank's obligation to a file an SAR, the acc notes that the
decision to file an SAR is inherently subjective and indicates that a bank should not be cited for a
violation of the SAR filing requirements unless the failure to file involved bad faith, a significant
or egregious situation, or a pattern or practice or other systematic breakdown. The ace
indicated it will evaluate the severity of the violations, when they occurred, whether frequent or
isolated and similar findings in prior exams in considering whether to cite a violation of the SAR
filing requirements.
Reaction to this enforcement guidance has been mixed. Many in the banking industry
believe that this guidance requires the acc to impose stiffer enforcement actions on banks with
BSA violations, an interpretation that would certainly be in line with the increased regulatory
scrutiny being placed on BSA issues. In a speech given in February 2005, Daniel P. Stipano,
Acting Chief Counsel of the acc, indicated that the acc intended this guidance to provide
national banks with an understanding of the acc's rules and expectations and he noted that the
acc was the only federal banking regulator to have issued such guidance.7 Mr. Stipano also
noted that the acc now requires any proposed citation of the BSA compliance program
requirements to be approved by the acc's Washington Supervision Review Committee given
the harsh enforcement actions that can result from violations of the BSA compliance program
requirements as noted above. If such a citation is not approved, the examiner must resort to a
more informal remedy to address the issue. Unfortunately for banks, the severity of the
underlying criminal or terrorist activity that a bank allegedly failed to uncover due to its BSA
compliance program deficiencies will no doubt impact how the acc and other regulators'
6 A similar requirement is imposed on the other federal banking regulators with respect to the depository institutions
that they supervise.
7 See note 1.
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perceIve the "severity" of the bank's deficiencies In considering an appropriate regulatory
response.
SAR Filing Safe Harbor Reaffirmed
In May 2004, the federal banking regulators issued an interagency advisory regarding a
recent U.S. District Court case, Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Karam, 8 in which the subjects of a SAR
filing by a national bank regarding suspicious lending activities filed a defamation suit against
the bank for filing the SAR. While the BSA specifically prohibits disclosing a copy of an SAR
to the party that is the subject of the SAR, the plaintiffs in this case attempted to get around this
requirement by seeking to discover from the bank any information .regarding conversations the
bank may have had with law enforcement about the possible filing of an SAR.
According to the interagency advisory, the u.S. District Court concluded that the bank
could not produce documents in discovery related to the existence or information contained in
the SAR or communications regarding its filing or content, including communications with
government authorities about the SAR or the possible legal violations that led to the filing of the
SAR. In issuing the interagency advisory, the federal banking regulators noted that this
conclusion was consistent with the approach taken in the majority of courts that the BSA
provides banks and their employees an unlimited safe harbor from civil liability for filing an
SAR.
Memorandum of Understanding among Regulators
In October 2004, FinCEN and the federal banking regulators announced that they had
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to set forth certain procedures for the
exchange of information among the regulators and FinCEN regarding BSA examinations and
compliance.9 The stated purposes of the MOU are to
~ assist FinCEN in fulfilling its role as the primary administrator of the BSA and
the federal banking regulators in their roles as banking regulators;
~ increase compliance with the BSA in the filing of reports and keeping of records;
and
~ improve interagency cooperation In the areas of BSA examination and
compliance.
8 The interagency guidance is available at http://,,vw,,v.occ.treas.gov/ftp!bul1etin/2004-24a.pdt~The Whitney case can
be found at 306 F.Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
9 The MOD is available at http://ww\\'".treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fincenbankingregulatorsmou.pdf.
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Of particular interest to bankers, in addition to a variety of periodical reports required to
be given by the banking regulators to FinCEN and vice versa, the MOD specifically requires the
federal banking regulators to promptly notify FinCEN of significant BSA violations or
deficiencies at banks. 10 Such a deficiency is defined to include
~ systemic or pervasive BSA compliance program deficiencies or reporting or
recordkeeping violations;
~ situations in which a bank fails to respond to regulatory warnings regarding such
deficiencies or violations or continues a history of such deficiencies or violations, even if
dissimilar to those cited in prior exams; or
~ a non-technical, one-time violation that demonstrates willful or reckless disregard
for the requirements of the BSA, or that creates a substantial risk of money laundering or the
financing of terrorism within the bank.
Other Regulatory Initiatives
The following are some additional regulatory developments that have occurred under the
BSA during the past two years:
~ The federal banking regulators are currently working on joint BSA examination
procedures which they hope to issue later in 2005.
~ In March 2005, FinCEN and the federal banking regulators issued a joint
statement on banking services provided to money service businesses (MSBs), including check
cashiers and money transmitters. 11 While noting that they would issue additional guidance on
their expectations under the BSA for banks who have MSB customers, FinCEN and the federal
banking regulators felt it was necessary to issue this joint statement at this time to clarify that
they do not expect banks to regulate the conduct of their MSB clients and that this misperception
was leaving many legitimate MSBs without an ability to obtain banking services. 12
10 This is an important point. FinCEN serves as the general administrator of the BSA and, as noted further below,
plays an important role in some of the more high profile enforcement actions such as those involving Riggs Bank
and AmSouth. In the Congressional hearings that followed the Riggs Bank scandal, Congressional members
questioned why the federal banking regulators rarely referred instances ofBSA violations to FinCEN. In the Riggs
Bank situation, the acc fIrst noted BSA deficiencies and problems at Riggs in 1997 but did not alert FinCEN until
2003.
11 The joint statement is available at http://www.fincen.gov/bsanlsbrevisedstatement.pdf.
12 But Compare this joint statement with the guidance that the acc issued in June 2004 (available at
http://\V\V\v.occ.gov/ftp/advisory/2004-7.txt) which specifically indicated that national banks should perform
"careful due diligence of the accounts ofMSBs to control money laundering and reputational risks." Such due
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~ In June 2004, FinCEN and the federal banking regulators issued an interagency
advisory to depository institutions on accepting accounts from foreign governments, embassies
and political figures. I3 Clearly a reaction to the Riggs Bank scandal discussed further below, the
guidance is brief and suggests that while the federal banking regulators will not, absent
"extraordinary circumstances", require or suggest that banks close or refuse to open a particular
account or relationship, banks clearly should evaluate the risks associated with dealing with
foreign governments, embassies and/or political figures and expect enhanced scrutiny from
regulators if the regulators perceive those relationships as involving high degrees of risks.
~ In June 2003, FinCEN adopted a revised SAR form. I4 Among the changes, two
new boxes, one related to terrorist financing and the other to identity theft, were added to the
prior SAR form.
Impact on Merger Applications
One of the specific Patriot Act amendments to the BSA reqUIres federal banking
regulators to consider a depository institution's record in BSA and anti-money laundering
compliance in deciding applications for bank mergers, acquisitions and other combinations.
Regulatory officials have indicated in speeches and testimony that those agencies have recently
told some banking organizations applying to engage in a merger or other expansion transaction
that such organizations should instead focus on their BSA compliance efforts. Clearly
depository institutions interested in growing through acquisitions, and even those interested in
being acquired, will need to be mindful of BSA compliance issues which ultimately could
negatively impact their strategic aims.
Recent Regulatory Enforcement Actions
Without question, Riggs Bank, N.A. is the most publicized enforcement action under the
BSA in recent memory. Riggs Bank had been an institution in the Washington D.C. area for
nearly two centuries. It was one of the preferred financial institutions for foreign embassies and
diplomats and boasted of having been the bank of choice for at least 21 United States Presidents.
In July 2003, the OCC entered into a cease and desist order with Riggs to correct numerous BSA
diligence might include, according to the acc, financial infonnation about the MSBs, including primary lines of
business and major customers, the MSBs anti-money laundering policies, infonnation on the MSB's owners, the
MSB's license if any, etc. Query whether that level of due diligence sounds more like the role of a regulator than a
banking organization providing services to its customers.
13 The interagency advisory is available at http://w\vw.fincen.gov/advis36.pdf.
14 See http://\v\V\v.occ.gov/ftp/bulletin/2003-27.txt.
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deficiencies and violations; however, many of deficiencies and violations were not corrected and
in May 2004 the acc and FinCEN assessed against Riggs, and Riggs consented to pay, a $25
million civil money penalty for violations of the reporting and anti-money laundering program
requirements of the BSA. The acc and FinCEN described Riggs' violations of the BSA as
"willful" (i.e., demonstrating a reckless disregard for the bank's legal obligations) and
"systemic". Every aspect of the bank's anti-money laundering program was deem~d seriously
deficient, particularly in the bank's failure to identify a large numbers of accounts belonging to
two foreign governments. From 2000 to 2003, the regulators alleged that Riggs Bank failed to
file either timely or at all 33 SARs involving transactions of almost $98 million because Riggs'
procedures to spot and report suspicious activity (such as structuring cash transactions to avoid
BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirements) either did not exist or were not implemented.
Considerable criticism was leveled at Riggs with respect to accounts held by certain foreign
governments or their affiliates, noting that numerous transactions exhibited "classic" indicators
of suspicious activity that Riggs failed to report. Riggs was also found not to have followed the
CTR filing requirements. 15 These deficiencies and violations allowed persons such as former
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet and the president and other government officials of Equatorial
Guinea to hide millions of dollars.
Shortly after this civil money penalty was imposed against Riggs Bank, its federal
banking regulators had to explain in hearings before Congress how Riggs' BSA compliance
problems, first identified in 1997 by the acc, were allowed to reach this point. John Hawke,
Comptroller of the Currency, essentially described the situation as "a failure of supervision" and
lack of aggressiveness on the part of the acc in addressing the compliance concerns at Riggs.
During these hearings, many Congressional members openly questioned whether the federal
banking regulators were committed to or even capable of ensuring that banks comply with the
BSA.
In January 2005, Riggs Bank's BSA violations resulted in the bank pleading guilty to one
criminal violation of the BSA and agreeing to pay an additional $16 million fine and subject
itself to a five year corporate probation. The bank also agreed to close its private and diplomatic
banking operations. This guilty plea paved the way for PNC Financial Services Group to
15 For a more specific listing of some of the BSA deficiencies and violations that occurred at Riggs Bank, see the
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty that Riggs consented to with FinCEN, which is available at
http://,vww.fincen. e:ov/riggsassessment3.pdf
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conclude its acquisition of Riggs earlier this year. But it should be noted that this was not before
PNC significantly reduced the price it was willing to offer to acquire Riggs given the damage
that Riggs' BSA violations imposed on the Riggs' organization.
But Riggs Bank is not alone in paying a heavy price for failing to comply with the BSA.
In October 2004, AmSouth Bank of Birmingham consented to being assessed a $10 million civil
money penalty by the Federal Reserve and FinCEN. Like the situation in Riggs, AmSouth's
anti-money laundering program was deemed deficient, including materially deficient in three of
the four minimum program requirements. AmSouth also failed to file SARs when it should have,
including one situation where SARs were not filed notwithstanding the fact that bank employees
had indicated to bank management that certain accounts were possibly being used to further a
Ponzi scheme. Again, like the situation in Riggs Banks, the regulators described AmSouth's
BSA violations as "willful" and "systemic". 16 In addition to the $10 civil money penalty,
AmSouth entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the u.s. Attorney's Office in
which AmSouth agreed to pay an additional $40 million fine.
While Riggs and AmSouth represented large banks with several billion dollars in assets,
smaller community banks are also being subjected to enforcement actions related to their
compliance with the BSA, among other issues. Examples in 2004 included the Community State
Bank, Poteau, Oklahoma ($125 million in assets on December 31, 2004),17 Traders Bank,
Spencer, West Virginia ($110 million in assets on December 31, 2004),18 Merchants Bank of
California, Carson, California ($72 million in assets on December 31,2004),19 and Surety Bank,
Fort Worth, Texas ($54 million in assets on December 31,2004).20
Not surprisingly, these enforcement actions have created considerable fear in the banking
community over BSA compliance issues. The American Bankers Association (along with all of
the state banking associations) sent a letter in January 2005 to the federal banking regulators, the
Secretary of the Treasury and FinCEN expressing the concern on the part of the banking industry
16 For a more specific listing of some of the BSA deficiencies and violations that occurred at AmSouth, see the
Assessment of Civil Money Penalty that Riggs consented to with FinCEN, which is available at
http://www.fincen. 20vIamsouthassess'mentcivitnlOlley.pdf.
17 See written agreement available at
http://www.federalreserve. 20Y/boarddocs/press/ellforcement/2004/20041021/attachment.pdf.
18 See written agreement available at
http://www.federalreserve. gOY/boarddocs/presslellforcement/2004/20040802/attachment.pdf.
19 See consent order available at http://www.occ.treas.gov!FTP!EAs/ea2004-64.pdf.
20 See consent order available at http://www.occ.treas.gov!FTP!EAs/ea2004-65.pdf.
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as to the lack of consistency in examinations and compliance guidance with respect to the BSA.
Chief among the expressed concerns was the fear that regulators and examiners are moving
towards an unrealistic "zero-tolerance" policy with respect to BSA compliance problems. This
letter also notes that some banks are beginning to file SARs in situations where an SAR is
probably not required rather than risk being second-guessed by their banking regulators, a
practice that ultimately could significantly undermine the usefulness of the SARs reporting
system.
Conclusion
Clearly the events of September 11, 2001, the passage of the Patriot Act and the scandals
involving banks such as Riggs Bank have brought the issue of BSA compliance back to the
forefront of issues facing banking organizations and their regulators. All banking organizations
would be well advised to reevaluate their BSA compliance programs and procedures in light of
the applicable legal requirements, the problems illustrated in the recent enforcement actions
involving banks such as Riggs Bank and AmSouth, and the particular risks the organization faces
based on its products, services and customers. A strong commitment to BSA compliance
starting with management and running through the entire banking organization coupled with an
appropriate, risk-based BSA compliance program will go along way towards ensuring that a
banking organization is not characterized as "willfully" violating the BSA or having "systemic"
BSA deficiencies. As Daniel P. Stipano, Acting Chief Counsel of the acc, pointed out in a
speech in February 2005, whenever a bank "fails to have appropriate systems and controls to
effectively manage its risks, whatever those risks are, then we have the profile of an institution
that will almost certainly attract a high level of regulatory scrutiny, especially where we perceive
a lack ofa sincere, thoroughgoing commitment to BSA compliance. ,,21
******
As a postscript, portions of the Patriot Act (including some of the more controversial
aspects relating to enhanced surveillance procedures) are set to expire at the end of 2005.
Congressional hearings are currently underway as to whether those portions of the Patriot Act
should be extended or even expanded. The provisions of the Patriot Act that amended the BSA
however only terminate if Congress adopts a joint resolution terminating those provisions.
21 See note 1 (emphasis added).
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Part 21
[Docket No. 03-08]
RlN 1557-AC08
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Parts 208 and 211
[Docket No. R-1127]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 326
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Thrift Supervision
12 CFR Part 563
[Docket No. 2003-18]
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Part 748
RlN 3133
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
31 CFR Part 103
RlN 1501-AA31
Customer Identification Programs for
Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions and Certain Non-Federally
Regulated Banks
AGENCIES: The Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, T~asury;Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Treasury; Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation; Office of Thrift
Supervision, Treasury; National Credit
Union Administration.
ACTION: Joint fmal rule.
SUMMARY: The Depamnent of the
Treasury, through the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN),
together with the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of Thrift Supervision COTS),
and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCllA) (collectively,
the Agencies), have jointly adopted a
final rule to implement section 326 of
the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools
ReqUired To Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001
(the Act). Section 326 requires the
Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to
jointly prescribe with each of the
Agencies, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a
regulation that, at a minimum, requires
financial institutions to implement
reasonable procedures to verify the
identity of any person seeking to open
an account, to the extent reasonable and
practicable; maintain records of the
information used to verify the person's
identity; and determine whether the
person appears on any lists of known or
suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations provided to the financial
institution by any government agency.
This final regulation applies to banks,
savings associations, credit unions,
private banks, and trust companies.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule is
effective June 9.2003.
Compliance Date: Each bank must
comply with this final role by October
1,2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Office of the Chief Counsel at
(202) 874-3295.
Board: Enforcement and Special
Investigations Sections at (202) 452-
5235,(202) 728-5829, or (202) 452-
2961.
FDIC: Special Activities Section,
Division of Supervision and Consumer
Protection, and Legal Division at (202)
898-3671.
OTS: Compliance Policy Division at
(202) 906-6012.
NCUA: Office of General Counsel at
(703) 518-6540; or Office of
Examination and Insurance at (703)
51~360.
Treasury: Office of the Chief Counsel
(FinCEN) at (703) 905-3590; Office of
the General Counsel (Treasury) at (202)
622-1927; or the Office olthe Assistant
General Counsel for Banking & Finance
(Treasury) at (202) 622-0480.
SUPPLEMENTARYINFORMATK>N:
I. Background
A. Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act
On October 26,2001, President Bush
signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. 107-56. Title In of the Act,
captioned "Intemational Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-
terrorist Financing Act of 2001," adds
several new provisions to the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA), 31 U.S.C. 5311 et
seq. These provisions are intended to
facilitate the prevention, detection, and
prosecution of international money
laundering and the fmancing of
terrorism.
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Section 326 of the Act adds a new
subsection (1) to 31 u.s.C. 5318 of the
BSA that requires the Secretary to
prescribe regulations "setting forth the
minimum standards for financial
institutions and their customers
regarding the identity of the customer
that shall apply in connection with the
opening of an account at a financial
institution. U
Section 326 applies to all "financial
institutions." This term is defined very
broadly in the BSA to encompass a
variety of entities, including commercial
banks, agencies and branches of foreign
banks in the United States, thrifts, credit
unions, private banks, trust companies,
investment companies, brokers and
dealers in securities, futures
commission merchants, insurance
companies, travel agents, pawnbrokers,
dealers in precious metals, check·
cashers, casinos, and telegraph
companies, among many others. See 31
U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) and (c)(l)(A).
For any financial institution engaged
in financial activities described in
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (section 4(k)
institutions), the Secretary is required to
prescribe the regulations issued under
section 326 jointly with each of the
Agencies. the SEC, and the CFfC (the
Federal functional regulators).
Section 326 of the Act provides that
the regulations must require, at a
minimum, financial institutions to
implement reasonable procedures for (1)
verifying the identity of any person
seeking to open an account, to the
extent reasonable and practicable; (2)
maintaining records of the information
used to verify the person's identity,
including name, address, and other
identifying information: and (3)
determining whether the person appears
on any lists of known or suspected
terrorists or terrorist organizations
provided to the financial institution by
any government agency. In prescribing
these regulations, the Secretary is
directed to take into consideration the
various types of accounts maintained by
various types of financial institutions,
the various methods of opening
accounts, and the various types of
identifying information available.
B. Overview ofComments Received
On July 23, 2002, Treasury and the
Agencies published a joint notice of
proposed rolemaking in the Federal
Register (67 FR 48290) applicable to (a)
any financial institution defined as a
llbank" in 31 CFR 103.11(c) t and
t This definition includes banks. savings
usociatioDS. credit unions. Edge Act and
Agreement corporatiODS. and branches and agencies
of foreign banb.
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subject to regulation by one of the
Agencies; and (b) any foreign branch of
an insured bank. On the same date,
Treasury separately published an
identical, proposed rule for credit
unions, private banks, and trust
companies that do not have a Federal
functional regulator (67 FR 48299).2
Treasury and the Agencies proposed
general standards that would require
each bank to design and implement a
customer identification program (elF)
tailored to the bank's size, location, and
type of business. The proposed role also
included certain specific standards that
would be mandated for all banks.3
Treasury and the Agencies
collectively received approximately five
hundred comments in response to these
proposed rules (collectively referred to
as the "proposal" or the uproposed
mle" for Ubanks"), although some
commenters sent copies of the same
letter to Treasury and to each oftha
Agencies. The majority of comments
received by Treasury and the Agencies
were from banks, savings associations,
credit unions, and their trade
associations. Most of these commenters
agreed with the 18rgely risk-based
approach set forth in the proposal that
allowed each bank to develop a CIP
based on its specific operations.
Some commenters, Jiowever,
criticized the specific requirements in
the proposed rule and suggested that
Treasury and the Agencies issue a final
role containing an entirely risk-based
approach without any minimum
identification and verification
requirements. According to some of
these commenters, such a thoroughly
risk-based approach would give banks
appropriate discretion to focus their
efforts and finite resources on specific.
high-risk accounts most likely to be
used by money-launderers and
terrorists.
Other commenters. especially those
representing credit card banks and
credit card issuers, asserted that the
proposed minimum identification and
verification requirements should be
eliminated because they did not take
into account the unique nature of credit
card operations. They warned that these
requirements,ifin1pleEnented,\¥ould
2lD the preamble for this proposed rule. Treasury
explained that a lingle flnal regulation would be
issued for all fiJ1llDCw inatitutions defined 88
"banks" under 31 CFR 103.11(c). with
modifications to accommodate certain differences
between Federally regulated and Don-Federally
regulated banb. See 67 Fa 48299, 48300.
3 At the same time. Treasury also published (1)
together with the SEC. propoeed rules for broker-
dea1en (67 FR 48308) and mutual funds (67 FR
48318); and (2) together with the CFTC. proposed
rules for future. commi.sion merchants and
introducing broken (67 FR 48328).
have a chilling effect on credit practices
important to U.S. consumers and would
impose significant compliance costs on
their industry with little benefit to law
enforcement.
By contrast. some smaller banks
criticized the flexibility of the proposal
and stated that a risk-based approach
would leave too much room for
interpretation by the Agencies. These
commenters urged Treasury and the
Agencies to issue a final rule
establishing more specific requirements.
For example, some commenters
suggested that the rule prescribe risk
assessment levels for each customer
type and type of account, along with a
specific description of acceptable forms
of identification and methods of
verification appropriate for each bank's
size and location.
While commenters representing
various segments of the industry
differed on the approach that should be
taken in the final rule, the vast majority
concluded that Treasury and the
Agencies had underestiDlated the
compliance burden that would be
imposed by certain elements of the
proposal. Commenters were especially
concerned about the proposed
requirements that banks verify the
identity of signatories on accounts, keep
copies of documents used to verify a
customer's identity, and retain identity
verification records for five years after
an account is closed.
Some commenters also suggested that
banks be given greater flexibility when
dealing with established customers and
urged that banks be permitted to rely on
identification and verification of
customers performed by a third party,
including an affiliate. Other commenters
asked for additional guidance regarding
the lists of known and suspected
terrorists and terrorist organizations that
must be checked, and regarding what
will be deemed adequate notice to
customers for purposes of complying
with the fmal mle. Many commenters
requested that the final rule contain a
delayed implementation date that
would provide banks with the time
needed to design a customer
identification program, obtain board
approval, alter existing policies and
proced~,fonnsandso~~,and
train staff.
Several comments were received from
companies engaged in the sale of
technology or services that could be
used to identify and verify customers,
retain records, and check lists of known
and suspected terrorists and tenorist
organizations. Many of these companies
recommended that the proposed rule be
modified to make clear that use of
specific products and services would be
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permissible. Some of these commenters
urged that the rule require banks to
authenticate any documents obtained to
verify the identity of the customer
through the use of automated document
authentication technology.
A small number of comments were
received from individuals. Some of
these individuals criticized. the
proposed requirement that banks obtain
a social security number from persons
opening an account as an infringement
upon individual liberty and privacy.
Some individuals were concerned that
this requirement would expose them to
an added risk of identity theft. Other
individuals supported the proposal and
concluded that its verification
requirements might diminish instances
of identity theft and fraud. A few
COD1Dlenters suggested that the
government develop a separate national
identification number or require that
social security cards bear photographs
and or other safeguards.
A variety of commenters applauded
the efforts of Treasury and the Federal
functional regulators to devise a
uniform set of mles that apply to banks,
broker-dealers. mutual funds, futures
commission merchants, and introducing
brokers." They noted that. without
uniformity, customers of financial
institutions may seek to open accounts
with institutions that customers
perceive to have less robust customer
identification requirements. These
commenters also suggested revisions
that would enhance the uniformity of
the rules.
Treasury and the Agencies have
modified the proposed rule in light of
the comments received. A discussion of
the comments. and the manner in which
the proposed rule has been modified,
follows in the section-by-section
analysis.
In addition, as suggested by a number
of commenters, Treasury and the
Agencies expect to issue supplementary
guidance following issuance of the final
role.
C./oint Issuance by Treaswy and the
Agencies
The final rule implementing section
326 is being issued jointly by Treasury,
through FinCEN, and by the Agencies.
It applies to (1) a ubank." 8S defined in
31 CPR 103.11(c), that is subject to
regulation by one of the Agencies, and
(2) to any non-Federally insured credit
union, private bank or trust company
that does not have a Federal functional
regulator (collectively referred to in the
final rule as "8 bank").
" See footnote 3. supra.
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The substantive requirements of this
joint final mIe are bein8 codified as part
of Treasury's BSA regulations located in
31 CFR part 103. In addition, each of the
Agencies is concurrently publishing a
provision in its .own regulations 5 to
cross-reference this final rule in order to
clarify the applicability of the final rule
to the banks subject to its jurisdiction.
Regulations governing the
applicability of section 326 to certain
financial institutions that are regulated
by the SEC and the CFrC are the subject
of separate rulemakings. Treaswy, the
Agencies, the SEC. and the CFrC
consulted.extensively in the
development of all joint roles
implementing section 326 of the Act.
All of the participating agencies intend
the effect of the rules to be uniform
throughout the financial services
industry. Treasury intends to issue
sQparate roles under section 326 for
certain non-bank financial institutions
that BI'8 not regulated by one of the
Federal functionalreRUlators.
The Secretary has determined that the
records required to be kept by section
326 of the Act have a high degree of
usefulness in criminal. tax. or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the
conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, to protect
against international terrorism.
In addition, Treasury, under its own
authority. is issuing conforming
amendments to 31 CFR 103.34. which
imposes requirements concerning the
identification of bank customers.
D. Compliance Date
Nearly all commenters on the
proposed rule requested that banks be
given adequate time to develop and
implement the requirements of any final
mIe implementing section 326 of the
Act. These commenters stated that if the
proposed rule were implemented. banks
would be required, among other things.
to revise existing account opening
policies and procedures, obtain board
approval, train staff, update forms,
purchase new or updated software for
customer verification and checking of
government lists. and purchase new
equipment for copying or scanning and
storing records. Commenters requested a
delayed effective or compliance date.
but. given the variety of banks that
would be covered by the fmal mIe, there
was no consensus regarding the amount
of time that would be necessary to
comply with the final role. The
transition periods suggested by
commenters ranged from 60 days to two
15 12 CFR 21.21 (ace); 12 CFR 208.83, 211.5. and
211.24 (FRB); 12 CPR 328.8 (FDIC): 12 eFR 563.177
(OTS)i and 12 CFR 748.2 (NCUA).
years from the date a final role is
published.
The final rule modifies various
aspects of the proposal and eliminates
some of the requirements that
commenters identified as being most
burdensome. Nonetheless, Treasury and
the Agencies recognize that some banks
will need time to develop a CIP, obtain
board approval, and implement the eIP,
which will include various measmes,
such as training of staff. reprinting
forms. and developing new software.
Accordingly, although this final mle
will be effective 30 days after
publication, banks are provided with a
transition period to implement the rule.
Treasury and the Agencies have
determined that each bank must fully
implement its CIP by October 1, 2003.
II. Section-by-SectioD Analysis ofFinal
Kwe Implementing Section 328
Section 103.121(a) Definitions
Section 103.121(a)(1) Account. The
proposed role defined "account" as
each formal banking or business
relationship established to provide
ongoing services, dealings, or other
financial transactions and stated that a
deposit account, transaction or asset
account. and a credit account or other
extension of credit would each
constitute an uaccount." 6 The proposal
also explained that the term "account"
was limited to formal banking and
business relationships established to
provide "ongoing" services, dealings. or
other financial transactions to make
clear that this term is not intended to
cover infrequent transactions such as
the occasional purchase of a money
order or a wire transfer.
Treasury and the Agencies received a
large number of comments on this
proposed definition. Some commenters
agreed with the proposed definition
though others thought the definition of
"account" was either too broad or
needed clarification. Some commenters
suggested that the definition of
"account" be narrowed to include only
those relationships that 81'8 financial in
nature. A number of commenters urged
that the definition be limited to high-
risk relationships that experts have
identified as actually used by money
launderers and terrorists. Some of these
commenters suggested that particular
types of accounts, especially those
established as part of employee benefit
plans, be excluded from the definition
of "account."
Most commenters requested that the
final role provide additional examples
I The definition of uaccount" in the proposed rule
wu based on the statutory definition of uaccount"
that is used in lection 311 of the Act.
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of the relationships that would
constitute an "account." Many
commenters requested that the rule
clarify the meaning of "ongoing
services." These commenters asked
whether a person who repeatedly and
regularly purchased a money order,
requested a wire transfer. or cashed a
check on a weekly basis, without any
other relationship with a bank. would
be considered to have an "account. It
Many other commenters asked that the
exclusion for transfers of accounts
between banks described in the
preamble for the proposal-which
commenters characterized as the
Utransfer exception" -be stated
expressly in the regulation and
expanded to cover all loans originated
by a third party and purchased by a
bank, such as mortgages purchased from
non-bank lenders and vehicle loans
purchased from car dealers.
The final role contains a number of
changes prompted by these comments.
First, the reference to the tenn "business
relationship" has been deleted from the
definition of "account." This change is
made to clarify that the regulation
applies to the bank's provision of
financial products and services, 8S
opposed to general "business" dealings.
such as those in connection with the
bank's own operations or premises.
Second, the definition now contains
additional. but non-exclusive, examples
of products and services, such as safety
deposit box and other safekeeping
services. cash management, and
custodian and trust services, that
constitute an "account.It
The definition of "account" also has
been changed to include a list of
products and services that will not be
deemed an "account." The preamble for
the proposed rule had used the term
"ongoing services" to define accounts
covered by the final rule, and had
refeITed to the exclusion of "occasional"
transactions and "infrequent" purchases
(which arguably would require a bank to
monitor all transactions for repetitive
contacts). By contrast, the final mle
clarifies that "account" excludes
products and services where a formal
banking relaUonship is not established
with a person. such as check cashing,
wire transfer, or the sale of a check or
money order. 7 Treasury and the
7 This exclusion is consistent with legislative
history indicating that by referencing the term
"customers," Congress intended ..that the
regulations prescribed by Treasury tab aD
approach similar to that of regulations promulgated
under Utl. V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, where the Federal functional regula.ton
defined "customera'· and '"customer relationship"
for purposel of the finandal privacy rules. tt H.R.
Rep. No. 107-250, pt. 1. at 62 (2001). Th.
deflnltiona of "cultomer" and flcu1tomer
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Foreign Banks· implementing sectioDs313 and
319{b) of the Act).
12 The proposed rule defined u person" by
reference to § 103.t 1(z). This definition includes
individuals, corporaUons, partnerships. trusts.
estates. joint stock companies, anociatioDJ,
syndicates, joint ventures, other unincorporated
organizations or group', certain Indian Tribes, and
all entities cognizable .. legal personalities.
Treasury and the Agendes agree that it is Dot ,
necessary to repeat thi. definition. Therefore, it is
omitted from the final mIe.
such accounts, including low Agencies have determined that foreign
contribution limits and strict branches of insured U.S. banks are not
distribution requirements. covered by the final role. Nevertheless,
Section 103.121(a)(2) Bank. The Treasury and the Agencies encourage
proposal jointly issued by Treasury and each bank to implement an effective
the Agencies applied to any financial CIP, as required. by this final rule,
institution defined as a "bank" in 31 throughout its organization, including
CPR 103.11(c) and subject to regulation in its foreign branches, except to the
by one of the Agencies, including banks. extent that the requirements of the rule
savings associations, credit unions, Edge would conflict with local law.
Act and Agreement corporations, and As noted in the preamble for the
branches and agencies of foreign banks. proposal, the CIP must be a part of a
The proposed definition also included bank's BSA comfliance program.
"any foreign branch of an insured bank" Therefore, it wi! apply throughout such
to make clear that the procedures a bank's U.S. operations (including
required by the role would have to be subsidiaries) in the same way as the
implemented throughout the bank, no BSA I' . t
matter where its offices are located. The comp lance program requlremen ·
However, all subsidiaries that are in
preamble for the proposal explained compliance with a separately
that the mle would apply to bank l' hI i d '6 1
subsidiaries to the same extent as app lC8 e, n ustry-spec! c ru e
implementing section 326 of the Act
existing regulations requiring banks to will be deemed to be in compliance
have BSA compliance programs.10 As with this final role.
described above, a second proposal S ( )'( ) Th
issued simultaneously by Treasury ection 103.121(a (3 Customer. e
applied to certain other financial proposal defined "customer" to mean
institutions defined as a "bank" in 31 any person 12 seeking to open a new
( ) I th red account. In addition, the proposalCFR 103.11 c , name y, ose c it defined a "customer" to include any
unions, private banks, and trost
th d h d al signatory on an account. The preamble
companies at 0 not ave a Fe er for the proposal explained that the term
functional reRU1ator.
Under the final role, "bank" includes "customer" included a person that
all financial institutions covered by both applied to open an account, but not
of the proposals described above, except . someone seeking information about an
that "bank" does not include any account, such as rates charged or
foreign branch of an insured U.S. bank. interest paid on an account, if the
Several commenters explained that the person did not apply to open an
proposal to cover foreign branches account. The preamble also stated that
might conflict with local laws any person seeking to open an account
applicable to branches of insured banks at a bank, on or after the effective date
operating outside of the United States of the final mle, would be a "customer,"
and might place U.S. institutions at a regardless of whether that person
competitive disadvantage. Consistent already had an account at the bank.
with the approach taken with respect to This proposed definition prompted a
final regulations implementing other large number of comments. First, nearly
sections of the Act,1t Treasury and the all commenters recommended that the
Agencies clarify in the text of the final
rule that "customer" does not include a
person who does not receive banking
services, such as a person whose deposit
or loan application is denied. Some of
these commenters suggested that the
role for banks derme "customer" to
mean "a person who opens a new
account," as did the proposed roles for
broker-dealers, mutual funds, futures
commission merchants and introducing
brokers.
10 All insured depository institutions currently
must have a DSA compliance program. See 12 CFR
21.21 (ace); 12 CFR 208.63 (Board); 12 CFR 328.8
(FDIC); 12 CFR 563.111 (OTS); and 12 CFR 748.2
(NCUA). In addition. all f1Dancial institutiou are
required by section 352 of the Act. 31 U.S.c.
531B(h), to develop and implement an anti-money
launderin& program. Treasury iuued a regulation
implementing section 352 providing that a financial
institution resuJated by a Federal functional
regulator is deemed to satisfy the requirements of
section 5318(h)(1) if it implements and maintains
an anti-money laundering program that complies
with the regulation of its Federal functional
regulator, i.e.• the requil'ement to implement a BSA
compliance program. See 31 CFR 103.12O(b); 67 FR
2113 (Apri129. 2(02). However, Treasury
temporarily deferred subjecting certain non-
Federally regulated banb to the anti-money
laundering program requirementa in section 352.
See 67 FR 61547 (November 6. 2002) (corrected 87
FR 88935 (November 14, 2002)).
uSee. 8.B., 67 FR 60562, 60585 (Sept. 26, 2002)
(FinCEN's regulation titled U Anti-Money
Launderin& Requirements "Correspondent
Accounts for Foreign Shell Banks: RecordkeepiDg
and Termination of Correspondent Accounts for
Agencies note that part 103 already
requires verification of identity in
connection with many of these products
and services. See, e.8., 31 CFR 103.29
(purchases of bank checks and drafts,
cashier's checks, money orders, and
traveler's checks for $3000 or more); 31
CFR 103.33 (funds transfers of $3000 or
more).
In addition, the final rule codifies and
clarifies the "transfer exception." Under
the final rule, the definition of
Uaccount" excludes accounts that a
bank acquires through an acquisition,
merger, purchase of assets, or
assumption of liabilities from any third
party.8 Treasury and the Agencies note
that the Act provides that the
regulations shall require reasonable
procedures for "verifying the identity of
any person seeking to open an
account." Because these transfers are
not initiated by customers, these
accounts do not fall within the scope of
section 326.9
Treasury and the Agencies generally
agree with the view expressed by
commenters who suggested that a bank's
limited resources be focused on
relationships that pose a higher risk of
money laundering and terrorism.
Accordingly, the Agencies have
included an exception to the definition
of "account" for accounts opened for
the purpose of participating in an
employee benefit plan estabUshed
pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. These
accounts are less susceptible to use for
the financing of terrorism and money
laundering, because, among other
reasons, they are funded through payroll
deductions in connection with
employment plans that must comply
with Federal regulations which impose
various requirements regarding the
funding and withdrawal of funds from
relationship" in the fiDancial privacy rules apply
only to a couumer who baa a "continuiDg
relationship" with a bank. for example. in the form
of a deposit or investment account. or a loan. S66
.3(h) and (1) of 12 CFR part 40 (OCC); 12 CFR part
216 (Board); 12 CFR part 332 (FDIC); 12 CFR part
573 (OTS); and 12 CPR part 718 (NCUA).
• In many CU88, theee third parties are themselves
ufInancIallnstitutiooa" for purposes of the BSA.
Treasury anticipates that these third parties
ultimately will be subject to their own customer
identification rules implementing section 326 of the
Act in the event that they are not presently covered
by such a rule.
vNeverthelea, there may be situations involving
the transfer of aa:ount. where it would be
appropriate for a bank, u part of the customer due
diligence procedures required under existing
regulations requiring banb to have compliance
programa implementing the BSA (BSA compliance
prosrams), to verify the identity of customers
associated with accountl that it acquires from
aDother financial institution. Treasury and the
Agencies expect financial institutions to implement
reasonable p:roced\l1'8l to detect money laundering
in any account. however acquired.
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Treasury and the Agencies agree with
the view expressed by some
commenters that the statute should be
construed to ensure that banks design
procedures to determine the identity of
only those persons who open accounts.
Accordingly. the final rule defines a
Ucustomer" a8 U a person that opens 8
new account." 13 For example, in the
case of a trust account, the "customer"
would be the trost. For purposes of this
mle, a bank will not be required to look
through trust, escrow, or similar
accounts to verify the identities of
beneficiaries and instead will only be
required to verify the identity of the
named accountholder.14 In the case of
brokered deposits. the "customer" will
be the broker that opens the deposit
account. A bank will not need to look
through the deposit broker's account to
determine the identity of each
individual sub-account holder; it need
only verify the identity of the named'
accountholder.
Many commenters requested that the
final rule clarify whether "customer"
includes a minor child or an informal
group with a common interest, such as
a club account. where there is no legal
entity. The final rule addresses these
comments by providing that "customer"
means "an individual who opens a new
account for (1) an individual who lacks
legal capacity, such as a minor; or (2) an
entity that is not a legal person, such as
a civic club."
A few banks stated that defining
"customer" to include a signatory was
consistent with their current practice of
verifying the identity of the named
accountholder and any signatory on the
account. However. most commenters
strenuously objected to the inclusion of
a signatory 8S a customer whose identity
must be verified. and asserted that this
proposed requirement would deviate
significantly from their current business
practices. These commenters stated that
requiring banks to verify signatories on
an account would be enonnously
burdensome to the financial institutions
and signatories themselves-many of
whom simply work as employees for
finns with corporate accounts--and
13 Therefore, each person named on a joint
account 11 a ··cu.tom.... under this final role unless
otherwise provided.
'"However, baaed on a bank's risk assessment of
a new account op8lled by a customer that is not an
individual, a bank may need to tab additional
steps to verify the identity of the customer by
seeking infonnation about individuals with
ownership or control over the account in order to
identify the cullomer, 81 described in
§ 103.121{b)(2)(ii)(C), or may need to look through
the account in connection with the CUAtomer due
dlllgence procedur81 required under other
provisionl of its DBA compliance program.
would outweigh any benefit.15 One
commenter asserted that inclusion of
signatories as customers went beyond
the scope of section 326 of the Act.
Although some commenters advocated
that any requirement regarding a
signatory should be omitted altogether,
these commenters generally advocated a
risk-based approach that would give
banks the discretion to detennine when
a signatory's identity should be verified.
credit card banks, in particular, were
critical of the signatory requirement
because the proposed provision, as
drafted, encompassed all authorized
users of credit cards. These banks
characterized the signatory requirement
as unnecessary in the case of credit card
companies, which, they explained,
already use sophisticated fraud filters to
detect fraud and abnormal use. These
banks also noted that a person need not
be a signatory to use another person's
credit card, especially when purchasing
products by telephone or over the
Intemet. Therefore, the signatory
requirement would not necessarily
ensure that banks would be able to
verify the identity of those using a credit
card account.
After revisiting the issue of whether a
signatory should be a "customer,"
Treasury and the Agencies have
determined that requiring a bank to
expend its limited resources on
verifying the identity of all signatories
on accounts could interfere with the
bank's ability to focus on identifying
customers and accounts that present a
higher risk of not being properly
identified. Accordingly t the proposed
provision defining "customer" to
include a signatory on an account is
deleted. Instead. the final rule, at
§ 103.121(b)(2)(ii)(C), requires a bank's
CIP to address situations when the bank
11Commenters contended that banb and
individuals would confront numerous practical
problems. Some comment81'S noted, for example,
that the identification and verification of signatories
could be burdensome for banb because busiDeu
accounts misht have many sipatorle. and thOle
sisnatories would change over time. Some
commenten explained that collecting detailed
Information about an employee who 11 a lignatory
would raise privacy concerns for those employ..
who would be required to disclose personal
Information to their employer's financial
institutions. Other commenters .tated that a
signatory rarely is present at the time of account
opening and, consequently, a bank would
eDcounter substantial obstacles when attemptins to
verify the signatory's identity using any of the most
common .methods described in the proposal,
includiDg by examining documentJ or by obtalDln.g
a credit report. (Under the Fair Credit Rsportiq Ad
(FCRAl, a consWDer reporting agency generally may
furnish a consumer report in connection with
transactions involving the consumer and no other.
SINJ15 U.S.C.1681b. Thus, for example, a bank
would be prohibited from obtaining a credit report
to verify the identity ofan authorized user of a
customer's credit card.)
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will take additional steps to verify the
identity of a customer that is not an
individual by seeking information about
individuals with authority or control
over the account, including signatories,
in order to verify the customer's
identity.
In addition to defining who is a
"customer." the final role contains a list
of entities that will not be deemed
"customers.If Many commenters
questioned why a bank should be
required to verify the identity of a
government agency or instrumentality
opening a new account, or of a publicly-
traded company that is subject to SEC ,
reporting requirements. Consistent with
these and other comments urging that
the final role focus on requiring
verification of the identity of customers
that present 8 higher risk of not being
properly identified, the fmal rule
excludes from the definition of
"customer" the following readily
identifiable entities: a financial
institution regulated by a Federal
functional regulator; a bank regulated by
a state bank regulator: and governmental
agencies and instrumentalities. and
companies that are publicly traded
described in § 103.22(d)(2)(ii)-(iv).18
Section 103.22(d)(2)(iv) exempts such
companies only to the extent of their
domestic operations. Accordingly, a
bank's ClP will apply to any foreign
offices, affiliates, or subsidiaries of such
entities that open new accounts.
A great many commenters also
objected to the requirement in
§ 103.121(b)(2)(ii) of the proposed rule
that a bank verify the identity of an
existing customer seeking to open a new
account unless the bank previously
verified the customer's identity in
accordance with procedures consistent
with the proposed rule and continues to
have a reasonable belief that it knows
the true identity of the customer. These
commentsrs asserted that such a
requirement would be burdensome for
the bank and would upset existing
customers. Some commenters
recommended that the rule apply
prospectively to new customers who
previously had no account with the
bank. Many commenters suggested that
the final rule contain a risk-based
approach where verification would not
be required for an existing customer
who opens a new account if the bank
has a reasonable belief that it knows the
identity of the customer, regardless of
the procedures the bank followed to
fonn this beUef.
18 Treasury previously determined that banks
should be exempted from. having to file reports of
tranlactions in currency In connection with these
entities. SlIe 31 eFR 103.22(d)(t).
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Treasury and the Agencies
acknowledge that the proposed rule
might have had unintended
consequences for bank-eustomer
relationships and that the risk-based
approach suggested by commenters
would avoid these consequences.
Accordingly, the final rule excludes
from the definition of "customer" a
person that has an existing account with
the bank, provided that the bank has 8
reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of the person.11
Section 103.121(0)(4) Federal
functional regulator. The proposed rule
defined "Federal functional regulator"
by reference to § 103.120(a)(2), meaning
each of the Agencies, the SEC, and the
CFTC. There were no comments on this
definition, and Treasury and the
Agencies have adopted it as proposed.
Section 103.121(a)(5) Financial
institution. The final rule includes a
new definition for the tenn ufinancial
institution" that cross-references the
BSA, 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2) and (c)(l).
This is a more expansive definition of
"financial institution" than that in 31
CPR 103.11, and includes entities such
as futures commission merchants and
introducing brokers. .
Section 103.121(0)(6) Taxpayer
identification number. The proposed
rule repeated the language from
§ 103.34(a)(4), which states that the
provisions of section 6109 of the
Internal Revenue Code and the
regulations of the Internal Revenue
Service thereunder detennine what
constitutes I'a taxpayer identification
number." There were no comments on
this approach, and Treasury and the
Agencies have adopted it substantially
as proposed, with minor technical
modifications.
Section 103.121(0)(7) ~nd (8) U.S.
Person and non-U.S. person. The
proposed rule provided that "U.S.
person" is an individual who is a U.S.
citizen, or an entity established or
organized under the laws of a State or
the United States. A "non-U.S. person"
was defined 88 8 person who did not
satisfy either of these criteria.
As described in greater detail below,
a bank is generally required to· obtain a
U.S. taxpayer identification number
from a customer who opens a new
account. However, if the customer is a
non-U.S. person and does not have such
a number, the bank may obtain an
17As. foreign branch of an insured u.s. bank is
no longer a "bankll for purposes of this mIe. a
customer of a bank', foreign branch will no longer
be to. person who baa an existing account with the
bank.1I Therefore, the bank must verify the identity
of a customer of its foreign branch in accordance
with its CIP if .uch a cuatomer open' a new account
in the U.S.
identification number from some other
form of government-issued document
evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar
safeguard.
Several commenters suggested that it
would be less confusing to bankers if
"U.S. person" meant both a u.s. citizen
and a resident alien, consistent with the
definition of this term used in the
Intemal Revenue Code (IRS
definition).18 A few commenters
criticized the proposed definition
because it would require banks to
establish whether a customer is or is not
a U.S. citizen.
Treasury and the Agencies believe
that the proposed definition of "U.S.
person" is a better standard for purposes
of this final rule than the IRS definition.
Adoption of the IRS definition of "U.S.
person" would require bank staff to
distinguish among various tax and
immigration categories in connection
with any type of account that is opened.
Under the proposed definition, a bank
will not necessarily need to establish
whether a potential customer is a U.S.
citizen. The bank will have tp ask each
customer for a U.S. taxpayer
identification number (social security
number, employer identification
number, or individual taxpayer
identification number). Ifa customer
cannot provide one, the bank may then
accept alternative forms of
identification. For these reasons, the
definition is adopted as proposed.
Section 103.121(b) Customer
Identification Program: Minimum
Requirements
Section 103.121(b)(1) General Rule.
The proposed rule required each bank to
implement a CIP that is appropriate
given the bank's size, location, and type
of business. The proposed rule required
a bank's CIP to contain the statutorily
prescribed procedures, described these
procedures, and detailed certain
minimum elements that each of the
procedures must contain. In addition,
the proposed rule required that the CIP
be written and that it be approved by
the bank's board of directors or a
committee of the board.
The proposed rule also stated that the
CIP must be incorporated into the
bank's BSA t9 compliance program and
should not be a separate program. A
bank's BSA compliance program must
be written, approved by the board, and
noted in the bank's minutes. It must
include (1) internal policies,
procedures, and controls to ensure
ongoing compliance; (2) designation of
18 26 U.S.C. 7701(aK30)(A).
18 See footnote 10, supra.
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a compliance officer; (3) an ongoing
employee training program; and (4) an
independent audit function to test
programs. The preamble for the
proposal explained that the elP should
be incorporated into each of these four
elements of a bank's BSA pro~am.
Most commenters agreed WIth the
proposal's approach of allowing banks
to develop risk-based programs tailored
to their specific operation, though some .
of these commenters recommended that
Treasury and the Agencies adopt an
entirely risk-based approach without
any minimum requirements while
others recommended a more
prescriptive approach. Many
commenters suggested that Treasury
and the Agencies clarify the extent to
which a bank could rely on a third
party, especially an affiliate, to perform
some or all aspects of its CIP.
Other CODlJnenters focused on the
requirement that a bank's board of
directors approve the eIP. These
commenters urged Treasury and the
Agencies to adopt a regulation that
states that the role of a bank's board of
directors need only be to approve broad
policy rather than the specific methods
or actual procedures that will be a part
of a bank's CIP. One commenter
recommended that the governing body
of a financial institution be permitted to
delegate its responsibility to approve the
CIP.
The final rule attempts to strike an
appropriate balance between flexibility
and detailed guidance by allowing a
bank broad latitude to design and
implement a CIP that is tailored to its
particular business practices while
providing a framework of minimum
standards for identifying each customer,
as the Act mandates. Following the
description of the procedures and
minimum requirements for each
element of a bank's CIP (identity
verification, recordkeeping, comparison
with government lists, and customer
notice), the final rule contains a new
section describing the extent to which a
bank may rely on a third party to
perfonn these elements, described in
detail below.
The final rule removes the
requirement that the bank's board of
directors or a committee of the board
must approve the bank'sCIP because
this requirement is redundant. A bank's
BSA compliance program must already
be approved by the board. Treasury and
the Agencies regard the addition of a
CIP to the bank's BSA compliance
program to be a material change in the
BSA compliance program that will
require board app~val.The board of
director's responsibility to oversee bank
compliance with section 326 of the Act
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is a part of a board's conventional The final rule provides that a bank's
supervisory BSA compliance . CIP must include risk·based procedures
responsibilities that cannot be delegated for verifying the identity of each
to bank management. Therefore, a customer 22 to the extent reasonable and
bank's board of directors must be practicable. The final rule also states
responsible for aprroving a eIP that the procedures must enable the
described in detai sufficient for the bank to form a reasonable belief that it
board to detennine that (1) the bank's knoWs the true identity of the customer.
elF contains the minimum requirements As section 326 of the Act states, a bank's
of this final rule; and (2) the bank's affirmative obligation to verify the
identity verification procedures are identity of its customer applies to •'any
designed to enable the bank to fonn a person" rather than only to a person
reasonable belief that it knows the true whose identity is suspect. as suggested
identity of the customer. Nevertheless. by one commenter. Furthermore,
responsibility for the development, Treasury and the Agencies have
implementation, and day-ta-day determined that the statutory obligation
administration of the CIP may be to "verify the identity of any person"
del~atedto bank management. requires the bank to implement and
Tile final rule will apply to soma non- . follow procedures that allow the bank to
Federally regulated banks that are not have a reasonable belief that it knows
yet subject to an anti-money laundering the tnIe identity of the customer.
compliance program requirement.20 Given the flexibility built into the
Therefore, the final role only requin:s final rule, Treasury and the Agencies
that the elF be ~ part of a bank's antI.. believe that it is not appropriate to
money laun~enngprogram once a bank provide special treatment for new
becomes subject t~ an anti-money customers known to bank personnel. In
laundering compliance program addition permitting reliance on bank
requirement 21 '1 th "d · fS ti 103 121'b)(.2) ld t·ty personna to attest to. e I entity 0 a
t;C OJ'! • l' 'I J en 1 customer may be· subject to
Verificati~n Procedures. The proposed manipulation. Accordingly, the final
role proVl~ed that each bank must have role does not establish different rules for
a CIP ~at mc~udes procedures for customers who are known to bank
verifyIng the Identity of each customer, personnel
to the extent reaso~bleand practicable, The ftn~l role requires the identity
ba~ o~ the bank s assessment of verification procedures to be based
cert81n nsks. The proposed rule stated upon relevant risks including tho e
that these procedures must enable the ad b th ' f S
bank to form a reasonable belief that it pre~en~ y e types 0 acco~ts
knows the true identity of the customer. mamtalned by th:e bank, the vanous
Some commenters recommended that methods of openIng accounts pro~d~d
the identity verification requirement be ~y the b~nk, an~ the types of.i~entlfylng
waived for new customers that are well Inform~tlonavadable; In additio~ to
known to a senior officer of the bank these nsk factors, which are specIfically
Some of these commenters endorsed· identified in section 326, the final rule
such a waiver provided that a bank ~tates that the proced';U"~should ~ake
employee could provide U an affidavit of Into account th~ bank s SlZe, location,
identity" on behalf of the customer. and.~e ofbusiness or.custo~erbase,
One commenter criticized the additional factors mentioned m the
standard requiring a bank to have Act's l~islativehistory.~3
identity verification procedures "that Section 103.121(b)(2)(i) Customer
enable the bank to form a reasonable Infonnation Required. The proposed
belief that it knows the true identity of role ~uired that a bank's CIP must
the customer" as too subjective. This contain procedures that specify the
commenter suggested that a better iden~ifying information the bank must
standard would be lack of affirmative obtain from a customer. It stated that. at
notice of deficiency in the identity a minimum, a bank must obtain from
process. Another commenter suggested each customer the following
that the rule make clear that a bank is information prior to opening an
only required to verify a customer's account: (1) Name; (2) address (a
identity, to the extent reasonable and residential and mailing address for
practical, in order to establish that it has individuals, and principal place of
a reasonable basis for knowing the true business and mailing address for a
identity 01 its customer. person other than an individual); (3)
20 See footnote 10, supra.
21 The 6nal rule therefore provides that until such
time 88 credit unions, private banb, and trust
compani. without a Federal functional regulator
are lubject to such a program, their ClPa must be
approved by their boudt of directora.
22 Other elements of the bank's CIPf such u
procedures for recordkeeping or checking of
government lists, are requirements that may not
vary depending OD risk factor•.
23 H.&. Rep. No. 107-250, pt. 1, at 82 and 63
(2001).
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date of birth for individuals; and (4) an
identification number I
Treasury and the Agencies received a
variety of comments criticizing the
requirement that a bank obtain certain
minimum identifying information prior
to opening an account. Some
commenters, including a trade
association representing large financial
institutions, recommended that a bank
be permitted to open an account for a
customer who lacks some of the
minimum identifying information,
provided that the bank has formed a
reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of the customer. Credit card
banks explained that the minimum
information requirement would create
problems for retailers that offer credit
cards at the point of sale. These
commentels stated that retailers were
not likely to have the means to record
identifying information other than what
is currently collected. They suggested
that when there are systems in place to
identify customers and detect
suspicious transactions, the rule should
require only the collection of
information that the credit card bank or
card issuer deems necessary and
appr!lpriate to identify the customer.
Other commenters stated that the role
should not require a bank to obtain the
minimum identifying infonnation prior
to account opening in every instance.
Some of these commenters suggested
that a bank be permitted to obtain the
required information within a
reasonable time after the account is
opened. Some CODUDenters suggested
that the rule permit banks to obtain
identifying information &om a party
other than the customer. This would
arise, for example, when a bank offers
a credit card based on information
obtained &om a credit reporting agency.
Other commenters suggested that a bank
also be required to obtain information
about a customer's occupation,
profession or business, as this
information is needed by a bank that
intends to me a report of transactions in
currency or a suspicious activities
report on the customer.
Consistent with the proposal, the final
rule provides that a bank's CIP must
contain procedures that specify the'
identifying information that the bank
must obtain from each customer prior to
opening an account. In addition, the
rule specifies the four basic categories of
information that a bank must obtain
from the customer prior to opening an
account. Treasury and the Agencies
believe that requiring banks to gather
these standard forms of information
prior to opening an account is not
overly burdensome because such
identifying information is routinely
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gathered by most banks in the account
opening process and is required by
other sections of 31 CPR part 103. Of
course, based upon an assessment of the
risks descri~ above, a bank may
require a customer to provide additional
information to establish the customer's
identity.
Treasury and the Agencies
acknowledge that imposing this
requirement on banks that offer credit
card accounts is likely to alter the
manner in which they do business by
requiring them to gather additional
information beyond that which they
currently obtain directly from a
customer who opens an account at the
point of sale or by telephone. Treasury
and the Agencies are mindful of the
legislative history of section 326, which
indicates that Congress expected the
regulations implementing this section to
be appropriately tailored for accounts
opened in situations where the account
holder is not physically present at the
financial institution and that the
regulations should not impose
requirements that are burdensome,
prohibitively expensive, or
im~ractical.24
Therefore, Treasury and the Agencies
have included an exception in the final
rule for credit card accounts only,
which would allow a bank broader
latitude to obtain some information
from the customer opening a credit card
account. and the remaining information
from a third party source, such as a
credit reporting agency, prior to
extending credit to a customer. Treasury
and the Agencies recognize that these
practices have produced an efficient and
effective means of extending credit with
little risk that the lender does not know
the identity of the borrower.
Treasury and the Agencies also
received comments on the advisability
of requiring banks to collect the specific
identifying information (name, date of
birth, address, and identification
number), as would have been required
under the proposed mle. With respect to
obtaining the customer's name, one
commenter recommended that based on
Texas law and banks' experience. a bank
should be required to obtain the name
under which the customer is doing
business and the customer's legal name.
The final rule continues to require that
the bank obtain the customer's name,
meaning a legal name that can be
verified. As noted above, this is a
minimum requirement, and a bank may
also need to obtain the name under
which a person does business in order
to establish a reasonable belief it knows
the true identity of the customer.
Z6H.R. Rep. No. 107-250. pte 1. at 63 (2001).
One trade association suggested that
banks be permitted to make a risk-based
determination before requiring a
customer to provide date of birth
because many customers would prefer
not to share this information. One
commenter stated that date ofbirth is
not an important identifying
characteristic and should be deleted.
Another commenter stated that credit
card issuers do not request this
information because it can raise fair
lending issues. Finally, a few
commenters noted that standardized
mortgage applications require age rather
than date of birth and would have to be
altered. .
The final rule provides that a bank
must obtain the date of birth for a
customer who is an individual. Treasury
and the Agencies believe that date of
birth is an important identifying ,
characteristic and can be used to
provide a bank or law enforcement with
an additional means to distinguish
between customers with identical
names. However, the required collection
and retention of information about a
customer's date of birth does not relieve
the bank from its obligations to comply
with anti-discrimination laws or
regulations, such as the prohibition In
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
against discrimination in any aspect of
a credit transaction on the basis of age
or other prohibited classification. Banks
collecting date of birth from individual
customers should be able to take
reasonable measures to convert this
information into age for purposes of the
fonns used in the secondary mortgage
market given the delayed compliance
date for the fmal rule.
Many commenters criticized the
requirement that a bank obtain both the
customer's physical and mailing
address, if different. Most commenters
urged Treasury and the Agencies to
eliminate the requirement that the
customer provide a physical address.
Some of these commenters stated that
this requirement could interfere with
the ability of certain segments of the
population to obtain a bank account,
such as members of the military,
persons who reside in mobile homes
with no fixed address, and truck drivers
who do not have a physical address.
Banks that offer credit card accounts
and card issuers stated that the address
requirement would be extremely
burdensome because they would have to
change the manner in which they do
business, and in some cases, credit card
banks currently do not have the capacity
to collect both addresses. Some of these
commenters stated that new credit card
customers are reluctant to give more
than one address and, therefore, it
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would be difficult to obtain this
information from customers. A trade
association representing credit card
banks asserted that customers may have
a legitimate reason for handling
correspondence through post office
boxes and should not have to provide a
physical address. This commenter
asserted that requiring the customer to
provide a physical address will
discourage the provision of financial
services to the unbanked and will
prevent a victim of identity theft from
using an alternative to an unsecured
home mailbox. Another commenter
noted that the physical address of a
cnstomeJ::s principal place of business
may not be relevant if the bank is
working with a customer's local office.
This commenter recommended that the
role simply permit the bank to obtain
the customer's street address. Credit
card banks and issuers urged Treasury
and the Agencies to make the
requirement that a bank obtain the
customer's physical address optional.
Section 326 of the Act requires
Treasury and the Agencies to prescribe
regulations that require financial
institutions to implement "reasonable
procedures." Accordingly, under the
final rule, a bank will not be required
to obtain more than a single address for
a customer. Nonetheless, Treasury and
the Agencies believe that the
identification. verification, and
recordkeeping provisions·of the Act,
taken together, should provide
appropriate resources for law
enforcement agencies to investigate
money laundering and terrorist
financing. The final rule therefore
provides that a bank generally must
obtain a residential or business street
address for a customer who is an
individual because Treasury and the
Agencies have determined that law
enforcement agencies should be able to
contact an individual customer at a
physical location, rather than solely
through a mailing address. Treasury and
the Agencies recognize that this
provision may be impracticable for
members of the military who cannot
readily provide a physical address, and
other individuals who do not have a
physical address but who reliably can
be contacted. Accordingly, the final rule
provides an exception under these
circumstances that allows a bank to
obtain an Army Post Office or Fleet Post
Office box number, or the residential or
business street address of next of kin or
of another contact individual. For a
customer other than an individual, such
as a corporation. partnership, or trust,
the bank may obtain the address of the
principal place of business, local office,
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or other physical location of the
customer. Of course, a bank is free to
obtain additional addresses from the
customer, such as the customer's
mailing address, to meet its own or its
customer's business needs.
The proposal required that banks
obtain an identification number from
customers. For U.S. persons, a bank
would have been required to obtain a
U.S. taxpayer identification number. For
non-U.S. persons, a bank would have
been required to obtain a number from
various alternative forms of government-
issued identification.
One commenter stated that this
requirement would not be burdensome.
Commenters representing certain
consumer advocacy groups commended
Treasury and the Agencies for providing
banks with the discretion to accept
alternative forms of identifying
information from non-U.S. citizens.
These commenters stated that this
position would assist low-income
immigrants in gaining fmancial
stability. By contrast, some commenters
stated that the final rule should not
permit a bank to open an account for a
customer using only a foreign
identification number when the
customer provides a U.S. address. Other
commenters asked for guidance on
whether a bank is pennitted to accept a
number from the identification
document issued by a foreign
government. A few commenters urged
the government to require a national
identification document for all
individuals.
Other commenters, primarily credit
card banks, stated that the requirement
that a bank obtain a u.s. taxpayer
identification number from U.S. persons
would create considerable hardship.
They stated that new credit card
customers are reluctant to give out their
social security numbers, especially over
the telephone. They urged that banks be
given the discretion to collect
identifying information, other than
social security numbers, when
appropriate in light of consumer privacy
and security concerns. In the .
alternative, they recommended that
banks be permitted to obtain a U.S.
taxpayer identification number for U.S.
persons from a trusted third party
source. such as a credit reporting
agency.
Some commenters questioned what
number to use for accounts opened in
the name of a bowling league or class
reunion, or to accept donations for a
special cause. Other commenters
questioned what number could be
obtained from foreign businesses and
enterprises that have no taxpayer
identification number or other
government-issued documentation.
The final rule provides that a bank
must obtain an •'identification number"
from every customer. As discussed
above, under the definition of
•'customer," the final role permits a
bank to obtain the identification number
of the individual who opens an account
in the name of an individual who lacks
legal capacity, such as a minor, or a
civic group, such as a bowling league.
After reviewing the comments,
Treasury and the Agencies have
determined that requiring a bank to
obtain a customer's identification
number, such as a social security
number, from the customer himself or
herself, in every case, including over the
telephone, would be unreasonable and
impracticable because it would be
contrary to banks' current practices and
could alienate many potential
customers. Accordingly, Treasury and
the Agencies have adopted an exception
for credit card accounts that will permit
a bank offering such accounts to acquire
information about the customer,
including an identification number,
from a trusted third party source prior
to extending credit to the customer,
rather than having to obtain this
information directly from the customer
prior to opening an account.
The final rule also provides that for a
non-U.S. person, a bank must obtain one
or more of the following: A taxpayer
identification number (social security
number, individual taxpayer
identification number, or employer
identification number); passport number
and colintry of issuance; alien
identification card number; or number
and country of issuance of any other
government-issued document
evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar
safeguard. This standard provides a
bank with some flexibility to choose
among a variety of identification
numbers that it may accept from a non-
U.S. person.25 However, the identifying
information the bank accepts must
permit the bank to establish a
reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of the customer.
Treasury and the Agencies emphasize
that the final role neither endorses nor
prohibits bank acceptance of
information from particular types of
.identification documents issued by
foreign governments. A bank must
decide for itself, based upon appropriate
ZSThe rule provide. this flexibility became there
Is no uniform identification number that non-U.S.
pe1'IOU would be able to provide to a bank. See
Treasury Department, U A Report to Congress in
Accordance with Section 326(b) of the USA
PATRIOT Ad," October 21, 2002.
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risk factors, including those discussed
above (the types of accounts maintained
by the bank, the various methods of
opening accounts provided by the bank,
the other types of identifying
information available, and the bank's
size, location, and customer base),
whether the infonnation presented by a
customer is reliable.
Treasury and the Agencies recognize
that a foreign business or enterprise may
not have a taxpayer identification
number or any other number from a
government-issued document
evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar
safeguard. Therefore, the final role notes
that when opening an account for such
a customer, the bank must request
altemative government-issued
documentation certifying the existence
of the business or enterprise.
The proposal also contained a limited
exception to the requirement that a bank
obtain a taxpayer identification number
from a customer opening a new account.
The exception permitted a bank to open
an account for a person other than an
individual (such as a corporation,
partnership. or trust) that has applied
for, but has not received, an employer
identification number (EIN), provided
that the bank obtains. a copy of the
application before it opens the account
and obtains the EIN within a reasonable
period of time after the account is
established. The preamble for the
proposed rule explained that this
exception was included for a new
business that might need access to
banking services, particularly a bank
account or fin extension of credit, before
it has received an EIN from the Internal
Revenue Service.
Some commenters questioned this
limited exception for certain businesses.
A few commenters suggested expanding
the exception to include individuals
who have applied for, but have not yet
received a taxpayer identification
number. Another commenter stated that
the exception provided no added benefit
and would add to a bank's
recordkeeping and monitoring burden.
Treasury and the Agencies have
determined that a bank should be
afforded more flexibility in situations
where a person, including an
individual, has applied for, but has not
yet received, a taxpayer identification
number. Therefore, the final rule states
that instead of obtaining a taxpayer
identification number from a customer
prior to opening an account, the CIP
may include procedures for opening an
account for 8 customer (including an
individual) that has applied for, but has
not received, a taxpayer identification
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number.28 To lessen the recordkeeping
burden for a bank that elects to use this
exception, the final rule also provides
that the bank's CIP need only include
procedures requiring the bank to
confirm that the application was filed
before the customer opens the account
and to obtain the taxpayer identification
number within a reasonable period of
time after the account is opened. Thus,
a bank will be able to exercise its
discretion 21 to determine how to
confinn that a customer has filed an
application for a taxpayer identification
number rather than having to keep a
copy of the application on file.
Section 103.121(b)(2)(ii) Customer
Verification. The proposed rule
provided that the ClP must contain risk-
based procedures for verifying the
information that the bank obtains in
accordance with § 103.121(b)(2)(i),
within a reasonable period of tim~ after
the account is opened.28 The proposed
rule also described when a bank is
required to verify the identity of existing
customers.
Several commenters asked Treasury
and the Agendes to underscore that
these verification procedures may be
risk-based by Doting that a bank may
verify less than all of the identifying
information provided by the customer,
Many commenters noted that there is
currently no reliable. efficient, or
effective means of verifying a customer's
social security number. Some of these
commentelS asked the government to
establish a method that would permit
banks to establish the authenticity and
accuracy of a customer's name and
taxpayer identification number.
Treasury and the Agencies recognize
that there currently is no method that
would pennit a bank to verify, for
example, a taxpayer identification,
passport or alien identification number
through an official source. Accordingly,
the final rule provides that a bank's CIP
must contain procedures for verifying
the identity of the customer, "using the
281'hia position 18 aual080ua to that in regulations
issued by the loternal Revenue Service (IRS)
concemiDg "awaiting-TIN (taxpayer identification
number] certificates." The IRS permits a taxpayer
to furnish an "awaiting-TIN certificate" in lieu of
a taxpayer identification number to exempt the
taxpayer from the withholding of taxes owed on
reportable payments (i.e., interest and dividends)
on certain accounts. See 26 CFR 31.3406{g)-3.
27 For example, the bank may wish to examine a
copy of the application filed.
28The preamble for the proposed rule noted that,
although an aca>unt may be opened, it is common
practice among banks to place limits on the
account, such as by relbictiDg the Dumber of
transactioDs or the dollar value of trlDsaetions,
until a customer's identity is venDed. Therefore, the
proposed regulatiOD provlded the bank with the
Bexibility to use a risk-bued approach to determine
how IOOD identity mUlt be verified.
information obtained in accordance
with; paragraph (b)(2)(i}," namely, the
identifying information obtained by the
banlc.. Thus, a bank need not establish
the accuracy of every element of
identifying information obtained but
must do so for enough information to
form a reasonable belief it knows the
true identity of the customer.
Some commenters stated that they
appreciated the flexibility of the
proposal permitting an institution to
determine how soon identity must be
verified. Other commenters asked
Treasury and the Agencies to clarify
what is a "reasonable period of time."
As stated in the preamble for the
proposal, Treasury and the Agencies
believe that the amount of time it will
take an institution to verify a customer's
identity may depend upon various
factors, such as the type of account
opened, whether the customer is
physically present when the account is
opened, and the type of identifying
information available. For the same
reasons, the final rule provides banks
with the flexibility necessary to
accommodate a wide range of situations
by stating that the bank must verify the
identifying information within a
reasonable time after the account is
opened.29
As discussed above in the definition
section, many commenters criticized the
proposed approach regarding
verification of existing customers that .
open new accounts. The final rule
addresses these concerns by modifying
the definition of "customer" to exclude
a person who has an existing account
with the bank if the bank has a
reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of the person.
Many commenters urged that the final
role continue to allow, but not mandate.
documentary verification. A few
commenters requested that the fmal rule
provide additional guidance on
verification. Some commenters asked
that the final rule clarify that a bank
may choose to use only documentary
methods and may refuse to open an
account using other methods.
The final rule addresses these
comments by stating that a bank's CIP's
verification procedures must describe
when the bank will use documents,
non-documentary methods, or a
combination of both methods to verify
a customer's ide~tity.
2VIt is possible that a bank would, however,
violate other laws by permitting a cUitomer to
transact bUlm8S1 prior to verifyiq the customer's
identity. See, I1.B., 31 CFR part 500 (regulations of
Treaaury's Office of Foreign Alaet Control (OFAe)
prohibiting transactions involving designated
foreip countries or their nationals).
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Section 103.121(b)(2)(ii)(A)
Verification Through Documents. The
proposed rule provided that the CIP
must contain procedures describing
when the bank will verify identity
through documents and setting forth the
documents that the bank will use for
this purpose. It then gave examples of
documents that could be used to verify
the identity of individuals and other
persons such as corporations,
partnerships, and trusts.
Most commenters noted that banks do
not have the means to authenticate or
validate documents prOVided by their
customers and urged Treasury and the
Agencies to clarify that document
authe~ticationis not a CIP requirement.
Treasury and the Agencies wish to
confirm that once a bank has obtained
and verified the identity of the customer
through a document such as a driver's
license or passport, the bank will not be
required to take steps to determine
whether the document has been validly
issued. A bank generally may rely on
government-issued identification as
verification of a customer's identity;
however, if a document shows obvious
indications of fraud, the bank must
consider that factor in determining
whether it can form a reasonable belief
that it knows the customer's true
identity.
Some commenters also asked that
Treasury and the Agencies provide more
examples and discuss appropriate types
of documentary identification in the
final rule or in separate guidance that
banks may easily access. Commenters
asked whether a utility bill, or library
card addressed to the same physical
address and name of the person seeking
the account, or a foreign identification
card, such 88 a foreign voter registration
card or driver's license, would be
acceptable. Some comnienters
questioned whether copies of
documents would suffice.
Given the recent increases in identity
theft and the availability of fraudulent
documents, Treasury and the Agencies
agree with a commenter who suggested
that the value of documentary
verification is enhanced by redundancy.
The rule gives examples of types of
documents that are considered reliable.
However, a bank is encouraged to obtain
more than one type of documentary
verification to ensure that it has a
reasonable belief that it knows the
customer's true identity. Moreover,
banks are encouraged to use a variety of
methods to verify the identity of a
customer, especially when the bank
does not have the ability to examine
original documents.
The final mle attempts to ~trike the
appropriate balance between the
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benefits of requiring additional
documentary verification and the
burdens that may arise from such a
requirement by providing that a bank's
CIP must state the documents that a
bank will use. This will require each
bank to conduct its own risk-based
analysis of the types of documents it
believes will enatile it to know the true
identity of its customers.
The final rule continues to provide an
illustrative list of identification
documents. For an individual, these
may include an unexpired government-
issued identification evidencing
nationality or residence and bearing a
photograph or similar safeguard, such as
a driver's license or passport. For a
person other than an individual, these
may include documents showing the
existence of the entity, such as certified
articles of incorporation, a government-
issued business license, a partnership
agreement, or a trust instrument.
Some commenters questioned
whether the examples of identification
documents given for persons other than
individuals would be reliable. One
commenter questioned whether trust
·documents alone would be sufficient
verification of identity. Another
commenter suggested allowing banks to
rely on a certification by the tnIstee, or
an appropriate legal opinion, rather than
the trust instrument to verify the
existence of a trust. Someone else
suggested that banks should be allowed
to rely on documentation consisting of
evidence that a business is either
publicly traded or is authorized to do
business in a state or the United States.
The examples provided in the final
rule were intended only to illustrate the
documents a bank might use to verify
the identity of a customer that is a
corporation. partnership, or trust. A
bank may use other documents.
provided that they allow the bank to
establish that it has a reasonable belief
that it knows the true identity of its
customer. Accordingly. the final role
makes no significant changes to the
examples.
Section 103.121(b)(2)(ii)(B) Non·
Documentazy Verification. Recognizing
that some accounts are opened by
telephone, by mail, and over the
Internet. the proposed rule provided
that a bank's CIP also must contain
procedures describing what non-
documentary methods the bank will use
to verify identity and when the bank
will use these methods (whether in
addition to, ~r instead of, relying on
documents). The preamble for the
proposed rule also noted that even if the
customer presents identification
documents, it may be appropriate to use
non-documentary methods as well.
The proposed rule gave examples of
non-documentary verification methods
that a bank may use, including
contacting a customer after the account
is opened; obtaining a financial
statement; comparing the identifying
information prOVided by the customer
against fraud and bad check databases to
determine whether any of the
information is associated with known
incidents of fraudulent behavior
(negative verification); comparing the
identifying information with
information available from a trusted
third party source, such as a credit
report from a consumer reporting
agency (positive verification); and
checking references with other financial
institutions. The preamble for the
proposed rule stated that a bank also
may wish to analyze whether there is
logical consistency between the
identifying information provided, such
as the customer's name, street address,
ZIP code, telephone number, date of
birth, and social security number
(logJcal verification). .
The proposal required that the
procedures address situations where an
individual, such as an elderly person,
legitimately is unable to present an
unexpired government-issued
identification document that bears a
photograph or similar safeguard; the
bank is not familiar with the documents
presented; the account is opened
without obtaining documents; the
account is not opened in a face-ta-face
transaction, for example over the phone,
by mail, or through the Internet; and the
type of account increases the risk that
the bank. will not be able to verify the
true identity of the customer through
documents.
Several commenters asked for
additional guidance regarding when
non-documentary verification methods
should be used in addition to
documentary verification methods and
the circumstances in which only one or
all of the non-documentary verification
methods listed are necessary.
Commenters also asked for guidance on
audit methodology, and an explanation
of the due diligence required for
verification of accounts opened by
telephone, mail, and through the
Internet. A few commenters suggested
that reference to verification, where a
bank compares information provided by
the customer with information from
trusted third party sources, be expressly
mentioned in the final rule.
As the large number of comments on
this section illustrates. 8 rule that
attempted to address every scenario and
combination of risk-factors that a bank
might confront would be extremely
complex and invariably would fail to
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address many situations. Rather than
adopt a lengthy and potentially
unwieldy rule that still would not
address every situation, Treasury and
the Agencies have concluded that it
would be more effective to adopt
general principles that are fleshed out
through examples. Therefore, the final
mle states that for a bank relying on
non-documentary verification methods,
the CIP must contain procedures that
describe the non-documentary methods
the bank will use.
The final rule fenerally retains the
illustrative list 0 non-documentary
methods contained in the proposal.
Treasury and the Agencies have
clarified that one method is
uindependently verifying the customer's
identity through the comparison of
information provided by the customer
with information obtained from a
consumer reporting agency, public
database, or other somes," rather than
verifying Ifdocumentary information"
thro~ such sources.
The final rule also retains the variety
of situations that the procedures must
address that were identified in the
proposal, with the following two
changes. First, because Utransaction" is
a dermed term in 31 eFR part 103,
instead of using the term uface-to-face
transaction," the final role states that
the procedures must address the
situation where a customer opens an
account without appearing in person at
the bank. Second, the final clause of this
provision provides that the eIP must
include procedures to address situations
where the bank is otherwise presented
with circumstances that increase the
risk that the bank will be unable to
verify the true identity of a customer
through documents. This clause
acknowledges that there may be
circumstances beyond those specifically
desaibed in this provision when a bank
should use non-documentary
verification procedures.
As stated m the preamble for the
proposed rule, because identification
documents may be obtained illegally
and may be fraudulent, and in light of
the recent increase in identity theft.
Treasury and the Agencies encourage
banks to use non-documentary methods
even when the customer has provided
identification documents.
Section 103.121(b)(2)(ii)(Cj Additional
Verification for Certain Customers. As
described above, the proposecJ, rule
required the identification and
verification of each signatory for an
account. Most commenters objected to
this requirement as overly burdensome.
and. upon consideration of the points
raised by the commenters. Treasury and
the Agencies agree that it is appropriate
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to delete it. For the. reasons discussed
below, however, the mle does require
that a bank's CIP address the
circumstances in which it will obtain
information about such individuals in
order to verify the customer's identity.
Treasury and the Agencies believe that
while the majority of customers may be
verified adequately through the
documentary or non.documentary
verification methods described in
paragraphs (b)(2)(ii)(A) and (B), there
may be instances where this is not
possible. The risk that the bank will not
know the customer's true identity may
be heightened for certain types of
accounts, such as an account opened in
the name of a corporation. partnership,
or trust that is created or conducts
substantial business in a jurisdiction
that has been designated by the United
States as a primary money laundering
concern or has been designated as non-
cooperative by an international body.
Obtaining sufficient information to
verify a customer's identity can reduce
the risk that a bank will be used as a
conduit for, money laundering and
terrorist financing. Treasury and the
Agencies believe that a bank must
identify customers that pose a
heightened risk of not being properly
identified, and a bank's CIP must
prescribe additional measures that may
be used to obtain information about the
identity of the individuals associated
with the entity in whose name such an
account is opened when standard
documentary and non-documentary
methods prove to be insufficient.
For these reasons, the requirement to
verify the identity of signatories has
been replaced by a new provision in the
final role that requires that 8 bank's elF
address situations where, based on the
bank's risk assessment of a new account
opened by a customer that is not an
individual, the bank also will obtain
information about individuals with
authority or control over such account,
including signatories, in order to verify
the customer's identity. This additional
verification method will only apply
when the bank cannot adequately verify
the customer's identity using the
documentary and non-documentary
verification methods described in
(b)(2)(ii)(A) and (B). Moreover, a bank
need not undertake any additional
·verification if it chooses not to open an
account when it cannot verify the
,customer's identity using standard
documentary and non-documentary
verification methods.
Section 103.121(b)(2)(iii) Lack of
Verification. The proposed role stated
that a bank's CIP must include
procedures for responding to
circumstances in which the bank cannot
form a reasonable belief that it knows
the true identity of a customer. The
preamble for the proposed role listed
what these procedures should include.
In addition, the proposal stated that a
bank should only maintain an account
for a customer when it can form a
reasonable belief that it knows the
customer's true identity.30
The final rule retains the general
requirement that a bank's CIP include
procedures for responding to
circumstances in which the bank cannot
form a reasonable belief that it knows
the true identity of the customer.
However, the rule text itself now states
that the procedures should describe the
following: when a bank should not open
an account for a potential customer; the
terms under which a customer may use
an account while the bank attempts to
verify the customer's identity; when the
bank should close an account after
attempts to verify a customer's identity
have failed; and when the bank should
file a Suspicious Activity Report in
accordance with applicable law and
reRU1ation.
'One commenter stated that requiring
a bank to close an account if it cannot
verify a customer's identity would
conflict with state laws and would
subject the bank to legal liability. The
commenter urged that if this provision
is retained. the final rule also should
shield banks from state regulatory and
borrower liability in these
circumstances. Other commenters asked
that Treasury and the Agencies clarify
that further investigation that results in
failure to open an account will not
trigger adverse action requirements
under the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.
or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq.
The final rule does not specifically
require a bank to close the account of a
customer whose identity the bank
cannot verify, but instead leaves this
determination to the discretion of the
bank. Treasury and the Agencies have
determined that there is no statutory
basis to create a safe harbor that would
shield banks from state regulatory or
borrower liability if 8 bank should
choose to close a customer's account.
Any such closure should be consistent
with the bank's existing procedures for
closing accounts in accordance with its
risk management practices. Treasury
and the Agencies also note that a bank
must comply with other applicable laws
and regulations, such as the adverse
so The preamble also explained that there are
80me exceptions to this basic mIe. For example, a
baDk may maintain an account at the direction of
a law enforcement or intelligeDCe agency, even
though the bank does not know the true identity of
the customer.
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action provisions under ECOA and the
FCRA, when determining not to open an
account because it cannot establish a
reasonable belief that it knows the true
identity of the customer.31
Section 103.121(b)(3) Recordkeeping
Section 103.121(b)(3)(i) Required
Records. The proposed rule set forth
recordkeeping procedures that must be
included in a bank's CIP. Under the .
proposal, a bank would have been
required to maintain a record of the
identifying information provided by the
customer. Where a bank relies upon a
document to verify identity, the
proposal would have required the bank
to maintain a copy of the document that
the bank relied on that clearly evidences
the type of document and any
identifying information it may contain.
The bank also would have been reqUired
to record the methods and result of any
additional measures undertaken to
verify the identity of the customer. Last,
the bank would have been required to
record the resolution of any discrepancy
in the identifying information obtained.
This section of the proposed rule
prompted the most comment. Though
one commenter felt that the
recordkeeping requirements in the
proposed rule were weak, almost all
other commenters identified the
proposed documentation and record
retention requirements as overly
burdensome. Commenters urged
Treasury and the Agencies to permit a
bank to record the information from the
documents obtained rather than
requiring banks to maintain copies of
these documents for the life of the
account. Commenters generally argued
that it would be difficult and very
burdensome to store and retrieve copies
of documents used to verify the identity
of the customer. In addition, some
commenters noted that many kinds of
identification documents, particularly
some new driver·s licenses, have
security features that prevent them from
being copied legibly. Other commenters
stated that copies of documents would
be difficult to safeguard and could
facilitate identity theft.
Commenters stated that requiring
banks to keep copies of documents
would substantially deviate from
current banking practice and would
violate certain states' laws. Banks
offering credit card accounts through
retailers, who require the customer to
31 See 12 CFR 202.9{b) (Federal Reserve
Regulation B that presaibes the form of ECOA
notice and statement of IpecifiC reasons); 15 U.S.C.
1681m (FCRA provision that provides for duties of
uaen lakin! adverse actions on the basis of
information contained in coDlUJD8r reports &om
other third partie. or affiliates).
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provide identifying documents at the
point of sale, strenuously opposed this
requirement if it were interpreted to
cover documents presented to the
merchant. These commenters stated that
copy machines are not usually available
at the point of sale, and that the rule as
proposed would require merchants to
purchase large numbers of additional
copy machines. The commenters also
anticipated that consumers would be
greatly inconvenienced by this
requirement and might have to endure
lengthy waits during any busy shopping
seaSOD. These commenters questioned
whether the risks of money-laundering
and the financing of terrorism through
retail store credit cards, which generally
have relatively low credit limits,
restrictions on pre-payment, and other
features to detect fraud, warrant the
imp~8itionof these additional costs.
Other commenters stated that
requiring bimks to keep copies of
documents that have pictures, such as
driver's licenses. could expose the bank
to allegations of unlawful
discrimination. even if the retention of
this information were not prohibited
under ECOA. Some banks objected to
this requirement on the grounds that it
directly conflicted with the position that
the Agencies have traditionally taken on
this issue, including the criticism of
banks that have retained such
information in their files when
extending credit.
Other commenters asked that a bank
be permitted to record the processes and
procedures generally used for
verification rather than being required
to keep records of the methods used and
the resolution for each and every
account, especially where the bank uses
standardized procedures for all
customers and could demonstrate that
these procedures were applied. Some
commenters suggested that the final role
permit banks to use a risk-based
approach for recordkeeping.
In light of the comments received,
Treasury and the Agencies have
reconsidered and modified the
recordkeeping requirements of the
proposed rule. The final role provides
that a bank's CIP must include
procedures for making and maintaining
a record of all information obtained
under the procedures implementing the
requirement that a bank develop and
implement a CJP. However, the final
role affords banks significantly more
flexibility than did the recordkeeping
provisions contained in the proposal.
Under the final rule, a bank's records
are to include ··8 description," rather
than a copy, of any document upon
which the bank relied in order to verify
the identity of the customer, noting the
type of document, any identification
number contained in the document, the
place of issuance, and, if any, the date
of issuance and expiration date. The
rmal rule also clarifies that the record
must include"a description" of the
methods and results of any measures
undertaken to verify the identity of the
customer, and of the resolution of any
"substantive" discrepancy discovered
when verifying the identifying
information obtained, rather than any
documents generated in connection
with these measures.
As Treasury and the Agencies
indicated in the preamble for the
proposal, nothing in the rnIe modifies.
limits. or supersedes section 101 of the
Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, Pub. L. 106-
229, 114 Stat. 464 (15 U.S.C. 7001) (E-
Sign Act). Thus, a bank may use
electronic records to satisfy the
requirements of this final rule. as 10Dg
as the records are accurate and remain
accessible in accordance with 31 CFR
103.38(d).
Section 103.121(b)(3)(ii) Retention of
Records
The proposal required a bank to retain
all of the records specified in the
recordkeeping provision for five years
after the date the account is closed.
This requirement prompted strenuous
objections. Assuming that copies of the
documents used to verify the identity of
the customer would have to be retained,
commenters asserted that retaining
records until five years after the account
is closed would be very burdensome.
Some commenters noted that imaging is
not a routine practice for community
banks and could be costly. Banks
offering credit card accounts stated that
the record retention requirement would
require a change i~ forms. processes.
and systems, while also increasing
storage costs. As credit cards do not
have a specific term, commenters noted
that~ would be required to keep
these records forever, unless they are
culled manually. Some commenters
suggested that the retention period be
shortened, with suggestions ranging
from one to three years after the account
is closed, while other commenters
suggested that the period be shortened
to five years from when the account is
opened. Many commenters stated that
two years from when the information is
obtained would be consistent with other
regulatory requirements. such as the
record retention requirements for an
application for an extension of credit
subject to ECOA (12 CPR 202.12(b)).
By eliminating the requirement that a
bank retain copies of the documents
used to verify the identity of the
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customer, Treasury and the Agencies
believe that the final role largely
addresses the main concern of these
commenters. However, Treasury and the
Agencies also have determined that,
while the identifying information
provided by the customer should be
retained, there is little value in requiring
banks to retain the remaining records for
five years after an account is closed
because this information is likely to
have become stale. Therefore, the final
rule now prescribes a bifurcated record
retention schedule that is consistent
with the general five-year retention
requirement in 31 CPR 103.38. First, the
bank must retain the information
referenced in paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) (that
is, information obtained about a
customer). for five years after the date
the account is closed or, in the case of
credit card accounts, five years after the
account is closed or becomes donnant.
Second. the bank need only retain the
records that it must make and maintain .
under the remaining parts of the
recordkeeping provision, paragraphs
(b)(3)(i)(B), (e). and (D) (tliat is,
information that verifies a customer's
identity) for five years after the record
is made.
Section 103.121(b)(4) Comparison
with Government Lists. The proposed
rule required a bank to have procedures
for determining whether the customer
appears on any list of known or
suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations proVided to the bank by
any Federal government agency. In
addition. the proposal stated that the
procedures must ensure that the bank
follows all Federal directives issued in
connection with such lists.
Most commenters were concerned
about how a bank would be able to
determine what lists should be checked
for purposes of this provision and how
these lists would be made available.
Some commenters asked that the final
mle confirm that a bank will not have
an affirmative duty to seek out all lists
compiled by the Federal government
and would only be required to check
lists provided to it by the Federal
government. Some commenters noted
that lists published by OFAC are
published but are not provided to
financial institutions.32 Many
commenters urged that all lists within
the meaning of section 326 of the Act,
32 Nevertheleu, the legislative history for thlI
provision indicates that the lists Congress intended
financial institutions to consult "are those already
supplied to financial institutions by the Office of
Foreign Asset Control (OFAe), and occasionally by
law enforcement and regulatory authoritie., u in
the days Immediately following the September 11,
2001. attacb on the Wor,ld Trade Center and the
Pentason.U H.R. Rep. No. 107-250, pL I, at 63
(2001).
Federal Register I Vol. 68, No. 90 I Friday, May 9, 20031 Rules and 'Regulations 25103
be centralized, issued by a single
desigJ;lated government agency, and
provided to financial institutions in a
commonly used electronic format. Some
of these commenters suggested that
instead of providing multiple lists, the
government set up a single Web site that
would permit a bank to search for a
name alphabetically, similar to the
OFAC list. Other commenters asked
Treasury and the Agencies to clarify
what action a bank should take when a
customer appears on a list.
Commenters also asked for guidance
regarding the timing of when the
comparison must be performed and
asked whether the lists could be
checked after an account is opened.
Some commenters stated that there is no
practical way for a financial institution
to check lists prior to opening an
account.
The final rule states that a bank's eIP
must include procedures for
determining whether the customer
appears on any list of known or
suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations issued by any Federal
government agency and designated as
such by Treasury in consultation with
the Federal functional regulators.
Because Treasury and the Federal
functional regulators have not yet
designated any such lists, the final role
cannot be more specific with respect to
the lists banks must check in order to
comply with this provision. However,
banks will not have an affirmative duty
under this regulation to seek out all lists
of known or suspected terrorists or
terrorist organizations compiled by the
Federal government. Instead, banks will
receive notification by way of separate
guidance regarding the lists that must be
consulted for p~ses of this provision.
Treasury ana tlia Agencies have
modified this provision to give guidance
as to when a bank must consult a list of
known or suspected terrorists or
terrorist organizations. The final role
states that the CIP's procedures must
require the bank to make a
determination regarding whether a
customer appears on a list "within a
reasonable period of time" after the
account is opened, or earlier if required
by another Federal law or regulation or
by a Federal directive issued in
connection with the applicable list.
The final rule proviaes that a bank's
CIP must contain procedures requiring
the bank to follow all Federal directives
issued in connection with such lists.
Again, because there are no lists that
have been designated under this
provision as yet, the final rule cannot
provide more guidance in this area.
Section 103.121(b)(5) Customer
Notice. The proposed role would have
required a bank's eIP to include
procedures for providing bank
customers with adequate notice that the
bank is requesting information to verify
their identity. The preamble for the
proposal stated that a bank could satisfy
that notice requirement by generally
notifying its customers about the
procedmes the bank must comply with
to verify their identities. It stated that
the bank could post a notice in its lobby
or on its Internet website. or provide
customers with any other form of
written or oral notice.
Treasury and the Agencies received a
large number of comments on this
provision. Some commenters did not
agree that section 326 of the Act
requires notice to bank customers. Some
of these commenters suggested that a
bank's request for identifying
information should be considered
adequate notice. Other commenters did
not question this requirement and stated
that they appreciated the flexibility of
this provision. However, a great many
commenters asked for additional
guidance on the content and timing of
the notice and specifically requested
that the final rule provide model
language so that all institutions
represent the requirements of section
326 in the same manner and the
adequacy of notice is not left to the
interpretation of individual examiners.
Section 326 provides that the
regulations issued "shall, at a minimum,
require financial institutions to
implement, and customers (after being
given adequate notice) to comply with
reasonable procedures" that satisfy the
statute. Based upon this statutory
requirement. the final rule requires a
bank's CIP to include procedures for
providing bank customers with
adequate notice that the bank is
requesting infonnation to verify their
identities. However, the final rule
provides additional guidance regarding
what constitutes adequate notice and
the timing of the notice requirement.
The final rule states that notice is
adequate if the bank generally describes
the identification requirements of the
final rule and provides notice in a
manner reasonably designed to ensure
that a customer views the notice. or is
otherwise given notice, before opening
an account. The final role also states
that depending upon the manner in
which an account is opened, a bank may
post a notice in the lobby or on its
website, include the notice on its
account applications, or use any other
form of oral or written notice. In
addition, the final rule includes sample
language that. if appropriate, will be
deemed adequate notice to a bank's
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customers when provided in accordance
with the requirements of this final rule.
Section 103.121(b)(6) Reliance on
Another Financial Institution. Many
commenters urged that the final rule
permit a bank to rely on a third party
to perform elements of the bank's eIP.
For example, some commenters asked
that the final rule clarify that a bank
may use a third party service provider
to perform tasks and keep records. Other
commenters recommended that the role
should permit a third party to verify the
identity of the bank's customer in
indirect lending arrangements. for
example, where a car dealer acting as
agent of the bank extends a loan to a
customer or where a mortgage broker
acts on a bank's behalf. Some
commenters urged that the final rule be
modified to more broadly permit
financial institutions to share customer
identification and verification duties
with other financial institutions so as to
avoid each institution having to
undertake duplicative customer
identification efforts. Some of these
commenters suggested that a bank be
permitted to allocate its responsibility to
verify the customer's identity by
contract with another financial
institution as pennitted in the proposed
rule for broker-dealers.
Other commenters requested that the
final rule permit the eIP obligations to
be performed initially by only one
financial institution if a customer has
different accounts with different
affiliates. These commenters noted that
it is common for a customer to maintain
several different accounts with a
financial institution and its affiliates.
The same customer, for example. may
have a credit card account with one
affiliate, a home mortgage with another
affiliate, and a brokerage account with a
broker-dealer affiliate. The commenters
urged that a bank be permitted to rely
on customer identification and
verification performed by an affiUate
because it would be superfluous and
unnecessarily burdensome to subject the
same customer to substantially similar
customer identification and verification
procedures on multiple occasions.
Furthermore, those commenters urged
Treasury and the Agencies to allow a
bank to rely on an affiliate in order to
reduce the substantial costs of
maintaining duplicative records
regarding identity verification under the
recordkeeping provisions of the rule.
Treasury and the Agencies recognize
that there may be circumstances where
a bank should be able to rely on the
performance by another financial
institution of some or all of the elements
of the bank's CIP. Therefore, the final
rule provides that a bank's eIP may
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include procedures specifying when the
bank will rely on the perfonnance by
another financial institution (including
an affiliate) of any procedures of the
bank's CIP and thereby satisfy the
bank's obligations under the role.
Reliance is permitted if a customer of
the bank is opening, or has opened.·an
account or has established a similar
banking or business relationship with
the other financial institution to provide
or engage in services. dealings, or other
rmancial transactions.
In order for a bank to rely on the other
financial institution, such reliance must
be reasonable under the circumstances,
and the other financial institution must
be subject to a rule implementing the
anti-money laundering compliance
program requirements of 31 U.S.C.
5318(h) and be regulated by a Federal
functional regulator. The other financial
institution also must enter into a
contract requiring it to certify annually
to the bank that it has implemented its
anti-money laundering program. and that
it will perform (or its agent will
perform) the specified requirements of
the bank's eIP. The contract and
certification will provide a standard
means for a bank to demonstrate the
extent to which it is relying on another
institution to perfonn its CIP, and that
the institution has in fact agreed to
perform those functions. If it is not clear
from these documents, a bank must be
able to otherwise demonstrate when it is
relying on another institution to perform
its CIP with respect to a particular
customer.
The bank will not be held responsible
for the failure of the other financial
institution to adequately fulfill the
bank's ClP responsibilities, provided the
bank can establish that its reliance was
reasonable and that it has obtained the
requisite contracts and certifications.
Treasury and the Agencies emphasize
that the bank and the other financial
institution upon which it relies must
satisfy all of these conditions set forth
in the rule. If they do not, then the bank
remains solely responsible for applying
its own CIP to each customer in
accordance with this regulation.
All of the Federal furictional
regulators are adopting comparable
provisions in their respective
regulations to permit such reliance.
Furthermore, the Federal functional
regulators expect to share information
and to cooperate with each other to
determine whether the institutions
subject to their jurisdiction are in
compliance with the conditions of the
reliance provision of this final role.
The final rule issued here does not
affect a bank's authority to contract for
services to be performed by a third panty
either on or off the bank's premises.
Thus, for example, a bank may contract
with a third party service provider to
keep its records even when the bank
does not act under the reliance
provision set forth in the regulation.
However, Treasury and the Agencies
note that the performance of these
services for Federally regulated banks 33
will be subject to regulation and
examination by the Agencies under
other applicable laws and regulations.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1867.
The final rule also does not alter a
bank's authority to use an agent to
perform services on its behalf.
Therefore. a bank is permitted to arrange
for a car dealer or mortgage broker,
acting as its agent in connection with a
loan, to verify the identity of its
customer. However, as with any other
responsibility perfonned by an agent,
and in contrast to the reliance provision
in the rule. the bank ultimately is
responsible for that agent's compliance
with the requirements of this final rule.
Section 103. 121(c) Exemptions. The
proposed rule provided that the
appropriate Federal functional
regulator, with the concurrence of
Treasury, may by order or regulation
exempt any bank or type of account
from the requirements of this section.
The proposal stated that, in issuing such
exemptions, the Federal functional
regulator and Treasury shall consider
whether the exemption is consistent
with the purposes of the BSA,
consistent with safe and sound banking,
and in the public interest. The proposal
stated that the Federal functional
regulator and Treasury also may
consider other necessary and
appropriate factors.
There were a number of comments
suggesting that various types of
accounts be exempted from the final
rule. For example, several commenters
suggested that accounts of Federal, state,
and local governmental entities, public
compani~s,and correspondent banks be
exempted from the final rule. One
commenter suggested that student loan
programs be exempted from the mIe
because CU1T8nt safeguards are sufficient
to verify the identity of student loan
borrowers. Another commenter
suggested that small trust companies
and limited purpose banks that provide
trust services be exempted from the
mle, because such entities are more
local in operation, would be burdened
33 Because it lacks the specific statutory authority
to regulate and examine service providers. NCUA,
.81 a matter ofsafety and soundness. will require
credit unions to document that their service
provid... fully comply with thi. regulation and
with the credit union·. customer identUlcat10n
pf08l8Dl.
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by the rule. and have fewer employees
to ensure compliance. Yet another
commenter suggested that the NCUA
exempt credit unions from the CIP
requirements.
Any suggested exemptions that
Treasury and the Agencies have
determined to be appropriate are
incorporated into the definitions of
Uaccount" and "customer" for the
reasons described above. The exemption
provision of the final rule is essentially
adopted as proposed with respect to
banks that have a Federal functional
regulator. Because the final role will
also apply to certain banks that do not
have a Federal functional regulator, a
new provision has been added to make
clear that Treasury alone will make all
determinations regarding exemptions
for these institutions.
Section 103.121(dj Other Information
Requirements Unaffected. The proposal
provided that nothing in § 103.121 shall
be construed to relieve a bank of its
obligations to obtain, verify, or maintain
information in connection with an
account or transaction that is required
by another provision in part 103. For
example, if an account is opened with
a deposit of more than 510,000 in cash,
the bank opening the account must
comply with the customer identification
requirements in § 103.121, as well as
with the provisions of § 103.22, which
require that certain infonnation
concerning the transaction be reported
by filing a Currency Transaction Report
(CTR). There were no comments on this
provision. Therefore. Treasury and the
Agencies have adopted this provision
generally as proposed, except that it bas
been clarified to provide that nothing in
S103.121 should be constnled to relieve
a bank of any of its obligations,
including its obligations to obtain,
verify, or maintain information in
connection with an account or
transaction that is required by another
provision in part 103.
m. ConforJDing Amendments to 31 CFJl
103.34
Section 103.34(8) sets forth customer
identification requirements when
certain types of deposit accounts are
opened. Together with the proposed
rule implementing section 326,
Treasury. on its own authority,
proposed deleting 31 CFR 103.34(a) for
the following reasons.
First, the preamble for the proposal
explained that Treasury regards the
requirements of §§ 103.34(a)(1) and (2)
as inconsistent with the intent and
purpose of section 326 of the Act and
incompatible with proposed section
103.121. Generally §§ 103.34(a)(1) and
(2) require a bank, within 30 days after
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certain deposit accounts are opened, to
secure and maintain a record of the
taxpayer identification number of the
customer involved. If the bank is unable
to obtain the taxpayer identification
number within 30 days (or a longer time
if the person has applied for a taxpayer
identification number), it need take no
further action under § 103.34
concerning the account if it maintains a
list of the names, addresses, and
account numbers of the persons for
which it was unable to secure taxpayer
identification numbers, and provides
that information to Treasury upon
request. In the case of a non-resident
alien, the bank is required to record the
person's passport number or a
description of some other government
document used to determine
identification. These requirements
conflicted with those in proposed
§ 103.121 which required a bank to
obtain the name, address, date of birth
and an identification number from any
person seeking to open a new account.
Second, § 103.34(a)(3) currently
provides that a bank need not obtain a
taxpayer identification number with
respect to specified categories of
persons 34 opening certain deposit
accounts. Proposed § 103.121 did not
exempt any persons from the CIP
requirements. Treasury requested
comment on whether any of the
exemptions in § 103..34(a)(3) should
apply in light of the intent and purpose
of section 326 of the Act and the
req~mentsof proposed § 103.121.
Third, § 103.34(8)(4) also provides
that IRS rules shall determine whose
number shall be obtained in the case of
multiple account holders. In the
preamble that accompanied its proposal,
Treasury stated that this proyision is
3"The exemption applies to (1) agencies and
instrumentalities of Federal, State. local. or foreign
govenmumla; (11) Judg•• pubUc officiala, or clerks
of courts of record as custodiaDs of funds in
controversy or und. the control of the court; (iii)
aliens who are ambassadors; ministers; career
diplomatic or consular officers: naval. military. or
other attach. of foreign embassies and legations:
and membel'l of their immediate families: (Iv) aliens
who are aa:redited representatives of certain
international 0rsanizaUODI. and their immediate
families; (v) alieni temporarily fesidins in the
United States for a period not to exceed 180 days;
(vi) aliens not engaged in a trade or business in the
United Statel who are attending a recognized
college or university. or any traiDlng program
supervised or conducted by an agency of the
Federal Government; (vii) unincorporated
subordinate units of a tax exempt central
OIIanization that are covered by a group exemption
letter; (viii) a persoD under 18 years of age, with
respect to an account opened as part of a school
thrift ..viDg' prosnun. provided the annual interest
i. 1888 than $10; (ix) a penon opening. Christmas
club. vacation club. or similar installment savings
program. provided the aDDual interest Is less than
S10; and (x) DOn-resident aliena who are not
engaged in a trade or business in the United States.
inconsistent with section 326 of the Act,
which requires that banks verify the
identity of ..any" person seeking to open
an account.
In addition, T~easuryproposed
deleting § 103.34(b)(1) which requires a
bank to keep "any notations, if such are
normally made, of specific identifying
information verifying the identity of the
signer [who has signature authority over
an account] (such as a driver's license
number or credit card number)."
Treasury stated that the quoted language
in § 103.34(b)(1) is inconsistent with the
proposed requirements of § 103.121. For
this reason, Treasury, under its own
authority, proposed to delete the quoted
language.
Few comments were received
regarding the proposed deletion of these
provisions. Some commenters agreed
that § 103.34(a) should be deleted if
proposed § 103.121 were adopted. One
commenter suggested that § 103.34(a)
should be revised to achieve the
objectives of the section 326 of the Act.
One commenter representing a military
bank requested continuance of the
exemption for agencies and
instrumentalities of the Federal
government that will permit exemption
of commissaries, exchanges and various
military organizations. Another
commenter requested maintenance of
the exemption for government entities,
court funds, unincorporated units of
tax-exempt organizations, and school
thrift programs.
Treasury has determined that given
the more comprehensive requirements
of the final version of § 103.121, there is
no lODger a need for § 103.34 (a). A
number of the exemptions formerly in
§ 103.34(a) have now been added to
§ 103.121. Other exemptions conflict
with the language and intent of section
326 of the Act and thus were not
adopted in the fmal rule. While
§ 103.34(a) will no longer be needed
once the final rule is fully effective,
withdrawing the provision before
October 1. 2003, would create a gap
period during which banks would not
be subject to a rule under the BSA
requbing a customer to be identified
when opening an account. Because
Treasury and the Agencies do not
believe such a gap period would be
appropriate, the final rule-rather than
withdrawing § 103.34(a)-amends the
section to cut off its applicability on
October 1, 2003, when §103.121
becomes fully effective.35
as Appropriate conforming amendments are made
to SS103.34(b)(11) and (12) to add a cross-reference
to the Internal ReveDue Code regarding the rules for
determlnins what constitutes a taxpayer
identification number.
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By contrast, Treasury no longer
believes that it is necessary to delete the
quoted language in § 103.34(b), which
requires a bank to keep "any notations,
if such are normally made, of specific
identifying information verifying the
identity of [a person with signature
authority over an account] (such as 8
driver's license number or credit card
number)." The definition of "customer"
in the final version of § 103.121 no
longer includes a signatory on an
account. Therefore, § 103.121 and
§ 103.34(b)(1) are not inconsistent and
the records required to be kept in
accordance with § 103.34(b)(1) will still
have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the
conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, and to
protect against international terrorism.
Therefore, the proposal to delete the
quoted language in § 103.34(b)(1) is not
adopted as proposed.
IV. Technical Amendment to 31 CPR
103.11(j)
Section 103.1I(n, which dermes the
term "deposit account," contains an
obsolete reference to the definition of
"transaction account," which is defined
in § 103.11(hh). Under its own
authority, Treasury proposed to correct
this reference. There were no comments
on this proposed technical correction.
Therefore, it is adopted as proposed.
v. R.egulatory Analysis
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA), an agency must either prepare a
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(FRFA) for a final rule or certify that the
final rule will not have 8 significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.38 See 5 U.S.C.
604 and 605(b).
Treasury and the Agencies have
reviewed the impact of this final rule on
.small banks. Treaswy and the Agencies
certify that the final rule will not have
a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
First, Treasury and the Agencies
believe that banks already have
implemented prudential business
practices and anti-money laundering
38 The RFA defines the term IIsmall entity" In 5
U.S.c. 601 by reference to the definitions published
by the Small Business Administration (SBA). The
SBA hu defined a lIaman entity" for banking
purpol8l U a bank. or savings institution with leu
than $150 million in assets. Sse 13 CFR. 121.201.
The NeUA defines "small credit union" as th08.
under $1 million In usets. Jnterpretive Rulins and
Policy Statement No. 87-2. Developing and
Reviewing Go'Vemment Regulations (52 FR 35231.
September 18. 1987).
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programs that include most of the
procedures that a CIP must contain
under this fmal mle. Banks generally
undertake extensive measures to verify
the identity of their customers as a
matter of good business practice. In
addition, Federally regulated banks
already must have anti-money
laundering programs that include
procedures for identification,
verification, and documentation of
customer information.31
Second, although the final rule
contains several requirements that will
be new to banks we anticipate that the
costs of implementing these
requirements will not be economically
significant For example, the
recordkeeping requirements in the final
rule may impose some costs on banks to
the extent that the information that must
be maintained is not already collected
and retained.38 Treasury and the
Agencies believe that the compliance
burden is minimized for banks,
including small banks, because the final
rule vests a bank with the discretion to
design and implement appropriate
recordkeeping procedures, including
allowing banks to maintain electronic
records in lieu of (or in combination
with) paper records.
The section of the final role that
requires banks to check lists of known
and suspected tenorists and terrorist
organizations and to follow Federal
agency directives in connection with the
lists is also a new requirement that will
impose nominal burden, once Treasury
and the Agencies publish lists that
banks must consult. However, no such
lists have been issued to date. Moreover,
banks already must have procedures to
satisfy other similar requirements. For
instance, banks already have to ensure
that they do not engage in transactions
involving designated foreign countries,
foreign nationals, and other entities
prohibited under OFAC rules. See 31
CPR part 500. We also understand that
many banks, including small banks, use
electronic search tools to check lists 39
and already use identity verification
software, both as part of their customer
due diligence obligations under existing
37 See footnote 10.
31 See. e.g., identification and verification of
custOID81'l in connection with each share or deposit
account opened (31 CPR 103.34).
38 We believe that molt bUlb will use technology
rather than manual methods to check listl. OFAC
Usb are generally incorporated into bank software
and. in respcmse to bank inquiries, Treasury and the
Agencies have made clear that banb are permitted
to share the liItI they receive PU1'8U8Dt to section
314 of the Act with their service providers. We
expect that any lilts provided under lection 326 of
the Act will allo be provided under the same
conditions.
BSA compliance program requirements
and to detect fraud.
The notice provisions of the rule also
are new. However, they are very flexible
and, as written, should impose only
minimal costs. The final rule pennits a
bank to satisfy the notice requirement
by choosing from a variety of low-cost
measures, such 8S posting a sign in the
lobby or on its website, by adding it to
an account statement, or using any other
fonn of written or oral notice. In
addition, the amount of time that a bank
will need to develop its notices will be
minimal as the final rule now contains
a sample notice.
Treasury and the Agencies believe
that the fleXibility incorporated into the
final rule will permit each bank to tailor
its CIP to fit its own size and needs. In
this regard, Treasury and the Agencies
believe that expenditures associated
with establishing and implementing a
eIP will be commensurate with the size
of a bank. If 8 bank is small, the burden
to comply with the proposed rule
should be de minimis.
Most commenters on the proposed
rule stated that Treasury and the
Agencies had underestimated the
burden imposed by the propos8d rule.
They highlighted aspects of the proposal
that they maintained would have
imposed excessive burdens and would
have required banks to alter their
current practices. Most comments
focused on the proposed provisions
requiring banks to verify the identity of
signatories on accounts, to keep copies
of documents used to verify a
customer's identity, and to retain
identity verification records for five
years after an account is closed.
In drafting the final rule, Treaswy and
the Agencies have either eliminated or
minimized the most significant burdens
identified by commenters. In response
to commenters. for example, the final
role eliminates signatories from the
definition of "customer,n no longer
requires a bank to keep copies of
documents used to verify a customer's
identity, and reduces the universe of
records that must be kept for five years
after an account is closed. Treasury and
the Agencies have taken other steps that
significantly reduce the scope of the
role and burdens of the mle. Many of
these burden-reducing actions are
described in the Paperwork Reduction
Act discussion below.40 As a result of
40In addition to the burden-reducing meuur.
discussed In the Paperwork Reduction Act
discussion, other changes include:
• A clarification that a bank must verify the
customer'. identity using the identifyins
information obtained. The proposed rule would
have required the b&nk to verify all identifying
information. The elimination of the requirement
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these changes, the final role is far more
flexible and less burdensome than the
proposed rule while still fulfilling the
statutory mandates enumerated in
section 326 of the Act.
Finally, Treasury and the Agencies
did consider whether it would be
appropriate to exempt small banks from
the requirements of the rule. We do not
believe that an exemption for small
banks is appropriate, given the
flexibility built into the rule to account
for, among other things, the differing
sizes and resources of banks, as well as
the importance of the statutory goals
and mandate of section 326. Money
laundering can occur in small banks as
well as large banks.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions of the final mle
contain "collection of information"
requirements within the meaning of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). An agency may not
conduct or sponsor, and a respondent is
not required to respond to, an
information collection unless it displays
a CU1T8ntly valid Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) control number.
Treasury submitted the final role to the
OMB for review in accordance with 44
U.S.C. 3507(d). The OMB has approved
the collection of information
requirements in today's role under
control number 1506-0026.
that a bank mUlt obtain a physical and a mailing
addres. from a customer opening an accounL Under
the final rule. the bank is only required to obtain
a physical address.
• A new provision that permits a bank to rely on
another flnaDcla1 inatitutiOD to perform ib CIP
under certain conditiOD8. This provision allows
financial in.titutiona that share a customer to share
customer identification and verification obligations
and to reduce the coat of maintaining duplicative
records required by the recordkeepins provisioDl of
the final rule.
• A revised provision that extends to customers
who lI'e individuals the exception that permits a
bank to open an IlCCOUIlt for a customer that hu
applied for, but has not received, a taxpayer
identification number.
• A new exemption for credit card accounts from
the requirement that a bank obtain identifyinB
information from the customer prior to opening an
account. In connection with credit card accounts,
a bank is permitted to obtain identifying
information from a thIrd party source prior to
extending credit.
• A clarification stating that the government will
providellsts of known or IUIpected terrorists and
terrorist o1'8anizationl to banks. Banks will not be
requJred. to seek out this information. In addition,
the rule now states that the bank may determine
whether a cu.stomer appears on the list within a
reasonable time after the account is opened, unless
it is required to do .0 earlier by another Federal
law. regulation, or directive.
• A transition period that permib ba.nb a period
of several month. to comply with the final nale.
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Collection of Information Under the
Proposed Rule
The proposed rule applied only to a
financial institution that is a "bank" as
dermed in 31 CFR 103.11(c),41 and any
foreign branch of an insured bank. The
proposed rule required each bank to
establish a written eIP that must
include recordkeeping procedures
(proposed § 103.121(b)(3)) and
procedures for providing customers
with notice that the bank is requesting
information to verify their identity
(proposed § 103.121(b)(5)).
The proposed rule required a bank to
maintain a record of (1) the identifying
information provided by the customer,
the type of identification document(s)
reviewed, if any, the identification
number of the document(s), and a copy
of the identification documentCs); (2) the
means and results of any additional
measures undertaken to verify the
identity of the customer; and (3) the
resolution of any discrepancy in the
identifying information obtained. It also
required these records to be maintained
at the bank for five years after the date
the account is closed (proposed
§ 103.121(b)(3».
The proposed role also required a
bank to give its customers Uadequate
notice" of the identity verification
procedures (proposed § 103.121(b)(5».
The proposed rule stated that a bank
could satisfy the notice requirement by
posting a sign in the lobby or prOViding
customers with any other fonn of
written or oral notice.
Collection of Information Under the
Final Rule
The final rule, like the proposed role.
requires banks to implement reasonable
procedures to (1) maintain records of
the information used to verify a
customer's identity, and (2) provide
notice of these procedures to customers.
These recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements are required under section
326 of the Act. However, the final role
greatly reduces the paperwork burden
attributable to these requirements, as
described below.
The final rule also contains a new
recordkeeping provision permitti~ga
bank to rely on another rmancial
institution to perform some or aU its
CIP, under certain circumstances.
Among other things, the other financial
institution must provide the bank with
a contract requiring it to certify annually
to the bank that it has implemented its
anti-money laundering program, and
that it will perform (or its agent will
lit This definition includel banks, thrifts. and
credit unions.
perform) the specified requirements of
the bank's CIP.
Response to Comments Received
We received approXimately 500
comments on the proposed rule. Most of
the commenters specifically mentioned
the recordkeeping burden associated
with the proposed mle. Some
commenters also asked Treasury and the
Agencies to clarify the meaning of
"adequate notice" and requested that a
sample notice be provided in the final
mle. .
Only a few commenters provided
burden estimates of additional burden
hours that would result from the
proposed rule. However, these burden
estimates did not necessarily focus on
the recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements in the proposal and ranged
from 200 extra hours per year to 9.000
additional hoW'S. Treasury and the
Agencies believe that the final rule
substantially addresses the concerns of
the commenters. Specific concerns
about paperwork burden have been
addressed as follows:
First, the recordkeeping and
disclosure burden are minimized in the
final rule because Treasury and the
Agencies reduced the entire scope of the
final rule, by:
• Narrowing and clarifying the scope
of "account'" The final rule specifically
excludes accounts that (1) a bank
acquires through an acquisition, merger,
purchase of assets, or assumption of
liabilities from a third party, and (2) .
accounts opened for the purpose of
participating in an employee benefit
plan established pursuant to the
Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. It also· specifically excludes
wire transfers, check cashing, and the
sale of travelers checks, and any other
product or service that does not lead to
a "formal banking relationship" from
the scope of the rule;
• Narrowing the definition of "bank"
covered by the role to exclude a bank's
foreign branches; and
• Limiting and clarifying who is a
"customer" for purposes of the final
role. The final rule now defines
"customer" as "a person that opens a
new account" making clear that a
person who does not receive banking
services, such as a person whose deposit
or loan application is denied, is not a
customer. The definition of customer
also excludes signatories from the
defmitionof "customer." Moreover. the
final rule excludes from the definition
of Ucustomer" the following readily-
identifiable entities: A financial
institution regulated by 8 Federal
functional regulator; a bank regulated by
a state bank regulator; and governmental
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agencies and instrumentalities and
companies that are publicly traded (i.e.,
entities described in § 103.22(d)(2)(ii)-
(iv)). The final rule also excludes
existing customers of the bank, provided
that the bank has a reasonable belief that
it knows the true identity of the
person."2
Second, recordkeeping burden was
further reduced by:
• Eliminating the requirement that a
bank keep copies of any document that
it relied uron in order to verify the
identity 0 the customer and
substituting a requirement that a bank's
records need only include 118
description" of any document that it
relied upon in order to verify the
identity of the customer. The final rule
also clarifies that the records need only
include Ua description" of the methods
and results of any measure undertaken
to verify the identity of the customer,
and of the resolution of any substantive
disaepancy discovered when verifying
the identifying infonnation obtained,
rather than any documents generated in
connection with these measures; and
• Reducing the length of time that
records must be kept. The final rule
requires that identifying information be
kept for five years after the date the
account is closed (or for credit card
accounts, five years after the account is
closed or becomes dormant). All other
records may be kept for five years after
the account is opened.
Third, disclosure burden was reduced
by providing sample language that, if
appropriate and properly provided, will
be deemed adequate notice to a bank's
customer. Disclosure burden also was
reduced by clarifying the term .
"adequate notice."
Treasury and the Agencies believe
that little additional burden is imposed
as a result of the fecordkeeping
requirements outlined in section
103.121(b)(3), because the type of
recordkeeping required by the final rule
is a usual and customary business
practice. In addition, banks already
must keep similar records to comply
with existing regulations in 31 CFR part
103 (see, e.g., 31 CFR 103.34, requiring
certain records for each deposit or share
account opened).
Treasury and the Agencies believe
that nominal burden is associated with
the disclosure requirement outlined in
§ 103.121(b)(5). This section contains a
sample notice that if appropriate and
42 The proposed rule stated that the identity of an
existing customer would not need to be verified if
the bank (1) bad previously verified the customer'.
identity In accordance with procedures consistent
with the proposed rule, and (2) continue. to have
a l'eUOD&ble belief that it knows the true identity
of the customer.
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provided in accordance with the final
role, will be deemed adequate notice. In
addition, it continues to permit banks to
choose among a variety of low-eost
methods of providing adequate notice
and to select the least burdensome
method, given the circumstances under
which customers seek to open new
accounts.
Treasury and the Agencies also
believe that nominal burden is
associated with the new recordkeeping
requirement in § 103.121(b)(6). This
section permits a bank to rely on
another financial institution to perfonn
some or all its CIP under certain
conditions. including the condition that
the financial institution enter into a
contract with the bank providing that it
will certify annually to the bank that it
(1) has implemented its anti-money
laundering program and (2) will perform
(or its agent will perform) the specified
requirements of the bank's CIF. Not all
banks will choose to rely on a third
party. For those that do, the minimal
burden of retaining the certification
described above should allow them to
reduce net burden under the rule by
such reliance.
Burden Estimates
Treasury and the Agencies have
reconsidered the burden estimates
published in the proposed rule, given
the comments stating that the burdens
associated with the paperwork
collections were underestimated.
Having done so, and considering the
reduction in burden taken in this fmal
rule, Treasury and the Agencies have
adjusted their estimates of the
paperwork burden of this rule. The
burden estimates that follow are
estimates of the incremental burden
imposed upon banks by this final rule,
recognizing that some of the
requirements in this rule are a usual and
customary practice in the banking
industry, or duplicate other regulatory
req~ments.
The potential respondents are
national banks and Federal branches
and agencies (OCe financial
institutions); state member banks and
branches and agencies of foreign banks
(Board financial institutions): insured
state nonmember banks (FDIC financial
institutions); savings associations (OTS
financial institutions); Federally insured
credit unions (NCUA financial
institutions); and certain non-Federally
regulated credit unions, private banks,
and trust companies (FinCEN
institutions).
Estimated number ofrespondents:
OCC:2207.
Board: 1240.
FDIC: 5,500.
OTS:962.
NCUA: 9.688.
FinCEN: 2,460.
Estimated average annual
recordkeeping burden per respondent:
10 hours.
Estimated aVi3rage annual disclosure
burden per respondent: 1 hour.
Estimated total annual recordkeeping
and disclosure burden: 242,627 hours.
Treasury and the Agencies invite
comment on the accuracy of the burden
estimates and invite suggestions on how
to further reduce these burdens.
Comments should be sent (preferably by
fax (202-395-6974)) to Desk Officer for
the Department of the Treasury, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Paperwork Reduction Project (1506-
0026). Washington, DC 20503 (or by the
Internet to jlackeyj@omb.eop.gov), with
a copy to FinCEN by mail or the Internet
at the addresses previously specified.
Executive~der12866
Treasury, the ace, and OTS have
determined that the final rule is not a
"significant regulatory action" under
.Executive ~der 12866 for the follOWing
reasons.
The role follows closely the
requirements of section 326 of the Act.
Moreover, Treasury, the acc, and OTS
believe that national banks and savings
associations already have procedures in
place that fulfill most of the
requirements of the final role because
the procedures are a matter of good
business practice. In addition, national
banks and savings associations already
are required to have BSA compliance
programs that address many of the
requirements detailed in this final rule.
At the proposed rule stage, Treasury,
the ace, and OTS invited national
banks, the thrift industry, and the public
to provide any cost estimates and
related data that they think would be
useful in evaluating the overall costs of
the rule. Most of the cost estimates
provided by commenters related. to the
requirements in the proposed rule that
banks verify the identity of signatories
on accounts, keep copies of documents
used to verify a customer's identity, and
retain identity verification records for
five years after an account is closed. As
described in the preamble, the fioal rule
eliminates signatories from the
definition of "customer," and no longer
requires a bank to keep copies of
documents used to verify a customer's
identity. The final rule also reduces the
universe of records that must be kept for
five years after an account is closed.
Treasury, the acc and the OTS have
taken other steps that significantly
reduce the scope of the rule and the
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burden of the role. These burden-
reducing measures are described in the
Paperwork Reduction Act discussion
and Regulatory Flexibility Act
discussion, above.43
List of Subjects
12 CPR Part 21
Crime, Currency, National banks,
Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures.
12 CFR Part 208
Accounting, Agriculture, Banks,
banking, Confidential business
infonnation, Crime, Currency.
Investments, Mortgages, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
12 CFR Part 211
Exports, Foreign banking, Holding
companies. Investments, Reponing and
recordkeeping requirements.
12 CFR Part 326
Banks,banking,Cun9ncy,buured
nonmember banks, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements. Security
measures.
12 CFR Part 563
Accounting, Advertising, Crime,
Currency, Investments, Reporting and
Recordkeeping requirements, Savings
associations, Securities. Surety bonds.
12 CFR Part 748
Credit unions. Crime. and Security
measures.
31 CFR Part 103
Administrative practice and
procedure, Authority delegations
(Government agencies), Banks, banking,
Brokers, Currency, Foreign banking,
Foreign currencies, Gambling,
Investigations, Law enforcement,
Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Securities.
Department ofthe Treasury
31 CFR Chapter I
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set forth in the pre.
amble. part 103 of title 31 of the Code of
Federal Regulations is amended as fol-
lows: .
.13 For these same reasons, and consistent with
section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform. Act
of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-1), Treasury, the ars and the
ace have also determined that this final rule will
not lUult iD expeudltures by State, local, and tribal
governments in the sgregate, or by the private
sector of $100 million or more in anyone year, and
therefore the rule is not subject to the requirements
of section 202 of that Act.
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PART 103-FINANCIAL
RECORDKEEPING AND REPORTING
OF CURRENCY AND FORBGN
TRANSACTIONS
• 1. The authority citation for part 103 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 182gb and 1951-1959:
31 U.S.c. 5311-5314 and 5316-5332: title nit
sees. 312. 313. 314, 319. 326. 352. Pub L.
107-56, 115 Stat. 307.
1103.11 [Amended]
.2. Section 103.11(j) is amended by
removing "paragraph (q)" and adding
"paragraph (hh)" in its place.
110~.34 [Amended]
• 3. Section 103.34 is amended as fol-
lows:
• a. By amending the first sentence of
paragraph (a)(1) to add the words "and
before October 1. 2003" after the words
"May 31, 1978" and after the words
"June 3D, 1972":
• b. By amending paragraph (b)(11) to
add the words "as determined under sec-
tion 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986" after the words "taxpayer
identification number;" and
• c. By amending paragraph (b)(12) to
add the words Uas determined under sec-
tion 6109 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986" after the words "taxpayer
identification number."
• 2. Subpart I ofpart 103 is amended by
adding new § 103.121 to read as follows:
1103.121 Customer Identification
Programs for blanks, Nvings _oclatlona,
credit union.. and certain non-Federally
regulat8d banks.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this
section:
(t).(i) Account means a formal banking
relationship established to provide or
engage in services, dealings, or other
financial transactions including a
deposit account, a transaction or asset
account, a credit account, or other
extension of credit. Account also
includes a relationship established to
provide a safety deposit box or other
8afekeep~services, or cash
management, custodian, and trost
services.
(Ii) Account does not include:
(Al A product or service where a
formal banking relationship is not
established with a person, such as
check-eashing, wire transfer, or sale of
a check or money order;
(8) An account that the bank acquires
through an acquisition, merger,
purchase of assets, or assumption of
liabilities; or
eCl An account opened for the
purpose of participating in an employee
benefit plan established under the
Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974.
(2) Bank means:
(i) A bank, as that term is defined in
§ 103.l1(e), that is subject to regulation
by a Federal functional regulator; and
(ii) A credit union. private bank. and
trust company, as set forth in
§ 103.1I(e), that does not have a Federal
functional regulator.
(3)(i) Customer means:
(Al A person that opens a new
account; and
(D) An individual who opens a new
account for:
(1) An individual who lacks legal
ca~city, such as a minor; or
(2) An entity that is not a legal person,
such as a civic club.
(ii) Customer does not include:
(Al A financial institution regulated
by a Federal functional regulator or a
bank regulated by a state bank regulator;
(B) A person described in
§ 103.22(d)(2)(ii) through (iv); or
(el A person that has an existing
account with the bank, provided that
the bank has a reasonable belief that it
knows the true identity of the person.
(4) Federal functioniJ1 regulator is
defined at § 103.120(a)(2).
(5) Financial institution is defined at
31 u.s.e. 5312(8)(2) and (c)(1).
(6) Taxpayer identification number is
defined by section 6109 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 6109)
and the Internal Revenue Service
regulations implementing that section
(e.g., social security number or
employer identification number).
(7) U.S. ~rson means:
(i) A Umted States citizen; or
(ii) A person other than an individual
(such as a corporation, partnership, or
trust), that is established or organized
under the laws of a State or the United
States.
(8) Non-U.S. person means a person
that is not a U.S. person.
(b) Customer Identification Program:
minimum requirements.
(1) In general. A bank must
implement a written Customer
Identification Program (CIP) appropriate
for its size and type ofbusiness that. at
a minimum, includes each of the
requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)
through (5) of this section. If a bank is
required to have an anti-money
laundering compliance program under
the regulations implementing 31 U.S.C.
5318(h), 12 U.S.C. 1818(s), or 12 U.S.C.
1186(q)(1), then the CIP must be a part
of the anti-money laundering
compliance program. Until such time as
credit unions, private banks, and trust
companies without a Federal functional
regulator are subject to such a program,
their CIPs must be approved by their
boards of directors.
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(2) Identity verification procedures.
The CIP must include risk-based
procedures for verifying the identity of
each customer to the extent reasonable
and practicable. The procedures must
enable the bank to form a reasonable
belief that it knows the tnle identity of
each customer. These procedures must
be based on the bank's assessment of the
relevant risks, including those presented
by the various types of accounts
maintained by the bank, the various
methods of opening accounts provided
by the bank, the various types of
identifying information available, and
the bank's size, location, and customer
base. At a minimum. these procedures
must contain the elements desaibed in
this paragraph (b)(2).
(i) Customer information required. (A)
In general. The CIP must contain
procedures for opening an account that
specify the identifying information that
will be obtained from each customer.
Except as permitted by paragraphs
(b)(2)(i)(B) and (e) of this section, the
bank must obtain, at a minimum, the
following information from the
customer prior to opening an account:
(1) Name:
(2) Date of birth, for an individual;
(3) Address, which shall be:
(11 For an individual, 8 residential or
business street address:
(ill For an individual who does not
have a residential or business street
address, an Army Post Office (APO) or
Fleet Post Office (FPO) box number, or
the residential or business street address
of next of kin or of another contact
individual; or
(iiJl For a person other than an
individual (such as a corporation,
partnership, or trust), a principal place
of business, local office, or other
physical location; and
(4) Identification number, which shall
be:
bl For a U.S. person, a taxpayer
identification number; or
(ill For a non-U.S. person, one or more
of the following: a taxpayer
identification number; passport number
and country of issuance; alien
identification card number; or number
and country of issuance of any other
government-issued document
evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar
safeguard.
Note to paragraph (b)(Z)(i)(A)(4)(iJl: When
opening an account for a foreign business or
enterprise that does not have an
identification number. the bank must request
altemative government-issued
documentation certifying the existence of the
business or enterprise.
(D) ExcepUon for persons applying for
a taxpayer identification number.
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Instead of obtaining 8 taxpayer
identification number from a customer
prior to opening the account. the CIP
may include procedures for opening an
account for a customer that has applied
for I but has not received, a taxpayer
identification number. In this case, the
eIP must include procedures to confirm
that the application was filed before the
customer opens the account and to
obtain the taxpayer identification
number within a reasonable period of
time after the account is opened.
(el Credit card accounts. In
connection with a customer who opens
a credit card account, a bank may obtain
the identifying information about a
customer required under paragraph
(b)(2){i)(A) by acquiring it from a third-
party source prior to extending credit to
the customer.
(ii) Customer verification. The CIP
must contain procedures for verifying
the identity of the customer, using
information obtained in accordance
with paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section,
within a reasonable time after the
account is opened. The procedures must
describe when the bank will use
documents, non-documentary methods,
or a combination of both methods as
described in this paragraph (b)(2)(ii).
(A) Verification through documents.
For a bank relying on documents, the
OF must contain procedures that set
forth the documents that the bank will
use. These documents may include:
(1) For an individual, unexpired
government-issued identification
evidencing nationality or residence and
bearing a photograph or similar
safeguard, such as a driver's license or
passport; and
(2J For a person other than an
individual (such as a corporation,
partnership, or trust). documents
showing the existence of the entity,
such as certified articles of
incorporation, a government-issued
business license, a partnership
a~ment,or trust instrument.
(B) Verification through non-
documentary methods. Fo~a bank
relying on non-documentary methods.
the CIP must contain procedures that
describe the non-documentary methods
the bank will use.
(1) These methods may include
contacting a customer; independently
verifying the customer's identity
through the comparison of information
provided by the customer with
information obtained from a consumer
reporting agency, public database, or
other source; checking references with
other financial institutioDB; and
obtaining a financial statement.
(2) The bank's non-documentary
procedures must address situations
where an individual is unable to present·
an unexpired government-issued
identification document that bears a
photograph or similar safeguard; the
bank is not familiar with the documents
presented; the account is opened
without obtaining documents; the
customer opens the account without
appearing in person at the bank; and
where the bank is otherwise presented
with circumstances that increase the
risk that the bank will be unable to
verify the true identity of a customer
through documents.
{el Additional verification for certain
customers. The elP must address
situations where, based on the bank's
risk assessment of a new account
opened by a customer that is not an
individual, the bank will obtain
information about individuals with
authority or control over such account,
including signatories, in order to verify
the customer's identity. This
verification method applies only when
the bank cannot verify the customer's
true identity using the verification
methods described in paragraphs
(b}(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section.
(iii) Lack ofverification. The CIP must
include procedures for responding to
circumstances in which the bank cannot
form a reasonable belief that it knows
the true identity of a .,ustomer. These
procedures should describe:
(Al When the bank should not open
an account;
(B) The terms under which a customer
may use an account while the bank
attempts to verify the customer's
identity;
eel When the bank should close an
account, after attempts to verify a
customer's identity have failed; and
(D) When the bank should file a
Suspicious Activity Report in
accordance with applicable law and
resu:lation.
(s) Recordkeeping. The CIP must
include procedures for making and
maintaining a record of all information
obtained under the procedures
implementing paragraph (b) of this
section.
(i) Required records. At a minimum,
the record must include:
(Al All identifying information about
a customer obtained under paragraph
.(b)(2)(i) of this section;
(8) A description of any document
that was relied on under paragraph
(b)(2)(ii)(A) of this section noting the
type of document, any identification
number contained in the document, the
place of issuance and, if any, the date
of issuance and expiration date:
ee) A description of the methods and
the results of any measures undertaken
to verify the identity of the customer
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under paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(B) or (el of
this section; and .
CD) A description of the resolution of
any substantive discrepancy discovered
when verifying the identifying
information obtained.
(ii) Retention ofrecords. The bank
must retain the information in
paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) of this section for
five years after the date the account is
closed or, in the case of credit card
accounts, five years after the account is
closed or becomes dormant. The bank
must retain the information in
paragraphs (b)(3)(i)(B), (el, and (D) of
this section for five years after the
record is made.
(4) Comparison with govemment lists.
The elf must include procedures for
detennining whether the customer
appears on any list of known or
suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations issued by any Federal
government agency and designated as
such by Treasury in consultation with
the Federal functional regulators. The
procedures must require the bank to
make such a detennination within a
reasonable period of time after the
account is opened, or earlierI if required
by another Federal law or regulation or
Federal directive issued in connection
with the applicable list. The procedures
must also require the bank to follow all
Federal directives issued in connection
with such lists.
(5)(i) Customer notice. The CIP must
include procedures for providing bank
customers with adequate notice that the
bank is requesting information to verify
their identities.
(ti) Adequate notice. Notice is
adequate if the bank generally describes
the identification requirements of this
section and provides the notice in a
manner reasonably designed to ensure
that a customer is able to view the
notice, or is otherwise given notice,
before opening an account For example,
depending upon the manner in which
the account is opened, a bank may post
a notice in the lobby or on its website,
include the notice on its account
applications, or use any other fonn of
written or oral notice.
(iii) Sample notice. If appropriate, a
bank may use the following sample
language to provide notice to its
customers:
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT
PROCEDURES FOR OPENING A NEW
ACCOUNT
To help the government fight the funding
of terrorism and money laundering activities,
Federal law requires all financial institutions
to obtain. verify, and record information that
identifies each person who op8ua an account.
What this means for you: When you open
an account, we will ask for your name,
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PART 21-MINIMUM SECURITY
DEVICES AND PROCEDURES,
REPORTS OF SUSPICIOUS
ACTIVITIES, AND BANK SECRECY
ACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
SUbpart C-Procedur. for Monitoring
Bank Secrecy Act Compliance
• 1. The authority citation for part 21,
subpart C. continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 1818, 1881-1884
and 3401-3422; 31 U.S.C. 5318.
• 2. In § 21.21:
• A. Revise the section heading; and
• B. Revise § 21.21(b) to read as follows:
§ 21.21 Procedure. for monitoring Bank
secrecy Act (BSA) compliance.
(b) Establishment ofa BSA
compliance program. (1) Program
requirement. Each bank shall develop
and provide for the continued
administration of a program reasonably
designed to assure and monitor
compliance with the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements set forth in
subchapter IT of chapter 53 of title 31,
United States Code and the
implementing regulations issued by the
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR
part 103. The compliance program must
be written, approved by the bank's
board of directors, and reflected in the
minutes of the bank.
(2) Customer identification program.
Each bank is subject to the requirements
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, April 21, 2003.
Jennifer J. Jolmson, •
SecretaIyofthe Board.
In concurrence:
By order of the Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation this
16th day of April. 2003.
Valerie J. Best,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
In concurrence:
Dated: April 9, 2003.
James E. Gilleran,
Director. Office ofThrift Supezvision.
In concurrence:
Dated: April 7, 2003.
Becky Baker,
Secretary ofthe Board, National Credit Union
Administration.
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Chapter 1
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set out in the preamble,
the ace amends chapter I of title 12 of
the Code of Federal Regulations a8 set
forth below:
of 31 U.S.C. 5318(1) and the
implementing regulation jointly
promulgated by the OCC and the
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR
103.121, which require a customer
identification program to be
implemented as part of the BSA
compliance program required under this
section.
*
Dated: April 17. 2003.
JohD D. Hawk., Jr.,
Comptrollerofthe CWTency.
Federal R.eserve System
12 CFR Chapter 11
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set out in the preamble.
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System amends 12 CFR Chapter
II as follows:
PART 208-MEMBERSHIP OF STATE
BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
(REGULATION H)
• 1. The authority citation for part 208
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 24, 24a. 36, 92a, 93a.
248(a), 248(c), 321-338a, 371d, 461. 481-486,
601, 611, 1814. 1816. 1818, 1820(d)(9),
1823ij),1828(o),1831. 18310, 1831p-l.
1831r-l, 1831w, 1831x, 1835a. 18430), 1882,'
2901-2907, 3105, 3310, 3331-3351. and
3906-3909; 15 U.S.C. 78b, 781(b), 781(g),
781(i), 780-4(c)(5), 78q, 78q-1, and 78w; 31
U.S.C. 5318; 42 U.S.C. 4012a. 4104a. 4104b.
4106, and 4128.
• 2. Revise § 208.63(b) to read as follows:
1208.83 Procedures for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act compliance.
*
(b) Establishment ofBSA compliance
program. (1) Program requirement. Each
bank shall develop and provide for the
continued administration of a program
reasonably designed to ensure and
monitor compliance with the
recordkeeping and reporting
requirements set forth in subchapter II
of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code, the Bank Secrecy Act, and the
implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder by the Department of the
Treasury at 31 CFR part 103. The
compliance program shall be reduced to
writing, approved by the board of
directors, and noted in the minutes.
(2) Customer identification program.
Each bank is subject to the requirements
of 31 U.S.C. 5318(1) and the
implementing regulation jointly
promulgated by the Board and the
Department olthe Treasury at 31 CFR
103.121, which require a customer
identification program to be
**
address. date of birth, and other information
that will allow us to identify you. We may
also ask to see your driver's license or other
identifying documents.
(6) Reliance on another financial
institution. The eIP may include
procedures specifying when a bank will
rely on the performance by another
financial institution (including an
affiliate) of any procedures of the bank's
CIP, with respect to any customer of the
bank that is opening, or has opened, an
account or has established a similar
formal banking or business relationship
with the other financial institution to
provide or engage in services, dealings,
or other financial transactions, provided
that:
(i) Such reliance is reasonable under
the circumstances;
(il) The other financial institution is
subject to a rule implementing 31 U.S.C.
5318(h) and is regulated by a Federal
functioDalreguJator;and
(iii) The other financial institution
enters into a contract requiring it to
certify annually to the bank that it has
implemented its anti-money laundering
program, and that it will perfonn (or its
agent will perform) the specified
requirements of the bank's CIP.
(c) Exemptions. The appropriate
Federal functional regulator, with the
concurrence of the Secretary, may, by
order or regulation, exempt any bank or
type of account from the requirements
of this section. The Federal functional
regulator and the Secretary shall
consider whether the exemption is
consistent with the purposes of the
Bank Secrecy Act and with safe and
sound banking, and may consider other
appropriate factors. The Secretary will
make these determinations ·for any bank
or type of account that is not subject to
the authority of a Federal functional
regulator.
(dlOther requirements unaffected.
Nothing in this section relieves a bank
of its obligation to comply with any
other provision in this part, including
provisions concerning information that
must be obtained, verified, or
maintained in connection with any
account or transaction.
Dated: April 28. 2003.
Jam. F. Sloan,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network.
Dated: April 17, 2003.
In concurrence:
John D. Hawke, Jr.,
Comptroller a/the Currency.
In concurrence:
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.implemented as part of the BSA
compliance program required under this
section.
PART 211-INTERNATIONAL
BANKING OPERATIONS
(REGULATION K)
• 1. The authority citation for part 211 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 221 et seq., 1818,
1835a, 1841 et seq., 3101 et seq., and 3901
et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 6801 and 6805; 31 U.S.C.
5318.
• 2. In § 211.5, add new paragraph (m) to
read as follows:
1211.5 Edge and agreem.nt corporations.
(m) Procedures for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act compliance.
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Customer identification program.
Each Edge or agreement corporation is
subject to the requirements of 31 U.S.C.
5318(1) and the implementing regulation
jointly promulgated by the Board and
the Department of the Treasury at 31
CFR 103.121, which require a customer
identification program.
• 3. In § 211.24, add new paragraph (j) to
read as follows:
t 211.24 Approval of offIcM of foreign
banks; procedurea for .pllcatlons;
standarda for approval; ........ntativ.
office activities and standards for approval;
p,..."atlon of existing authority.
(n Procedures for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act compliance. .
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Customer identification program.
Except for a federal branch or a federal
agency or a state branch that is insured
by the FDIC, a branch, agency, or
representative office of a foreign bank
operating in the United States is subject
to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5318(1)
and the implementing regulation jointly
promulgated by the Board and the
Deparbnent of the Treasury at 31 CPR
103.121, which require a customer
identification program.
By order of the Board of Govemors of the
Federal Reserve System, April 21. 2003.
JeJUlifer J. Jolmson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
12 CFR Chapter 111
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set out in the preamble,
the FDIC amends title 12, chapter ill of
the Code of Federal Regulations, as set
forth below:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
1513.177 Procedure. for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act (BIA) complia~c••
* * * * *
(b) Establishment ofa BSA
compliance program. (1) Program
requirement. Each savings association
shall develop and provide for the
continuedadmimsuationofapro~mn
reasonably designed to assure and
monitor compliance with the
recordkeeping and reporting
requirements set forth in subchapter n
of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code and the implementing regulations
issued by the Department of the
Treasury at 31 CFR part 103. The
compliance program must be written,
approved by the savings association's
board of directors, and reflected in the
minutes of the savings association.
(2) Customer identification program.
Each savings association is subject to
the requirements of 31 u.s.e. 5318(1)
and the implementing regulation jointly
promulgated by the OTS and the
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR
103.121, which require a customer
identification program to be
implemented as part of the BSA
compliance program required under this
section.
Dated: April 9, 2003.
J..... Eo Gilleran,
Director, Office a/Thrift SupelVision.
National Credit Union Administration
12 CFR Chapter VH
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set out in the preamble.
NCUA amends title 12, chapter vn of the
Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth
below:
PART 748-SECURITY PROGRAM.
REPORT OF CRIME AND
CATASTROPHIC ACT AND BANK
SECRECY ACT COMPLIANCE
• 1. The authority citation for part 748 is
revised to read 88 follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.e. 1766(a). 1186(q); 15
U.S.C. 6801 and 6805(b): 31 U.S.C. 5311 and
5318.
• 2. In § 748.2:
• A. Revise the section heading; and
• B. Revise paragraph (b) to read as fol-
lows:
§ 748.2 Procedures for monitoring Bank
Secrecy Act (BIA) compliance.
(b) Establishment ofa BSA
compliance program. (1) Program
requirement. Each federally-insured
credit union shall develop and provide
for the continued adminisuation of a
By order of the Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation this
16th day of April. 2003.
Valerie J. Best,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
OfficeofThriftSupernswn
12 CFR Chapter V
Authority and Issuance
• For the reasons set out in the preamble,
OTS amends title 12, chapter V of the
Code of Federal Regulations, as set forth
below:
PART 326-Mlnlmum security Devices
and Procedure. and Bank Secrecy Act
Compliance
• 1. The authority citation for part 326 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1813, 1815. 1811,
1818, 1819 (Tenth), 1881-1883; 31 U.S.C.
5311-5314 and 5316-5332.2.
• 2. Revise § 326.8(b) to read as follows:
1326.8 Bank Secrecy Act compliance.
* *.. * * *
(b) Compliance procedures. (1)
Program requirement. Each bank shall
develop and provide for the continued
administration of a program reasonably
designed to assure and monitor
compliance with recordkeeping and
reporting requirements set forth in
subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31,
United States Code and the
implementing regulations issued by the
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR
part 103. The compliance program shall
be written, approved by the bank's
board of directors, and noted in the
minutes.
(2) Customer identification program.
Each bank is subject to the requirements
of 31 U.S.C. 5318(1) and the
implementing regulation jointly
promulgated by the FDIC and the
Department of the Treasury at 31 CFR
103.121, which require a customer
identification program to be
implemented 8S part of the Bank
Secrecy Act compliance program
required under this section.
* * * * *
PART 563-SAVINGS
ASSOC~T~N&-OPERATIONS
• 1. The authority citation for part 563 is
revised to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 375b, 1462, 1462a,
1463.1464, 1467a, 1468,1811.1820,1828,
18310, 3806; 31 U.S.C. 5318; 42 U.S.C. 4106.
• 2. In § 563.177:
• A. Revise the section heading; and
• B. Revise paragraph (b) to read 8S fol-
lows:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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program reasonably designed to assure
and monitor compliance with the
recordkeeping and recording
requirements set forth in subchapter II
of chapter 53 of title 31. United States
Code and the implementing regulations
issued by the Department of the
Treasury at 31 CFR part 103. The
compliance program must be written,
approved by the credit union's board of
directors, and reflected in the minutes
of the credit union.
(2) Customer identification program.
Each federally-insured credit union is
subject to the requirements of 31 U.S.C.
5318(1) and the implementing regulation
jointly promulgated by the NCUA and
the Department of the Treasury at 31
CFR 103.121, which require a customer
identification program to be .
implemented 88 part of the BSA
compliance program required under this
section.
25113
* * *
Dated: Aprll 7. 2003.
Becky Babr.
Secretaryofthe Board, National Credit Union
Administration.
[FRDoc. 03-t1019 Filed 5-8-03; 8:45 am]
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE ~EASURY
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
IN THE MATTER OF
RIGGS BANK, N.A.
ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL MONEY PENALTY
I. INTRODUCTION
No. 2004-01
The Secretary of the United States Department·ofthe Treasury has delegated to
the Director of the Financial Crimes Enfor~ementNetwork ("FinCEN") the authority to
detennine whether a financial institution has violated the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 USC
§§S311 et!tUl. and 31 CFR Part 103 thereunder ("BSA"), and what, if any, sanction is
appropriate.
In order to resolve this matter, and only for that purpose, Riggs Bank N.A.
("Riggs") has entered into a CONSENT TO THE ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTY ("CONSENT") dated May 13, 2004, without admitting or denying FinCEN's
determinations described in Sections III and IV below, except as to jurisdiction in Section
II below, which is admitted.
The CONSENT is incorporated into this ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL MONEY
PENALTY ("ASSESSMENT") by this reference.
II. JURISDICTION
Riggs is the principal subsidiary ofRiggs National Corporation, a publicly traded
bank holding company based in Washington, D.C. As ofDecember 31,2003, Riggs had
assets of approximately $6 billion, deposits of$4.29 billion, and stockholders' equity of
$427.2 million. Riggs is a "financial institution" and a "bank" within the meaning of31
USC §S312(a){2) and 31 CFR §103.11. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(the "OCC") is Riggs' primary federal supervisory agency and examines Riggs for BSA
compliance.
III. FINDINGS
A. Summary of Violations
FinCEN has determined that Riggs willfully violated. the suspicious activity and
currency transaction reporting requirements of the BSA and its implementing regulations,
and that Riggs has willfully violated the anti-money laundering program ("AML
program") requirement of the BSA and its implementing regulations. The violations
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Riggs engaged in were systemic - Riggs was deficient in designing a program tailored to
the risks of its business that would ensure appropriate reporting, implementing the
procedures it did have, and responding to classic "red flags" of suspicious conduct.
Riggs failed to correct the violations and implement an adequate BSA program in a
timely manner. Consequently, on July 16,2003, the ace entered into a comprehensive
Consent Order with Riggs to correct the deficiencies and referred the BSA violations to
FinCEN for a determination ofwheth~r a civil penalty was warranted. Since then,
however, additional violations occurred and the DCC is concurrently issuing a
supplemental Consent Order requiring additional corrective actions.
B. Violations ofthe Anti-Money Laundering Program Reguirements
FinCEN has detennined that Riggs has been in violation of the AML program
requirements ofthe BSA. As ofApril 24, 2002, the BSA has required banks to establish
an AML program to guard against money laundering. A bank regulated by a Federal
functional regulator is deemed to have satisfied the requirements of 31 USC §S318(h)(1)
if it implements and maintains an AML program that complies with the regulation of its
Federal functional regulator governing such programs. 31 CFR §l03.120. Since January
27, 1987, the oce has required each bank under its supervision to establish and maintain
a BSA compliance program that, at a minimum: (a) provides for a system of internal
controls to ensure ongoing compliance; (b) provides for independent testing for
compliance conducted by bank personnel or an outside party; (c) designates an individual
or individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance; and
(d) provides training for appropriate personnel. 12 CFR §21.21(c).
Riggs' program contained serious deficiencies and was not in compliance with the
BSA regulations. In January 2003, Riggs' program was deficient in all four elements
required by the AML program regulation. Some ofthe internal control and audit
deficiencies continued after the DCC's Consent Order was issued. These deficiencies are
described in detail below.
I. Internal Controls
Riggs' system ofintemal controls was inadequate to ensure ongoing compliance
with the BSA across all business lines. Riggs' internal controls were not designed to take
into account the exposure posed by the customers, products, services, and accounts from
high-risk international geographic locations that are commonly.viewed as high-risk for
money laundering. Indeed, Riggs' internal controls proved insufficient to detect and
monitor risk, or to alert the bank to the need to take preventive or corrective action when
the risk materialized.
Riggs did not implement an effective system to identify and assess the BSAlAML
risk present throughout the institution. The risk matrices used in some ofRiggs'
divisions all contained similar criteria, rather than being tailored to the particular lines of
business on a risk-graded basis, which weakened their effectiveness. As a result,
management was unable to defme and analyze concentrations of risk in the accounts,
customers, locations, and products ofRiggs.
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Riggs' customer due diligence program was weak and was not implemented in an
effective or consistent manner. Certain areas ofRiggs failed to acquire or to use the
bank's account opening and customer activity information collection procedures.
Further, customer due diligence information required by Riggs' policies and procedures
was frequently missing. As a result, Riggs failed to identify a large number ofaccounts
associated with the governments of two foreign countries. Moreover, Riggs' enhanced
due diligence policies and procedures governing high-risk areas were weak Of, in some
cases, nonexistent. High-risk areas include high-risk transactions such as transactions
payable upon proper identification ("PUPID"), high-risk customers such as check cashers
and money remitters, and accounts involving high-risk international geographic locations
including international private banking, embassy banking, politically exposed persons,
and non-resident aliens. On two occasions, although Riggs' management said that the
institution had discontinued PUPID transactions, Riggs allowed the transactions to
continue.
Riggs also failed to implement adequate internal controls to ensure the
identification ofsuspicious transactions and the timely filing ofcomplete suspicious
activity reports ("SARs") on reportable transactions. Riggs did not effectively use
procedures and automated technology already in place to identify and review suspicious
cash, monetary instruments, or wire activity. Riggs did not have procedures or internal
controls to ensure that subpoenas and other government requests regarding
accountholders were referred to the division responsible for investigating potential
suspicious activity.
Finally, internal controls were lacking in Riggs' management of its largest
banking relationship, which involved the accounts ofa foreign government, its politically
exposed persons, and the companies owned by such persons (described section III.C.3.
below). There was insufficient staff and procedures to monitor the accounts and a lack of
oversight over the account relationship manager and his staff. ~ese problems continued
even after numerous warning signs indicated that Riggs needed to take corrective action.
2. Independent Testing
Riggs did not implement an adequate system for independent testing ofBSA
compliance. The independent testing for compliance with the BSA was neither timely
nor effective for the level ofrisk within Riggs. The internal audit could not verify that
management's corrective action for identified deficiencies were effective or timely. In
addition, the scope ofthe audit failed to include an evaluation ofthe areas ofmoney
laundering vulnerabilities, BSA compliance, or the suspicious activity reporting process.
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3. Designation of Individuales> to Coordinate and Monitor
Compliance
Riggs also lacked effective monitoring for compliance by the BSA officer. Day-
to-day oversight and monitoring ofhigh-risk transactions, high-risk customers, and high-
risk geographies were minimal. Strategies and alternative measures to ensure ongoing
BSAlAML monitoring for suspicious transactions were not adequately developed and
applied. In addition, the person(s) responsible for BSA compliance at Riggs failed to
adequately monitor, identify, investigate, analyze, and report suspicious activity.
4. Training Appropriate Personnel
Training on monitoring and detecting suspicious activity was particularly weak at
Riggs. For example, bank officer visits to customer business locations did not include
assessments ofBSAIAML risk factors. In addition, branch personnel most familiar with
accounts held by money services businesses ("MSBs") were unaware ofthe factors that
typically are associated with suspicious activity and the new BSA registration
requirements for MSBs.
In summary, Riggs failed to develop and maintain an effective BSA compliance
program in violation .of 12 CFR § 21.21(c) and, thus, failed to establish and implement an
adequate AML program in violation of § S318(h)(1) of the BSA and its implementing
regulation, 31 CFR § 103.120. Riggs' faulty AML program resulted in its violation of
the suspicious actiyity and currency transactions reporting requirements of the BSA, as
discussed below.
C. Violations ofthe SAR Reguirements
FinCEN has determined that from 2000 through 2003, Riggs violated the SAR
requirements of the BSA set forth in 31 USC §S318(g) and 31 CFR §103.18 by failing to
file or by delinquently filing approximately 33 SARs. These 33 SARs represent at least
$98 million in suspicious transactions. 1 .
1. SAR Requirements
A bank must report any transaction involving or aggregating to at least $5,000
that it "knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect" (i) involves funds derived from illegal
activities or is conducted to disguise funds derived from illegal activities, (ii) is designed
to evade the reporting or recordkeeping requirements of the BSA <Y:., structuring
transactions to avoid currency transaction reporting) or (iii) "has no business or apparent
lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would normally be
expected to engage, and the bank knows ofno reasonable explanation for the transaction
1 These SARs report transactions and categories oftransactions described below. Generally, RialS' SAR
program suffered from a lack oftimeliness. FinCEN's review ofSARs filed by Riggs from February 2000
through April 2004 disclosed an additional 61 SARs that were filed more than 60 days after the suspicious
activity occurred.
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after examining the available facts, including the background and possible purpose ofthe
transaction." 31 USC §S318(g) and 31 CFR §l03.18.
The SAR regulation requires a bank to file SARs ''to the extent and in the manner
required by this section" by "completing" a SAR Form. 31 CFR §103.18(a). A bank
must file a SAR no later than 30 calendar days after the date of initial d~tection of facts
that may constitute a basis for filing a SAR. 31 CFR §103.18(b)(3) and Instructions to
SAR Form, TO F 90-22.47. Ifno suspect is identified on the date of the detection ofthe
incident requiring the filing, a bank may delay filing a SAR for an additional 30 calendar
days to identify a suspect In no case is reporting to be delayed more than 60 calendar
days after the date of initial detection of a reportable transaction. When filing a SAR, a
bank must provide a detailed description ofwhy the transaction was unusual, irregular, or
suspicious in the narrative section ofthe form. Part V, SAR Form, TO F 90-22.47. The
form requires "a chronological and complete account" ofthe transaction. The form
emphasizes that the narrative description "is critical" and that the care with which it is
written "may determine whether or not the described conduct and its possible criminal
nature are clearly understood" by law enforcement.
To comply with the SAR rule, a bank must be able to determine whether
transactions are in fact reportable. Therefore, a bank is required to have in place systems
to identify the kinds of transactions and accounts that may be a high risk for money
laundering or that exhibit indicia of suspicious activity, considering the type ofproducts
and services it offers and the nature of its customers. Otherwise, a bank cannot assure
that it is in fact reporting suspicious transactions as required by the BSA.2 In this case,
the record shows that Riggs had information about its customers and their transactions
that caused it to "know, suspect, or have reason to suspect" that many transactions were
reportable suspicious transactions. However, Riggs failed to report these transactions,
delinquently reported them, andlor filed incomplete reports because Riggs' procedures to
identify, analyze, and report suspicious activity were either non-existent or not
implemented. As a result, Riggs violated the SAR requirements of 31 USC §S318(g) and
31 CFR §103.18.
2. Basic Deficiencies in SAR Procedures and Filings
As noted above, subpoenas and other matters were not appropriately referred for
investigation. As a result, Riggs failed to identify for review accounts in which
suspicious activity might be occurring. The SARs that were eventually filed by Riggs
reported activity that occurred two to three years before the date of filing.
Structuring, which is the breaking up of transactions for the purpose ofevading
the BSA reporting and recordkeeping requirements, is often indicative of underlying
illegal activity. It is also unlawful under the BSA. See 31 USC §S324. Structuring is
one of the most basic situations that an effective SAR program should be designed to
detect and report.3 Riggs failed to discover that several customers had been structuring
2 ~Matter ofKorea Exchange Bank, No. 2003·04 (June 24, 2003).
3 ~Matter ofWestern Union, No. 2003·2 (March 6, 2003).
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transactions. These instances included the regular structuring ofcash deposits into the
bank, as well as the structuring ofmoney order purchases. Riggs belatedly filed SARs on
these transactions. However, most of these SARs were deficient because the narrative
descriptions of the transactions were sparse and conclusory. Rather than providing
specific information on the type, timing, and amount ofactivity observed in each
account, Riggs simply stated that there was an appearance of structuring. Riggs also
failed to report the total dollar amount allegedly structured in each account. Such
deficiencies make it difficult for law enforcement to evaluate whether the activity
described in the SAR is worth pursuing.4
3. EmbasSY Banking/Intemational Private Banking Relationships
Extensive and frequent suspicious cash, monetary instrument, and wire activity at
Riggs occurred within the accounts held by the government of a foreign country,
politically exposed persons oftbat country, and the companies owned by such persons,
where very little monitoring ofactivity was performed by the bank. Within this
relationship, there were a number of transactions that exhibited classic indicators of
suspicious activity, or at a minimum lacked any reasonable business or economic
purpose, but were never identified and reported. These transactions included:
- aggregate cash withdrawals from the accounts of the government, politically
exposed persons, and government employees that totaled tens ofmillion ofdollars
over a 2-year period, the majority ofwhich were conducted through PUPID
transactions;
- dozens of sequentially n\llt1bered international drafts drawn from a politically
exposed person's account on 3 dates over a 2-month period, totaling millions of
dollars, and made payable to the account holder, which were returned to Riggs for
crediting back to the account; aDd
- dozens of sequentially numbered cashier's checks purchased from the same
above-listed account on 3 different dates over a period of six months, totaling tens
of millions of dollars, and made payable to the account holder, half ofwhich were
returned to Riggs for deposit back into the account.
Riggs also railed to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activity related to the
accounts of another foreign government, its politically exposed persons, and the
companies owned by such persons. This was among Riggs' largest depository
relationships; however, the relationship manager for these accounts had little or no
supervision. Riggs failed to monitor the activity in these accoun~, despite various
indicators in early 2003 that should have alerted it to the high-risk nature of the
relationship, including publication ofa newspaper article alleging official corruption and
Riggs' receipt ofa subpoena requiring documents regarding the relationship.5
Meanwhile, Riggs failed to implement controls or monitor the ongoing activity.
4 SB Matter ofGreat Eastern Bank ofFlorida, No. 2002-02 (Sept. 4, 2002).
5 Guidance on applying scrutiny to situations ofthis type has been available for some time. ~ Guidance
on Enhanced ScNuny for Transactions that May Involve the Proceeds ofForeign Corruption (January
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As a result of these deficiencies, 'Riggs could not properly identify, evaluate, and
report suspicious activity occurring in the relationship, including activity by its .
employee, the relationship manager. Riggs failed to discover that the relationship
manager had signatory authority over two accounts within the relationship, received
funds from a government account within the relationship, and failed to file SARs on a
timely basis. Examples of the relationship manager's suspicious transactions with
respect to this relationship include:
- alteration ofa check from the account of a politically exposed person who is the
relative of a government official; and
- over $1 million in wire transfers from accounts owned by the government into the
account of a private investment corporation owned by the relationship manager at
another U.S. bank.
Riggs also failed to identify, evaluate, and report on suspicious activity occurring
in the accounts owned by the government involving transactions by and for the benefit of
politically exposed persons, including:
- cash deposits into the account ofa private investment corporation owned by a
poli~ical1y exposed person who is a government official, totaling millions of
dollars, over a 2-year period; and
- wire transfers, totaling hundreds ofthousands ofdollars, from a government
account to the personal account of another government official who had signature
authority over the government account.
D. Violations of the CTR Requirements
FinCEN has determined that Riggs violated the BSA currency transaction
reporting requirements set forth at 31 CFR §103.27(d) by failing to provide accurate
information or omitting information on numerous currency transaction reports ("CTRs").
Under the BSA, banks are required to file eTRs for transactions in currency greater th"an
$10,000 in a single day. 31 USC §S313 and 31 CFR §l03.22. Banks are required to file
CTRs in the form prescribed by the Secretary ofthe Treasury and provide all the
information called for by the form. 31 CFR §103.27(d).
The eTRs filed by Riggs on two markets did not contain the accurate legal names
ofthose businesses. Over a one-year period, Riggs filed 90 CTRs representing $6
million for one market and 52 CTRs representing $1.3 million for the other market. The
businesses had been long-standing customers ofRiggs before Riggs began filing CTRs
with their accurate legal names.
Riggs' failure to collect, document, and verify customer and account information
resulted in its failure to provide accurate information on 6 CTRs filed on a company
2001), which was jointly issued by the Departments ofthe Treasury and State, the OCC, the Federal
Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office ofThrift Supervision.
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owned by a politically exposed person who is a foreign government official. In the
eTRs, Riggs reported the company's line of business as the export ofiimber, although
the entity was actually a private investment company holding the personal investments of
a politically exposed person who is a foreign government official. Together, the 6 CTRs
revealed S11.5 million in cash deposited over 2 years.
E. Willful Nature ofBSA Violations
FinCEN has determined that Riggs' violations ofthe BSA and its implementing
regulations were willful. The conduct ofa bank may be characterized as willful if it
demonstrates a reckless disregard for its obligations under law or regulation. As an
OCC-supervised bank, Riggs was aware ofthe AML program, SAR, and CTR
requirements of the BSA and its implementing regulations. Riggs' failure to establish
and implement a BSAlAML program adequate to meet its suspicious activity and·
currency transaction reporting requirements constitute systemic violations demonstrating
a reckless disregard of its obligations under the BSA.
Riggs' willfulness is further demonstrated by its failure to correct identified
deficiencies. The OCC deemed Riggs' BSA compliance systemically deficient in 2003
and thus entered into a Consent Order with Riggs on July 16,. 2003. However, Riggs is
not in full compliance with the acc's July 2003 Consent Order. Riggs' failure to
establish and implement an adequate BSA·compliance program, followed by its failure to
correct deficiencies identified by its primary Federal regulator, is a pattern ofconduct
indicative ofwillfulness.
IV. CIVIL MONEY PENALTY
FinCEN has determined that by failing (1) to establish and implement an adequate
AML program, (2) to file timely, accurate, and complete SARs, and (3) to file accurate
and complete CTRs as described in Section III, above, Riggs willfully violated the AML
program, SAR, and CTR provisions of the BSA and a civil money penalty is due
pursuant to 31 USC §S321 and 31 CFR §103.S7(t). In light of the seriousness of the
violations, their continuing and ongoing nature, the potential harm they pose to the
public, and taking into account the financial resources ofRiggs, FinCEN has determined
that the appropriate penalty amount in this matter is $25 million.
V. CONSENT TO ASSESSMENT
In order to resolve this matter, and only for that purpose, Riggs, without
admitting or denying either the facts or determinations described in Sections III and IV
above, except as to jurisdiction in Section II, which is admitted, consents to the
assessment of a civil money penalty against it in the sum of$25 million. This penalty
assessment shall be concurrent with the $25 million penalty assessed against Riggs by the
OCC. The penalty assessment ofFinCEN and the oce referenced above shall be
satisfied by one payment of525 million to the Department of the Treasury.
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Riggs agrees to pay the amount of $25 million upon the assessment ofthe civil
money penalty. Such payment shall be:
a. made by certified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order or by
wire;
b. made payable to the United States Department ofthe Treasury;
c. any check or money order or copy of the wire transfer must be hand-
delivered or sent by overnight mail to Nicholas A. Procaccini, Assistant
Director and Chief Financial Officer, FinCEN, 2070 Chain Bridge Road,
Suite 200, Vienna, Virginia 22182; and
d.' submitted under a cover letter, which references the caption and file
number in this matter.
Riggs recognizes and states that it entered into the CONSENT freely and
voluntarily and that no offers, promises, or inducements ofany nature whatsoever were
made by FinCEN or any employee, agent, or representative ofFinCEN to induce Riggs
to enter into the CONSENT, except for those specified in the CONSENT.
Riggs understands and agrees that the CONSENT embodies the entire agreement
between Riggs and FinCEN relating to this enforcement matter only, as described in
Section III above. Riggs further understands and agrees that there are no express or
implied promises, representations, or agreements between Riggs and FinCEN other than
those expressly set forth or referred to in the CONSENT and that nothing in the
CONSENT or this ASSESSMENT is binding on any other agency ofgovernment,
whether federal, state, or local.
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VI. RELEASE
Riggs understands that its execution ofthe CONSENT and compliance with the
terms of this ASSESSMENT and the CONSENT constitute a complete settlement of civil
liability for reporting and recordkeeping violations of the BSA, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, which were identified by the oce prior to the date hereof.
By: Ilsll
William J. Fox, Director
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
U.S. Department ofthe Treasury
Date: May 13, 2004
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,id.enyiDJFulCEN's determiDations ciescribod:~s~,m'and lVbolOw. cx"lJll;.to,
jurisdiction in SeictionlIlbclow. wbidfisadnU1tccL " , , '
Tbe,CONSBNTi$,~ into'this ASSESS~;OFCIV1LMONEY
PENALTV r"ASSDsMBN:r)by this refcrcoce. '
n. lURISDICl10N
Botheoti~~~~~~~~a:::~~~=)"
Baneo1pOrationbat:Issct$:.t~y$4S.6~.~tsof$jO.4bil~'~'
stoekholders'cquityofS3.2bilIioD. AmSOuth,isa ~a1il!Stitutionn and••"barlk"
within the mcaningof31 U$Q'S3l2(.)(2) and31CFR §lO$WU. TheBoard,.:of
Governors oftho F~Re.erve8Ystem (the ''FecIc:lra1,;~')is AmSout!l'sprirr.tary
t'e&:ral . ,," '" 'anchxaminesAmSouthfor;;Bd~'Act co ~supervISOr)' aaeocY ' ", ", v-a_:T rnp "
In. PINeal'S DS'fiIIQNATlONS
A. SnDunaryofViolatig
FiriCEN bis~tbatAmSouthwiWUl1yvioJ"' ••~
launderingprogra$_~OUs~vitynportin&~"""tsof_Bank Secrecy
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Act andi1SimpJementiAl~. AmSouth~.deve1op an anti-mo.-y
1.llnderi.n1prOsnm:;~tCr_'.ofits~and~ly_gntA,'as
,:OW:~:~~eJ:e=r:ee~u::'::=::=;.
PrPsramlackeciadequatebqardand~q~:_acedi:~lIY;bnpl~
pc4icies::",~ across tbe'Barik;'fOplW.)Vi40:tb.r~,";dili~;fID6;;
.~ ofwapicious aetivity"infonnation.Ja:edllde4uate~;tO ~¢OmPtiance.
andhada;materially dc~i.:lntC\!~.laUditprocess'that ~:tO~,,,
'it.wIequacles., Theresu1t_,~~tedpmaralllmwbi,Ci':_ of.'''BaPk ha.i,
iIWmi'1ationoD suspiciousactimythat was neverc:ommnaicltedtotbolel1lSp9.w&!e fOr
....~Ac:t,c»mpliance;~,systemic~_in AmSouth's_~
,1aun4triJr&1'~&mn resuu.~:inAmSotith·s faitureto timelytilcsuspicioUl,adivity
reporti';m.'cirCU1tlShInCC;S~the'Bank was awareor~lJSaetivitYbyllS
'<:UStom~ Fin<:m-f:has .1Uc1Od'lhat these failwea,~,aavil~ty.to be"
asaaaedconcum=ndY ,Withute,civil:~ty by theF~'~' ~currently~,
this CON'SENr••FederaJ~e uenteringjmo.ja~_y.eec.o Q~
'OrdorandOrderofAssessment,ot"aCivilM'" 'Peni1h1with:~ ,"" ", in" _ ,,"'__",",,',,""" ,,' ODCY".. "J ';';:;":',"
additiorl'to paymcntofa¢j,Vij,• .,lty.COIrecUve ac~to~'MDSouth·iotO
cOmplianee,with its,8ant~'-y,,:AetobliptiODS.
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oversiaJU. AmSouth·se$pl~traiDing was insufJicieltt.withbotb;~ ..
.stafTlad(ittgaclearu~Qt~ obtiptioDa.~toaccomp1isbthem.
Finally. the inc1ependCnt••t.~was inadCquIte.·ThcIlJe~ieacies are described
in·tiu:ther4etail~.
1. _ ....Coo.tmls
AmSoufltfmled to dcvolopandilnp~adequate inte:mal policicsdriCedures.·
and~ls toensuro,~~~Withthe Bd~AtCpd its' . lc:animn.. . ... ~'. ..... . ...--~ ... 1IDP. g
fOIPJhitions. AmSouthdidnor,meefu.lega). obligatiQas1oasess the~·srisbor
.. WlncnbiJiues'tOmoncy laundering andtaroristfinlnciri&l11dto tailoritspoUt;;i~
. procedureS. an<leontrol$\~y.Withtbe exception ofitaprivatebatllciQC'line of
businCss. AmSoulb,~'tij~.risk assessm_of.~erb8lleto:identifY
catOpicsofb.ijlHiskc~produets.and ~;·JocationL}theBank.la~kcd
~tO;iaentilY~momto.rCU$l~widl""'~ve~to~··~
the activity VI< . . ..'..•:" ., "' ..Tbi$.·:.~lledili . ····Rilure re.suk.::;a:,in.·:a;.;;'BankJs. iriatiility to. as Sf.IIPJCl~ .. . .~... ge:nce... '. I~. .W!'i .. .. . .
tailor its duedili~,p~.'appropria.tcto~vQDI'~ ~,rlJl.posed by
its customcnriDdUdingdIe·c:rationoferahanced_"'~procedlas Wbere
warren~ ItalsOpreveiltedAmSouthBo.m~,.~forJIDnitGring.,·
trm$8Ctiora8 ofhigh-risJ.U.DletSto 4etermine'if.....11 activitY.~~
with,,~ected·aetivitY.tlldt9r~.uyapplteDt.bUsiitess:or••lepl·purpasc;.
ThcBank...~ "....6 . ··'I:;"'_A· ro t....t.d:,~_. intomalcontrols end$,-~~cnngp gmm~~,........ ....
'~·ro~inj1)Ui"'JOI1erated'bya1J""C)f"Bank's~,,8Dd
.araneots,tbat_.~tO"eoablethe~'olappropriate:aue diligence,
bicludingcomJ)~with Socti~314(a)ofthc PattiPt~¢SpccificaUy, systems used
lUbe Bankt.brimChosror~'~~tssoldto non-accowuhotden
w~not1Wlymt~wijJI.'-'B,ank·sl)'SfCin'tor ~.toMqueatlsem by
Fmc.ENwtder~31.i)of.'_Patriot Act.~.'.:taet 1hat·such rccordsmust
bemaintaiD.ed.• ,••BankQ.~...... ··Actt.:--.·.......·· • D.......uld .. ..1..._:..._ whether. .... ----7. comp~&&J'lii'.~co not-...a-
the scopeofUl:Section:314(a)seard1eswas.~formon«arY.~t
transactiOnS.t • ... ". ..• ..•. edt and reporlJgeoeratcd,~vIriousclOpartmcnts not
directly involvedmBaOk' . Act eompliance.butwbid'~infonn the
Bank ofsuspiciollSaetivityoccurringwithin it(e.g..".:~pDoarepon$. Jtaud and loss
·prcv~OIi mordlbringh:~DOtreguladypm~ ••tOBaDkSecrec.YAct complianeeor
·CorpotateSecurity~.tOrappropriatoacdon.Forexampte.·tlte U;pl Dc.partmcat
bad no system irlp~to·••BankSecrecyActco~~'~e1t1)Wbpoenasand
inConnation req_it received ftom·law~.,IlfcertDt ou.... it did not
provideillfomtatiOn to~.8ank ~h:t~Ji~od1otpo~,Security~1
abouUiUspicious aetivil¥,~'CbrouaJtlitiptionCtiVity·aadr:pr1S·~··ftosn
it,·wbidI was usedonly.'to~and ttl8nap.1iUgatod.~. 'w..)'of,tle,~
·Wi1hiaAmSouth·'1aCbd'ad~'~"-and·..I~ ..........,.··+. p ..,the.a""u,·. r'. .. . . . .. ~,r--- S\lJ-~~ . . . ~veryo
.information to9Pl'OPriatepersoDnel·mr.~OUIaetivi.'d~s.
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,,~~'·faile4·;tQ.~::and implcmcnt.~;:~',and-intemal
..~'-;1:~....~;:~:!.:~,.iDV~~and:~:of~~ious
~oDs.:1n.~~;~"~_!POU~esandp~.::~:~J
·:dW~~~===;::'ro:::::.~.:
dircctiDs:.einployee:'~:i~:~•.to admiiUstratively~~:~c~.farer~.;or.eOnduetan
.,iIwestipti~ an4:Wben to file·a·SAR=wen: inadequate.
Finally••~g·~~[:_~t(or·the:puq1OIe$.~:~o.toring::~(ro~ersight of .
. ·compliance·aetivii. W8S:materi*1lY defic'ient. ~UlJ.W:wri_:proetidures··for
.~~~=~~ma;:===·~~~eItt
'orB~.SeC~y::Ad compijai\~ \Vt1fi()ut adeq~:.~:bcMrd .aiJ4:~setDor
'.._t.cOmmittees:~D1e· Cot:oversoein&:." 'Or1:an ofthe:!Suspi.cious:aetiVity
identi~ __:~.~:eould.DOt:be::deetive~
2. TraiDina Appnmriate PeqpnneI.
,',AmSoutb·.m~!ip:!·_lacked:s.cient~o~~;~·
~Actconip.ce0I),11~~~large pIlt"bccause o£:_::~Uat~·~__:-
proamm.· ··BetO~:::pebruary 2004.:Am$outh did~not ..plQ~:;"~~de Qnir,s~~~
detectin8::~,~ fraud m~t:o~:rQrms ors_j.Q_~:_Jity foJ;;~fO~
,. Suspi~ous·:aCtiYity. repOrts Wtft not filed because_:~·units.~~ .er:~
op wbat.~iVitYw~.~.Many._~yea·:dIa:not~.~.:
,obJiptions. In faclj::.,~~~:~peratcd ....thc·.m~qn·:_:suspicjous
. .'-v.ity~\V~'riotreq~tt)'&fi~ed.unJes$,~~al_ ~:~'Bank.leading
, to ~l~JD·;~i..!bat:@.~iIlfa ..··:·~plOyees=:blcked.:suliC1ent kDo\VWge·
.·and;1~ence·to det_::_i~~;..,iciOUS·~Vity. .
3. 1rldepsgjentI_a tor:ComtJjIgee··.
implemal~:.k~='~U::"::===::~
en~.wi~ intcmal:..4it:of~.~~t~pU_Xf~~2OQ~i<aowev«.the
~~~==:==~ac:::~~~
compl~"~of.ciOus.activi~~ tbat.:~:-.ny fil~ ~::ia'resu1t,
the audit·didnot:;review. detectiOn' arid monitoring~i ....,__:and::teSt:~tially
~i.ciO~·:~ounts, .qri~:iau·.op~ JCIl~ C)t;:~::on.•:,veranackq~
ofAmSo1ith~s'anti~~!,..QDderiqpropD with~felpecriodetecd" ~<mitoril1l;_.
teportina suspici_:~Vijy~.:.~:~ audit didnotevaJ_:.mto~::~
t~dctami~ ifthey.were:9PrOPri.·0f·etrective.Thc·~:~di4'llOt:~·whetb.er
all. lCCOuDls..refteCtcd on··th:e.:moftitori~S.:tqJ01U recelVed1~~y::~~p~j-,.onnel;were ..
actuall .aaal~·and resu~, in dther . ~cious·aetiVity.: .. .. .4:1~·or;iu"""'~~ey 11~ . ~ ~~ ,,~
notations 9fthc reasons tbat·:.·~ty did not merit a....OJ.IS·lCdvJ~·.•rt.No
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~w_~y:, or tested fOr idc:ntifieationofsuspieioul activity.
The:auditthus waa:inc:aPaJi1* ..' ," ,. .. the1deqWICYoftheprooedures (or
monitorin&~ amlrepOrtinaSU$picious activity.·M~s review,of, and
'. quality:USU1'ItIICe OVCI', tho audit work~the f'iDdinpdocumented"andthe
condusions.l'el'Ide:Iedwere·iUdequate.
1DSU1Wtla1)'.AmSouth &iledtodevelop8Dd"~aBank,.recy Act
¢OQlpJi,nceplOgrarll,~.f.the size and complexi.,ofits:busi~in~aIioDf>r
',t2CFR 1;.-,".•63,,:"'"""" '·....... laiteato;~t.1isb and·", .,':'-~.. ','.' " ,· ....-uateanm.mcm."." '..... . l'~~ IoUYIIf .' ~1llIU unp ~ " .. . ~
.11UDdcdngp$grd'l inviOJation·,of§S3f8(b)(llof,.:BIu*:SecrecyAct'aJidits
imPlementing~~t:,:atil§;J03.120.Am$oUth·I:b:lidequate anti-money
IaDndering~:resultod,mmlations oftho auspicious activity reportiq
.JcquiremcntsoftheBank SecRcy Ad, as discu..secU)4~1OW.
C. Violttippt,,'.'SUJPicious ActiYkYRprtinI Reqyirgments
FinCEN'''~,QWAmSouth·~ tbe_icj(I~qvity;:~
~'ofthe'88nk'~Actand itsimp~!~'I~ODS,.~in 31
USC §S318(g):W:n CFR§103.18.,'Because of~~j,ifttdjili1yto~fyor
monitor m,p-osk:customers or tnDsactions effectiv,~:.~ideral RtSiIltvc's June,~
ex8~on coUld nol,iUadIy'all,traasaetionsmeritmgthefiUagof'''.~9Q:.vity
~".1'hc Cease and~:,QtdCf'd,lat AmSouthisenterig:'~unvlth ~:P.«leral
1laerYe'simuJtaIleOuslywithtDsCONSENTwiU~,~to~~ its
implementaliQft:OfprocedureSto ideAti1Y such circt)...~::tlid~tbeappropriate
fiJinp. Ho\VCWCro FinCEN bas idcntifiCdexamp~ot,Sip;litIntiDJta»ces ofsuspicious
actiVityknonto thtJJ.t.Qnwld~suspiciooi.vityieportSsIM:Juld bav~ been, but
were not .filed. wbiCiurecliscUiled,))elow. .
A bank"':teportao.y~tioninvolVing or~toat leIst.$5.000:_t
it"knows.:~orbas reason to suspect" (i) in~lves,~;~fronriUegal
. activi_,orjl'conduettld to4jsguise funds derivecl~i~:~viti .. (ul is designed
.to'~the'RportingQf'~t4keepingrequirema1tl'Of:~BiDk SccnlGY Act (J£.
.~trwae.~'tc>••~ tAnsaction:reportina).or (iii)·"bas no business
.:.parent"lawful,PJlPOlO:.;is,~tbe sort inwhich the particular cuStomer Would
.. Dorrna11ybCcxpcct~Ho ....,...xt'the bankknoW$~fl»~le~ for the
tranIactioa:.,examinina tlteawilible facts, includiJllthe backaroUDd'. possible
~4ftbe_saction." 31 USC§5318(J) and<$t¢Fk ii§103.IS.A;,bankmustfilc a
'reportnp"later.1han 30 caleadar days after the dale ofhlitW.detectiOl1offacts that may
CQI1IdHUtca_is for fiJins. 31CFR. §l03.1S<bH) andl'nstrulCti.oPltoSutpici.oUs
ACtiviW,Report Fo~TOF~22.47. Ilno suspcctisideotifilcl.'thc.weoflhe
. deteCtion 01 tho incident requirinStbe filin& a bank ma1'cJjlay tiling a report for an
additional '30 calendar days to identify.aauspect. Inno cUe is reporting to be~~
morethan 6Oca1endar days after the date ofinitialdetection ofa rc:portabJe.tnInIIdion.
1·51
In!c.s-~~,IIttdon. a bank should:QOtlfylawalf'orccment ofthe
aetivityby..~ but suehnotifieatiou does not~tho bank ofits oblipti01lto
file a_ciOGs activit)t,~
TO<:Om\'lywid1,~ rules. abailkmuif" able to determine whether
transaCtiOllS::,",m;:f8ct~Ie. ".Th.erefore. a~is'~ to have in place systems
to idcntify::cheilindS of trinsacti9na an4 lCC9unts.tbat_:~ ofa high risk iormoney
lauIndIringor thatexhlOit~ia:'9fsuspicio.. lCtiYityt considerinathe type ~products
and service.sAtoft"tN and the uatuRof'it$ euatometS.,~abank;,cIriQotlssurc
·that it is infaCt~n&$U$pi~ous·transaeti_as:8Cluired:by tb.eB8Dk~~ In
tltis caao, tberecoM'SboWs'.:1dl1South had infoJmatiOnabQ\&t itScust~:~'their
transactionstbat~ ittO:~~suspect. orhave~to...,ect .. that certain
'tnnsactions wetoreportablesuspicioUs transaetions._~) AmSouthfailcd to'rqxxt
'dleae transaeticms or.~Y,J'CPOrtcdthanbec"nsprocec:birestoidentUY*
'~and RpOrt,su5jiCj,~"i~weIe inaMqui.te. Asa:"'~ AmSOuUtmlated
3f1JSC§S318(g) ....31 eFR;:lt03.lB.
2..sjQ~esin$~ Actixi\)tRwrtiQsPmce4ures
g::HIiDII . .
~araultor_"",irtits anti",moneyJauncleriDa:pogram desctiQed above,
AmSoUth ngulady,:tailed!to~fclrreview lCCOU11tt:inwhicb suspiciousactmlY
mightbe,occ~ Even when perso!)DCll1 the ma;bUiiDess unilsha4know~ot
suspiciouS-'oVity in certain~Wlts,the Bank~I,Iack: ot~:a.ndIor~
.procOdura~ftenptev.cn*,~;~on hm;beiq;,~,~:tbc at__oCtIle
·penonsRl$pOnsi~"for·su.sPiCIousactivityreportin&;.:,In~"~BaukpersonneJ
inconectIy'~tbaK..repQltinawuilOtrequired~~_rioloss to
AmSouth. Inother~~Bank'personnel would DOtt'ilesuspic.ious activity
reports ona.etivUy,_IWJ':bCentCJ.honicaUy~·to,t.w~eu:mrt.2 The lack of
rnanapmeDtoYmisbtad.review ofthopropm~theso,.roblems.
3.JiumIJr4ofAmSouth·'R~Yjo1etjf!!l§
~Jailcd!totimely fileSU$picious actiVity~regardii1g the followina
Qbj~vclY l1ISpicious~tb';itsCustomerl:
.• Tbcpapetrttors .~• .fi:audulcnt inves«mem ~6il#ljncc;t~ounts at
Am$Oudl;;tOhandle Amdscontributedby~lin~AmSouth,di4'not
peifomtlldeq~~ ••f#mceonthe~. ..·eoWd~,teWaled
financial andprioi;~'problcmi.FUI'tiHlr. ..'. . . ipred ltd fl.
inc1udinsc:oncema,commumcated to BankJDIDaaematb;YaeVeral:mnp~at
".-,AmSoutb~indicatingtbelCCOUIltsWCl'Obeing USb:Iial\titberancc
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ofaPonzi scheme.;:.o.pite such warnings, AmSouthfiWedtofilea~
activity zeport,atiJ;~,Yemafter it knew or .t\ouktbave known about the
suspici<Ml$nature ortheaCtiv.Uy andmillioDsbadboeadepositcd and then
witbdrawn Dom rdatedacco..at~~·.Tbo~rnl1timatelywere
convictOd olmoney1aund~tDhnolley~ccmspiracy.
• The CbieCF4'a....;()fticer,ofan AmSouth colpOl'ltecustomcr~RV_
milliondpu.n'~;1bo~on overtbree'~usiD& forgcc:landltnProperly'
81I~4hccks ...AJtb9UIhAm80uth emp1o)WllOticecltbattbtChief
Ymal1ciaHH&erwM conducting'anmnberol'hishlyunusualtl'lmSaCtions.tbe
Bank didDbt tilca suspiciousdVity RpOrtbcc:auait suff«Ol1~loss.
• Anotbermatt« involved an emplpyoeolAmS_~~brokcr-dcalet who allegedly
cOimnittecFtraudin cHeats' accc)rints by,amona'Q1k tbinp,tOtging:eustomer
'" . onnumemusdocUlDClD.ts..The~ rtecUhis' 10#.~ '.' . ." ....•. ,". ,~ .... ,.erDp ...
misconduct to tho Nalioul'Association'ofSOcuritiesDcaleri~"). '.
broker«aler,aJso;.'.duty to report what itkDew;tobcqpi¢!ous,aetiyity'bf:'Us
own emplo)WlO::~~anditfaiH4.tod.o IO~ AmSouth,.aciDow~
that a SAR'Sbolillfhave"'filed indUSn.umer, and~yfiled: ••Stdt.
An employeeofa_;~pronnedhisown~and#left,~ an
account atAmSouthundertbenameorthe~"dba" (doing business as)
blWllO,oftho car dealersbip~Overa year.1flc..lo.~~edseveral
hund~..tthousanddol1ars worthoftbocb nuu:re,:~tetohi$;_loyerinto the
A!JISOutbaccoum. tbecmployerultimately:..etAmSouthconcemin& these
trabsactions. AmSouth bandledtbc litiptionwithoutconducting a review to
dCtamine wltedlet'aSARshouJd be~
• AniDdividualOJ**daD'audulentmulti·miIliOn4oJ1ar trading'operaUon for five
:YC*Ibeforebein&am=sted. More than S20milljOnin assets from investoraiJl;;tbe
proJI8IDwere ioan.in vatiousbanks, includinJ.AmSouth. AmSouthrecdved
securities and &lcluanp Commissioo and grant:l.jury subpocnassccking
infoJ:mationon~mafter.Months after the individualpJeaded~ (0 felony
cbaraes oftei:uritilN'fi:I.Ud.,money launderinl and wire fraud, A.1rJSoUthc1Oscd'-
last oflUaccoumawittiout;ever haviq filed a suspiciOUl activitYrepOrt.
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.• A·COlpOfIle~omer4~~ into its AmSoudt:8ccoUDt an::oflicial cbcck.:for
$120,000·~.ii~ ttS~ bank. Six.ys•. _':~omer:initiatecfa
wire··transferof-Sl••OOb·:fio_·.itsAmSoudl::~::tOa:bank:·•.·a·foreign
coun~~ All but $30tOOO·:oftM~wire4·:ftInd$·w.:·th.withdrrint_._
.' .·fOreip··bank.Nine~.p.:.:~tI depoii~::the·chiCk;::!I.8*·retumed~ to
Am$O~th·~:t&e~~:had"been.tiert4...:~ Am$oUth notified·1oca.1
. la~:·cntorecmcnt ofthe iDC~::_Dtf:M1ycoopcDied:with the JOvemmcnt
'investilatiOllt:i.t:djd.J1ot::6:l.:a:suapi¢j_~~ty ~
. "
.: . A.~:ca5tiicr at anotJier':baok eDJbeUJcd ~-::timn his emplOyori~ywirins"
ftiDds=;:from an acepvgt:maintained ;bY'bi8::~loyer. to .deposit~::at
AmSouth :Jt_:·Ui··~.:qr:biI:·Wire~1 name. 1be:~:cashicr then'inv~ these
.fundI'in'~ent aCcounts at AmSoutb~s.brOker-deUer.subsidiary.Thc,:
.empJoyercon~;~utb·:about the baDk .~s::aeeoun~ Although
AmSouth notilied:~fodia;flaw:enforcclilcnt oflhc::iQ¢i_ it never tiled a
~icious activity··report
. :m additiol1,:..tlie·Fed.t~·s June 2004~·aIC1osed thit:··AmSoutti:..
.:·hII6·~.·,~~idous aCtiVity·repO~::~na.~~~:~!~::of~_k kidng.~1Y'
.··':~~;po$slDle 1~~e;:$5.000,.:Which··~.oD·=an..~·i~l~
JP:~·:to the;'~~i:~uth .:JlOw)~~ ~_:~aetiyity::~i~on
·==:=:=:~:===~~~::Wby
the·:ti8ltdt~p~tiOl1 :uni~ .also.W«e..not·reportecL·
·D. ~illful&tutP'OfUA' ViolatiOJ1,.
ne'~"oCa 'baDlc:':maybe,cbaracterized:_.:1riQNrifit demonstrates a reckless
.disreprd,.for its:~~1igatip~ ::~~taw·.or~~· .AI;.•/bank stq)etViscd by the Federal
..aeserve.··AmSoutbw*:a.;Ot~::~ti~money:~I·:~· and:suspicious
:~YitY .rtinl;;req~:of: __:~Bank:$ecrecy:~:_;·itli_J~tingregulations.
-.so~~:ha;d;~ ~=cies :~;;the:_c e~::otits.~~~moDey ~ng
~~.::WbiCh led:tQ;~~o~.otd1e susPiCious,;aetivity repot;tingrcq~ in a
.m8b_·ofsi~"~:~ These violations..:~(rand."'~'FiJlC~
Jlas·d~;that·AmSoutb·s vioJationsofthe;:B8Dt::secrecy·.Act-:amfits..implementing..
.~_.werewiJI.~ .
.w~ ClVIL.•0NBY PENALTY
FinCEN_~~•.by failing tD::establish·andtmp~:an::~equate··
·.anti-moncy·:·~p~:·_tofile and .fiJe~y::~o~::~ty:tepO.-ts::as
described:in.Section IlL above..the ~Soudt willfuU),.:violated··the:.i~money '~J
proPDl and: suspicious'.yity~inJ provWODI or:the.Bank;'~=~~·i_:its·
.implementing ~JUlatioDl;:a:ciwj~ penalty is due:p.-:to 3:1 USC'15321 and 31
CPR §103:.57(t).
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v. ,CONSENT TCfASSESSMBNT
In:(t.:to resolve,this·:~,and.only'for tbat,pwpose, ~outtt. without
admitti1lJ;·or denyinl::~~::tbc~fjets·,~. deterrni_ons ~;~::~:Sections·:mand IV
abo~':except as· tqjUriSdiCtiooi·in,:section II, Which:is.:~_~__ts·to the
.·~t':Qf:a' ~VJl~y penaltY api~:-it,i~ tbcrsottfof:Sl0.million. 1bi~ :~ty:
:·~t:_::·be:con~t:'Mth·the·$lO:milijOn: penalty:... -apilllt·AmSouth by..
~:~.:R~c.:·.lbc::~:;:..ment.of'·Pi~~:,:.·;the·FcdeniI·Reserve:
~""vo::~I:'be I8iiSfied:'bY'()ne'paymeDtOf~$I(fIiliUjon tothe~'t·of"
',the~.
~dt::..·to '"y the amount of SJO'miIJ:ion'upon thc::~t:of;the ci~l
money penAlty. SUCb"~!~aU:.be:
a.
.... 'e~
made' by ~rdfied' cheek~ '~ca8hi~·s :cbeck, or bank':tnoney~or:by ...
~~ . .
~'payable:'to the 'tJmteclSwes~t"of:theTreaaury;
==!:ui:=:::=~~o,
:¢hain Bridge 'Road. SUite:·200, Vjen1l~ V~nja 22182;. and
.:$Ubmltted UIt~:.~ ·co~et.le~~:;:~bidt· references the 'captiOti~!~and~:;file:
'number:in this;'''~
I
. .. .
. .• :Am$9Um feC9lltizes: and:....th_t iten~,:i~t9~~:CON~freely and
·~Untaai~y::~:~;ino offers. promjses~: or"i~ts::of:8nY natUre wh~tsoeVcf have
"=tt:==:~:n~=tf:==:%:~~:~~
AiJiSo.··understan4s.;.and·~:that.:thC·CONSENT'~-.ses the entire
p~t., ~~:federal~· $t8~:or]ocal. . .
VI. RBLEASE
. AmSoudt :~·that:it8:·execution·ot ..the·CONSENT and· compliance with
·thc·;termI of-tbis..:_ESS~"8JK1 the CONSBNI\COJUd~ acon:pete settJe..t·of
ciVil liability.for::raportiDJ and recordkccping:violadtms'::of:the Bank::Secrecy ~:.rthe·
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replations~~.wbich were idetditicdb"theFcd_ Re.serv.ep:rior,
to tbcdate'hereo£
... . .'BNf'ORCEMENT NB1'WORK
t1iS~Department ofthc1ieuUI'Y
OCT 12 2004Date: _
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• In the 1700's and 1800's, state legislatures granted "special" charters
for insurance companies. New Hampshire was one of the first states to
create a formal agency to regulate insurance in 1851.
• The U.S. Supreme Court formally recognized the state system of
insurance regulation in Paul v. Virginia in 1868, ruling that insurance
transactions were "local in nature."
• In 1944, in Us. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association. the
Supreme Court reversed Paul v. Virginia. holding that the business of
insurance was interstate commerce and insurance companies were
subject to antitrust and other federal laws.
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• The McCarran-Ferguson Act (1945) nullified the effect of u.s. v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association. and exempted the insurance
industry from the Commerce Clause and antitrust laws. The Act
permits states to act as the primary regulatory authority over the
business of insurance.
• States must "regulate" insurance to a sufficient extent in order to
preempt federal law. Generally, if a situation falls within the "business
of insurance," a state statute will suffice to preempt federal law.
• As a result of the Act, states enacted legislation covering insurance rate
regulation to preempt the Sherman Antitrust Act and other federal law.
In addition, many states adopted legislation addressing unfair trade
practices in order to preempt the Federal Trade Commission Act.
• The preemption of federal law has been consistently upheld, including
recently by the 11th Circuit in Atlanta in November, 2004, in the case
ofGilchrist v. State Farm. Allstate. Nationwide. GEICO et al. In this
case, the court upheld the federal antitrust exemption for insurance
companies and ruled that the repair ofautomobiles and the manner in
which they are repaired pursuant to policies of insurance are the
business of insurance. Consequently, these matters are within the
purview of state laws and regulations, and not federal law.
• The court also ruled that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the "boycott"
exemption under McCarran-Ferguson, which would have permitted
federal regulation if the insurers had failed to deal in a collateral
transaction in a way that would have coerced action in the primary
transaction.
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• State legislatures set broad policy for the regulation of insurance. They
establish and oversee state insurance departments, regularly review and
revise state insurance laws, and approve state regulatory budgets. State
insurance departments employ more than 12,000 personnel.
• States collect more than $10 billion annually from insurance sources,
approximately 8% of which is used for direct costs in connection with
the regulation of insurance. The remaining 92% goes to the general
funds of the various states.
• State laws require every insurance company or related business (TPA,
MGA, etc.) to be licensed and subject to regulation in its state of
domicile and in any other state in which it conducts business. There
are currently more than 7,000 insurance companies in the U.S.
• The NAIC serves as a vehicle for state regulators to coordinate their
activities and share resources, and it functions as an advisory body and
service provider for state insurance departments. Commissioners use
the NAIC to pool resources, discuss issues ofcommon concern, and
align their oversight ofthe industry. Each state, however, ultimately
controls the regulatory activity in its state.
• The NAIC's Uniform Certificate of Authority Application (UCAA), a
company licensing system, helps states expedite the review process of
a new company license. In addition, an NAIC database has been
developed to facilitate information sharing on acquisition and merger
filings. Theses databases assist insurance regulators by creating a
streamlined and more cost-efficient regulatory process.
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• Insurance agents and brokers, also known as producers, must be
licensed and comply with various state laws and regulations.
Currently, more than 3 million such individuals are licensed in the U.S.
State insurance departments oversee producer activities in order to
protect insurance consumer interests.
• States also administer continuing education programs to ensure that
agents meet required standards. As many as 16,000 producers are
fmed or have their licenses suspended or revoked each year for failure
to comply with regulatory requirements.
• The NAIC maintains special databases to help states coordinate their
activities for producers who operate in multiple jurisdictions. The
National Insurance Producer Registry (NIPR), a non-profit affiliate of
the NAIC, was established to develop and operate a national repository
for producer licensing information.
• Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, Congress has chipped away
at McCarran-Ferguson over the years. Some ofthe more notable
legislation permitting the federal government to regulate certain
aspects of the insurance or related businesses includes the following:
.:. Medicare and Medicaid Acts of 1965;
.:. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA);
.:. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA);
.:. Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 and Amendments of 1986;
.:. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA);
.:. Granun-Leach-Bliley Act of1999 (GLB); and
.:. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA).
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• ERISA limits the scope ofMcCarran-Ferguson by extending federal
oversight and regulation to "employee benefit plans."
• "Employee benefit plans" are divided into "pension plans" and
"welfare plans."
• ERISA sets uniform minimum standards to assure that employee
benefit plans are established and maintained in a fair and financially
sound manner.
• ERISA is enforced by the U.S. Department ofLabor (Pension and
Welfare Benefits Administration) and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).
• Originally enacted in 1981 as the Product Liability Risk Retention Act;
amended in 1986 to extend to all liability insurance.
• Permits formation of"risk retention groups" (RRGs) and "risk
purchasing groups" (PGs).
• RRGs are insurance companies formed by groups ofpersons or
companies engaged in similar businesses with similar risk exposures.
• RRGs can domicile in any state and underwrite liability insurance in
all states with minimal regulation (primarily solvency related) outside
of the domiciliary state.
• PGs are groups of similar businesses with similar risk exposures who
form an organization (such as a trade association) to purchase liability
insurance on a group basis. Insurers who underwrite the risks ofPGs
have considerably greater regulatory flexibility.
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• HIPAA affects nearly everyone involved in the health care process,
including providers, information systems vendors, and payers
(insurance companies, HMO's, MCO's, etc.). The primary goal of
HIPAA is to improve portability and continuity of health insurance
coverage in order to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within the health
insurance industry.
• The five comprehensive areas ofHIPAA are:
.:. Title I: Health Care Access, Portability, and Renewability;
.:. Title II: Preventing Health Care Fraud and Abuse;
.:. Title III: Tax-Related Health Provisions;
.:. Title IV: Application and Enforcement of Group Health Plan
Requirements; and
.:. Title V: Revenue Offsets.
• HIPAA regulations apply to "covered entities," including healthcare providers,
health plans and healthcare clearinghouses who transmit health information in
electronic form in connection with transactions covered under HIPAA.
• HIPAA regulations are comprised ofthree distinct parts:
.:. Transaction Standards: Require the use of common electronic claims
standards, code sets and unique identifiers for all payers and providers;
.:. Privacy Regulations: Govern the release of individually identifiable
health information and specify how covered entities must give notice of
privacy policies and procedures to patients and obtain consent for the use
of such mformation; also govern how such information is shared and how
patients can access, inspect, copy and amend their medical records; and
.:. Security Regulations: Dictate the kind of administrative procedures and
physical safeguards covered entities must have in place to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of protected health information.
GR'"~
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• Repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and established a
comprehensive framework to permit affiliations among
banks, securities firms and insurance companies, while
preserving state regulation of insurance.
• Modernized the U.S. financial system by allowing
financial institutions of all types to participate in business
outside of their narrow core area.
• Applies to any institution significantly engaged in financial
activities defined in, and permitted under, the Bank
Holding Company Act.
+Financial Activities include:
.:.Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others,
or safeguarding money or securities;
.:. Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss,
harm, damage, illness, disability, or death, or providing
and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, agent, or
broker for purposes of the foregoing;
.:.Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory
services, including an investment company; and
.:.Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in
securities.
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+The following exceptions apply to the notice and
opt out requirements:
·:·To non-affiliated entities to perform joint marketing
activities;
.:.For processing and servicing transactions;
.:. With consent or at the discretion of the individual;
.:.Pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act;
.:. In connection with the proposed or actual sale, merger
or transfer of a business unit; and
.:. For law enforcement activities and fraud investigations.
GR.!!t~
• GLB privacy provisions cover "non-public personally
identifiable information" (NPPI) about customers,
including any list, description or grouping of customers.
• GLB applies to customers (who have an on-going
relationship) and consumers (who inquire about
establishing a relationship) who provide NPPI in
connection with financial products or services for personal,
family or household purposes.
• GLB requires a privacy notice before any NPPI may be
disclosed, if a disclosure does not meet one of the specified
exceptions. In addition, any opportunity to "opt out" of
disclosures must be provided to the customer or consumer.
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• Standards for safeguarding NPPI (established effective May 23,2003)
apply to all fmancial institutions over which the FTC has jurisdiction
and cover all NPPI (whether that of a customer or provided by another
financial institution).
• The standards include:
.:. Establishing written policies and procedures;
.:. Establishing administrative, technical and physical safeguards;
.:. Designating employees to run the program;
.:. Identifying internal and external risks (including employees, information
systems, and system failures/attacks);
.:. Designing and implementing safeguards against such risks;
.:. Selecting and overseeing service providers (including requiring
contractual acceptance ofGLB standards); and
.:. Ongoing evaluation, adjustment and training.
• Summary of the highlights of GLB include:
.:. Preemption of anti-affiliation laws;
·:·60-day limit on review by Dept. of Ins. of proposed
affiliations;
.:. Preservation of state licensing of agents (National
Association ofRegistered Agents and Brokers would
have been established if a majority of states had not
enacted uniform agent licensing laws);
.:. Establishment of a process for dispute resolution
between state insurance regulators and federal bank
regulators.
GR..M~
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+Check separate laws in each state regarding
licensing of agents and other aspects of the sale of
insurance and receipt of commissions.
+Agent licensing laws may be different for agents
employed by banks.
+Sale of credit life insurance may be regulated
differently.
+Restrictions on who may receive commissions for
the sale of title insurance.
+~imitations on partnership of a bank with an
Insurance company.
• TRIA was enacted in 2002 to provide a temporary federal program of
shared public and private compensation for insured property and
casualty losses resulting from acts of terrorism. TRIA is set to sunset
on December 31, 2005. Extension ofTRIA beyond 2005 is currently
pending in Congress.
• All "insurers" must participate in the program. TRIA defmes
"insurers" to include all "state licensed or admitted" entities, including
captives insurance companies.
• Insurers must make terrorism risk insurance available in commercial
property and casualty insurance policies, and coverage must not differ
materially from terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations
applicable to losses arising from events other than acts ofterrorism.
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• TRIA includes the following lines of insurance coverage in the program:
.:. Commercial property and casualty;
.:. Excess insurance;
.:. Worker's compensation; and
.:. Surety insurance.
• TRIA excludes the following lines of insurance coverage from the program:
.:. Federal crop insurance;
.:. Private mortgage insurance;
.:. Monoline financial guaranty insurance;
.:. Medical malpractice insurance;
.:. Life or health insurance;
.:. Flood insurance;
.:. Reinsurance;
.:. Fidelity insurance; and
.:. Acts of terrorism committed as part of a course of war declared by Congress.
• Once an "act ofterrorism" is certified, each insurer is responsible for a
deductible (10% in 2004 and 15% in 2005) based on its pro rata
portion of"direct earned premium" in the previous year. The federal
government picks up 90% of payments in excess of the deductible.
• The limit of insured losses subject to the program is $100 billion
during any program year.
• The federal government will recoup a portion of its payments by
surcharging commercial property and casualty premiums up to 3% in
anyone year. The insurance industry must retain $12.5 billion ofrisk
in 2004 and $15 billion in 2005.
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• The litigation aspects of TRIA include the following:
.:. Exclusive federal cause ofaction for claims arising from certified
acts of terrorism;
.:. Claims consolidation in federal court;
.:. Prohibition on federal payments for punitive damages; and
.:. A right ofsubrogation for the U.S. with respect to any claim paid
by the U.S. under the program.
• The states maintain (at the NAIC) the world's largest insurance
financial database, which provides a 15-year history of annual and
quarterly filings on more than 5,000 insurance companies.
• Periodic fmancial examinations occur on a scheduled basis. State
fmancial examiners investigate a company's accounting methods,
procedures and financial statement presentation. These exams verify
and validate what is presented in the company's annual statement to
ascertain whether the company is in good fmancial standing.
• When an examination of fmancial records shows the company to be
financially impaired, the state insurance department takes control of
the company.
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• Insurance companies may not file for reliefunder the federal
Bankruptcy Code.
• Insurance company insolvency is governed by state law.
• When an insurance company experiences fmancial difficulty, the
domiciliary state insurance department may put the company into
rehabilitation or supervision in order to protect its assets and provide
protection under which the company can continue its business. This
step mayor may not lead to receivership.
• Liquidation ofan insurance company is normally referred to as
"receivership" under state law. When an insurance company is placed
into receivership, the state commissioner of insurance normally will
appoint a statutory receiver (similar to a bankruptcy trustee).
• The NAIC now employs a concept known as "risk based capital"
(RBC) for states to utilize when determining the solvency ofany
insurance company and the minimum amount ofcapital necessary for
the conduct of its business. RBC is a complicated formula that
compares an insurance company's assets to its risks and takes into
account the types of insurance underwritten and the aggregate limits on
its policies. In determining an insurance company's minimum RBC
requirement, the regulators will look at four types of risk: asset, credit,
underwriting and off-balance sheet.
• When an insurance company's RBC level falls to certain action levels,
a state may be permitted or required to place the company into
supervision or receivership.
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